NYTimes article on privacy, identity theft

2005-05-19 Thread Bill Stewart
http://nytimes.com/2005/05/18/technology/18data.html?hpex=1116475200en=7f0572052438ec3bei=5094partner=homepage
Good NYTimes article on privacy, identity theft, and
easy correlation of data in public records.
Usual Suspect Professor Avi Rubin at Johns Hopkins
has his grad students demonstrating things you can find out.
Betty Ostergren's Virginia Watchdog website
http://www.opcva.com/watchdog/
reinforces complaints about public records privacy
by outing the records of public officials to make her points to them.
[NYTimes articles usually require free registration;
I'm not sure if there's currently a cypherpunks userID there,
but I think some of the strings following the ? in the URL
indicate that you don't need registration if you use this URL..]
Bill Stewart


Re: NYTimes article on privacy, identity theft

2005-05-19 Thread Michael Silk
On 5/18/05, Bill Stewart [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 http://nytimes.com/2005/05/18/technology/18data.html?hpex=1116475200en=7f0572052438ec3bei=5094partner=homepage
 
 Good NYTimes article on privacy, identity theft, and
 easy correlation of data in public records.
 Usual Suspect Professor Avi Rubin at Johns Hopkins
 has his grad students demonstrating things you can find out.
 Betty Ostergren's Virginia Watchdog website
 http://www.opcva.com/watchdog/
 reinforces complaints about public records privacy
 by outing the records of public officials to make her points to them.
 
 [NYTimes articles usually require free registration;
 I'm not sure if there's currently a cypherpunks userID there,
 but I think some of the strings following the ? in the URL
 indicate that you don't need registration if you use this URL..]

there is also 'bugmenot.com', last time i tried it took about the 16th
ID, but it worked.

-- Michael

 
 Bill Stewart



Re: Len Adleman (of R,S, and A): Universities need a little Limbaugh

2005-05-19 Thread cypherpunk
  Now before you label me as a right-wing ideologue, let me present my
 credentials as a centrist. Limbaugh has well-known positions on the
 following issues: abortion, capital punishment, affirmative action, prayer
 in school, gun control, the Iraq war. I disagree with him on half of these.

Any speculations on which half?  My guess is that he agrees on
affirmative action and gun control (opposing both) and probably the
Iraq war (a conservative is a liberal who's been mugged, and many
people took 9/11 personally).  He certainly disagrees on prayer in
school, probably on capital punishment (opposing both, while Limbaugh
supports them), and probably supports abortion rights, which Limbaugh
opposes.

CP



Re: /. [Dissidents Seeking Anonymous Web Solutions?]

2005-05-19 Thread cypherpunk
 Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/05/13/0250226
[1]DocMurphy asks: I'm working with some dissidents who are looking
for ways to use the Internet from within repressive regimes. Many have
in-home Internet access, but think it too risky to participate in
pro-freedom activities on home PCs. Internet cafis are also available,
but although fairly anonymous, every machine may be infected with
keystroke loggers that give governments access to and knowledge of
'banned' sites. Dissidents not only want to remain anonymous
themselves, but also wish to not compromise the sites they access. Any
suggestions for products/procedures/systems out there making anonymous
access  publishing a reality under repressive regime run Internet
access?

There were some good ideas presented, the best of which were probably
to first compose an email at home, then PGP encrypt it, then stego-ize
it, then put it on a USB token and bring it to the internet cafe, and
send it there.  For receiving, download a bunch of junk from a mailing
list used for this purpose onto the token, go home and de-stego and
de-PGP it.

This doesn't work though for web browsing. For that you need a real
time channel. You can go to various proxies, and some people run them
specifically to help the Chinese, the slashdot replies talked about
this. But first, the Chinese block them when they find out, and
second, it makes you look suspicious if you're visiting one.

Be nice if there were a high bandwidth stego channel that was widely
available. For example, imagine an open source P2P multi player game
which intentionally included a reasonably high bandwidth channel of
random data. It would be a service to the public to play this game and
thereby provide people who need it the ability to communicate
undetectably. Dissidents could use a hacked version which would
replace some of the random noise bits with their messages. Only the
recipients could distinguish the results from noise.

CP



Re: Secure MPC( ab )

2005-05-19 Thread Sarad AV
hi,

--- Adam Back [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 There is a simple protocol for this described in
 Schneier's Applied
 Crypto if you have one handy...
 
Yes, I found it. Thankyou.


--- cypherpunk [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
That is
 known as a multi party computation or MPC

True, Its a secure MPC protocol. I confused it with
Zero knowledge protocols.


--- Justin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 I don't recall that particular protocol in AC, but
 it's a mistake to
 call such a thing zero-knowledge, since it
 mandatorily leaks ~1.585
 bits of information (the first time) about the other
 person's integer.

How is there information leakage?

Mr.Bruce Schneier in his book titled  Appiled
Cryptography mentions the following MPC protocol to
compare the income of two parties, Alice and Bob
without revealing their income.

The protocol works as follows:

Let 'i' be Alice's income.
Let 'j' be Bob's income.

Let Eb be Bob's public key.
Let Db be Bob's privare key.
Let n be Bob's public modulus.

To start with we assume that the range of i and j is
from 1 to 100.

1) Alice chooses a random number x and using Bob's
public key computes

c=x^Eb (mod n)

2) Alice computes k = c-i and sends the result to Bob.

3) Bob computes the following 100 numbers

y1 = (k+1)^Db (mod n)
y2 = (k+2)^Db (mod n)

[.]

y100 = (k+100)^Db (mod n)

Bob now chooses a large prime p, such that px. Bob
doesnot know the value of x but Alice can tell Bob
about the _size_ of x.

4) Bob then computes

z1 = y1 (mod p)
z2 = y2 (mod p)

[.]

z100 = y100 (mod p)

He verifies that |zi-zj|=2 for all i,j in the range 1
to 100. If this is not true Bob chooses another prime
and starts again.

5) Bob sends Alice the sequence in the exact order

let _ denote subscript, e.g. a_b is a subscript b.

Z1, Z2, ...,Zj, Z_(j+1) +1, ..., Z_(j+100) +1, p

6) Alice checks if the  (i th) number in the sequence
is congruent to 
x mod p. If yes, she concludes i=j, otherwise ij.


When we have the case ij, Bob computes Z_(j+1) +1,
.., Z_(j+100) +1, this makes the (i th) sequence
Alice looks at incongruent (mod p) and makes the
protocol work. We have |zi-zj|=2 so that the
sequences donot collide with one another.

The protocol as such donot detect cheaters in the
scheme.


thanks,
Sarad.




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