RE: Resources discussing secure time (nonce) in a distributed environment.

2002-03-22 Thread Phillip H. Zakas


Kevin A. Burton writes:
Does anyone have any references they would recommend which talk about
the
problems of time in a secure and distributed environment?

Try datum.com...they offered a sponsor pitch at intl financial
cryptography in Bermuda two weeks ago. Unlike most of the academic (and
irrelevant) debate I've seen on this issue lately, their products seem
to work pretty well given real world needs/constraints today.
Phillip







RE: Official Anonymizing

2001-09-05 Thread Phillip H. Zakas

 A. Melon writes:
 John Young takes a courageous stand:

  I propose that all anonymizers adopt a code of practice that
  any sale to officials of anonymizers or their use be disclosed
  to the public (I suggested this to ZKS early on when first
  meetings with the feds to explain the technology were being
  sometimes disclosed). That seems to be a reasonable response
  to officially-secret prowling and investigating cyberspace.

 Absolutely appropriate, given cypherpunk goals.  It may be difficult
 to apply in every case but the intention is laudable.

 Here is an example of the principle put into practice, from the
 anonymous web proxy service at http://proxy.magusnet.com/proxy.html:

 : If you are accessing this proxy from a *.mil or *.gov address
 : it will not work.

Given the amount of federal research conducted at the poles you might end up
blocking santa claus (which would piss him and his gang of elves off.)

It's impossible to determine the ultimate end-user.  For example, what if a
university performs secure computing research via a federal grant or
directly for an agency?  Are you going to block *.edu?  What if an
agency/contractor/employee/grantee uses comcast business internet access?
Or speakeasy sdsl service? What about using a qwest cybercenter and peering
with dozens of tier-one providers?  are you going to block the ones that do
business with the government?  What about international carriers?  Will you
block Deutsche Telekom just because the german govt. uses DT?  The world is
too complex for simple rules such as the above regardless of the intent of
the rules.

phillip




RE: News: U.S. May Help Chinese Evade Net Censorship

2001-08-31 Thread Phillip H. Zakas

 Adam writes:
 As far as your opinions of our business, well, I'm really uninterested
 in getting into a pissing match with you.  The reality is that
customers
 and investors give us money tp produce privacy tools, and they, not
you,
 are the ones I need to keep happy.

The reality is that people like may and lists like this one that may
help your customers and investors understand what they are and aren't
getting.  For example, your investors probably don't realize that you
can't use zks tools for more than x% (I'm guessing 45%) of the us
consumer market right off the bat because of self-imposed operating
restrictions of your products (if you're not fully compatible with aol
mail and web browsing, you're missing much of your usa market...btw 85%
of aol users use the internal aol browser not an external browser so I
doubt they will figure out how to download let alone launch an external
browser and follow your arcane load/unload/re-load aol usage
instructions.)  plus investors probably aren't aware that limiting
outlook support to 'internet only' mode cuts your outlook customer base
quite a bit (I haven't seen the latest figures, but I believe a large
group of outlook users configure their software for corporate/workgroup
mode.)  and investors probably don't realize how complex (in my opinion)
the software is to set up and operate -- I'm disappointed that you've
not released usage figures that I could find easily on your website
(both downloads and average customer lifespan for the standard or
premium products)...are people rushing to use the products?  oh, and a
minor point, but how much further have you cut your market share by
focusing only on w2k, w98 and wme?  You should correct me if I've
mis-analyzed the info provided on the zks website.
 
Anyway I don't like criticizing products per se (every products has
weaknesses), but I do think criticisms lead to more aware
investors/customers and perhaps even better products in the future.  So
in a sense it's helpful to listen to commentary from may or lists like
this one.




RE: News: U.S. May Help Chinese Evade Net Censorship

2001-08-30 Thread Phillip H. Zakas

 Faustine wrote:
 I wouldn't trust either of them with anything significant. 

More importantly, the claims that safeweb/triangle boy actually works
may be misleading to the people who will rely on its claims of securely
circumventing government censorship in china.  The entire in/out bound
traffic for the system can be effectively blocked or monitored.  Plus
did it strike anyone as odd that the 'triangle boy' software, to be used
when access to safeweb.com is blocked, is downloaded from the
safeweb.com website?  I've not seen that software anywhere else and
frankly downloading/having that triangleboy software in itself is a dead
giveaway of suspicious activity isn't it?  I'm not as worried about US
citizens using the stuff in the usa, just concerned for chinese
dissidents using it in china.
phillip




RE: Top Firms Retreat Into Bunker To Ward Off 'Anarchists'

2001-08-24 Thread Phillip H. Zakas


The most sophisticated bunkers in the world are still vulnerable to the
average utility digging crew.
phillip

 Matthew Gaylor
 From: Moon Kat [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 TOP FIRMS RETREAT INTO BUNKER TO WARD OFF 'ANARCHISTS'
 
 Some of Britain's biggest companies are running their Internet
 operations on systems installed in a 300ft-deep nuclear blast-proof
 bunker to protect customers from violent anti-capitalist campaigners.





RE: Lawyers, Guns, and Money

2001-08-21 Thread Phillip H. Zakas

isn't it easier to donate $$ to a political party and request an
appointment?
phillip

 -Original Message-
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Faustine
 Sent: Tuesday, August 21, 2001 6:05 PM
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Re: Lawyers, Guns, and Money



 Tim wrote:

 But people should do what really drives them. Anyone going into law this
 late in the boom just to make money is probably going to be in for a
 rude awakening. Ditto for anyone going into it in order to do pro bono
 work on Cypherpunks issues.


 Great points. If you're looking to make a difference re:
 cypherpunk and pro-
 libertarian issues and have a scientific and practical streak,
 why not get
 an advanced degree in policy analysis instead? You get a rock-solid
 grounding in a number of critical disciplines, and put yourself in a
 position to seriously affect policy on the broadest possible
 stage. Not for
 the ideological purists out there, but personally I don't see
 anything at
 all wrong with wringing every ounce of information you can get from the
 real pros, whether they share your values or not. If there were a
 number of
 people committed to advancing libertarian issues who took this
 approach, I
 think it would be a great thing.

 Harvard is supposed to have the best program, but here's a little
 something
 I found online from the University of British Columbia which
 explains what
 it's all about. This one seems a little business-heavy, but other
 analysis
 programs have a lot more room to focus on technology policy. At
 least this
 gets you in the ballpark:


 Policy Analysis and Strategy

 Overview
 This PhD specialization covers both business strategy and public policy
 analysis. It draws strongly on underlying foundations in economics and in
 applied statistics. Topics in which faculty members have
 expertise include
 entrepreneurship and venture capital finance, international
 investment, the
 management of research and development, environmental management and
 policy, experimental tests of game theory, competitive strategy and
 competition policy, public enterprise and regulation, and international
 trade policy.

 Undergraduate or masters-level training in economics and/or quantitative
 disciplines such as mathematics, statistics or engineering would be a
 typical background for qualified students. Students with undergraduate
 backgrounds in commerce or business who have focused on the more
 quantitative areas would also be well qualified for the program.

 Once students are admitted they have extensive interaction with faculty
 members and attend a regular workshop run by the Policy Analysis
 Division,
 in addition to normal course work. The first major supervised research
 project is undertaken in the student's first summer. Except for those
 funded from outside sources, at least three years of funding is
 guaranteed
 to all admitted students.

 Program of Study
 There is considerable flexibility in the programs of individual students.
 All students are required to take a faculty-wide course in research
 methodology and a faculty wide course in teaching methods. Other required
 courses include:
 Economics 500 Microeconomic Theory
 Economics 565 Market Structure
 Commerce 581 or equivalent Statistical Methods
 Commerce 691 Advanced Topics in Policy Analysis

 The student will take at least four other courses to form two
 fields (two
 courses per field) and will normally take one or more additional
 courses in
 applied statistics or research methods. These courses will be chosen in
 consultation with the Graduate Advisor and may be in the Commerce Faculty
 or in other areas of study.

 Students normally complete their course work in two years and write
 comprehensive exams at the end of the second year. However, students who
 have taken prior graduate work may be able to complete course work
 requirements more quickly.

 Sample Program Sequence
 Year - 1 Fall COMM 693 (Research Methodology), COMM 581 (Statistical
 Methods), Econ 500 (Microeconomic Theory), Elective or Field Course
 Year - 1 Winter Econ 565, statistics course, 2 field courses
 Year - 1 Summer Summer research paper

 Year - 2 Fall EPSE 506 (Teaching), COMM 691 (Topics in Policy Analysis),
 statistics course, field course
 Year - 2 Winter Field courses, electives
 Year - 2 Summer Comprehensive exams

 Year - 3 Preparation and presentation of thesis proposal

 Year - 4 Preparation and defense of thesis




RSA Factoring Challenge

2001-08-06 Thread Phillip H. Zakas


Is anyone working on the current RSA factoring challenge?  $10K prize for
factoring a 576-bit number; $200K for a 2048-bit number (other awards for
640, 704, 768, 896, 1024 and 1536-bit numbers.)  See this page for details:

http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/challenges/factoring/numbers.html

They've provided me with the C source used to generate the numbers (though
not the BSafe toolkit you need to link into the program.)  Anyone can
receive the source by asking RSA for it.  I've decided to enter by using a
factoring program which makes guesses about what the prime number factors
are (by examining the last two digits, predicting the likely like of
one/both factors, using lists of prime numbers generated by a second
algorithm, etc.)  So far, barring errors in my logic and code (always a
possibility), I've completed a little over 5% of the likely candidates for
the 576-bit number in a little over 2 days using a single CPU pentium
III-600 with 512MB RAM.

phillip




RE: Space War

2001-08-06 Thread Phillip H. Zakas

 John Young Wrote:
 Don't overlook what is reportedly happening on the back side of
 the moon. The URL for an IF-mooncam was posted here a while
 ago. The stream is encrypted but with weak crypto -- the
 crypto-processor is 1968-9 vintage. The cam is part of a data
 package placed on the dark side in a classified operation. Signals
 bounced off a reflector stationed at the very edge of the moon's
 profile.

 What else is being done there remains to be disclosed.

Two applications I've heard of:

1.  Here's an excerpt from a US Navy press release:
Jim Trexler was Lorenzen's project engineer for PAMOR (PAssive MOon Relay,
a.k.a. 'Moon Bounce'), which collected interior Soviet electronics and
communication signals reflected from the moon.
URL: http://www.pao.nrl.navy.mil/rel-00/32-00r.html

2.  On another site: ...The new Liberty was a 455-foot-long spy ship
crammed with listening equipment and specialists to operate it. The vessel's
most distinctive piece of hardware was a sixteen-foot-wide dish antenna that
could bounce intercepted intelligence off the moon to a receiving station in
Maryland in a ten-thousand-watt microwave signal that enabled it to transmit
large quantities of information without giving away the Liberty's location.*
*The system, known as TRSSCOMM, for Technical Research Ship Special
Communications, had to be pointed at a particular spot on the moon while a
computer compensated for the ship's rolling and pitching. The computers and
the antenna s hydraulic steering mechanism did not work well together,
creating frequent problems.
URL: http://www.euronet.nl/~rembert/echelon/db08.htm

phillip




RE: Apollo 11 - For all mankind

2001-08-06 Thread Phillip H. Zakas


 Bear wrote:
 Note the commentary that it was strictly a symbolic activity, as the
 United Nations Treaty on Outer Space precluded any territorial claim.

I thought it would be useful to post the US Dept of State's link to the
actual outer space treaty:
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/space1.html

The treaty section of interest to me is:
...The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications,
the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on
celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for
scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be
prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful
exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be
prohibited...

this doesn't seem to expressly prohibit the activity referred to in the US
Navy press release I sent out earlier today, but at the same time the spirit
of the outer space treaty doesn't seem to support the navy/SIGINT
activities, either.

phillip




RE: Pi

2001-08-02 Thread Phillip H. Zakas

this is truly interesting...do you have a link to the original 1996 paper?
do you know if anyone has incorporated this into a program?
phillip

 -Original Message-
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Eric Cordian
 Sent: Thursday, August 02, 2001 2:35 PM
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Pi



 Interesting article recently posted on the Nature Web site about the
 normality of Pi.

 http://www.nature.com/nsu/010802/010802-9.html

 David Bailey of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in California and
  Richard Crandall of Reed College in Portland, Oregon, present evidence
  that pi's decimal expansion contains every string of whole numbers. They
  also suggest that all strings of the same length appear in pi with the
  same frequency: 87,435 appears as often as 30,752, and 451 as often as
  862, a property known as normality.

 Of cryptographic interest.

 While there may be no cosmic message lurking in pi's digits, if they are
  random they could be used to encrypt other messages as follows:

 Convert a message into zeros and ones, choose a string of digits
  somewhere in the decimal expansion of pi, and encode the message by
  adding the digits of pi to the digits of the message string, one after
  another. Only a person who knows the chosen starting point in pi's
  expansion will be able to decode the message.

 While there's presently no known formula which generates decimal digits of
 Pi starting from a particular point, there's a clever formula which can be
 used to generate HEX digits of Pi starting from anywhere, which Bailey et
 al discovered in 1996, using the PSLQ linear relation algorithm.

 If you sum the following series for k=0 to k=infinity, its limit is Pi.

   1/16^k[4/(8k+1) - 2/(8k+4) - 1/(8k+5) - 1/(8k+6)]

 (Exercise:  Prove this series sums to Pi)

 Since this is an expression for Pi in inverse powers of 16, it is easy to
 multiply this series by 16^d and take the fractional part, evaluating
 terms where dk by modular exponentiation, and evaluating a couple of
 terms where dk to get a digit's worth of precision, yielding the (d+1)th
 hexadecimal digit of Pi.

 Presumedly, if one could express PI as a series in inverse powers of 10,
 one could do the same trick to get decimal digits.  Such a series has so
 far eluded researchers.

 --
 Eric Michael Cordian 0+
 O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division
 Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law





RE: Attention to detail lacking

2001-07-26 Thread Phillip H. Zakas

Tim May Wrote:

 I think Choate is much like this tech of mine: lacking a solid 
 grounding and overly reliant on his own private notions of what 
 mass and energy and group velocity and so on are. All the best 
 cranks view the world this way.

maybe Choate is the long lost son of oedipa maas.

phillip




RE: A question of self-defence - Fire extinguishers self defence

2001-07-25 Thread Phillip H. Zakas


the newchotian philosophy: reductio ad absurdum.

phillip

 -Original Message-
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Jim Choate
 Sent: Tuesday, July 24, 2001 5:50 PM
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: RE: A question of self-defence - Fire extinguishers  self
 defence
 
 
 
 
 Spirit, Blood, and Treasure
 The American cost of battle in the 21st century
 D. Vandegriff, ed.
 ISBN 0-89141-735-4
 
 Minimal Force: The mark of a skilled warrior
 John Poole
 pp. 107
 
 The particular principle that is behind it is called,
 
 'principium inculpatae tutelae'
 
 
  --
 
 
 Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night:
 God said, Let Tesla be, and all was light.
 
   B.A. Behrend
 
The Armadillo Group   ,::;::-.  James Choate
Austin, Tx   /:'/ ``::/|/  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
www.ssz.com.',  `/( e\  512-451-7087
-~~mm-'`-```-mm --'-
 
 




RE: THE INCHOATE LAWYER

2001-07-24 Thread Phillip H. Zakas


i'd front the expense of the test and a cab fare between his home and the
nearest testing facility (not to exceed $50 total cab fare.) but let's make
this interesting:

1.  Choate will receive a $500 bonus if he scores above 97th percentile (eg.
97th percentile loses, but 97.01th percentile wins.) (I'll pitch in $100 in
prize money, the rest from cpunks?)
2.  ETS scores must be presented in original unmodified form to an approved
cpunks reader within 72 hours of Choate's receipt of official test scores.
3.  Choate pays the EFF $500 for any score less than 85 percentile.  Choate
must send this money via an approved cpunks reader to the EFF to verify the
inevitable transfer of funds.
4.  If the ETS scores aren't received by Choate and cpunks within a
reasonable period of time (not to exceed eight weeks from the day of the
test), Choate will not be eligible for the $500 bonus, and Choate must pay
the EFF $250 as per point 4 above.
5.  If Choate does not take the exam by September 30, 2001 he must pay the
EFF $250 as per point 4 above.

phillip

 -Original Message-
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Declan McCullagh
 Sent: Monday, July 23, 2001 3:19 PM
 To: Petro
 Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Re: THE INCHOATE LAWYER



 By my count, we now have three or four people willing in principle to
 either chip in or refund the ~$100 cost. Depending on details (we'd
 require full disclosure, of course), Choate could make up to $300 on this,
 after expenses.

 That should be sufficient incentive.

 -Declan


 On Sun, Jul 22, 2001 at 10:23:11PM -0700, Petro wrote:
  At 9:41 PM -0700 7/22/01, Black Unicorn wrote:
  I will personally refund the money to Mr. Choate when he
 presents a valid ETS
  score report for the test to me or Mr. Sandfort.
 
  Willing to make me the same offer?





RE: DMCA has pushed me to my limit.

2001-07-18 Thread Phillip H. Zakas

see this link for papers on steganalysis:
http://ise.gmu.edu/~njohnson/Steganography/

essentially, the papers assert that given our knowledge of how images and
music files are encoded, and given information about how some of the popular
steg. programs work, it's possible to detect the presence of hidden
information and perhaps extract that information.  this is very early stage
work, so it doesn't provide all of the answers...

phillip


 -Original Message-
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of David Honig
 Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2001 12:34 PM
 To: Ray Dillinger
 Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: RE: DMCA has pushed me to my limit.



 At 08:07 AM 7/18/01 -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote:
 I keep looking at the whole stego thing.  But the basic problem
 remains the same.  Stego relies on the *method* being secret,
 which stands in stark contrast to kerchoff's principle.  I mean,
 sure, you can stego encrypted stuff so nobody who recovers it
 can read it, but if you use any of the available programs,
 there will always be utilities that can detect your encrypted
 stuff and, usually, extract it.

 1. encrypted data is indisttinguishable from uniformly distributed noise
 2. LSBs in digitizations of analog signals are noise
 3. ignoring the nuance of different LSB distributions, how can you
 distinguish a stego'd from unaltered file?

 Stego by itself is much less interesting than stego'd encrypted data
 (with idenntifying headers stripped of course)

 That spam, mp3, or image could be merely a transport for more privledged
 info.  Posting /reading to a public newsgroup solves traffic-analysis
 issues too.




RE: lawyer physics (was taxing satellites)

2001-07-10 Thread Phillip H. Zakas


you know one of the things i'd like to do is go into the waste removal
business in orbit.  lots of junk up there...would like to launch a satellite
with a long finger attached to it and poke stuff out of orbit.  the nudge.
who'd pay?  it would be quite an unfornate event if a satellite were
mistaken as a piece of debris...or if debris suddenly appeared in a launch
window ;)

phillip


 -Original Message-
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Trei, Peter
 Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2001 3:24 PM
 To: 'Ray Dillinger'
 Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: RE: lawyer physics (was taxing satellites)



  --
  From:   Trei, Peter
  Sent:   Tuesday, July 10, 2001 3:05 PM
  To: 'Ray Dillinger'
  Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Subject:RE: lawyer physics (was taxing satellites)
 
 
 
   --
   From: Ray Dillinger[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
   Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2001 2:36 PM
   Cc:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   Subject:  Re: lawyer physics (was taxing satellites)
  
  
  
   On Tue, 10 Jul 2001, Dynamite Bob wrote:
 quoting someone who is not participating in this discussion
   The property in question here is geostationary,
   said Larry Hoenig, a San Francisco attorney
   representing Hughes Electronics. Geostationary
   satellites sit above the equator in a fixed
   position; they do not rotate around the Earth. So
   the satellites we're talking about here are not
   movable property.
  
  Actually, there's a curious legal precedent which might
  help the satellite holders. One of the NASA probes (perhaps
  the atmospheric probe to Jupiter? Did we have a Venus probe?)
  had an instrument window made of diamond. The fairly large
  diamond used drew considerable import duty when it was
  brought into the US, but that duty was returned after the
  launch, since the diamond had been 're-exported'. This
  seems to my IANAL logic to set a precedent that an
  asset in space is not in the US.
 
 ...you can find anything on the net if you choose to look

 This was the Pionner Venus Orbiter, built by Hughes and
 launched in 1978.


 http://www.a1.nl/phomepag/markerink/diamond.txt
 -
 FROM: Dr. Mark W. Lund [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 SUBJECT: Re: Who makes big diamond windows?
 DATE: Fri, 17 Sep 1999 17:11:44 -0600
 ORGANIZATION: MOXTEK, Inc.
 NEWSGROUPS: sci.optics

 Nelson Wallace wrote:

  Big meaning around 1 inch diameter, say 0.1 thick.
  Regards,  Nelson Wallace

 Wow, you TRW-government-contracting-no-holds-barred-
 success-at-any-cost-if-you-have-to-ask-you-can't-afford-it guys
 have all the
 fun.

 Hughes Aircraft bought the diamond window on the Venus probe
 nephelometer from DeBeers.  I remember that it was suggested to
 the principle investigator that he could save a lot of money if he
 used two smaller windows, but he was worried that they might  not
 be the same temperature, so he splurged. I also remember that when
 the probe landed on Venus the US Customs people refunded the
 customs duty, since the diamond had been re-exported.


 





RE: Cypherpunks, Feds, and Pudgyfaced Voyeurism

2001-04-11 Thread Phillip H. Zakas


if the problem is about keeping ourselves out of trouble re: statements or
association with others on this list, I have some observations:

first-
if defeating traffic analysis is important, hiding message headers and using
anonymizing services isn't going to help very much.  the existing newsgroup
system is trackable (even through anonymizing services).  The scenario:
someone watches mr. white.  mr. white xmits a message to anonymizing service
at 9:00pm.  at 9:03pm the service routes message to newsgroup.  unless the
message is encrypted for the anonymizing service, decrypted (to reveal
destination) by the anonymizing service, then delays delivery for a random
amount of time (5 mintues to 5 hours) to the true destination, the message
traffic or content could be pegged to a person.
...plus i don't fully trust anonymizing services because i haven't met the
individuals running them, and i've not seen the technology to know there
isn't a backdoor, etc.

potential solution: need an anonymizing service with encrypted inputs and
outputs, along with an encrypted gateway between the newsgroup and the
anonymous service.  perhaps several unrelated anonymizing services use the
newsgroup's public key and only xmits traffic to the newsgroup service using
that key...plus the key should change every week.  and no one should be able
to send messages directly to the newsgroup, even if the public key is known.
of course all messages sent to an anonymizing service should be signed using
the anonymizing service public key, and posters should not be allowed to
post to the same anonymizing service more than 3-4 times before switching
services.  this can be done if we drop the notion of using a single nym for
online messages.  btw, would not use PGP for the sigs, either.  we should be
doing exactly what govts do...use proprietary algorithms which aren't
published but are frequently changed.  there is enough expertise on this
list (i belive) to perform basic cryptanalysis on proposed algorithms, and
if we change the system frequently enough it would cause cryptanalysts a
tremendous headache -- becomes too expensive to manage if enough messages
are encrypted over time. we don't need to create a new AES...just need to
make sure there isn't ever enough traffic flow to crack one system before we
switch methods/systems. (yep i'm one of those who actually think it's not so
great to have publicly available algorithms...makes cryptanalysis much
easier even when an algo. is theoretically unbreakable.)

second-
perhaps the lawyers in this group could provide a standard disclaimer which
we could all attach to our sigyou know, something along the lines of
'this message is part of an ongoing satire...don't sue me or take me
seriously...'  is this possible??  i assume probably not, but it's worth
investigating.

third-
isn't there something terribly anonymous about a huge mailing list like
this?  i mean if we all simply took care of ourselves and went to whatever
lengths we needed to protect our own identities, why complicate the mailing
list?

if anyone is interested in exploring the first option above, i'd be willing
to offer design suggestions or assist in coordinating a red team exercise
against the system.  let me know.

phillip


 -Original Message-
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Brian Minder
 Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 11:41 PM
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Re: Cypherpunks, Feds, and Pudgyfaced Voyeurism



 The "secret-admirers" list strips all headers (except the Subject:) from
 submissions and is gatewayed to/from alt.anonymous.messages.  The list
 intro may be found below.  If there was enough interest, it could be
 hooked up to the CDR instead, or made standalone.

 Thanks,

 -Brian

 __
 I would like to announce the "secret-admirers" mail list.

 The "secret-admirers" list is intended to function in a manner similar
 to the well-known Usenet newsgroup "alt.anonymous.messages".  This
 newsgroup serves as a dead drop for communications in which the recipient
 wishes to remain unknown.

 While access to a Usenet news server is unavailable in many environments,
 the ubiquity and flexibility of e-mail may be advantageous for the
 following reasons:

 - Penetration:  More people having access to (pseudo|ano)nymizing tools
 is generally a good thing.
 - Pool Size:Higher utilization of the message pool may frustrate
 traffic analysis.  The list may be gateway back into
 alt.anonymous.messages or vice versa.  CDR-like
 nodes for redistribution may be established to reduce
 load on individual nodes.
 - Filtering:E-mail filtering tools are widely available, allowing
 recipients to draw only pertinent messages from the
 pool by filtering on tokens which have been negotiated
 

RE: cell phone anonymity

2001-01-08 Thread Phillip H. Zakas

Hi,

I don't believe cell phones can be queried while they're off.  The phone has
to xmit a pulse (to hear a pulse, crank up your PC speakers, turn on your
cell phone and place it within 3 inces of a speaker...you'll hear the
speakers produce static at a regular interval [about every 30 seconds or so
with my startac]).  In an unscientific study, I've placed my cell phone,
turned off, next to the speakers and not heard the familiar pulse.  Also
since you posed the question I ripped open my recently acquired Motorolla
Timeport.  Not seeing any activity in the xmit circuitry when the battery is
plugged in and the power is turned off.  Of course I'm having trouble
putting the case back on the phone correctly but I'll figure that out later
;)

phillip zakas




-Original Message-
X-Loop: openpgp.net
From: Ray Dillinger [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Monday, January 08, 2001 11:10 AM
To: Phillip Zakas
Cc: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: RE: cell phone anonymity




On Mon, 8 Jan 2001, Phillip Zakas wrote:


Just a minor correction to the below posting: cell phone locations are NOT
calculated using GPS.  They're triangulated via the three nearest cell
sites
reading the cell phone signal.  Accuracy is much lower than with GPS, but
good enough for cops to, say, find a stranded motorist on a highway.  I
believe resolution is somewhere around 40 meters in densely populated areas
(where there are many cell phone towers).  This resolution figure varies
from region to region.


Hm.  Okay.  I knew there were locators in them, and had assumed that
they were GPS.  My mistake.

Does anyone know any particulars about whether these phones can be
queried for their locations while not in use?


IMHO, the real privacy issue with cell phones is the security of a
conversation.

Yes indeed.  Privacy is a tougher thing to achieve than anonymity,
at least with cell phones.

Bear









RE: cell phone anonymity

2001-01-08 Thread Phillip H. Zakas

Thanks for pointing out the article -- love learning new things.  Didn't
realize companies were moving so quickly to GPS.  Not sure how well it would
work in urban areas or buildings (hence I guess the two mode system of
triangulation and GPS in one).

phillip

-Original Message-
X-Loop: openpgp.net
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Declan McCullagh
Sent: Monday, January 08, 2001 1:07 PM
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Re: cell phone anonymity





On Mon, Jan 08, 2001 at 03:10:55AM -0500, Phillip Zakas wrote:

 Just a minor correction to the below posting: cell phone locations are NOT
 calculated using GPS.  They're triangulated via the three nearest cell
sites
 reading the cell phone signal.  Accuracy is much lower than with GPS, but
 good enough for cops to, say, find a stranded motorist on a highway.  I
 believe resolution is somewhere around 40 meters in densely populated
areas
 (where there are many cell phone towers).  This resolution figure varies

For now; future trends include GPS. See an article I wrote below.

-Declan


http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,40623,00.html

Qualcomm, for instance, said that its gpsONE technology shifts the
choice to whomever is holding the handset. The user has three choices:
a default of always on or always off, the option of deciding every
time the device is used, or choosing which applications will reveal
the information.

The company argues that providing its customers with that flexibility
will give them even more options than they enjoy with landline phones,
which often reveal the subscription address of the person paying for
the service. The gpsONE technology, which uses both GPS technology and
base station triangulation, can locate a user within a diameter of 5
to 15 meters outdoors, and 30 to 60 meters indoors.