Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
The Java Anonymous Proxy (JAP) service, your local library, and you, among others need to develop a response should you be served with an order (court or otherwise) to produce information which includes the requirement that you keep the order secret. There are a large number of responses one could use. Some of them might be: * Cooperate. * Take the service down. * Publicly refuse to cooperate. * Publicly announce that you are being monitored. * Stop saying that the service is not monitored. * Appear to cooperate, but provide false information. * etc. Please keep in mind when reading the following analysis that I am not a lawyer. Cooperation seems to be the safest from a short term legal standpoint. However, to the extent it encourages the police state, it is dangerous in the long term. Taking the service down is an obvious response. It is a difficult response for your public library to implement. In addition, a strict enough secrecy order could require you to keep the service up. Publicly refusing to cooperate is the most honorable response, and will probably end you up in jail for an indefinite term on contempt charges. This is the path of civil disobedience, followed by a number of heros in past encounters with totalitarianism. Publicly announcing that you are being monitored will probably end up with the same contempt charges as a public refusal to cooperate, coupled with the possibility of the dishonorable act of breaking your word (depending on your terms of service). Stopping your notification that the service is not monitored can be forbidden by a strict enough secrecy order. It may be the least legally risky of the options. The fact that you will stop notification should be included in your terms of service. Providing false information is an interesting option, but I think you are legal toast if you are caught doing it. One can get a lot of amusement from considering who to implicate in place of the real anonymous user. Cheers - Bill - Bill Frantz | A Jobless Recovery is | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | like a Breadless Sand- | 16345 Englewood Ave. [EMAIL PROTECTED] | wich. -- Steve Schear | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA
Re: traffix analysis
as a solid dish. (The uwaves see the screen as solid, however.) With that much gain (ie directionality) wind could mess with your (albeit brief) connection. This one has 30 degree coverage and is perfect for connecting to consumer APs up to a mile: http://www.tranzeo.com/products.php?cmd=viewpageid=102 Car window glass will cost you about 1.5-2 dB. = end (of original message) Y-a*h*o-o (yes, they scan for this) spam follows: __ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! SiteBuilder - Free, easy-to-use web site design software http://sitebuilder.yahoo.com
Re: DoS of spam blackhole lists
On Fri, 29 Aug 2003, Andrew Thomas wrote: Considering that it appears that spammers are now resorting to DoS'ing sites that host spam lists, wouldn't now be a good time to investigate the possibilities of a distributed, or at least, load balanced blacklist provider? That's an interesting reaction to the problem. Here's a better idea: a) admit that your stupid, self-appointed-netcop blacklists and self-righteous spam projects are inherently flawed, and are generally populated by spam reports made by clueless idiots that don't realize they are reporting forged and/or incorrect addresses. The net effect is that a lot of innocent bystanders/IP-blocks/ISPs waste a lot of time dealing with your self-righteous crusader projects. b) realize that the distributed method you suggest already exists - it is called procmail(*). Please spend your sophomore year working on something besides self-appointed-spam-netcop-site-of-the-week. (*) or you could setup a dummy email account on all web-published documents, and delete any email that arrives in both mailboxes, or you could implement a challenge/response mechanism for all new senders. All three mechanisms mentioned are distributed, independent, and don't require some asshole swooping in to save us with his miraculous spews database. - John Kozubik - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - http://www.kozubik.com
Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
At 01:54 PM 8/29/2003 -0700, you wrote: Stopping your notification that the service is not monitored can be forbidden by a strict enough secrecy order. It may be the least legally risky of the options. The fact that you will stop notification should be included in your terms of service. All covered in my previous postings. This approach should be particularly applicable to ISPs as they generally have billing arrangement and can add this on as an extra service fee for each inquiry. Instead of court orders being a cost they become a revenue source. steve The fetters imposed on liberty at home have ever been forged out of the weapons provided for defence against real, pretended, or imaginary dangers from abroad. --President James Madison (1751-1836)
Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
On Fri, 29 Aug 2003, Tim May wrote: But when Big Brother commands that his Carnivore boxes be added, ISPs are afraid to shoot his agents who trespass. Just for the record, as someone who is in a position to have first-hand personal knowledge of this... When the various plastic-id carrying critters came around asking to let ISPs install Carnivores just after 9/11, they were almost all turned away. The notable exceptions were from companies that are (not surprisingly) based outside of the US. I was *stunned* at how many ISPs told them to fuck off (including, I am happy to say, the one I work at).. When a court order is present - that is a whole new ball game: nobody will refuse that. And so the work is done for free. And so, too, will the fees you talk about be waived. Free under the duress of a court order is AFAIK virgin territory here. There is no question that installing a DCS1000 is no small task when you're dealing with modern high speed circuits (OC12s and up), and will require significant planning and engineering support to accomplish without devastating interruptions in service - this is a significant expense to the business being ordered to comply. I would be surprised if this went on without compensation, even if at a reduced rate. And the sheer expense may in and of itself be a controlling factor in such orders. I know that they are rare enough to cause ripples of whispers in the NSP/ISP community. I think my solution may be best: take a few ISPs who have bent over for Big Brother and kill their owners and staff. A few ISP owners found necklaced and smoking may send a message to others. It works for the Mob in a way none of the more civilized approaches can possibly work. You narc us out, we douse your children with gasoline and light them off. Your choice. Sometimes freedom demands harshness. Make them move to Texas. Force them to listen to recordings of Shrub all day, while sitting in the hot Texas sun. --Tim May -- Yours, J.A. Terranson [EMAIL PROTECTED] Every living thing dies alone. Donnie Darko
Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
On Friday, August 29, 2003, at 03:28 PM, Steve Schear wrote: At 01:54 PM 8/29/2003 -0700, you wrote: Stopping your notification that the service is not monitored can be forbidden by a strict enough secrecy order. It may be the least legally risky of the options. The fact that you will stop notification should be included in your terms of service. All covered in my previous postings. This approach should be particularly applicable to ISPs as they generally have billing arrangement and can add this on as an extra service fee for each inquiry. Instead of court orders being a cost they become a revenue source. This has been proposed for, but it fails for the usual reasons. An ISP is free to say anyone requesting a tap is required to pay a fee, just as any ISP is free to say that it will handle installation of special Carnivore equipment for a certain fee. But when Big Brother commands that his Carnivore boxes be added, ISPs are afraid to shoot his agents who trespass. And so the work is done for free. And so, too, will the fees you talk about be waived. I think my solution may be best: take a few ISPs who have bent over for Big Brother and kill their owners and staff. A few ISP owners found necklaced and smoking may send a message to others. It works for the Mob in a way none of the more civilized approaches can possibly work. You narc us out, we douse your children with gasoline and light them off. Your choice. Sometimes freedom demands harshness. --Tim May
