Re: Gnutella scanning instead of service providers.

2001-08-26 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Sat, 25 Aug 2001, Gary Jeffers wrote:

My fellow Cypherpunks,

   Ray Dillinger believes that scanning would assist oppressors as
much as regular users. Joseph Ashwood agrees with this and further
thinks that the Internet overhead of a scanner would be a serious
problem.

   Not really.  To that extent, a gnutella scanner is probably 
already in the hands of any law enforcement types that are 
interested, and there's no reason gnutella itself ought not 
benefit from the same technology.  Better points, since I need 
to spell them out, are:

(a) If scanning is done in a clumsy way it generates a lot 
of network traffic and twangs a lot of alarms at various 
firewalls.

(b) scanning is a hot button issue with a fair number of 
people and could generate complaints.

(c) complaints about gnutella scanning would be legal ammo 
for people who wanted to shut it down.


I think that all network applications ought to be able to find other 
nodes running other copies of the application - but be very careful 
how you design it, so as not to piss people off.  

   As far as Joseph Ashwood's claim that the Internet overhead would be
too much. Is his point exaggerated? Would it be possible to write low
overhead scanners? I do not have the skill set to say. Maybe he is
right, maybe not. Anybody got something definitive to say on this?

A nice low-overhead scanner that doesn't generate complaints, would 
be a request and response on some other protocol.  If you write a 
little cgi program, say IsGnutellaThere.cgi, and have gnutella users 
drop it into their apache (or iis, or whatever) directory, then you 
can make an HTTP request on port 80.  IsGnutellaThere.cgi would run 
and check to see if the gnutella server is up and what port it's on, 
maybe check a table to find other gnutellas that it knows about,
and return that information in an http response.  

Then gnutella users who wanted to be scannable (and not all of them 
will) could drop the program into their CGI directory, and scan-enabled 
gnutellas could just learn how to make a simple HTTP request and keep 
that table up-to-date for IsGnutellaThere.cgi to access.

HTTP is low-overhead and innocuous, and there's already a hole for it 
in most firewalls.  It won't generate alarms.  A straight-up scanning 
approach most definitely will.

Bear




Re: Jim Bell sentenced to 10 years in prison

2001-08-26 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Sat, 25 Aug 2001, John Young wrote:

See 9-page judgment in TIF format:

  http://cryptome.org/jdb-hit.tif  (262KB)

In addition to 10 years Jim was also fined $10,000 due 
immediately and faces three years of probation. No 
computer use and a long list of other prohibitions 
including no direct or indirect contact with the 
victim in this case, Special Agent Jeff Gordon.

Motherfucking sonsofbitching shiteaters.


Interesting that JeffG should have his name included in those 
documents.  Isn't he afraid that that order, and his involvement 
in this case generally, is going to stick up like a lightning 
rod and attract the attention of lots of folks who would otherwise 
have ignored him?

Bear




Re: FBI Tries to Set Up Brian K. West

2001-08-19 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Sat, 18 Aug -1 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Will someone publish the home address of the prosecuting attorney and judge issuing 
the warrant?


There are serious risks in doing so.  Having such a post linked 
to your meatspace identity could result in persecution - and 
most likely eventually prosecution as well.

Bear




Re: NRC asks for reviewers for forthcoming Internet porn report

2001-08-15 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Wed, 15 Aug 2001, Jim Choate wrote:

On Thu, 16 Aug 2001, Sampo Syreeni wrote:

 Maybe, maybe not. I'm the first to agree that porn *should* be treated as
 equal to other speech,

But 'porn' is no more speech than 'murder' is. What makes porn so
offensive isn't the pictures, but the ACTS that had to be commited to
create the speech. 

You mean acts which consenting adults perform voluntarily?
In most off-camera cases, acts which signify love and trust 
with a life partner? Acts on some of which the continuation 
of the species depends?

The idea that such acts are somehow wrong or criminal is 
ridiculous.  And you are asking us to believe that the 
images or descriptions of such acts are heinous because they 
inherit wrongness or criminality from the acts themselves?

Go soak your head.

Bear
(Who happens to enjoy sex)




Free kiddie porn would save a lot of kids from being abused.

2001-08-15 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Wed, 15 Aug 2001, Jim Choate wrote:

The desire to get the 'speech' is what drives the act. To address one and
ignore the other is simply not reasonable. The images should be taken as
evidence of the act and then destroyed. They should not in and of
themselves be left in circulation to promote further acts.

Your assumption here is that leaving them in circulation will promote 
further acts against children.  I do not believe that this is the case. 
In fact, if anything promotes further acts against children, it is 
taking such images *out* of circulation.

If the desire to get the 'speech' (ie, photos) is what drives the 
abuse of children, do we not owe it to those children to minimize 
the motive to harm them?  And if the motive is financial, how better 
to minimize it than to flood the market with public-domain computer-
generated kiddie porn?  If you saturate the market, then there is 
no more financial motive to abuse kids.  

It's plain old supply and demand, right?  It's totally obvious to 
anyone whose motive is actually protecting kids rather than 
suppressing speech.  Which would explain why the american legal 
system has been missing it so consistently; protecting kids, 
whatever the rhetoric they use, is not what they want to do.


Bear


  






Re: Organized crime groups going online, report says -- beware!

2001-08-14 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Tue, 14 Aug 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote:

- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
In addition, of course, organized crime groups use the Internet for
communications (usually encrypted) and for any other purposes when
they see it as useful and profitable. Indeed, organized crime is
proving as flexible and adaptable in its exploitation of
cyberopportunities as it is in any other opportunities for illegal
activity. 

Just a note here, but this is one of the most common stereotypes 
about organized crime figures, and it's just not true.  These guys 
are businessmen -- they won't turn down a deal just because it 
happens to be legal. Organized crime figures are proving flexible 
and adaptable in their exploitation of opportunities to make a 
profit -- they are not interested in illegal activity exclusively, 
they just don't give a damn whether a given opportunity happens to 
be legal or not.  

Bear




Re: Products Liability and Innovation. Was: Re: Traceable Infrastructure is as vulnerable as traceable messages.

2001-08-13 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Mon, 13 Aug 2001, Black Unicorn wrote:

Do I think that software should have products liability attached to it?  No.
Do I think strict liability stifles innovation?  No.


I would actually like to make a smaller point here. Broadly I 
agree with BU, but I'd like to analyze it a little.

If software actually cost money per every unit produced, products 
liability would make more sense because then it could become part 
of the production costs.

However, given that copying bits is in fact free (copyright issues 
aside), adding a real per-unit expense has the potential to 
*dominate* the production cost.  Open-source software would become 
impossible to produce, because the whole open-source paradigm 
depends on copying bits being free.

I think MS would like nothing better than having products liability 
attached to software in general; it would solve a massive problem 
for them by putting open-source stuff out of production.  Even though 
the open-source stuff is better from a security standpoint, there 
is effectively no one who is making enough money from it to bear 
the costs of product liability. 

Some security consultants *do* bear the cost of product liability 
on software they install and configure; they are paid obscene amounts 
of money to take that risk and do the solid configurations that 
minimize it, and that is as should be.  The effect of product 
liability on the industry as a whole would be to remove the only 
secure products available (open-source products), making it 
effectively impossible for security consultants to do their jobs. 

Bear





Re: Advertisements on Web Pages

2001-08-08 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Tue, 7 Aug 2001, Tim May wrote:

(I'm surprised no one has urged me to use Lynx. Is it still being used?)

Some of us still use it, but we tend not to recommend it to 
anyone - it has become fairly obscure and, to be honest, lots 
of webpages suck pretty hard when viewed through lynx.  I 
find it particularly handy though as a route around some 
firewalls.  If I find myself on a machine where HTTP requests 
are filtered or published, I can ssh to a machine where they're 
not and use lynx from there. 


Bear




Re: Advertisements on Web Pages

2001-08-08 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Tue, 7 Aug 2001, Tim May wrote:

( I expect 98% of the readers here have no idea what a Symbolics is or 
was.)

Heh.  I would cheerfully commit a felony or two to get my hands 
on a Symbolics Ivory chip fabbed using modern technology and running 
at a GHz or so.  When I was a student, we had six Lisp Machines in the 
AI lab. 

Bear




Re: Advertisements on Web Pages

2001-08-08 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Tue, 7 Aug 2001, Tim May wrote:

To all who have contributed ideas about turning off Java, blah blah, l 
wasn't really _complaining_ about my personal situation. I was noting 
the bizarre world of online advertising in which the right third of a 
page is filled with ads, the top third is filled with ads, and now there 
are pop-up windows covering the main page...and which pop-up several 
times.

Newspapers are usually over 60% advertising.  But at least in 
newspapers, the ads don't wiggle.

Bear




Re: Advertisements on Web Pages

2001-08-08 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Wed, 8 Aug 2001, Tim May wrote:


(Ads could be tied-in to the content, with some light crypto or copright 
protection. A circumvention of this liight crypto could be a DMCA 
violation. I would not be surprised to see this already impicated in the 
DVD cases: that 5 minute period of trailors that cannot be 
fast-forwarded past...it's probably a violation of the DMCA to build 
devices which circumvent the copyright holder's plans and intents.)

They're sticking *trailers* on movies that people *pay for??* 

Geez.. talk about destroying the value of the merchandise they're 
trying to sell. 

Bear




Re: Advertisements on Web Pages

2001-08-07 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Mon, 6 Aug 2001, Tim May wrote:

Just a note about what's happening with Web advertising.

Went to a site, www.imdb.com, to check something about a film. Up popped 
a doubleclick.net ad. In front of the main page, obscuring it. I clicked 
the close box. Up popped a _different_ ad. I clicked the close box. Yep, 
up popped a third ad box.  I closed it. I think it stopped at this point.

Simple answer: turn off javascript and java.  It is generally not 
used except to make ads more annoying.  If your browser allows it 
(I gotta put in a plug for the registered version of Opera here) 
turn off animated graphics.  These three simple acts will kill 
over 90% of web advertising. If you're actually after *content*, 
you can usually turn off autoloading of images as well, and that 
will kill almost 100% of web advertising.


Bear




Re: Traceable Infrastructure is as vulnerable as traceable messages.

2001-08-06 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Mon, 6 Aug 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

re: driving remops out of business
I'm quite aware of the attack. It's not guaranteed successful yet. 

True.  But it beats the snot out of guessing keys.

Offhand, I'd estimate that if three US remops were taken down 
forcefully, and the federal law looked as though any other could 
be, all but two or three hardcases would cease operating remailers 
in the USA.  That would wipe out well over 70% of the remailers, 
leaving a very small universe indeed to monitor. 

Bear




Re: Space War

2001-08-06 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Mon, 6 Aug 2001, Jim Choate wrote:

On Mon, 6 Aug 2001, Ray Dillinger wrote:

 Second, it pretty much means the US is going to have to withdraw 
 from the space treaty of 1965, which bans space weapons.  This 
 latter is actually more interesting to me, because that treaty 
 also bans national claims of sovereignty over off-earth property 
 (or else Neil Armstrong would have been saying the ancient 
 incantation, we claim this new land in the name of when he 
 planted that American flag on the moon in '69) and, more 
 importantly, private claims of ownership on off-earth property.

He did do that you silly goose. He claimed it in the name of the US for
'All mankind'...

Check the web.

I did, actually.  Turns out I got the year wrong, it was 1967 not 
1965.  But the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, to which the US is a 
signatory, has a big fat anti-sovereignty clause, stating that no 
nation can claim off-earth territory. 

Discussion can be found at 

http://www.spacepolicy.org/page_mw0799.html

Although I found this guy far too optimistic about the role of
government, I believe he has his facts straight regarding the 
treaty.

Bear




Re: Apollo 11 - For all mankind

2001-08-06 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Mon, 6 Aug 2001, Jim Choate wrote:

Note the commentary about changing the budget to prevent other flags from
being planted...

http://www.harmonize.com/swdroundup/Apollo11.htm



Note the commentary that it was strictly a symbolic activity, as the 
United Nations Treaty on Outer Space precluded any territorial claim.

Bear




Re: Gotti, evidence, case law, remailer practices, civil cases, civilit

2001-08-03 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Thu, 2 Aug 2001, An Metet wrote:

Your complaints about free research suggest that you have the sense
that you are more valuable than or superior to other contributors.

He is not superior in any substantial way; however, his expertise 
in law, combined with a willingness to actually discuss it, are in 
short supply here.  That same expertise is extremely valuable to 
people designing systems, and for the sake of such people, please 
do not discourage him in any way from sharing it. 

The discussion of legal spoilation has been particularly enlightening; 
Before this discussion started I knew that it was possible to get 
in trouble for destroying documents before charges were filed or a 
subpeona was served. But before an investigation is even under way? 
Before a complaint is even filed?  The mind boggles.  I'd never 
have known that without reading the caterpillar cite, and as one who 
is not of the Priveleged Caste in terms of access to legal information, 
(ie, willing to pay thousands of bucks to Westlaw or whoever each 
year) I am grateful to him for passing it on.

A worthwhile question for Cypherpunks -- all of the court decisions 
and cites are, technically, public domain information.  And yet 
access to that information, in terms of legal databases, remains 
either extremely expensive, or the province of a Priveleged Caste 
(to whom extremely expensive looks like normal business expenses). 

Westlaw owns some of the most expensive copyrights, per-copy, of 
any entity -- and all they've done is number the pages and paragraphs 
and provide an index on public domain information.

I think that there is, or ought to be, a good cypherpunk solution 
to making legal cites available for everyone.  A distributed 
law library, hosted on many servers?  Legal cites on Freenet? 

After all, what good is crypto anarchy if we can't break a copyright 
monopoly (or at least a case of non-competitive pricing) imposed on 
public domain information?

Bear




Re: Traceable Infrastructure is as vulnerable as traceable messages.

2001-08-03 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Jim Choate wrote:


But the only place they can trace messages in a 'small world' model is at
source/destination link, which means they're already on top of you. If
they're out fishing all they'd see is a bunch of packets sent between
remailers with the body encrypted several layers deep with keys held by a
variety of people.

the point is, that's enough.  Both endpoints on such a packet's 
route are participants, obviously.  If they want to shut it 
down, and they have seen such a packet, they have two people 
they can shut down.  Repeat ad nauseam, and the infrastructure 
is destroyed.  They don't have to trace individual messages 
if they can make the software illegal. 

And in an agent provocateur mode, the software is illegal the 
minute they want it to be -- all they have to do is show a 
DMCA violation (which they can manufacture at will) and declare 
the software illegal as a circumvention device.

With Plan 9 that would require them to outlaw using a particular OS. Maybe
in a lot of places, but not in the US.

Really?  I guarantee you that if a particular OS gets in the way 
of those with power, they can declare it a circumvention device 
the same as any other software.  

 That is the threat model I'm concerned 
 about, and given that network monitoring is now automatable and 
 cheap, it is entirely do-able.

If you stick with current paradigms.

Bingo.  That is absolutely the point.  The current paradigm being 
the Internet as we know it.

Bear




Re: Crypto instructions = Bomb-making instructions

2001-07-31 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Tue, 31 Jul 2001, Tim May wrote:


The critical point is that Congress is now in the business of 
criminalizing mere speech. mere research. Whether one quibbles about 
whether hackers understand the instructions on how to bypass crypto 
protections, or whether bombz d00dz understand the chemistry and 
physics of their bombs, the new outlawing of crypto instructions and 
bomb-making instructions is the issue.

You are absolutely correct.  From a human-rights point of view, 
that is exactly the problem.  There are now thought-crimes.  

However, just because the law happens to be wrong, does not mean 
that specious crap can prevent a conviction on it in court.  It says 
that circumvention devices are illegal, and the opinion of the 
court is that code -- source *or* executable -- is a device.  
At the same time, it says that other information, which promotes 
*understanding*, but which is not a device, is legal. At least 
for now.

You can argue about gray areas and fine points all you want in 
this forum, but if your butt lands in court it will be dismissed 
as specious crap.

Bear




Stegotext in usenet as offsite backup

2001-07-31 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Tue, 31 Jul 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

If it's a crime to take actions specifically for the purpose of later
rendering you unable to comply with a judge's order (is it?),
how is escrowing it on the isle of man any different?

Oddly, I've been watching this one with some interest. 
The other day I got worried about potential disk drive 
crashes, since with one thing and another I'm starting 
to accumulate a lot of unreleased original source code 
on my main machine. After the work I've put into it, 
I'd hate to lose it.  But it's not an application that 
does anything useful yet.

It would be handy, from my point of view, to use usenet as 
an offsite backup solution -- posting encrypted source 
for work-in-progress on binary newsgroups so I could just 
go back and nab it out of the archives if I ever have a 
disk crash or in case the computer gets stolen.

If I want to increase the odds of its getting archived, I 
would just embed it in a sound file or a movie file using 
stego (original sound and movies, so as to avoid DMCA 
hassles, of course). 

Stegograms present an interesting copyright question for 
the legally inclined; if I'm using usenet archives as offsite 
backup via stegograms, I'm okay with the release and public 
use of the stegogram, which most folks will interpret as 
being the same as the covertext.  But would that entangle 
the copyright on the stegotext as well?  Or if somebody took 
the stegogram and figured it out, would I have legal recourse
to stop them from doing anything with my code?

(I was considering going to a lawyer with this one, but 
since the odds against anyone hacking the password on the 
encrypted data in the stegotext are literally astronomical, 
I figure the point is sufficiently moot to be not worth 
answering except as an intellectual curiosity.)

Bear





Re: Criminalizing crypto criticism + 802.11b access

2001-07-28 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Fri, 27 Jul 2001, David Honig wrote:

You can create an executable, with source code, package it up and 
send it to the copyright owner with a note that says your protection 
is broken: here's the proof.

How about dropping them a note to send an engineer to DefCon? 

Not a problem -- as long as what you're making available to the 
public at DefCon is not a program that script kiddies can download 
and use to break stuff.

You can shout at the top of your lungs that their crypto is broken, 
on all kinds of forums. 

Might be libel if not true.

Oh, yeah, feature them suing you for libel, and then watching aghast 
as you enter exhibit A -- the source code -- into the trial and the 
public record.  If it successfully decrypts their stuff, it proves that 
what you said is true.  It also goes all over the internet within 
about twenty minutes.  

Bear in mind that these people are not dealing from a position of 
strength, as long as their crypto is actually broken.  The only 
evidence you need is precisely the evidence they don't want on the 
public record.  And if it's produced for the first time in your 
own defense, in a court of law, I don't think they can press 
criminal charges on you for producing it.

Bear




Re: Weird message from someone named NIPC

2001-07-27 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Thu, 26 Jul 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Declan wrote:
#
#   Yes, clearly I was wrong and this must be the real thing.
#   I urge you to start an online campaign straightaway! 

I'm stunned you think this is a joke. 
 

You misspelled hoax.  Think about it.  You know how secure 
SMTP isn't?  Go read the RFC, then you can telnet to the SMTP 
port of any open relay and create a message that appears to 
come from anywhere or anyone you like.  Choate even still 
runs an open relay for your convenience. 

There is *NO* evidence that this isn't a hoax.  Making a hoax 
would be so damn easy it isn't even funny.  All that has to 
happen is for some monkey out there to read the sircam story 
and the dmitry story and decide he wants to yank the cypherpunks' 
collective chain (and/or discredit a reporter). 

There is a (remote) possibility that it could be real.  But if 
so it is totally deniable and reporting it would cause a loss 
of credibility.  The only way to find out if it's real is to 
save it, wait for more facts about FBI operations and structures 
to come out, and then the smoking gun would point at it only 
if it refers to or confirms any things that are true at this 
time but wouldn't be known to a hoaxer at this time. 

Bear




Re: A question of self-defence - Fire extinguishers self defence

2001-07-27 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Thu, 26 Jul 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

--

The rear window had been smashed in when they whacked the cop with the four inch 
steel pipe, or when they whacked the cop with the two by four timber. so there was no 
problem with chucking it underhand and sideways.  Plenty of room.  One is naturally 
inclined to chuck large heary objects in this 
fashion, because it is difficult to sling them overhand.  In order to sling it in 
frontwards, he would have had to chuck it in one handed, and it was too heavy for 
that.  In order to chuck it, he needed both hands, and in order to chuck it with both 
hands, he needed to chuck it sideways.

You try chucking a great big fire extinguisher.  Unless you are Arnold, you will 
chuck it in the same fashion.


I have two brothers.  Early in their college career, one of them got 
drunk, and for the sheer hell of it started bowling overhand.  The 
manager of the lanes at the student union was disinclined to try 
kicking him out personally, so he called my other brother to come 
get him out...  

This was possible because at that time all three of us had a lot of 
experience chucking large heavy objects (and the arms/shoulders to 
prove it) because we had been operating a firewood business to pay for 
tuition.

If you can get a grip on a large, heavy object which is long (like a 
chunk of a log, or a fire extinguisher) You can often throw it further 
and harder one-handed and underhand than you can two-handed and 
sideways, because the swing gets the far end going a lot faster and 
that translates into a lot of power for the throw.  You can also 
throw the sucker overhand, but you have to start by lifting it high 
in front of you, then swinging it down, turning sideways, bringing 
it up behind you, and releasing it over your head - as my brother 
discovered he could do with bowling balls. 

This guy holding up the fire extinguisher two handed, on the other 
hand, looks like he was intent on using it for a battering ram -- 
to push in someone's face with it or something. He didn't have room 
for the big underhand swing, nor the full-circle followed by overhand 
release, nor even really for the sideways chuck. 

One thing that his arms and posture suggest to me is that it's 
actually lighter than you've been guessing -- if it were heavy 
I'd expect to see a little more tension.  Perhaps it was already 
discharged, thus only about 5-7 pounds? 

Bear




Re: Criminalizing crypto criticism + 802.11b access

2001-07-27 Thread Ray Dillinger

 `(3) FACTORS IN DETERMINING EXEMPTION- In determining whether a person
 qualifies for the exemption under paragraph (2), the factors to be
 considered shall include--
 `(A) whether the information derived from the encryption research was
 disseminated, and if so, whether it was disseminated in a manner
 reasonably calculated to advance the state of knowledge or development
 of encryption technology, versus whether it was whether it was
 disseminated in a manner that facilitates infringement under this
 title or a violation of applicable law other than this section,
 including a violation of privacy or breach of security;

My reading of these paragraphs is that basically, you don't start 
out by releasing a program that script kiddies can download and 
use to break stuff.  

You can present your paper at defcon, as long as there's not an 
executable.  

You can create an executable, with source code, package it up and 
send it to the copyright owner with a note that says your protection 
is broken: here's the proof.

You can shout at the top of your lungs that their crypto is broken, 
on all kinds of forums. 

You can engage in your right to fair use using your own executable, 
ie, taking a five-second clip and using it in an original work 
where it's seen in the background as your protagonists stroll by 
arguing about the new sushi restaurant. 

But what it looks like is, you cannot publish that executable, nor 
make it possible for anybody else to engage in their right to fair 
use.

Something may appear in an anonymous channel, and if it's not 
traceable to you -- or downloadable from your website, etc -- 
then they may sue you for having done the research that made it 
possible, but they will lose.

Of course, there is life outside the USA, and I'm sure some kid in 
Italy or Finland or Russia will cheerfully read your paper and 
implement the thing you describe and release it.  But that kid 
better not visit the USA anytime real soon unless that kid publishes 
anonymously.

I think a lot of the flaws with the DMCA could be fixed by allowing 
an exemption for a notice period -- one year after you notify them 
that their crypto is broken, they've had enough time to fix it -- 
and if they haven't fixed it, they deserve what they get.

Bear




Re: So, what do the Russians think?

2001-07-26 Thread Ray Dillinger

Good point. 

A Russian cryptographer was grabbed, unable to talk to his consulate 
for at least three days, and the Russians don't say anything?

I smell a rat.  Perhaps Dmitry was sold down the river.

(Note for non-USA readers: sold down the river is an americanism 
for betrayal.  It dates from the days of slavery, where the conditions 
for slaves were worse the further down the (Mississippi) river they 
were.  It was common for slaveowners to promise to sell their slaves 
upriver to gain their goodwill, and then sell them downriver for more 
money than they could get upriver.  Since slaves' communication was 
tightly controlled, lying to the ones left about where their buds had 
gone was also common, and usually undetected.  Parallels to the current 
situation are left as an exercise for the reader.)

Bear




Re: IP: The Postal Service Has Its Eye on You (fwd)

2001-07-25 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Tue, 24 Jul 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Does anyone have a link to this B form, or more exact data on it's
contents?  It seems a little pointless to fill out a form saying that
Unknown person refused to ID for a transaction of $3000.00.  This
suspect was 5'8 and 125#, brn hair, brn eyes and wearing jeans and a
tee-shirt

It probably notes time of day and gets submitted along with videotape 
from the cameras, so the lions can run it through their mugbooks.

Bear




RE:

2001-07-23 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Mon, 23 Jul 2001, Petro wrote:

At 11:30 PM -0700 7/22/01, Ray Dillinger wrote:
On Sun, 22 Jul 2001, Sandy Sandfort wrote:


   The pressures of commercial advertising--in the sense of mass media--have been 
with us for as long as there has been mass media. 

   You either deal with it as an adult, or you deal with it as a child. To 
complain that people are making you want something and they should stop is definitely 
in the realm of the latter. 


I was never really socialized enough for it to work all that well.
But I had to just stop listening, because it made me angry day after 
day.


   I say this as someone who has a bit more credit card debt than he really 
should, so I understand the consumeristic drive, but it's really all about 
self-disipline, now isn't it? 


Self-discipline in an arms race with techniques designed to suppress 
or defeat it, yes.  And that's only on the personal level.  On the 
personal level, I'm now pretty insulated from most marketing campaigns, 
so that's not all that relevant to me.  However, the societal effects 
are nasty, because the *widespread* suppression of self-discipline 
leads to a lot of stupid, wasteful, or harmful effects that are very 
widespread, and which I can't get away from. 

Personally, I am debt-free, and frankly loving it.  It is hard to 
understand how much debt sucks until you get the opportunity to 
live without it.  I highly recommend it.

gets a little stifling when people can't or don't control how much 
pressure (as advertising etc) they are exposed to.

   You left out one word in there. 

   Won't. 

Bingo.  Won't.  And are intentionally maintained in a condition 
where they won't, at least until they break away from the herd 
and strike out in their own direction.  

Let's put it this way; why would a rational person or even a sane 
person purchase a furby?  It is useless; it is annoying; its expected 

   Mostly to stop their children from wailing about wanting one. 

   Children are, almost by definition, not sane people. 

Bingo.  Family pressure, brought about by marketing.  That's 
part of the whole crazy-making cycle.

'Mommy's not home for dinner, sweety, because she's working 
overtime to buy you a furby she's on the fucking treadmill, 
and you helped put her there.  Want some pie?'

But the science of marketing is increasingly about arresting the 
processes of rational thought, and even the processes of mental 
health, in order to induce people to buy crap which they don't 
need, won't or can't use, or can't get any real satisfaction from.  


   Advertising only works on adults (or rather rational people) when it shows 
them something they already want. 


You are correct; and therefore, it is in the best interests of 
marketers to make sure that everything is as banal and bland as 
possible, and that all the ideas are prepackaged - specifically 
in order to prevent people from growing up emotionally, or becoming 
rational.  They're doing an increasingly effective job of it and 
whether we're directly included/affected ourselves or not, whether 
we are consumerist zombies or critical-thinking adults, we have 
to live in the sick society that results from their handiwork.

   Marketing has not gotten anywhere near that personal. 

Yes, it has.

   I don't receive car commercials with a picture of a buxom oriental woman 
wearing red PVC undergarments, while my neighbor get his with a picture of one of 
maplethorpe's models. Now, granted part of this is because it's not commercial 
feasible, and I doubt it ever will be. 

Trust me on this; it will be. Men known to be gay are already getting 
car adverts featuring leather-clad men instead of the customary bikini 
babes, and offered accessories like rainbow stickers direct from the 
dealers.  From here out, it's only a matter of refinement.  Ultimately, 
if the car dealers find out enough, the question is only about whether 
the marginal sales to people who like busty oriental babes in red PVC 
underwear will pay for the photo shoot, ad composition, and printing 
costs.  Digital imaging and poser software drives down the cost of 
the first, Expert Systems are driving down the cost of the second, and 
printing costs are already pretty damn minor. 

   No, the most that modern advertising science has been able to do is to 
direct clients NOT to advertise in places where they won't get a ROI, in favor of 
places that WILL. 


With the result that practically *every* ad you see causes pressure, 
because all the ones that wouldn't get an ROI (which wouldn't cause 
pressure) are elsewhere.  The total pressure on each and every 
consumer has dramatically increased.

Bear




RE:

2001-07-22 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Sat, 21 Jul 2001, Sandy Sandfort wrote:

It should be obvious that these riots are not so much ideologically
motivated (though that's the pseudo-rational), but testosterone motivated.
Most of these monkeys couldn't spell anarchy let alone understand it
philosophically.  Let's not confuse the cover story with the real
motive--fucking stuff up for the fun of it.


Hmmm.  I was digging after this for a while, trying to figure out 
why these people were rioting.  As you note, there's no real 
coherent message from the protesters, not even a thread of unifying 
platform or goals. 

But then, the information content of what comes out of the mouth of 
someone who's just hit his/her thumb with a hammer is pretty low, too. 
It doesn't mean s/he doesn't have a real concern. 

This is just a guess, but what *I* think motivates these people is 
frustration and disenfranchisement.  It's not that any substantial 
group of them want any particular thing, it's just that the whole 
bunch of them feel that they don't have a voice in what's happening 
any more.  The globalization people are consulting *each other* 
instead of the people affected by the laws to figure out what laws 
they should pass, and the people are pissed off because they don't 
feel that they have any input into the process.  

Also, the personal pressure on them is a little higher every year 
as the forces of capitalism get more ruthless and efficient at 
exploiting them as a market and as cheap labor - and the barriers 
to actually starting a business of one's own seem to be going nowhere 
but up - so they're also frustrated by the fact that even though 
they may be making more money, they're still working for other 
people and at the end of the day they're still poorer.  Capitalism 
from the worker's perspective means working longer hours, getting 
paid more, and winding up under family pressure (because your family 
is an intensely and effectively targeted market) to spend it all on 
stupid stuff.  Furbys, TV's, and barbie dolls, for god's sake. So 
at the end of the day they have more stupid crap but they're poorer 
and more tired and have less time to spend with their family - and 
after a while they get frustrated. 

But none, or few, of them see it in exactly those terms. They're 
just angry and frustrated and they don't really know why.  The 
few issues they believe in are getting ignored, so they go protest 
about those few issues and it turns into a chaotic mess because 
everybody has different issues and different degrees of how pissed-
off they really are.  More frustration.

Bear





Re: CNN.com - Family remembers G8 protester - July 21, 2001

2001-07-22 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Sat, 21 Jul 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote:

I'm sympathetic to the deceased's family. But it strikes me that if
you assault a police vehicle with armed cops inside with the evident
intent to do physical harm, you'd better be wearing a bulletproof vest.
   ^^^ 

I think you misspelled Armored Personnel Carrier. 

Bear




Re: [free-sklyarov] Re: Rallies on Monday

2001-07-21 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Sat, 21 Jul 2001, Morlock Elloi wrote:

So Adobe thugs will pour out of the building sprayng crowd with machine-gun
fire ? Corporate commandos will make arrests and cart them to software
sweatshops ?

What exactly peaceful banner-carrying demonstrators on the public grounds
should be afraid of ?

The police, and possibly military presence, responding to Adobe 
executives panicked calls that they are under attack by an armed 
mob of anarchists bent on the utter destruction of our building 
and grounds and possibly the murder of our employees and executives... 

Adobe security guys behind a window on the third floor of the 
building, scanning the crowd with a high-resolution camera, and 
the $MILLIONS they are willing to spend to hire a private investigator 
to find out who each and every one of the people in the picture is 
so that police complaints can be filed against each and every one, 
and charges brought for criminal trespass, even if it takes months
And of course the money spent tracking them all down will be on the 
bill of damages they try to recover

Illegal sweetheart deals that have been worked out with police 
officials and/or private security whereby they've pretty much agreed 
in advance that if Adobe puts out the right codeword, a bunch of 
muscular men in riot gear will show up to HURT the attackers - 
this could involve the deployment of tear gas or pepper spray.

Miscellaneous water cannon, rubber bullets, and, worst of 
all, thundering herds of lawyers both for attack and defense.
I'm pretty sure attack dogs are effectively banned in California 
due to astronomical liability settlements, but otherwise you'd 
have to worry about that.

Make no mistake, an american company with a really paranoid bent 
can make life sheer hell for any who have the temerity to show 
up protesting on its grounds. 

It costs them a lot of goodwill though -- if they pull out all 
the stops more than once every few years, it's going to seriously 
hurt their reputation and their business.

I doubt that Adobe will go the whole route here: I bet they'll go 
as far as meeting the protesters with a full cordon of armed law  
officers, but if things stay peaceful, the two groups will probably 
be able to just stand a respectful distance apart and wave at each 
other politely.  They'll probably scan the crowd with a high-res 
camera, but probably won't bother to file charges unless someone 
throws a rock or something. And we're not likely to see water cannon 
or pepper spray used unless someone actually gets inside one of the 
buildings.

Bear




Re: What NAI is telling people

2001-07-16 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Mon, 16 Jul 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Back to the original question:  It's obvious that NAI is operating 
under the belief that some ISPs are complying with some unspoken BXA 
idea/wannabe-law and blocking encrypted messages from no-no 
originating domains.  Is this really the case, or is NAI also full of 
it on this one?


Well, the easy way to find out would be to spoof the headers of an 
encrypted email so it appears to originate from one of those countries,  
send it to a tentacle or an anonymous account, and see if it falls 
into a black hole somewhere.  

Bear




Re: Big Brother the toilet troll

2001-07-12 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Thu, 12 Jul 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Um, what would the price premium be for a toilet that operates as a
stoolie? 10X? 20X? Don't hold your breath waiting for it to become a
standard. 

The hell of it is, this provides a useful function.  The only thing 
that makes it invasive is that it communicates with people OTHER than 
the one whose poop it's analyzing.  

I'd actually pay a substantial amount of money to have a health monitor 
system in place -- to alert *me* to any problems or parasites in my gut, 
so that *I* could take appropriate action (or not, as I choose).  Why 
the hell does this guy want it to talk to people other than the one 
with the health interest?

Bear




Re: Taxifornia becomes interplanetary menace (fwd)

2001-07-11 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Wed, 11 Jul 2001, Eugene Leitl wrote:

clip
L.A. May Be Shot Down in Bid to Tax Satellites
By Dan Whitcomb
clip

Auerbach insisted that he was not pushing for a tax on the satellites but
was simply doing his job and trying to determine whether they should be
taxed.

``I'm neutral on the whole thing,'' he said. ``My job is to make sure all
property that's taxable gets assessed and I'm going to follow the law. If
the law says its not taxable it's not taxable. If it is taxable I will
assess it.''

Just imagine what things would be like if assessors were paid on 
commission. Tax Farming, anyone?

Bear





Re: lawyer physics (was taxing satellites)

2001-07-10 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Tue, 10 Jul 2001, Dynamite Bob wrote:
  quoting someone who is not participating in this discussion
The property in question here is geostationary,
said Larry Hoenig, a San Francisco attorney
representing Hughes Electronics. Geostationary
satellites sit above the equator in a fixed
position; they do not rotate around the Earth. So
the satellites we're talking about here are not
movable property.

Since the equator does not pass through California, it 
follows that any property hanging above a point on the 
equator is NOT within the borders of California -- no 
matter how far up you extend them.  So I doubt the 
claim of jurisdiction. Hmmm.  Maybe their theory is that 
because it's not within another nation's border, property 
owned by US citizens is subject to American Taxes.  That 
would be bad.

Or maybe they're attempting to establish a doctrine that 
Americans can be charged property tax on property they 
hold outside the borders of the US regardless of whether 
it's in the borders of another country.  That would be 
worse.  At the very least it would provide substantial 
disincentive to retaining American citizenship.

Now, if Sri Lanka wanted to charge property taxes for 
some prime orbital real estate, it might be able to make 
a better case -- it actually *has* prime orbital real 
estate.

Bear




Re: Dropping out of the USA

2001-07-10 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Tue, 10 Jul 2001, Jim Choate wrote:

Seems to me the only answer is to keep moving, don't settle in any one
country (or store your possessions in any one jurisdiction) for a lengthy
stay. A couple of years max.

Um, no.  A couple of years would have been fine a decade ago, but 
these days if you piss off The People Who Must Not Be Pissed Off, 
extradition - from anywhere you'd remotely want to be - happens 
really fast.  And getting faster, at least until the US sets off 
a backlash of sentiment among its current supporters. 

I guess it depends on what you're up to.  If you really want to 
avoid attracting their attention -- then you're not posting to this 
list ever again and you're *definitely* not doing anything like 
Phil Zimmerman and several others we could name did.  In short, 
you abandon cypherpunk ideas to all outward appearances and do 
not contribute anything to the freedom of our descendants. You 
just sit there like a nice little shitbag and quiver when they 
tell you to quiver, and they'll leave you alone.  For now.  At 
least until they run out of people who make them more nervous.

On the other If you *do* attract their attention, then international 
travel will make them even more nervous about you -- and we all know 
(from Bell's case) what happens when Those Who Must Not Be Pissed 
Off get nervous about a particular person.  A Kangaroo trial and 
a long sentence, natch.  Same as anywhere else in the world.

I think maybe the most effective path is a middle path; do things 
that help the situation of everybody, publish good subversive 
software if your talents run that way, and you'll definitely 
attract their attention.  But as far as you can avoid it, never 
*frighten* them  

I guarantee that if Phil Zimmerman had had an impressive 
collection of guns or a stockpile of chemical reagents in his 
posession when he released PGP, he would be rotting in jail 
today and the rest of us wouldn't have PGP, nor its lineal 
descendants.   Basically, you're allowed to piss them off a 
little, and they still need some kind of excuse to arrest 
you.  But once you've pissed them off, any excuse will do, 
even (as Bell's case teaches us)  the legal exercise of a 
constitutionally protected right. 

I think a lot of international travel would be more likely to 
give them the excuse they need to arrest you, if they were 
looking for one, than it would do to keep them off your back. 
And when you go travelling internationally, the opportunities 
for setups of various types multiply exponentially.  What if 
somebody blackbags your luggage and a pound of dope shows up
in turkish customs?  Now add in a hefty bribe to the judge 
in the case and your innocent ass can be sitting in jail in 
Turkey for decades at no PR cost to the USA.

Bear


I used to feel like a flea on the back of a dinosaur -- 
 But lately, I've felt that that may have been a misassessment. 
 Maybe I'm more like a small, yapping poodle on the back of a 
 dinosaur 
-- Philip Zimmerman 
   (paraphrased no doubt by my faulty memory)







TV as an indicator...

2001-07-09 Thread Ray Dillinger

I turned on a television set last night, for the first time in many 
months.  I was watching videotapes, but I caught fragments of shows 
while tapes were rewinding, etc.

American TV has taken a definite turn for the vicious since I last 
watched.  It's still pablum-and-opiates, but someone has spiked it.

We're seeing an increasing focus on elitism, survival of the fittest, 
etc -- shows that present the elimination of the weak as a virtue, 
and where game-show hosts masquerading as intellectuals intentionally 
humiliate contestants.  We are seing a separation of moral responsibility 
from action and being conditioned to accept viciousness in authority 
figures.  We are also being conditioned to accept the idea that some 
form of pseudo-intellectual correctness excuses viciousness.

The tone is very similar to entertainment or public education 
films that were produced by the propaganda arm of the german National 
Socialist party in 1936-1938, which I remember from school but 
which folk in Germany, or those who attend current-day American 
schools, will not recognize due to censorship.  We forget history, 
believing that this will prevent us from repeating it rather than 
the other way round

The progression was reasonably simple, as I recall. 

First, the people are conditioned to accept harsh reality, survival 
   of the fittest, etc. 
Second, the people are conditioned to accept that, these things being 
   inevitable, hurrying them along is a virtue. 
Third, some class of people are identified as being inferior and 
   pseudoscience upholding the claim is advanced.  

The shows I saw last night were deep into the second stage, and 
universal public monitoring is now more pervasive here than it was 
then and there, and our schools are raising a generation of people 
who think monitoring and draconian weapons laws are normal, and 
ideas not politically correct are being persecuted as vigorously
here as they were in Nazi Germany. 

The parallels continue...  The new media must be controlled of 
that era was radio and television -- now it's the internet.  Same 
basic debates going on -- most of the same outcomes happening.

I am scared.


Bear




Re: Meatspace anonymity manual

2001-07-07 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Sat, 7 Jul 2001, Sampo Syreeni wrote:


the protection afforded by Black Blocs is quite thin (just indict them under
organized crime or gang laws), 

The similar clothing is enough to charge with gang membership and invoke 
RICO.  Also, the 'black bloc' tactic has 'premeditated' written all over 
it.  I'd say these kids haven't provided more protection for themselves; 
on the contrary, they've raised the stakes.  The cops will have to arrest 
*more* people in order to deal with the bloc, but the people arrested 
when it happens are going to be charged with more serious crimes, like 
racketeering, conspiracy, and membership in a corrupt organization, than 
if they'd stuck with the simpler tactics.  And most of what they might 
otherwise have claimed as defenses are going to crumble under that 
'premeditation' thing.

I'm not a lawyer, and I don't play one on TV, but this just looks like 
a silly mistake that's going to bite them in the butt to me.

Bear




Re: Can I reproduce out of print books?

2001-03-11 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Sun, 11 Mar 2001, A. Melon wrote:

Does anyone know the law regarding duplication of out of print
books/other works?

It's the same law as the law regarding duplication of in-print 
books/other works.  There are places and situations in which the 
enforcement varies depending on whether it's out of print, but 
in the US anyway, it's the same law. 

E.g. Stephen King withdrew his book 'Rage' (support your neighborhood
second-hand bookstore) about a schoolkid who holds his class hostage 
at gunpoint, shortly after the Littleton shootings.  King _does not_ 
want this book to be available to the public until the mess blows over.

If I distributed this book in electronic format for free, I would not
be costing him a single penny.  Would I still be violating the DCMA
and which other laws would I violate?  

Yep, you would still be violating copyright, including the DMCA. 

Also, what if I claimed that books like King's were in some way
responsible for the current spate of shootings?  Would I be able to
reproduce the book (so my quotes can be judged in the context of a whole 
work) in order to campaign against it?  Or can he legally suppress his 
own works?

You can quote from it, subject to the rules on fair use - but you 
can't reproduce the whole of it.  

However, if the text of the book is submitted as evidence, in a civil 
or criminal trial, there are some different rules that apply. 

I recall a circumstance in which a reporter for the Topeka newspaper, 
while on vacation on his own nickel, researched a story on a local 
foaming-at-the-mouth minister named Fred Phelps, going to Phelps' 
hometown and interviewing people who'd known him as a kid etc.  He 
then wrote an article and handed it to his editor at work, at the 
Topeka Capitol Journal.  

As it turns out though, when the Journal had changed ownership a year 
or so earlier, Phelps and his goons had started picketing the owner's 
house.  Loudly and continuously, until they started getting good press. 
The owner, effectively in Phelps' pocket, quashed the story.

The reporter notified them that he intended to publish an article using 
the research he'd done for the quashed article elsewhere, and the 
newspaper (acting more or less on orders from Phelps' goons)  sued 
to stop him.  The reporter entered the text of the submitted article 
as Exhibit A in the lawsuit, and the research he'd done as Exhibit B. 
His case was to show that the article he intended to publish elsewhere 
used different parts of his research than the article that the Capitol 
Journal had refused to publish. But when it was submitted as evidence, 
it became public information and went out on the internet within two 
hours.

I don't remember whether he won or lost the suit.  But it seemed kind 
of moot after that.

Bear




Re: Shooting down 'Bandit Satellites'

2001-03-02 Thread Ray Dillinger

On Thu, 1 Mar 2001, An Metet wrote:

Suppose can-sats WERE launched illegally, and then started broadcasting 
time synchronisation signals/OTP/other cypherpunk related signals, 
along with a spoken commentary by Radio Free North America (so Joe 
Sixpack has an excuse when those nice detector van gentlemen knock on 
his door and ask why he's listening to 128.0 FM) 

Would they be able to physically shoot at it, jam its signal or burn 
out its electronics from the ground or aircraft altitude? 

Assuming the can-sat were in low earth orbit, yes, they could easily 
shoot it down.  The air force has a few extreme high-altitude craft 
that can launch long-range missiles.  These can actually reach the 
same altitude or nearly, as low-earth-orbit satellites.  

(They cannot reach low earth orbit; that would require them to be 
at that altitude but going much much faster.)

They can't launch a missile fast enough to get low earth orbit, 
either -- but in the final analysis, it doesn't really matter 
whether the satellite hits the missile or the missile hits the 
satellite.  

Could someone 
put up enough disposable 'bandit-sats' (expecting to make less orbits 
than Sputnik) over time to make it uneconomical to keep shooting them 
out of the sky?

if you're getting one bandit-sat per launch, then the answer is 
plainly no.  Because the missiles or planes don't have to reach 
orbital velocity at all, they are much cheaper to shoot down than 
to put up. 

However, if you get a thousand bandit-sats per launch, and they 
scatter all over the sky once they're up there, it becomes much 
more viable.  It could take weeks or months to shoot them all 
down, and since they wouldn't be clumped together you'd have to 
fly a separate mission for every one of them.  In that scenario 
they are cheaper to launch than to shoot down.  

But still, the launch costs would be a substantial fraction of 
the shootdown costs, and unless you can spend a substantial fraction 
of what the US government would be willing to spend on it, I think 
that's cold comfort at best.

If you go for higher orbits, we might get to see some of the 
stuff the "star wars" research paid for...  At the very least, I'm 
betting on a satellite with a laser which, given a few minutes at 
a hundred-kilometer range, could probably burn through a can-sat.  
Probably something faster than that.  Possibly a bunch of can-sats 
with "intercept and collide" or "get close and explode" missions. 


Would directional transmissions from ground to 
satellite be traceable (and would this depend on whether there are 
other birds in the part of the sky I want to send to)?

depends on how tightly focused.  If you're using radio, you cannot 
focus that tightly, and yes your signal to the satellite can be 
traced.  If you're using laser, it would require them to have a 
satellite with some appropriate directional sensor within a few 
degrees of the satellite.  Hmm, as I think about it, unless your 
laser doesn't illuminate dust in the atmosphere, it might not 
require that much to detect it after all.

Would retrieval of a returned film capsule be possible before Air 
Force helicopters descended on the landing site?

Interesting question.  If the film capsule is tiny, nonmetallic, 
and contains no radio equipment, it might be possible for it 
not to show up on radar, in which case it's much less detectable 
than radio etc. 

Bear




Re: Consensus Actions in Cipherspace?

2001-01-13 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Sat, 13 Jan 2001, dmolnar wrote:

   1) To post a message, sender S takes a 2-dollar coin and then
   uses some kind of verifiable secret sharing protocol to split it
   into shares.
snip

   4) If a group agent thinks the message is spam, it sends its
   share to Engineers Sans Frontiers or whoever. 


No central server now, just needs a verifiable secret sharing scheme.
Pedersen has one, 

Cite, or URL?  A verifiable secret sharing protocol could solve a *LOT* 
of protocol problems and I want to read it closely. (Thanks in advance 
for any pointers...)

and another is part of the Proactive Security work I
mentioned previously. 

On Byzantine Agreements?  I have run into references to the topic, but 
it was never really clear what Byzantine Agreement really means.

Bear






Re: Consensus Actions in Cipherspace?

2001-01-12 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Fri, 12 Jan 2001, David Honig wrote:

the server could simply use a voting protocol to get (or timeout) 
permission to do proposed actions.  We are assuming that the server
is trusted, right?  

Actually, no.  That creates a single priveleged machine, which is 
also a point of failure, which is also a point of attack, which is 
also subject to subpeonas or outright theft.  Ideally, this is 
something that runs on the distributed machines of the participants.
I think that's the only way to be safe from the "lawsuit attack".


Perhaps I'm not clear on what constitutes an action that could
be distributed without relying on a trusted actor (server).  


For example, consider a robo-moderated mailing list formed by 
cat owners.  They have a "posting protocol" that requires you 
to submit a digital coin worth a dollar or two along with your 
letter.  If enough people click on the "this is spam" button, 
the group agents donate the coin to an animal shelter and you 
can't spend it. Otherwise, you get your coin back when your 
message expires.  

The posting protocols etc. are wrapped in scripts, of course; 
on your end you get a message box that says "Are you willing 
to post a two-dollar bond that says most of the people on the 
list don't think this is spam?"  and yes/no buttons.  The 
subscribers just have another little button on their mail 
reader - So it goes Next message, delete, reply, reply all, 
spam.

I'd really like it if somebody has figured out a way for a 
group to form consensus and act on that consensus as though 
it were a single individual -- capable of participating in 
general protocols.  

But individual solutions to problems like the above would 
be a great start. 

    Bear




At 06:01 PM 1/12/01 -0500, Ray Dillinger wrote:

Crucial facts about a protocol that does the right thing would be: 

1) DOES NOT create any single priveleged user or machine. 

2) Resistant to denial-of-service attacks and attempts to 
   "stack the vote." (Requires user authentication)

3) No altered versions of the agent ought to be able to gather
   enough information to force an action as long as at least 
   the majority of agents are unaltered.

4) Once a consensus is reached, a majority of the agents acting
   together should be able to take whatever action is found
   even if the dissenters' agents don't cooperate with them.
   (a consensus reassembles a key?  But then that key can't 
   be used again, what's the next key?)


Interesting idea.  Starting with 1 user who can admit (by virtue 
of having 100% of the vote) and then letting the users vote
to add others.  

I don't think reassembling the key is the final stage.  I think
the server could simply use a voting protocol to get (or timeout) 
permission to do proposed actions.  We are assuming that the server
is trusted, right?  

The server could send signed PGP-encrypted email to all members saying: 
"The following script has been proposed to be run by GroupServer for your
Group.. to vote yes or no, sign a yes or no message and encrypt and send it
to GroupServer.  This vote closes in 3 days, and votes are acknowleged
immediately."


(Thinking out loud) Maybe the actions require access to a distributed
N-of-M database?   How do you prevent someone from reusing the
reconstructed database?  Or uncooperatives refusing to update their slice
of the DB?  




 






  










RE: cell phone anonymity

2001-01-08 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Mon, 8 Jan 2001, Phillip Zakas wrote:


Just a minor correction to the below posting: cell phone locations are NOT
calculated using GPS.  They're triangulated via the three nearest cell sites
reading the cell phone signal.  Accuracy is much lower than with GPS, but
good enough for cops to, say, find a stranded motorist on a highway.  I
believe resolution is somewhere around 40 meters in densely populated areas
(where there are many cell phone towers).  This resolution figure varies
from region to region.


Hm.  Okay.  I knew there were locators in them, and had assumed that 
they were GPS.  My mistake.  

Does anyone know any particulars about whether these phones can be 
queried for their locations while not in use?


IMHO, the real privacy issue with cell phones is the security of a
conversation. 

Yes indeed.  Privacy is a tougher thing to achieve than anonymity, 
at least with cell phones. 

Bear








RE: cell phone anonymity

2001-01-08 Thread Ray Dillinger


This pretty much kiboshes the idea that they might be continuously 
broadcasting; I'm more concerned about the idea that there may be 
some signal they're passively listening for, to which they will 
*respond* with a pulse signalling their location. 

Bear



On Mon, 8 Jan 2001, Phillip H. Zakas wrote:

Hi,

I don't believe cell phones can be queried while they're off.  The phone has
to xmit a pulse (to hear a pulse, crank up your PC speakers, turn on your
cell phone and place it within 3 inces of a speaker...you'll hear the
speakers produce static at a regular interval [about every 30 seconds or so
with my startac]).  In an unscientific study, I've placed my cell phone,
turned off, next to the speakers and not heard the familiar pulse.  Also
since you posed the question I ripped open my recently acquired Motorolla
Timeport.  Not seeing any activity in the xmit circuitry when the battery is
plugged in and the power is turned off.  Of course I'm having trouble
putting the case back on the phone correctly but I'll figure that out later
;)

phillip zakas




-Original Message-
X-Loop: openpgp.net
From: Ray Dillinger [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Monday, January 08, 2001 11:10 AM
To: Phillip Zakas
Cc: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: RE: cell phone anonymity




On Mon, 8 Jan 2001, Phillip Zakas wrote:


Just a minor correction to the below posting: cell phone locations are NOT
calculated using GPS.  They're triangulated via the three nearest cell
sites
reading the cell phone signal.  Accuracy is much lower than with GPS, but
good enough for cops to, say, find a stranded motorist on a highway.  I
believe resolution is somewhere around 40 meters in densely populated areas
(where there are many cell phone towers).  This resolution figure varies
from region to region.


Hm.  Okay.  I knew there were locators in them, and had assumed that
they were GPS.  My mistake.

Does anyone know any particulars about whether these phones can be
queried for their locations while not in use?


IMHO, the real privacy issue with cell phones is the security of a
conversation.

Yes indeed.  Privacy is a tougher thing to achieve than anonymity,
at least with cell phones.

   Bear











Re: Anglo-American communications studies

2001-01-08 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Mon, 8 Jan 2001, David Honig wrote:

At 08:17 AM 1/8/01 -0500, Ken Brown wrote:
and there are very few opportunities for real misunderstanding. We know

The meaning of 'billion' differs by three orders of magnitude 
across the pond.  That's plenty of room for confusion :-) 


And in the US, "billiards" is a game played with cues and balls 
on a felt-covered slate table.  In the UK, it's also a very large 
number.  Thankfully, so large that that definition rarely comes 
into conversation.  As I understand cross-pond conversions, it 
goes like this

USA  UK   Scientific
Thousand Thousand  1E3
Million  Million   1E6
Billion  Milliard  1E9
Trillion Billion   1E12
Quadrillion  Billiard  1E15
Quintillion  Trillion  1E18
Sextillion   Trilliard 1E21
Septillion   Quadrillion   1E24
OctillionQuadrilliard  1E27
etc  etc   etc


This silliness seems regular, and has no good reason not to 
extend indefinitely.  But perversely, both dialects use the 
same word for googols and larger quantities.

This is one reason why I tend to just say "screw it" and go to 
scientific notation when writing.  That way it's clear what I 
mean no matter where the reader is from.

Bear






Re: cell phone anonymity

2001-01-08 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Mon, 8 Jan 2001, Tim May wrote:

Ray, you seem knowledgeable in some areas. But your pontifications on 
California basements, cellphone GPS, etc., are very "Choatean" in 
nature. Something you might want to look at.

You can trust anything I say about Math or Programming (especially 
AI and LISP programming -- ie, my job).  A lot of my "rants" in 
fields like architecture, state government, etc, come from situations 
in Kansas, many of which do not apply to California, and I need to 
think twice before speaking once.  Much of the rest (including GPS 
chips in cell phones "within the next couple of years," heard a couple 
of years ago) is gleaned from mainstream media and evidently has its 
share of distortions. 

Bear

An aside -- Contractors are now building uninsulated homes in Kansas 
(a climate where temperatures range from about 110 fahrenheit to 
-3 fahrenheit over the course of an average year) on floodplains, 
with slab foundations, not even buttressed down to the heave line 
and with no provision for airflow to mediate temperature - and 
people are buying them!  This monumental stupidity was a feature 
of the circus of fools around me for many years, and is still 
where my mind goes by reflex action whenever I hear about electricity 
supply difficulties, power costs and escalating home insurance prices -- 
however irrelevant it may be to the situation in California.  

California, it seems, has its own set of completely different acts 
in the circus of fools, and I'm still learning them






Re: CIA proctologists

2000-11-15 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Wed, 15 Nov 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

US Citizenship is required, as is successful completion of a medical evaluation, 
polygraph interview and an extensive background investigation.

A "medical evaluation"??

http://www.odci.gov/cia/employment/jobpostings/architectstud.htm

Pretty standard procedure.  A medical evaluation can detect drug 
users, alcohol users, people whose brain chemistry is different, 
etc.  It can also detect people who are likely to be more or less 
expensive to insure, people who need drugs (from insulin to 
psychopharmaceuticals) to function normally, and people with more 
than a "reasonable" number of knife-fight scars, which might 
indicate that someone is too rash or hotheaded. 

It also gets them DNA samples etc, which they can later use to 
positively identify you if you ever get implicated in anything 
criminal or controversial.  

And finally, they will wind up knowing all about your tattoos 
and brands if any, which will point out people who were in certain 
gangs and societies during certain time periods.  

That's just part of the job.  If you're going to handle secret 
material for any government, that government will want to know 
everything about you no matter how invasive, and they will want 
to own every possible bit of leverage anyone can have on you, 
and they want to be damned sure that no one else has any leverage 
on you that they don't know about.  

Medical examinations are just one aspect of that.  

I bet they audit someone's taxes for the last six years before 
they hire them, too.


Bear





Re: Zero Knowledge changes business model (press release)

2000-11-01 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Wed, 1 Nov 2000, David Honig wrote:

Although its hazardous if done wrong [cf recent PGP problems], is
tarnished by the Fedz/Denning/etc, and might have no use in a personal
privacy tool (your diary dies with you), isn't it too dogmatic to rule out
key escrow for tools intended for use by groups? 

Are there equivalent methods which don't use escrowed keys, which I
am unaware of?  

First, I think the people who've spoken about document escrow are 
right.  A much safer approach than key escrow.  

But I'm going to talk about key escrow, because there *are* decent 
ways to do it.

There are methods for key escrow that don't involve a single trusted 
party having all the keys.  For example, you can generate a dozen 
random strings of bits, XOR them together, then XOR the result with 
your key.  Take the result of that operation and it's your thirteenth 
string.  Now you can hand the thirteen strings out to thirteen different 
people.  Now if you get hit by a bus, or if they are *ALL* ready to 
subvert the protocol by working together, they can get together, XOR 
all the strings together, and produce your key.  A reasonable protocol 
for a company with fourteen board members, perhaps.  There would be no 
way to serve thirteen out of fourteen board members with subpeonas and 
still have the investigation of the fourteenth board member be a secret 
to the company.

Third, there are methods for key escrow with a single escrow agent 
that don't allow the escrow agent access to the key while it's still 
live.  Take your August key on August First, and use a digital 
timelock to put one solid month of computing between the company 
escrow officer and the key.  Hand the escrow officer the resulting 
blob, and use your key with impunity until August 30.  On the 30th, 
you encrypt everything with your September key.  On September 1, if 
she's put the fastest available machine to work on it the whole time, 
the escrow agent gets your August Key.  Now, if you get hit by a 
bus during august, the escrow officer will be able to get stuff 
from your drive after august -- but will never have your key while 
that key is still in use. 

Fourth, the trusted third party doesn't need access to your keys.  I 
could set up a web service that generated complementary asymmetric 
key pairs and published them thirty days apart.  Now when Alice 
wants to put her key in storage for the company escrow officer, 
she can come to my site, pick up the key of the day, encrypt her 
key with it, and hand it to Bob the escrow officer.  If Bob needed 
to use the key, and it were more than a month later, he could come 
to my site and get the complementary key and decrypt Alice's key. 
With this setup, I'm the only one that knows the decryption key, 
and I don't know diddley about what's encrypted under it or where 
anything encrypted under it is stored. 

Bear





Filters

2000-10-25 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Wed, 25 Oct 2000, David Honig wrote:

At 08:06 PM 10/24/00 -0400, Ray Dillinger wrote:
If nobody comes up with some filterware that works, then there will 
probably be continuing pressure to regulate content.  

Its called 'parenting' but most are too busy, so they ask the State, or
machines (censorware, v-chips, rating systems, etc.) under others' control,
to do it instead.  

Machines under *others* control?  I think we have different ideas of 
what "filters" mean.  I support the right of people to not see what 
they don't want to see, provided they can do it without restricting 
what the rest of us see.  If they can buy software that blocks out 
the things they don't want to see, and run it, good for them and 
good for the software provider.  

Ditto Privately owned libraries - but probably not public ones, at 
least not unless they also maintain an *UN*censored connection.

The v-chip does *not* prevent programming from reaching my home - 
it doesn't even prevent programming from reaching the homes of 
those who've willingly purchased and installed it, but it prevents 
stuff they'd find objectionable from being displayed on their 
screens.  This is their right.  After all, we're talking about 
*their* screens.

Bear






Re: judges needing killing...

2000-10-19 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Thu, 19 Oct 2000, jim bell wrote:

Naturally, a chemical solution (pun not directly intended...but I'll take it
anyway) becomes apparent.  If the ultimate motivation of the car siezures is
to sell them and keep the money, what would happen if somebody acquired a
few ounces or gallons of PCB's (poly-chlorinated biphenyls; common in
20+year-old (non-electrolytic) capacitors), and sprayed them (only a very
tiny amount per car should be necessary, maybe 1 milliliter or so?) into
those siezed cars though a broken window (or injected through door seals).
Naturally, it would  be important to anonymously call the local newspaper or
TV stations and report on what had occurred, possibly the EPA as well.  That
car would suddenly change from a $10,000 asset into possibly a $100,000
liability for the agency which siezed them..

Just a thought

A thought, however, requiring people to handle PCB's -- which 
are no fun whatsoever, heavily regulated, hard to acquire (albeit 
relatively easy to synthesize), and all-around poisonous.  That's 
damaging more than just the criminals in this case.  That's damaging 
the planet.

Instead, consider the possibilities of putrescine -- it's easier
to synthesize, totally harmless ecologically speaking, legal to 
own (and legal to spill on your *own* property prior to seizure)
and while it doesn't actually make the car into a 100K liability,
it does make it so that nobody except a scrap metal dealer would 
ever pay any money for it.

Don't inhale anywhere nearby after you open the vial though;  If 
you do, you *will* puke.

The stuff *NEVER* comes out, either.  


Bear
 









Re: Burglar Politics, Tempesting PC's that watch TV and DVD regions

2000-10-11 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Wed, 11 Oct 2000, jim bell wrote:

 A popular, but false, myth. The video cards radiate more than the CRT's.
 Laptops tend to be the worst offenders.

 --Lucky Green [EMAIL PROTECTED]

As to the video cards...
Sorry, Lucky, but you're going to have to support this a little better.
Emissions are a function of  the signal voltage in a conductor, and the
extent that this conductor is free to emit.  

Given that a laptop uses an LCD display, there's really no good 
reason, electronically speaking, why its video hardware should 
have to do the ((scan+horizontal_retrace)*+vertical_retrace) 
sequence that the technology for getting a coherent signal 
relies upon. 

But the fact is, laptop hardware does write bits in a predefined 
order, (in fact the same order as CRT-based machines) so it's a 
worthwhile question whether anyone can figure the order and pick 
up the emissions from the video hardware.  

This looks like the sort of thing that can be resolved by experiment 
though; Anybody got enough DSP smarts to put an induction coil next 
to a laptop monitor and *see* whether they can read the darn thing? 

Also, it looks like the sort of thing that could be designed around. 
If someone were building a "secure laptop" they could make a video 
system and drivers that wrote the bits in a different, randomized 
order each time, and which only wrote the changed bits.  If anybody 
is actually making a product like this, it would be a strong 
indication that *somebody* with money to spend on RD considers 
it a valid threat model, because nobody makes products without a 
market.

Bear







Re: Rijndael Hitachi

2000-10-11 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Wed, 11 Oct 2000, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:

The fact that some people put Medeco's in glass doors, doesn't mean 
Medeco should never develop a better lock.

I don't have a problem with people who manufacture locks.  
I have a problem with the people who sell them.  

A sign of irrational fear is when the thing that is the 
*symbol* of security -- in this case the lock, or the cipher, 
is made very strong -- but used in a way that does not afford 
good *actual* security.  

If the fear of being burgled weren't at least partly 
irrational, meaning if it were based mostly on experience 
rather than mostly on fear -- we'd be seeing doors with 
half-inch thick steel plates in them to provide the same 
level of security as the medeco lock -- and reinforced 
concrete walls to provide the same level of security as 
the door.

Ditto ciphers.  A strong cipher is like that Medeco 
lock, or even better - but if the "door" is a dumb 
key management policy, or the key is easily guessable, 
then what has been gained?  

Because what is a lock, really?  It makes it harder to 
get in *without breaking anything*.  But actual burglars 
could really care less whether they break some of your 
stuff -- provided it's stuff they can't steal.  So if 
actual burglars were as common as the people who sell 
these fancy locks tend to make out in their sales pitches, 
most folks would know, from experience, that burglars 
who break a window or a door are far more common than 
burglars who pick a lock -- and would be demanding 
*actual* security, meaning windows, doors and walls made 
of unbreakable stuff, rather than just *symbolic* security, 
of a strong lock or a strong cipher. 

If you want to propose a "Paranoid Encryption Standard", 
IE, a system for people who actually *DO* expect people 
to spend several million bucks and hundreds of man-years
and thousands of CPU-years trying to break it, then it's 
going to have to encompass a hell of a lot more than 
ciphers.  Start with physical machine security -- put 
the box in a concrete bunker with armed guards, give it 
a flat-panel monitor and roll your own drivers and video 
hardware. Stick a thermite grenade with a photosensitive 
fuse in the hard drive box. Make a continuous circuit 
through all the case components, that will detect anybody 
taking the case off, and blow the HD if the circuit's 
broken. Do a couple dozen other things along this line, 
and you'll have the physical security thing covered about 
as well as your cipher protects the data. 

But you're not through yet -- you've got the lock and the 
door, but burglars can still come in through the windows 
and the walls.  You've got to do some real serious data 
security as well. 

First of all, nothing unencrypted is EVER written to the 
hard drive except a bootstrap loader that prompts for a 
cipher key.  When it gets the cipher key, it reads and 
attempts to unencrypt the rest of the boot record.  

There is NO swap partition, and no swapping OS is to be used. 

The system computes a new cipher key every day using a 
cryptographically strong random number generator, and notifies 
you of it in a pencil-and-paper cipher that you can solve. 
(on high-entropy binary data, pencil-and-paper ciphers are 
actually quite strong)  That's the key you would need to 
use the following day.  If you don't log on for one day, 
you will not have the key for the following day, period. 
Thus, if someone seizes your box and you can hold out for 
*one* day, the data is GONE. 

But the burglars can still come in, maybe, through the roof.

So just to make sure of it, put a timer in there that blows 
the HD if it's ever been more than 24 hours since you were 
last logged on.  

*There's* your paranoid encryption standard.  Use blowfish for 
the cipher, and the cipher won't be the weakest point. 

Bear




Re: stego for the censored

2000-10-07 Thread Ray Dillinger





On Fri, 6 Oct 2000, Tom Vogt wrote:


I'm currently thinking of whether or not it is feasable to put stego
data into EVERY .mp3 downloaded. just put random data into those not
intended to carry a message.

On Fri, 6 Oct 2000, Ray Dillinger wrote:

You're talking
about making the audio channels a bit (more or less) thinner, but
they're too thin already.

On Sat, 7 Oct 2000, petro wrote:

   But if you make them a little "thinner" won't that mean that it 
will sound worse to more people, thus making the push for a better 
format?

Um, possibly if *all* MP3's were made with stegodata. If there 
is *one* source of MP3's that's stego'd and a bunch of other 
people trying to make them sound as good as possible, the one 
supplier with consistently poor sound quality will stand out 
when someone goes looking for stegograms.

One thing, which you pointed out in a comment I snipped above, 
is that some music adapts better to MP3 compression than other 
music.  There is plenty of room for stegodata in synthesizer-
pop bands like "Yes" and "The Eurythmics", but almost none 
in layered atmospheric music like "Enya".  If you pick and 
choose which plaintexts to stego, you can probably be less 
obtrusive about it. 

Bear








Re: stego for the censored

2000-10-06 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Fri, 6 Oct 2000, Tom Vogt wrote:


I'm currently thinking of whether or not it is feasable to put stego
data into EVERY .mp3 downloaded. just put random data into those not
intended to carry a message.

For the sake of us audiophiles, please don't.  MP3 is tinny and flat 
at best; it ticks me off that most folks seem to hear it as "good 
enough", because if most folks hear it as "good enough" it means we're 
not going to get a better sound format widely used.  You're talking 
about making the audio channels a bit (more or less) thinner, but 
they're too thin already.  

Bear





Re: Spam free secure email accounts.

2000-10-04 Thread Ray Dillinger




On Wed, 4 Oct 2000, Tom Vogt wrote:

same problem here: how do you find out whether or not a message is
encrypted?

Plaintext looks like plaintext.  This isn't even a "real" problem, 
once you look at the text produced by, eg, PGP, GPG, and whatever 
else you allow on the system. 

You don't even have to have a human look at it; a simple program 
to count character distributions, character contacts, and line 
lengths can identify something as being the legitimate output of 
PGP, or whatever encryption program, with a margin of error so 
flat it's only theoretical.

It would need to make a "profile" for PGP, another one for GPG, 
etc -- then look at incoming messages to see if they match the 
profile.

I mean, yeah, people could theoretically get stuff past it, 
or it could theoretically bounce encrypted messages --  but 
people can also theoretically guess a 128-bit encryption key 
on the first try, and I wouldn't expect that to happen. 

Ray







Re: CDR: Re: Spam free secure email accounts.

2000-10-04 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Wed, 4 Oct 2000, Jim Choate wrote:


On Wed, 4 Oct 2000, Ray Dillinger wrote:
 Plaintext looks like plaintext.

Yeah, if the only thing you right is simple English. Most of the planet
doesn't speak English and their plaintext doesn't necessarily look like
plaintext.

This is a xenophobic view.

No, it's not.  Every natural language has a detectable frequency 
distribution and contacts.  *ALMOST* every cipher does not. 

Someone could be writing martian using the cyrillic alphabet, and 
you could still look at it and say "this character occurs seven 
times as often as average and is never followed by that character. 
This other character is preceded by the same character fully half 
the time it appears.  And over here we have a set of characters 
one of which *always* follows any appearance of any member of this 
other set of characters (which is a constant in almost all languages 
with plosive consonants -- the only thing that normally follows a 
plosive consonant is a vowel...) 

You don't have to know what it says or what language it is.  
Plaintext looks like plaintext, and by the time you have 
more than 50 characters the probability curve of mistaking 
it for anything else is flat as a goddamn strap.

 This isn't even a "real" problem, once you look at the text 
 produced by, eg,  PGP, GPG, and whatever  else you allow on 
 the system. 

Ah, here's the rub. Here we are trying to stop the government and other
organizations from dictating 'standards' and yet here you are wanting to
impose another one.

Did I say someone else couldn't set up a crypto-only mailer using 
DES and AES?  You always get to dictate 'standards' for systems you 
own.  I always get to dictate standards for systems I own.  And the 
government rightfully gets to dictate standards for systems it owns. 
Sometimes it tries to do more than is rightful, but that is another 
question. 

The function of an anonymous remailer should NOT be context/content
sensitive.

Uh, now who's trying to impose a standard?  You want a system that 
_someone_else_ runs to conform to _your_ ideas of what it ought to 
do.  You get to dictate standards on systems _YOU_ own -- not on  
anyone else's.

Bear






Re: one time pad and random num gen

2000-10-03 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Tue, 3 Oct 2000, Kevin Elliott wrote:

A 
cryptographically strong PRNG would then be a PRNG with a very large 
period and some way of reinjecting randomness to guarantee the device 
never begins to recycle.
-- 


Isn't that a misnomer though?  If randomness is reinjected to 
prevent the system from falling into a period, then it won't 
be possible to generate the same sequence of bits twice -- so 
you can't use such a system for a PSEUDO-random generator, in 
applications like a stream cipher or whatever.  Programs rely 
on the same sequence coming out of the same initial state with 
a PRNG -- otherwise things like stream ciphers can't be decrypted. 

What you describe above, I'd have termed an RNG - not a PRNG. 

Bear





Re: one time pad and random num gen

2000-10-03 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Tue, 3 Oct 2000, Kevin Elliott wrote:

Actually if you can pull that off you've got yourself a darn fine 
real random number generator- any PRNG has to have some period after 
which it will begin to recycle (assuming no other randomness in 
introduced into the system), in which case you just set ithe period 
and read off future states using
current state +1 = current state - period + 1.

True, but the period can be made such that the last star in 
the universe will die and grow cold first.  

If you have for example a 256-byte internal state, and your PRNG 
is a full permutation (ie, eventually every possible state is 
on the path of the "cycle") you don't really need to worry about 
it.

Bear







Re: New email could confound law enforcement

2000-09-25 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Sun, 24 Sep 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Rival products include HushMail, ZixMail, Disappearing Inc. and Authentica. 


I own Disappaering Inc.  We have no such product and we have no 
such product under development.  


Ray Dillinger





Re: New email could confound law enforcement

2000-09-25 Thread Ray Dillinger
ownloaded from a website, I 
would have to suspect since it's made in the US that somewhere in the 
headers or trailers, the message bears a block that contains most of 
the key (all but the last 40 bits) encrypted in a form the NSA (and 
whomever else has their key) can read. -- This is the same thing that 
happened to Netscape after v4.07 for example, and Internet Explorer 
after v4.  If it can't be exported, that would be a good sign.  

Aside from that, I don't know the particulars of the encryption they 
use - they claim to use a product cipher, but so far I haven't seen 
what the components of the product cipher are, what the key lengths 
are, how they do key management, etc etc etc. 


Ray Dillinger
Disappearing Inc











Re: New email could confound law enforcement

2000-09-25 Thread Ray Dillinger




Correction:  

After a web search through USPTO, I find that there is another 
company also named Disappearing Inc, on Howard street in San 
Francisco. This is probably the company that was referred to. 

To clarify:  I have done business as "disappearing inc", and I am 
the owner of the domain name "disappearing-inc.com", which I have 
not yet used.

This pisses me off  now they'll probably try to evict me as 
a cybersquatter.

        Ray Dillinger

On Mon, 25 Sep 2000, Ray Dillinger wrote:



On Sun, 24 Sep 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Rival products include HushMail, ZixMail, Disappearing Inc. and Authentica. 


I own Disappaering Inc.  We have no such product and we have no 
such product under development.  


           Ray Dillinger







Re: New email could confound law enforcement

2000-09-25 Thread Ray Dillinger


Well, after a short conversation with the USPTO's server, I now have 
an application on file for a trademark which I can use to defend my 
business' web address.

Unfortunately, after a short discussion with the California 
Corporation Commission, it appears that I cannot now incorporate 
under the name "Disappearing Inc" because these guys already did. 

As it turns out, all the trademark applications they've filed that 
would interfere with the application I filed are being disputed by 
the USPTO as being too general -- they are mainly just descriptive 
words.  So they don't actually have trademarks they could use to 
kick me off my domain name yet. 

Anyway -- the way it looks now, there's a decent chance of my 
application being approved, and if that happens, then it will 
conflict/interfere with the trademark applications they've filed 
and those applications will have to be refused.  There is also 
a chance that the trademark applications they have filed will 
be approved, and if that happens then mine will be refused as it 
will be found in conflict with theirs. 

And the wheels grind on

Sigh.  I ordered DSL service so I could put this site up on my 
own server way back in April.  It's scheduled to be installed 
on October 3. Argh, Argh, Argh  

Ray




On Mon, 25 Sep 2000, Ray Dillinger wrote:




Correction:  

After a web search through USPTO, I find that there is another 
company also named Disappearing Inc, on Howard street in San 
Francisco. This is probably the company that was referred to. 

To clarify:  I have done business as "disappearing inc", and I am 
the owner of the domain name "disappearing-inc.com", which I have 
not yet used.

This pisses me off  now they'll probably try to evict me as 
a cybersquatter.

       Ray Dillinger

On Mon, 25 Sep 2000, Ray Dillinger wrote:



On Sun, 24 Sep 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Rival products include HushMail, ZixMail, Disappearing Inc. and Authentica. 


I own Disappaering Inc.  We have no such product and we have no 
such product under development.  


  Ray Dillinger








Re: A cool idea that didn't hold up under cryptanalysis.

2000-09-22 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Thu, 21 Sep 2000, Marcel Popescu wrote:

Would you mind writing a "tutorial for the beginner cryptanalist"?

Mark


Maybe in a year or so.  Right now I'm working on a reference book on 
cryptographic protocols, and it's looking like it's gonna take a pretty 
major chunk of work. 

Meanwhile, if you read "The Codebreakers" by David Kahn, you will
find a few gems of pencil-and-paper cryptanalytic technique in there 
sandwiched by lots and lots of history.  The history is interesting 
though, so it won't be a boring or frustrating hunt.

Bear







Can we PLEASE discuss free speech instead of content?

2000-09-19 Thread Ray Dillinger


On Tue, Sep 19, 2000 at 01:52:54AM -0400, Jodi Hoffman wrote:
 And more from this "only TEENAGERS and adults" website...

MASSIVE SNIP

Ms. Hoffman, please stop posting this crap to the Cypherpunks 
list.  It won't help.  It is damned insulting to everyone here 
that you seem to expect us to confuse content with context. 

Although you seem to demand it, and although several people 
have allowed themselves to get dragged down to that level 
by your hyperbole and your refusal to talk about anything 
else, the content of the site is utterly irrelevant to this 
discussion.

Please understand, the content of the site is NOT what the 
argument is about, and you constantly dragging it back into 
the discussion is unproductive, not to mention infuriating. 

The argument is about context -- whether it is tolerable to 
have laws that constitute prior restraint of speech.  It is 
NOT.  The content of the site is utterly irrelevant to this 
question, and posting chunks of it as though it were is only 
insulting the other subscribers of this list.

Speech MUST remain free, even if the actions it advocates are 
both odious and illegal.  Speech is not action.  Suppressing 
speech on the basis of content, as though it were action, is 
intolerable.  Content is not Context. 

Bear
---
"And even though I say 'Fuck you', enthusiastically 
enough, it's not as though I ever would, not in a 
million years... Well, maybe if I was stoned off my 
ass, but that doesn't count...'

Hunter S Thompson






Re: VISA to smartcard the US

2000-09-13 Thread Ray Dillinger



Hmmm.  These devices could be useful, even without using 
them as credit cards.  I wonder if you could buy a batch 
of them from the manufacturer with custom software installed? 

It would sure be nice if I could make a physical key token 
that would render my system completely useless if the key 
were, say, in my wallet at work, and the computer found its 
way to, say, the hands of someone carrying out an illegal 
search and seizure.  

likewise it would be nice to store PGP keys on, etc -- bits 
of data that you want to maintain complete physical control 
of at all times. 

"Oppression is sometimes best fought with the tools that 
the oppressors have built for their own use." 

I want a PGPdisk you can boot from.

Bear


On Tue, 12 Sep 2000, A. Melon wrote:

Sep 12, 2000 - 07:27 PM 

Visa USA to Launch Smart Card in
the U.S. 
The Associated Press

NEW YORK (AP) - After success with its smart card in
Europe and Japan, Visa is aiming squarely at the U.S.
market with an upgraded version that contains more
memory. 

Over the next couple of weeks, Visa USA, the
companys U.S. division, will be launching smart cards
- microprocessors embedded in plastic -that will offer
prepackaged services to be determined by its issuers. 

Customers will be able to download information from
their computers via special card readers. Over the next
year or so, they will be able to store airline tickets, for
example, and eventually use the cards as keys to their
cars and homes. 

The card, which has 32 kilobytes of memory, is
different from Visas original version, which has mainly
served as a "monetary value card," said Al Banisch,
senior vice president of consumer credit products. 

The new card will be available free to Visas 350
million cardholders. 







Re: Breaking eggs

2000-08-22 Thread Ray Dillinger



I'm of the opinion that an *attempted* crime should probably be 
punished as a crime.  The question is of action, knowledge, and 
intent, rather than result.

I'm also of the opinion that people do not have the right to take 
reasonably foreseeable risks with other people's lives or property, 
and that doing so is reasonable to define as a crime. 

A man who fires a gun into a crowd, without the permission of the 
people in that crowd, has committed a crime by risking the lives 
and well-being of others.  

A man who merely waves a gun around has not yet committed a crime, 
but the police probably ought to stop him anyway.  I don't say he 
should be tried, convicted and found guilty of something, but a 
police entity of some sort seems to be the most effective means at 
society's disposal for defusing the situation. 

And that's a distinction that a lot of folks never think about; 
there is a lot of ground between "Needs to be stopped before someone 
gets hurt" and "Has Committed a Crime."  

Sometimes a police officer has more knowledge of the situation than 
someone else does; the guy throwing rocks into the water off the cliff 
may not know that it's a pearl bed and there are a lot of pearl divers 
down there at this time of morning.  The police officer who knows that, 
needs to stop the guy from throwing rocks.  Has the guy committed a 
crime?  Probably not, but if he's hurt someone he ought to be responsible 
to that person or that person's family.  But if he goes on throwing rocks 
after the police stop him the first time, he has committed a crime and 
needs to be charged, tried, and convicted. 

It's popular to debate clear, bright lines of law and ethics, but the 
fact is that we make the police responsible both for things that are 
crimes and for things that are not, and that sometimes the same act 
can be a non-crime that just needs to be stopped, or a crime whose 
perpetrator requires arrest, depending on the knowledge and intent of 
the actor.  So, we don't really have clear bright lines that give 
themselves to absolutist interpretation. 

Bear








Re: CARNIVORE HEARINGS NOW ON C-SPAN 10:30PM PDT

2000-07-26 Thread Ray Dillinger



Declan McCullagh wrote:
 
 When it comes to maintaining the size of government or giving more
 money to police, there is rarely gridlock. Look at the ever-increasing
 FBI budgets, for instance.

This should be expected, actually; In the presence of strong 
crypto and really good surveillence equipment (such as spy 
satellites), War as such is obsolete -- it means too big a cost 
in terms of infrastructure.  Instead, you can get your intel 
*out* of the country (using strong crypto) or *about* the country
(using surveillence equipment), learn about exact targets, and 
send your operatives in.  No muss, only a little fuss, and 
you often wind up in control of infrastructure that you'd have 
had to destroy otherwise, usually with whatever remains of 
the original government acting as your puppet, er, your proxy. 

Sometimes the naibs get upset and refer to your operatives as 
"terrorists".  Heck, sometimes that's exactly what they are. 
If the best way for you to change the policy of a foreign country 
to something you like better is to terrify them, then that's the 
kind of operation you'll send your guys over to do. 

Anyway, one of the FBI's major jobs is to keep countries and 
other terrorist organizations from doing this to the USA -- as 
this type of thing becomes the dominant mode of last-resort 
diplomacy (as it assumes the position formerly occupied by war) 
you will be seeing the army's budget decline and the FBI's 
(and CIA's, and NSA's) budget get bigger.  

Our problem is that the FBI cannot stop these guys in a free 
country.  So it will be asking for more and more resources, and 
occasionally doing really silly crap like this; Carnivore is 
not going to allow the FBI to catch any terrorists working for 
nation states, or other dangerous organizations - those guys 
have training.  It will probably allow them to catch future 
generations of Tim McVeigh's crowd (assuming they use the 'net 
at all) but that's not nearly as important, because those 
organizations have no plan or unified agenda - their actions 
are merely white noise, as opposed to orchestrated campaigns 
likely to accomplish any specific purpose.  

The thing is, they're *pretending* that it will allow them to 
catch the dangerous ones, because they're under such tremendous 
pressure to produce something, anything, that will be effective 
against them.  

Ray