Re: [Reproducible-builds] concrete steps for improving apt downloading security and privacy

2014-10-16 Thread Hans-Christoph Steiner


René Mayrhofer wrote:
 On 2014-09-25 06:24, Hans-Christoph Steiner wrote:

 W. Martin Borgert wrote:
 On 2014-09-24 23:05, Hans-Christoph Steiner wrote:
 * the signature files sign the package contents, not the hash of
   whole .deb file (i.e. control.tar.gz and data.tar.gz).
 So preinst and friends would not be signed? Sounds dangerous to me.
 All package contents would be signed, except the signature itself.  The
 signature would be a separate file in the ar archive of the .deb that signs
 control.tar.gz and data.tar.gz. See jar or apk format for an example of how
 this works.
 I know I'm late to the discussion, but for the record, I fully agree
 with this approach as the probably best compromise between usability
 (don't underestimate that, see the emergence of the various app shops
 for Linux applications), security, and flexibility. If anybody wants to
 work on that, I'm happy to support it in the University Linz context
 (i.e. as student work, thesis, etc.) and contribute to the process
 (although, depressingly but realistically, not the implementation).
 
 Rene

Since you mention Austria, I'll be based in Vienna from Oct 30th until March
3rd, perhaps we could even arrange a dev meeting/sprint on this topic in Linz
or Vienna.

.hc


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Iceweasel and web browsers vulnerabilty concerning poodle.

2014-10-16 Thread Marco Galicia
Hi,

As I know, a new vulnerability called poodle has been discovered regadirng
https. This vulnerabilty takes advantage of the ssl 3.0, and forcecs the
https protocol to use this outdated protocol.

I have been told that a fix for this vulnerabilty is to disable the use of
this protocol in the web browsers.

In inceweasel:

*change this option in about:config*


*security.tls.version.min *

*to 1*


*shoulnd't iceweasel be recompiled to include this option in the
complilation settings??*

*Can it be done officially in debian??*

*Can this be done also for other web browsers??*

If if is not possible to do ti officially??
How can i do it?? What would be the compilation parameter, something like 
/.config  --security.tls-version.min.1??

I have obtained the info from this webiste.

http://www.dmdcosillas.org/2014/10/que-demonios-no-hay-dos-sin-tres/  (in
spanish)
-- 







*Por favor, evite enviarme documentos adjuntos en formato Word Excel o
PowerPoint.Como alternativa puede enviarme documentos en formato odt, odx u
ods, además de documentos en formato pdfSi realmente es necesario enviarme
un documento en formato Word, por favor utilize el formato .doc en lugar de
.docx Vea http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/no-word-attachments.html
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/no-word-attachments.htmlhttp://es.libreoffice.org/
http://es.libreoffice.org/http://getgnulinux.org/es
http://getgnulinux.org/es*


Re: Iceweasel and web browsers vulnerabilty concerning poodle.

2014-10-16 Thread Brad Cable

I would like to point out what security.tls.version.min actually does:

http://kb.mozillazine.org/Security.tls.version.*

Setting security.tls.version.min to 1 allows TLSv1.0 to be used, which 
is vulnerable to a similar padding oracle attack (and timing oracle 
attacks) found long ago.  You should be using a value of 2 for this setting.


-Brad


On 10/16/2014 10:28 AM, Marco Galicia wrote:

Hi,

As I know, a new vulnerability called poodle has been discovered 
regadirng https. This vulnerabilty takes advantage of the ssl 3.0, and 
forcecs the https protocol to use this outdated protocol.


I have been told that a fix for this vulnerabilty is to disable the 
use of this protocol in the web browsers.


In inceweasel:
/change this option in about:config
/
/*
security.tls.version.min
*/
/*to 1
*/
/*
*/
/shoulnd't iceweasel be recompiled to include this option in the 
complilation settings??

/
/Can it be done officially in debian??
/
/Can this be done also for other web browsers??
/

If if is not possible to do ti officially??
How can i do it?? What would be the compilation parameter, something 
like  /.config --security.tls-version.min.1??


I have obtained the info from this webiste.

http://www.dmdcosillas.org/2014/10/que-demonios-no-hay-dos-sin-tres/ 
(in spanish)

--
/Por favor, evite enviarme documentos adjuntos en formato Word Excel o 
PowerPoint.
Como alternativa puede enviarme documentos en formato odt, odx u ods, 
además de documentos en formato pdf
Si realmente es necesario enviarme un documento en formato Word, por 
favor utilize el formato .doc en lugar de .docx


Vea http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/no-word-attachments.html
http://es.libreoffice.org/
http://getgnulinux.org/es
/




Re: Iceweasel and web browsers vulnerabilty concerning poodle.

2014-10-16 Thread Pedro Worcel
​Just something related I happened to stumble across:

http://www.bit-tech.net/news/bits/2014/10/15/google-mozilla-sslv3/1​


Re: Iceweasel and web browsers vulnerabilty concerning poodle.

2014-10-16 Thread Pedro Worcel
Sorry about the double email, this is the original source for Mozilla
https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2014/10/14/the-poodle-attack-and-the-end-of-ssl-3-0/

2014-10-17 9:12 GMT+13:00 Pedro Worcel pe...@worcel.com:

 ​Just something related I happened to stumble across:

 http://www.bit-tech.net/news/bits/2014/10/15/google-mozilla-sslv3/1​




Re: Iceweasel and web browsers vulnerabilty concerning poodle.

2014-10-16 Thread Yves-Alexis Perez
On jeu., 2014-10-16 at 10:28 -0500, Marco Galicia wrote:
 *shoulnd't iceweasel be recompiled to include this option in the
 complilation settings??*

You're not asking at the correct place, it's a bit unlikely the
maintainer read that list.

But in any case, Mozilla themselves intend to disable SSLv3 in future
Firefox releases.

Regards,
-- 
Yves-Alexis Perez - Debian Security




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External check

2014-10-16 Thread Raphael Geissert
CVE-2014-0558: TODO: check
CVE-2014-0564: TODO: check
CVE-2014-0569: TODO: check
CVE-2014-3689: RESERVED
CVE-2014-3692: RESERVED
CVE-2014-4287: RESERVED
CVE-2014-6457: RESERVED
CVE-2014-6463: RESERVED
CVE-2014-6464: RESERVED
CVE-2014-6469: RESERVED
CVE-2014-6474: RESERVED
CVE-2014-6478: RESERVED
CVE-2014-6484: RESERVED
CVE-2014-6489: RESERVED
CVE-2014-6491: RESERVED
CVE-2014-6494: RESERVED
CVE-2014-6495: RESERVED
CVE-2014-6496: RESERVED
CVE-2014-6500: RESERVED
CVE-2014-6506: RESERVED
CVE-2014-6507: RESERVED
--
The output might be a bit terse, but the above ids are known elsewhere,
check the references in the tracker. The second part indicates the status
of that id in the tracker at the moment the script was run.


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