Re: Odp: Cypherpunks Europe
Jan Dobrucki wrote: World, this is the USA, USA, this is The World. Now that you know each other, start thinking in a more broad perspective, please. Blow me. /s/ An Ugly American -- Steve FurlongComputer Condottiere Have GNU, Will Travel The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man. -- George Bernard Shaw
RE: p2p and asymmetric bandwidth (Re: Fear and Futility at CodeCon)
On 28 Apr 2002 at 16:20, Morlock Elloi wrote: How exactly does the introduction of IPV6 on a machine that is NAT-ted by the ISP who doesn't give shit about IPV6 help the situation ? James A. Donald: To connect to the IPV6 world from inside a NAT network, you need a machine that is both inside and outside the NAT network, a gateway machine that has an IP4 an external address, even if only a dynamic address. Then all machines on the inside can talk to the outside through that machine, thus they can all receive quasi static IP6 addresses, even though not even the gateway machine possesses a static IP4 address. To clarify, this means that if you have a home network with a gateway computer, you can probably get global static IPV6 addresses for all the machines of your home network, though you might have trouble getting software to use this, or finding people to who can access your computers in IPV6 However, for a corporation, such measures make sense and are useful, because it means they can videoconference within the corporation, and also with other corporations that have adopted the same measure -- video conferencing being the P2P app used by people who are willing to pay money for it.
Re: Odp: Cypherpunks Europe
On Mon, 29 Apr 2002, Steve Furlong wrote: Blow me. Troll, and ye shalt be heard. Seriously, while the relationship between furriners and merkins has been notoriously strained, might there not be need for a cpunx-europe@? For regional announcements, and such. English to be preferrable mode of communication, but occasional multilingual excursions could be perhaps tolerated (yes, even frogspeak). The rationale is to mutually decouple regionally and politically local babble. Who feels compelled to keep track of everything, can always subscribe to a yet another list. What say ye, Eurotrash?
Re: Got carried away...
Jan Dobrucki wrote: I do have an idea thou. I'm thinking how to implement PGP into car locks. And so far I got this: The driver has his PGP, and the door has it's own. Path of least resistance - *access* to the car is generally not the problem. Instead weaker attacks such as breaking the glass, or forcing the door work much better. Once inside, a different mechanism again would be needed to prevent the car from being hotwired. In short, the addition of PGP doesn't particularly enhance the security, especially if the protocol is still vulnerable to, say, identity theft (the encryption is useless if somebody just steals the PGP keys). To steal an idea from the Mary Whitehouse Experience, iirc, car security will be complete when we can use imaging technology to disguise someone's latest XR3i as a clapped out Austin MiniMetro*. Seems that it's just another case of trying to use a buzzword in an unnecessary solution, making it overly complicated from a user POV, and whilst ignoring the other fundamental aspects. As has been pointed out a multitude of times, encryption has its places and uses, most of which will never be the interest, imho, of the common populace. (Only perhaps on a need-to-use basis, such as SSL. I doubt pgp mail encrypting will become natural, or indeed sexy to the sheeple.) And nor should it (have to) be. There are, however, still plenty of places where the techniques are, or would be, of great benefit. .g * Purely for demonstrative purposes only, obviously. -- The history of cosmology is the history of us being completely wrong, Sometimes I use Google instead of pants. http://www.exmosis.net/2:254/500.50
Re: p2p and asymmetric bandwidth (Re: Fear and Futility at CodeCon)
On Sat, 27 Apr 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So if your P2P application is IPv6 compatible, you can get a semi permanent IPv6 IP automatically from a server, and thereafter do peer to peer, just as if you were full, no kidding, on the internet. This nicely solves the problem with NATs, true. However, most firewalls I know are there for security reasons. Those will likely be adapted to work for 6to4 as well. The transition period will likely see some cracks where p2p can work, but I suspect those will be closed in due course. Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED], tel:+358-50-5756111 student/math+cs/helsinki university, http://www.iki.fi/~decoy/front openpgp: 050985C2/025E D175 ABE5 027C 9494 EEB0 E090 8BA9 0509 85C2
Re: Re: disk encryption modes
Title: Re: Re: disk encryption modes Here is a technique for encrypting a hard disk that should provide reasonable performance, good security, and be easy to render the entire disk unreadable in an emergency. 1. Start with a good (P)RNG. Seed it constantly with radioacitve decay noise, digitized samples of monkeys farting into your sound card, keystroke data, mouse squeaks, your favorite hardware RNG's, etc. Hash and whiten to your heart's content, just make sure it can output a few hundred KB/second of data cryptographically indistinguishable from random (an attacker having access to the entire of the output of this device since it started has no more than a .5 probability of determining any future bit of the output). 2. Each disk cluster is encrypted individually. (On my 100 GB NTFS drive the cluster size is 4096 bytes. Different drive sizes under different file systems may have different cluster sizes. For clarity's sake, I will stick with the 4K cluster size.) Encryption can be done with any cipher that can accept a 256 bit key, You can use a block cipher (in a suitable feedback mode) or a stream cipher. The first 128 bits of each block key is the master disk encryption key, (a hash of a passphrase ors ome such hereafter called the permanent key half) and the other 128 bits are the randomest bits you can obtain from the aforementioned (P)RNG whenever a cluster is written to (hereafter referred to as the temporary half. The temporary bits of the key are stored in a separate file which can be on a CDRW disc, compact flash card, etc. The format of this file is simple; the first 16 bytes of the file is the temporary 128 bits of the key for the first cluster of the disk the next 16 bytes are for the second cluster, and so on. Each time a disk cluster is written to, a new temporary half-key is pulled from the (P)RNG and used to encrypt the cluster data, and then is stored in the temporary key file. When a cluster is read, the appropriate temporary key half is read from the temporary key file, combined with the permanent key half, and then the data is decrypted. Here are the advantages I see with this technique: 1. If you edit a sensitive file and save several versions of it, no 2 versions of the file, or even any 2 4K sections of the file will be encrypted with the same key, so an attacker will not have many instances of similar ciphertexts as obvious targest for attack. 2. If you need to destroy the encrypted data quickly, and have the temporary key file on separate media, (like a CDRW) the temporary key file can be destroyed quickly (microwave the CDRW until extra crispy) thereby rendering the encrypted data unrecoverable even if the main passphrase is rubberhosed out of someone. Imaginative encryption driver design could have several temporary key files; a real one and several dummies, so that an attacker could be confused as to which file was real until the real one had already been destroyed. The temporary key file could also be located in a remote location (preferably somewhere with no extradition treaty with your jurisdiction) if you can find a party there who would be trusted to cut off access to, and securely destroy the real temporary key file (They could continue to provide access to a bogus one) if a certain signal was received. If I ever tell you to write value X to block Y of the key file, assume I have been arrested and burn the CD the real key file lives on... If you wanted to get really fancy you could use secret splitting or RAID techniques where the temporary key file is split into X pieces, and Y number of pieces are needed to reconstitute the entire file. You can use whatever values of X and Y you need to satisfy operational reliability requirements and your paranoia level. Comments, nits to pick?
RE: disk encryption modes
Title: RE: disk encryption modes With a 4096 byte cluster size, 1 GB of drive space would require 4 MB temporary key file storage. At this ratio, a 128 MB compact flash card could hold a key file for 32 GB of hard drive space. The key file could be stored on the same physical drive if you wanted to do so, but putting it on separate, and easily microwaveable media gives you the wipe all the data without touching the actual hard drive capability. If you trust the reliability of the storage hardware, you could send the main drive the encrypted data and the temporary keyfile drive the temp key data concurrently and let the drive buffering do its magic without a major performance hit. Reliability would be a significant issue, since losing keyfile data would mean the loss of a proportionally larger amount of data on the main storage device. If operational reliability is really super-important, having 2 copies of the key file on separate CDRW's would up the warm-and-fuzzy factor, but require the destruction of both CD's or CF cards or whatever to securely destroy the data. The main feature I was going for was the ability to give a semi-trusted third party out of the reach of your local men-with-guns the ability to irrevocably destroy your data in an emergency, without giving the third party any of your actual data. If the I need you to destroy the keyfile NOW signal was automatically sent to the third party after N failed login attempts by the encryption driver (by writing a pre-arranged random value to a pre-arranged random section of the key file) you wouldn't even have to be conscious. And your (semi) trusted third party could have a similar arrangement with you, to covertly warn you if he was compromised. This design is intended primarily for applications where complete loss of the data is less dire than disclosure of the data to the wrong parties. For these applications, security considerations would probably be more important than absolute cutting-edge performance. but since the keyfile data would be about 0.4% of the actual stored data, I think it could be done reasonably reliably without a noticeable performance hit. One real-world application that comes to mind for this idea is encryption for a corporate laptop computer. The laptop has an encrypted partition containing the sensitive corporate data, and the keyfile for that partition is stored at corporate HQ. In order for the encrypted partition to be accessed, the laptop has to have a live connection to corporate HQ. Even if this connection was a 33.6 kilobit dialup, you could still encrypt and decrypt at over 800 kilobytes per second, which is fast enough to open up most files in a reasonable amount of time. (The laptop/HQ connection would need to be end-to-end encrypted and authenticated to prevent an attacker from gradually acquiring the keyfile.) If the laptop is stolen, the thief gets none of the encrypted data, and runs the risk of having the computer tattle on his location via caller ID, GPS, or other means when it phones home. You could also use this concept for pay-per-view digital content, but of course it doesn't address the unsolvable issue of once the consumer has decrypted the content, how to make them play nice with it and not redistribute it. -Original Message- From: Bill Stewart [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Monday, April 29, 2002 2:16 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: disk encryption modes At 01:13 AM 04/29/2002 -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [each cluster has 128 bits permanent half-key, 128 bits nonce half-key...] are for the second cluster, and so on. Each time a disk cluster is written to, a new temporary half-key is pulled from the (P)RNG and used to encrypt the cluster data, and then is stored in the temporary key file. When a cluster is read, the appropriate temporary key half is read from the temporary key file, combined with the permanent key half, and then the data is decrypted. At least it's big enough to prevent searches through the space. But it not only requires managing the extra key-file (which could be pretty large, and needs to be kept somewhere, apparently not in the same file system), it potentially requires two disk reads per block instead of just one, which is a major performance hit unless you're good at predictive caching, and more seriously it requires two writes that both succeed. If you write the key first and don't write out the block, you can't decrypt the old block that was there, while if you write the block first and don't succeed in writing the key, you can't decrypt the new block. This makes depending on caching writes much more difficult - it's already one of the things that helps make systems fast and either reliable or unreliable, and you've made it tougher as well as requiring two disk spins. You can get some relief using non-volatile memory (the way the Legato Prestoserve did for NFS acceleration - first cache the write in
Re: Odp: Cypherpunks Europe
Eugen Leitl wrote: On Mon, 29 Apr 2002, Steve Furlong wrote: Blow me. Troll, and ye shalt be heard. Seriously, while the relationship between furriners and merkins has been notoriously strained, might there not be need for a cpunx-europe@? For regional announcements, and such. English to be preferrable mode of communication, but occasional multilingual excursions could be perhaps tolerated (yes, even frogspeak). The rationale is to mutually decouple regionally and politically local babble. Who feels compelled to keep track of everything, can always subscribe to a yet another list. What say ye, Eurotrash? Wouldn't get me anywhere, since I'd be on both lists... Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.thebunker.net/ There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit. - Robert Woodruff
Re: Cypherpunks Europe
I don't think you get freelance IRA guys. Not with both kneecaps, anyway. might be surprised - donations from the states have apparently tailled off (having been the subject of a terrorist attack themselves they seem less willing to fund them) and they could do with the revenue - but you are probably better off talking with the dodgier firms in london - the prices will be better and they will do a more professional/painful job. The price improvement is because reusable sledgehammers are cheaper than having to dispose of a gun ;) L** G*** is a nice man. He wrote that the Cult of the Dead Cow were a bunch of barely literate mindless American teenage delinquents. If they lived in England they could possibly sue him for that :-) Maybe they could anyhow - juristiction shopping isn't exclusive to LG. In fact, I am sure half the list will chip in a tenner or so each to help out the legal fees ;)
Re: Cypherpunks Europe
Tim May wrote: Not sure about the rest of europe - but we have a targetted crypto list in the UK (UKCrypto, sensibly enough) so already have a forum for uk-specific issues. Thats not to say some of it wouldn't be better here - but I am sure our problems with .. [name elide to prevent His search engines from finding text with His name in it and then threatening legal action.] Well, he's not quite as bad as Sr Ac used to be. Do you mean _Him_? He indeed means Dr. L G* a long-time reader of, and spasmodic contributor to, the UKcrypto Cyber-rights-UK mailing lists. Has recently been the main troll in sidelining a thread on something I've forgotten about into a rehash of censorship/anti-censorship arguments. I once followed-up to a post mentioning Him and received many threatening e-mails demanding that I cancel my post and inform Google that it was to be removed forthwith or both Google and myself and my ISP would face massive legal attack. He makes anti-Choatian category errors - sort of I understand physics therefore I understand ethics|law|politics|society - delete as appropriate. The main one being that he really seems to think that if something is against the law then it shouldn't happen, and that it can be prevented. Ah, I remember - the thread was about Deutsche Bahn suing ISPs who allowed links to websites purporting to contain instructions for disabling German railways. I was tempted to tell him, and his lawyers (er, barristers) to fuck off. Lawyers will do. Barristers are professional advocates, lawyers who plead in court. Very unlikely to be writing cease-and-desist letters. In England retail lawyers are solicitors. Either than or to hire a freelance IRA guy to blow him up. I don't think you get freelance IRA guys. Not with both kneecaps, anyway. L** G*** is a nice man. He wrote that the Cult of the Dead Cow were a bunch of barely literate mindless American teenage delinquents. If they lived in England they could possibly sue him for that :-) Ken
Re: p2p and asymmetric bandwidth (Re: Fear and Futility at CodeCon)
-- On 29 Apr 2002 at 14:58, Sampo Syreeni wrote: [IPv6] nicely solves the problem with NATs, true. However, most firewalls I know are there for security reasons. Those will likely be adapted to work for 6to4 as well. The transition period will likely see some cracks where p2p can work, but I suspect those will be closed in due course. Customers want P2P. Businesses will supply it. The reason they are not supplying it now is that there is an IP shortage. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG LFpwFHMRzVb3bItJnefOQKed+0h+Ra8Z4V5mtA1b 4U8h947/ql0vOFSk9s9IMkJ1fW8pZPVSSfyvCOL0R
Re: Upcoming workshop on category theory and concurrency
On Monday, April 29, 2002, at 09:29 AM, dmolnar wrote: [concerning category theory and crypto protocols] So when you have done some real work on the matter, at least written some paper on the stuff, and published it, you may well write about it here. I think that sets the bar a bit too high - there is a place for saying this area looks interesting and relevant, but I don't have it down yet. Perhaps one thing to do might be to make the discussion more specific by finding particular applications of category theory to areas close to cryptography and looking at those applications in more detail. (No, I'm not necessarily volunteering to do this.) I chose not to reply to KPJ for two reasons: 1. His whine was that he/she/it didn't think I'd done enough to justify commenting. 2. I checked, and could find no other messages, ever, from KPJ. (It's possible he/she/it posted before, and I deleted the messagesI only keep about half of all posts which make it past my filters.) There's no doubt in my mind that commenting on factors affecting crypto today and also commenting on math of possible relevance to crypto protocols is AT LEAST as on-topic as much of what gets posted here. In any case, if KPJ doesn't want to read it, he/she/it should know what to do. In any case, if Tim or anyone else wants to submit a paper, this is a page on a workshop in Categorical Methods for Concurrency, Interaction, and Mobility http://www.cwi.nl/events/2002/cmcim/ the call for papers just showed up in my inbox yesterday. While not specifically about crypto protocols, interaction and mobility seems to cover some of what I think Tim is getting at. I'll have more to say about what I'm getting at when I a) know more, and b) take the time to write up a teaching essay. In the meantime, I suggest KPJ establish a track record for interesting posts before taking more potshots. --Tim May A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects. --Robert A. Heinlein
Re: Upcoming workshop on category theory and concurrency
It appears as if Tim May [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: | |I chose not to reply to KPJ for two reasons: But you _did_ in fact reply, through the cypherpunks list. So I presume you meant to perform a social gesture of some kind, which, to me, suggests you felt an emotional reaction to my post. These social rituals apparently mean a lot to many people. |1. His whine was that he/she/it didn't think I'd done enough to |justify commenting. You have entered self-defence mode instead of reading the stated points. Standard human behaviour, but inappropriate. Try to avoid it. Emotions will cloud your rational mind. Correction: I have not stated anything on whether you have written ``enough'' (whatever that might mean). Your statements above imply that you believe I did. If you do, you are in error, and should repent. |2. I checked, and could find no other messages, ever, from KPJ. (It's |possible he/she/it posted before, and I deleted the messagesI only |keep about half of all posts which make it past my filters.) Yes, humans forget easily, a mark of a short-lived species and a small brain capacity (e.g. elephants remember much longer due to their larger memory). A human can remember more and better using mnemotechnic tool, organisation, and technology. With a wearable and a Remembrance Agent you can remember every post you have ever seen, if you so wish. Will you also avoid talking to somebody on the street unless you have a memory of ever having received a formal presentation or business card from that person? I have noticed this on-line anomaly which several people: they require more data on an online communication subject than on an offline communication subject. Appears irrational to me: online security can never become higher than physical security of the subject. But I disgress. |There's no doubt in my mind that commenting on factors affecting crypto |today and also commenting on math of possible relevance to crypto |protocols is AT LEAST as on-topic as much of what gets posted here. In |any case, if KPJ doesn't want to read it, he/she/it should know what to |do. On topic, maybe. But as you so eloquently stated, not cypherpunks-y. Idle guesses as to whether something might prove useful to encryption someday makes interesting fantasy for people who enjoy fantasy. Nothing more. Hard work, using the scientific method (including peer review), OTOH, changes the world. You can make a difference with science as your companion. Therefore, if one wish to changes the world, one should avoid idle guesses and do hard, scientific work on the matter. Thus, ``cypherpunks write code''. Have you forgotten? FYI: I read _everything_ on this list, including the posts of unit Mathew X. | In any case, if Tim or anyone else wants to submit a paper, this is a | page | on a workshop in Categorical Methods for Concurrency, Interaction, and | Mobility | http://www.cwi.nl/events/2002/cmcim/ | | the call for papers just showed up in my inbox yesterday. While not | specifically about crypto protocols, interaction and mobility seems to | cover some of what I think Tim is getting at. | |I'll have more to say about what I'm getting at when I a) know more, and |b) take the time to write up a teaching essay. Excellent! Looking forward to read about it. |In the meantime, I suggest KPJ establish a track record for |interesting posts before taking more potshots. Whether others interest themselves in my comments lacks relevance to me. In fact, the less people know about me, the better for my purposes. As the old saying goes: The interest lies in the reader's cognitive centre, just as beauty lies in the viewer's esthetic centre. Cheers, /kpj _ I will not be pushed, filed, stamped, indexed, briefed, debriefed, or numbered. My life is my own.
attack on rfc3211 mode (Re: disk encryption modes)
On Mon, Apr 29, 2002 at 11:58:46AM +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: Adam Back [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: | [RFC3211 mode] are you sure it's not vulnerable to splicing attacks (swapping ciphertext blocks around to get a partial plaintext change which recovers after a block or two)? CBC mode has this property, and this mode seems more like CBC in CBC than a CBC-MACed CBC-encrypted message -- there can't be a MAC property as such because there is no where to store one, so the best you could hope for is earch byte of plaintext depends on each byte of ciphertext, and this is the property I'm questioning based on the usual CBC splicing attacks. It is a CBC MAC. A CBC MAC encrypts n blocks and then takes the final output as the MAC. Now look at where the IV for the second pass comes from. It's a nice trick, because it works without any data expansion. I can see that, but the security of CBC MAC relies on the secrecy of the ciphertexts leading up to the last block. In the case of the mode you describe in RFC3211, the ciphertexts are not revealed directly but they are protected under a mode which has the same splicing attack. The splicing attack on CBC MAC with leading ciphertext works through CBC encryption, here's how that works: Consider plaintext P1,P2,P4,P5, first pass ciphertext A1,...,A5 and second pass ciphertext B1,...,B5: If we swap the first and second blocks of ciphertext (B1,B2) like this: B1'=B2, B2'=B1, B3'=B3, B4'=B4, B5'=B5 and then try decrypting as usual with the two pass mode, first decrypt B5 using B4 as IV to get A5: IV = A5 = D(B5)+B4 = A5 so the IV is the same. Then decrypt B1' to B4' to get A1' to A4': A1'=B1+A2+A5,A2'=A5+A1+B1',A3'=B2+A3+B2',A4'=A4 So the CBC mode has recovered by A4, then decyrpt A1',...,A5' using IV of 0 as usual to get P1',...P5': P1'=D(B1+A2+A5),P2'=D(A2')+A1',P3'=D(A3')+A2',P4'=A3+A3',P5'=P5 and you can see we have effected a partial and targetted garbling of the plaintext. I would have thought this would be considered a 'break' of a non-malleable cipher mode as discussed for disk encryption where each bit of plaintext depends on each bit of ciphertext as would be the case with a secure cipher matching Mercy's design goals (a block cipher used in ECB mode with a different key per block). With a disk mode, unlike with RFC3211 pasword based encryption for CMS there is no place to store the structure inside the plaintext which may to some extent defend against this attack. Adam -- http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/
Re: Re: Got carried away...
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- I have been thinking about the window problem and the ignition too. What I was thinking was a car of the not so far future. Where there wont be any windows because the driver will see the outside throu a camera and he wont need regular lights cause there'll be ultraviolet or something like that. The car will be like a little tank, so to speak. If the thief can't get in, then the ignition problem wouldn't exist. So someone can steel the pgp keys of the driver, but what if the key was, say a tatoe on his hand and would be visible only when the drivers was thinking of say... green fried tomatoes. Ok, so the thief managed to get into the car. There still voice recognition, fingerprints, retina scan, DNA scan, and whatever you can think of. I know this will be expensive, but in the future, well lets just say I don't think it's going to be sweet. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: PGP 2.6.3ia Charset: cp850 Comment: information is ammunition iQEVAwUBPM3CnA/jCFZJN2XlAQFS+Qf/V7sUMXZFYMilT4kmRFMy3Ml1XfAEHzPO cKLMNtYtWpZtzKf1SzlYVXBK8tLLh9+aG7o76DHRKdytDQwQ06nHwEpcqTyishCP ws/ytHwL9/fsFD2I1xPxcdH0fcL0/0IWA1jIoXm3MkaIvL7ALWe4IdQRKq2dnxVH mVsjmt8zVMhyTBE6U0gW7Qkyp6pitYP+5cQ+p9vOvt9c49ucVsWbMyZEXDRC752L rHbdascXOVJPkzCmtT0qrCt65/xS7w/tkcAzf0m6c6hrwMyzucKDTBmKWOy2aq0a dbL4Juiq/e/HQh5Jrd8Jq9KvLxI4i5XEGuOVZ4fMY4JjuI1/cbcM6A== =Hlob -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Siedzisz i czytasz... a tam ktos wlasnie wykupuje Twoj urlop! http://link.interia.pl/f15b1
BBC2 to recreate Stanford Prison Experiment
..from an ad in circulation on BBC2 (UK) if I recall inaccurately. If they shaved your head, would you lose your individuality? If they took away your name, would they take your identity? [..] 16(?) men. Half with power, half with none. See how events unfold in: The Experiment. Coming soon to BBC2... -- We don't need no steenking badges!!! - Blazing Saddles.
(Resend) UK's biggest e-pedo bust ever! .. Yet
70 more e-pedophiles busted in War To Protect A Single Child. Big bust of those who trade in verboten pixels on Tuesday. Computers towed away to be impounded and none or more children relocated to safer accomodation. Link between pornography and action becomes clearer, movie at 11. The only interesting part was the company/product touted as the new tool to pierce chatroom user's illusions of anonymity. Surfcontrol even got to whore their product on the wall behind the interviewees. This tool allows the authorities to trace a user back to their ISP, who then turns over their True Name. The video distributed by the authorities (same images on rotation on all news progroms) shows newsgroups entitled alt.sex.children and alt.sex.paedophilla, like that isn't a stupid name for a group. Can anyone please verify if these groups actually exist? (or have ever) I can't, Big Brother Is Watching Me. It's safer if you do it for me, honest. Channel 5's sensationalistic news coverage was the worst. First Kirsty Young introduced the article as A World-Wide-Weapon Against Our Children? Then Matthew Wright, host of daytime talk show The Wright Stuff (You know its Wright [wing!]) just about declares, When I hear about child pornography, there ain't a civil libertarian bone in my body! There can be no excess in the pursuit of e-paedophillia! He then goes on to say we will never be fully rid of child pornography since the most determined will always find a way, but just like we can't solve every murder, there is no reason to give up and legalise murder. The problem with the internet is that it allows the curious to find thoughtcrime rather than just the already committed. No shit Sherlock! How long did it take you to figure that out? And then the conversation gradually drifted round to putting more(?) pressure on PC retailers to ship NannyWare by default. How installing blocking software on my childrens' boxen is going to stop e-pedos exchanging verboten pixels I don't know. Do I detect the subtle fragrance of Agenda(TM) pour Hominid? Remember this is the Channel that brought us the hourly headlines, as in, Media Break(TM) You give us two minutes: we'll give you the world. I guess whatever scares the punters sells more tabloids ^h^h^h^h^h^h^h^h responsible news media^h^h^h^h^h^h message. -- You do not need to see my citations. These are not the trolls you're looking for.
Re: Re: Odp: Cypherpunks Europe
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Greetings. From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] On 28 Apr 2002 at 22:26, Jan Dobrucki wrote: and third, Americans say, respect human rights, when the US hasn't signed any conventions protecting human rights, because if it did, it would have to stop sending people to death row. Yet oddly, the people drawing up these conventions were not restrained from using slave labor, terror against their subjects, mass murder of political opponents, etc. Yes you are correct. The US did participate in the creation but it didn't sign it. And this is Europe 21st century. We don't do that sort of thing anymore. We Europeans. At least those that I know of. Yes, ex-Yugoslavia could be an exception, but there was a civil war going on. Apart from that all nations have their dark past. It just depends if it comes out, when and if it ever ends. Jan Dobrucki -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: PGP 2.6.3ia Charset: cp850 Comment: information is ammunition iQEVAwUBPM3kww/jCFZJN2XlAQF64Qf/cXlIeS7csH7G6zCyOvF08h3bX9DoNLZd xyVe7HlRvaU0RNBwJFOGw0e4xUQLDB+1cbzIvmpTSAic4imyBCbUaHS5NG2XQFrg /UkS5CAT9jZK9D4Eoogt86LvRk6QzB7TFAjVhbosoMfvMeDib9DjPZ+WaKt3lXLG o2FGToyOQ3Acmf+EBIaBQVseDEEnUPTNYF2vKlrsyjNEqeaTwuUOv13v+njQIBtN D7MWMhwU4RJDETfFI61DjpNPWIaqdUsgbHxDmLVmBaGtH/xy9KbKr4BGKNPA ERk60UkX0Sn1FVOg1LXH+O1PYFfda/+qOpxgsojl41s6tX4B7rjv3A== =o4GQ -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Siedzisz i czytasz... a tam ktos wlasnie wykupuje Twoj urlop! http://link.interia.pl/f15b1
