Re: On the orthogonality of anonymity to current market demand

2005-11-01 Thread Chris Palmer
James A. Donald writes:

 Further, genuinely secure systems are now becoming available, notably
 Symbian.

What does it mean for Symbian to be genuinely secure? How was this
determined and achieved?


-- 
http://www.eff.org/about/staff/#chris_palmer



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Re: On the orthogonality of anonymity to current market demand

2005-11-01 Thread Peter Gutmann
Chris Palmer [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
James A. Donald writes:

 Further, genuinely secure systems are now becoming available, notably
 Symbian.

What does it mean for Symbian to be genuinely secure? How was this determined
and achieved?

By executive fiat.

Peter.



Re: On the orthogonality of anonymity to current market demand

2005-11-01 Thread James A. Donald
James A. Donald writes:
  Further, genuinely secure systems are now becoming available, notably
  Symbian.

Chris Palmer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 What does it mean for Symbian to be genuinely secure? How was this
 determined and achieved?

There is no official definition of genuinely secure, and it is my 
judgment that Symbian is unlikely to suffer the worm, virus and 
trojan problems to the extent that has plagued other systems.





Re: On the orthogonality of anonymity to current market demand

2005-10-31 Thread johns
hi

( 05.10.26 09:17 -0700 ) James A. Donald:
 While many people are rightly concerned that DRM will
 ultimately mean that the big corporation, and thus the
 state, has root access to their computers and the owner
 does not, it also means that trojans, viruses, and
 malware does not.

do you really think this is true?

doesn't microsoft windows prove that remote control of computers only
leads to compromise? [especially in our heavily networked world]

and doesn't history show that big corporations are only interested in
revenue- so that if they get revenue by forcing you to pay them fees for
'upkeep' of your digital credentials to keep your computer working they
are going to do that.

the problems 'solved' by DRM can also be solved by moving to an
operating system where you have control of it, instead of an operating
system filled with hooks so other people can control your computer.

and that operating system is freely available ...

-- 
\js oblique strategy: don't be frightened of cliches



Re: On the orthogonality of anonymity to current market demand

2005-10-31 Thread R.A. Hettinga
At 10:22 AM -0500 10/31/05, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
and doesn't history show that big corporations are only interested in
revenue

One should hope so.

;-)

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'



Re: On the orthogonality of anonymity to current market demand

2005-10-26 Thread John Kelsey
From: R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Oct 25, 2005 8:34 AM
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: On the orthogonality of anonymity to current market demand

..
That is to say, your analysis conflicts with the whole trend towards
T-0 trading, execution, clearing and settlement in the capital
markets, and, frankly, with all payment in general as it gets
increasingly granular and automated in nature. The faster you can
trade or transact business with the surety that the asset in question
is now irrevocably yours, the more trades and transactions you can
do, which benefits not only the individual trader but markets as a
whole.

The prerequisite for all this is that when the asset changes hands,
it's very nearly certain that this was the intention of the asset's
previous owner.  My point isn't to express my love for book-entry
payment systems.  There's plenty to hate about them.  But if the
alternative is an anonymous, irreversible payment system whose control
lies in software running alongside three pieces of spyware on my
Windows box, they probably still win for most people.  Even bad
payment systems are better than ones that let you have everything in
your wallet stolen by a single attack.  

..
However anonymous irrevocability might offend one's senses and
cause one to imagine the imminent heat-death of the financial
universe (see Gibbon, below... :-)), I think that technology will
instead step up to the challenge and become more secure as a
result. 

What's with the heat-death nonsense?  Physical bearer instruments
imply stout locks and vaults and alarm systems and armed guards and
all the rest, all the way down to infrastructure like police forces
and armies (private or public) to avoid having the biggest gang end up
owning all the gold.  Electronic bearer instruments imply the same
kinds of things, and the infrastructure for that isn't in place.  It's
like telling people to store their net worth in their homes, in gold.
That can work, but you probably can't leave the cheapest lock sold at
Home Depot on your front door and stick the gold coins in the same
drawer where you used to keep your checkbook.

And, since internet bearer transactions are, by their very
design, more secure on public networks than book-entry transactions
are in encrypted tunnels on private networks, they could even be said
to be secure *in spite* of the fact that they're anonymous; that --
as it ever was in cryptography -- business can be transacted between
two parties even though they don't know, or trust, each other.

Why do you say internet bearer transactions are more secure?  I can
see more efficient, but why more secure?  It looks to me like both
kinds of payment system are susceptible to the same broad classes of
attacks (bank misbehavior (for a short time), someone finding a
software bug, someone breaking a crypto algorithm or protocol).  What
makes one more secure than the other?  

..
Cheers,
RAH

--John Kelsey



Re: On the orthogonality of anonymity to current market demand

2005-10-26 Thread James A. Donald
--
John Kelsey
 What's with the heat-death nonsense?  Physical bearer
 instruments imply stout locks and vaults and alarm
 systems and armed guards and all the rest, all the way
 down to infrastructure like police forces and armies
 (private or public) to avoid having the biggest gang
 end up owning all the gold.  Electronic bearer
 instruments imply the same kinds of things, and the
 infrastructure for that isn't in place.  It's like
 telling people to store their net worth in their
 homes, in gold. That can work, but you probably can't
 leave the cheapest lock sold at Home Depot on your
 front door and stick the gold coins in the same drawer
 where you used to keep your checkbook.

Some of us get spyware more than others.

Further, genuinely secure systems are now becoming
available, notably Symbian.

While many people are rightly concerned that DRM will
ultimately mean that the big corporation, and thus the
state, has root access to their computers and the owner
does not, it also means that trojans, viruses, and
malware does not. DRM enables secure signing of
transactions, and secure storage of blinded valuable
secrets, since DRM binds the data to the software, and
provides a secure channel to the user.   So secrets
representing ID, and secrets representing value, can
only be manipulated by the software that is supposed to
be manipulating it. 

--digsig
 James A. Donald
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 3CepcQ59MYKAZTizEycP1vkZBbexwbyiobaC/bXS
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