Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 02:25:26PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 05:58:47PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: It'd have a substantial effect if a supermajority was required: if 60 of 100 people preferred your second preference, and voted Yes/Further Discussion/No, while 40 people voted Further Discussion/Yes/No, the vote would fail, and you'd be back at the start again. Personally, I doubt this would do you any good: everyone's already likely to have decided on their preference, so you may as well take the compromise rather than trying again and again and again. Depends on how I felt on the issue -- I rate things based on my preferences, not based on some abstract expectation about other people's preferences. Certainly, you can vote however you like. But be aware that other people might _not_ want to hinder their second preference just because they've got no chance of getting their first preference. Similarly, in the counting scheme I proposed, you'd vote: Er.. I've been trying to find your proposal. Let me restate it, then. A single vote is called, with each alternative option in its full form as an option, along with a "Status-quo" option. Developers submit ballots with each option numbered according to their relative preferences. First note: you don't attempt to distinguish between "this is worth redoing" and "this is not worth redoing", in your "status quo". As I've said, I don't see any benefit in doing it. Whichever's selected, as far as the constitution's concerned, you'll get the same result (ie nothing will change). As far as people are concerned, I don't believe it's appropriate to try to silence discussion by a vote. I'll also note we haven't consistently distinguished between "no" and "further discussion" in past votes. Votes are counted by first counting how many individual votes rank one option above another option, and a matrix is formed, where M[a,b] is the number of votes that rank option "a" over option "b", and M[b,a] is the number of votes that rank option "b" over option "a". Second note: this mechanism won't work for STV (which you suggest using, below). Eh? The matrix won't help you working out STV, but so what? You can just ignore it later, if you want to. An option has quorum if the number of individual ballots mentioning that option is greater than or equal to the quorum required. An option, a, meets a supermajority of N:1 if M[a,S] M[S,a] * N, where S is the Status-Quo option. Third note: this is something we're still debating. Yes, and I'm using this scheme as an example of a single-ballot preferential system that has the properties of supermajority I describe. That's its whole point. The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). That is there isn't a bias towards options with supermajority requirements. I don't care about problems that don't exist, if that's what you mean, I guess... Let me try a different explanation for what a "bias" is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. If, instead, you had a "Yes" and a "No" vote, and "Yes" required 3:1 supermajority to win, then clearly: 60 votes N over Y 40 votes Y over N would be a clear win for N, but then 60 votes Y over N 40 votes N over Y would also be a win for N. So any way of counting
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 09:42:09PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Certainly, you can vote however you like. But be aware that other people might _not_ want to hinder their second preference just because they've got no chance of getting their first preference. If they don't want to put their first preference first, then it's no longer their first preference. First note: you don't attempt to distinguish between "this is worth redoing" and "this is not worth redoing", in your "status quo". As I've said, I don't see any benefit in doing it. Whichever's selected, as far as the constitution's concerned, you'll get the same result (ie nothing will change). As far as people are concerned, I don't believe it's appropriate to try to silence discussion by a vote. I'll also note we haven't consistently distinguished between "no" and "further discussion" in past votes. Eh? [I'm deleting a paragraph I wrote here, about courtesy and understanding.] If no wins, and a new vote is called, the minimum discussion period must elapse before any further votes can be held. If further discussion wins, a new vote can be held whenever. An option has quorum if the number of individual ballots mentioning that option is greater than or equal to the quorum required. An option, a, meets a supermajority of N:1 if M[a,S] M[S,a] * N, where S is the Status-Quo option. Third note: this is something we're still debating. Yes, and I'm using this scheme as an example of a single-ballot preferential system that has the properties of supermajority I describe. That's its whole point. Well, except that you're squeezing in other concepts (for example, you're tossing the further discussion option). The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. You really think that "winner doesn't have quorum, but some option it beat does" is a worthwhile scenario? [You might be right -- I'm trying to understand if there's a reason behind this viewpoint.] This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). Supermajority options which don't meet supermajority requirement but do meet a lesser majority requirement will (by definition) pairwise beat other options [which don't have that requirement]. Let me try a different explanation for what a "bias" is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. No problem. If, instead, you had a "Yes" and a "No" vote, and "Yes" required 3:1 supermajority to win, then clearly: 60 votes N over Y 40 votes Y over N would be a clear win for N, but then 60 votes Y over N 40 votes N over Y would also be a win for N. So any way of counting votes like this is biassed towards a "No" answer. Which is justifiable, because things like changing the constitution or the social contract shouldn't be done on a whim. Doing what we've always done is at least somewhat effective, you need to have a strong, convincing argument to take the risk and change. It's entirely fair and reasonable to be biassed towards what we're already doing, and to encode that into the way we vote. Ok, here you're defining the effect of supermajority as "bias". What you're also saying, though, is that given three options, A, B and Status-Quo, say, where A requires a 3:1 supermajority, but B doesn't, that if the vote went like: 60 votes B over A over S 40 votes A over B over S
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 12:36:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: First note: you don't attempt to distinguish between "this is worth redoing" and "this is not worth redoing", in your "status quo". As I've said, I don't see any benefit in doing it. Whichever's selected, as far as the constitution's concerned, you'll get the same result (ie nothing will change). As far as people are concerned, I don't believe it's appropriate to try to silence discussion by a vote. I'll also note we haven't consistently distinguished between "no" and "further discussion" in past votes. If no wins, and a new vote is called, the minimum discussion period must elapse before any further votes can be held. If further discussion wins, a new vote can be held whenever. From A.3(1): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire resolution procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' From A.3(2): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' If you're going to bring new assertions in, could you at least verify them first? The above isn't something I'd thought of, and thus could've been interesting if it had at least been correct. An option has quorum if the number of individual ballots mentioning that option is greater than or equal to the quorum required. An option, a, meets a supermajority of N:1 if M[a,S] M[S,a] * N, where S is the Status-Quo option. Third note: this is something we're still debating. Yes, and I'm using this scheme as an example of a single-ballot preferential system that has the properties of supermajority I describe. That's its whole point. Well, except that you're squeezing in other concepts (for example, you're tossing the further discussion option). Oh, you meant `the Status-Quo option', by `this'. Look, forget it then. Assume `Further Discussion' and `No' are separate options on the ballot, and that they're both scaled according to the relevant supermajority requirements. For the purposes of this discussion it doesn't really matter. The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. You really think that "winner doesn't have quorum, but some option it beat does" is a worthwhile scenario? [You might be right -- I'm trying to understand if there's a reason behind this viewpoint.] No, I'm not interested in it at all. Look, I realise this has other features, but right now, I don't care about them. I'm trying to get you to understand what supermajority stuff is about. This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). Supermajority options which don't meet supermajority requirement but do meet a lesser majority requirement will (by definition) pairwise beat other options [which don't have that requirement]. You're using a particular definition for `supermajority requirement' there, that I don't accept or agree with. Can we avoid assuming you're right for the moment, and see if there's a reasonable justification for thinking that way? Let me try a different explanation for what a "bias" is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. No problem. Now, I probably should have added: a completely unbiassed vote isn't something we want. We want to bias towards (at least) the status-quo because we know it works. This is at least what quorum is about, and IMO, what
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 01:37:31PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: From A.3(1): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire resolution procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' From A.3(2): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' Oops, my goof. I still maintain there's a difference (because the intent of the developers is more obvious), but you're right about the minimum discussion period. The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. You really think that "winner doesn't have quorum, but some option it beat does" is a worthwhile scenario? [You might be right -- I'm trying to understand if there's a reason behind this viewpoint.] No, I'm not interested in it at all. Look, I realise this has other features, but right now, I don't care about them. I'm trying to get you to understand what supermajority stuff is about. Ok. I think this ties together, but let's see how it pans out. This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). Supermajority options which don't meet supermajority requirement but do meet a lesser majority requirement will (by definition) pairwise beat other options [which don't have that requirement]. You're using a particular definition for `supermajority requirement' there, that I don't accept or agree with. Can we avoid assuming you're right for the moment, and see if there's a reasonable justification for thinking that way? Er.. I thought I was using your definition of supermajority options, in that paragraph. Let me try a different explanation for what a "bias" is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. No problem. Now, I probably should have added: a completely unbiassed vote isn't something we want. We want to bias towards (at least) the status-quo because we know it works. This is at least what quorum is about, and IMO, what supermajority is about. I'll agree that quorum biases against any change (when there aren't enough voters). I'll also note, here, that quorum is different from supermajority. I'll only agree that supermajority biases against certain forms of change (changing the constitution, for example). Ok, here you're defining the effect of supermajority as "bias". I'm saying that supermajority requirements is a particular kind of bias, yes. Ok. What you're also saying, though, is that given three options, A, B and Status-Quo, say, where A requires a 3:1 supermajority, but B doesn't, that if the vote went like: 60 votes B over A over S 40 votes A over B over S then B should clearly win (which I agree with), but also, if A and B were swapped, so that you had: 60 votes A over B over S 40 votes B over A over S that B should still win. That is, you're biassed towards accepting any option that doesn't require a supermajority over any that does. Sure, this validates your underlying assumption: that a supermajority requirement is a bias. I can accept this definition, but using the terms in the way you've indicated: I don't see that "taking the bias out of the voting" system means anything other than "taking the effect of supermajority out of the voting system". It'd also take quorum out of the voting system too. Well, it could mean
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 02:25:26PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 05:58:47PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: It'd have a substantial effect if a supermajority was required: if 60 of 100 people preferred your second preference, and voted Yes/Further Discussion/No, while 40 people voted Further Discussion/Yes/No, the vote would fail, and you'd be back at the start again. Personally, I doubt this would do you any good: everyone's already likely to have decided on their preference, so you may as well take the compromise rather than trying again and again and again. Depends on how I felt on the issue -- I rate things based on my preferences, not based on some abstract expectation about other people's preferences. Certainly, you can vote however you like. But be aware that other people might _not_ want to hinder their second preference just because they've got no chance of getting their first preference. Similarly, in the counting scheme I proposed, you'd vote: Er.. I've been trying to find your proposal. Let me restate it, then. A single vote is called, with each alternative option in its full form as an option, along with a Status-quo option. Developers submit ballots with each option numbered according to their relative preferences. First note: you don't attempt to distinguish between this is worth redoing and this is not worth redoing, in your status quo. As I've said, I don't see any benefit in doing it. Whichever's selected, as far as the constitution's concerned, you'll get the same result (ie nothing will change). As far as people are concerned, I don't believe it's appropriate to try to silence discussion by a vote. I'll also note we haven't consistently distinguished between no and further discussion in past votes. Votes are counted by first counting how many individual votes rank one option above another option, and a matrix is formed, where M[a,b] is the number of votes that rank option a over option b, and M[b,a] is the number of votes that rank option b over option a. Second note: this mechanism won't work for STV (which you suggest using, below). Eh? The matrix won't help you working out STV, but so what? You can just ignore it later, if you want to. An option has quorum if the number of individual ballots mentioning that option is greater than or equal to the quorum required. An option, a, meets a supermajority of N:1 if M[a,S] M[S,a] * N, where S is the Status-Quo option. Third note: this is something we're still debating. Yes, and I'm using this scheme as an example of a single-ballot preferential system that has the properties of supermajority I describe. That's its whole point. The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). That is there isn't a bias towards options with supermajority requirements. I don't care about problems that don't exist, if that's what you mean, I guess... Let me try a different explanation for what a bias is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. If, instead, you had a Yes and a No vote, and Yes required 3:1 supermajority to win, then clearly: 60 votes N over Y 40 votes Y over N would be a clear win for N, but then 60 votes Y over N 40 votes N over Y would also be a win for N. So any way of counting votes like this is biassed
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 09:42:09PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Certainly, you can vote however you like. But be aware that other people might _not_ want to hinder their second preference just because they've got no chance of getting their first preference. If they don't want to put their first preference first, then it's no longer their first preference. First note: you don't attempt to distinguish between this is worth redoing and this is not worth redoing, in your status quo. As I've said, I don't see any benefit in doing it. Whichever's selected, as far as the constitution's concerned, you'll get the same result (ie nothing will change). As far as people are concerned, I don't believe it's appropriate to try to silence discussion by a vote. I'll also note we haven't consistently distinguished between no and further discussion in past votes. Eh? [I'm deleting a paragraph I wrote here, about courtesy and understanding.] If no wins, and a new vote is called, the minimum discussion period must elapse before any further votes can be held. If further discussion wins, a new vote can be held whenever. An option has quorum if the number of individual ballots mentioning that option is greater than or equal to the quorum required. An option, a, meets a supermajority of N:1 if M[a,S] M[S,a] * N, where S is the Status-Quo option. Third note: this is something we're still debating. Yes, and I'm using this scheme as an example of a single-ballot preferential system that has the properties of supermajority I describe. That's its whole point. Well, except that you're squeezing in other concepts (for example, you're tossing the further discussion option). The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. You really think that winner doesn't have quorum, but some option it beat does is a worthwhile scenario? [You might be right -- I'm trying to understand if there's a reason behind this viewpoint.] This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). Supermajority options which don't meet supermajority requirement but do meet a lesser majority requirement will (by definition) pairwise beat other options [which don't have that requirement]. Let me try a different explanation for what a bias is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. No problem. If, instead, you had a Yes and a No vote, and Yes required 3:1 supermajority to win, then clearly: 60 votes N over Y 40 votes Y over N would be a clear win for N, but then 60 votes Y over N 40 votes N over Y would also be a win for N. So any way of counting votes like this is biassed towards a No answer. Which is justifiable, because things like changing the constitution or the social contract shouldn't be done on a whim. Doing what we've always done is at least somewhat effective, you need to have a strong, convincing argument to take the risk and change. It's entirely fair and reasonable to be biassed towards what we're already doing, and to encode that into the way we vote. Ok, here you're defining the effect of supermajority as bias. What you're also saying, though, is that given three options, A, B and Status-Quo, say, where A requires a 3:1 supermajority, but B doesn't, that if the vote went like: 60 votes B over A over S 40 votes A over B over S then B should clearly win
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 12:36:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: First note: you don't attempt to distinguish between this is worth redoing and this is not worth redoing, in your status quo. As I've said, I don't see any benefit in doing it. Whichever's selected, as far as the constitution's concerned, you'll get the same result (ie nothing will change). As far as people are concerned, I don't believe it's appropriate to try to silence discussion by a vote. I'll also note we haven't consistently distinguished between no and further discussion in past votes. If no wins, and a new vote is called, the minimum discussion period must elapse before any further votes can be held. If further discussion wins, a new vote can be held whenever. From A.3(1): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire resolution procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' From A.3(2): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' If you're going to bring new assertions in, could you at least verify them first? The above isn't something I'd thought of, and thus could've been interesting if it had at least been correct. An option has quorum if the number of individual ballots mentioning that option is greater than or equal to the quorum required. An option, a, meets a supermajority of N:1 if M[a,S] M[S,a] * N, where S is the Status-Quo option. Third note: this is something we're still debating. Yes, and I'm using this scheme as an example of a single-ballot preferential system that has the properties of supermajority I describe. That's its whole point. Well, except that you're squeezing in other concepts (for example, you're tossing the further discussion option). Oh, you meant `the Status-Quo option', by `this'. Look, forget it then. Assume `Further Discussion' and `No' are separate options on the ballot, and that they're both scaled according to the relevant supermajority requirements. For the purposes of this discussion it doesn't really matter. The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. You really think that winner doesn't have quorum, but some option it beat does is a worthwhile scenario? [You might be right -- I'm trying to understand if there's a reason behind this viewpoint.] No, I'm not interested in it at all. Look, I realise this has other features, but right now, I don't care about them. I'm trying to get you to understand what supermajority stuff is about. This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). Supermajority options which don't meet supermajority requirement but do meet a lesser majority requirement will (by definition) pairwise beat other options [which don't have that requirement]. You're using a particular definition for `supermajority requirement' there, that I don't accept or agree with. Can we avoid assuming you're right for the moment, and see if there's a reasonable justification for thinking that way? Let me try a different explanation for what a bias is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. No problem. Now, I probably should have added: a completely unbiassed vote isn't something we want. We want to bias towards (at least) the status-quo because we know it works. This is at least what quorum is about, and IMO, what supermajority is about.
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 01:37:31PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: From A.3(1): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire resolution procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' From A.3(2): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' Oops, my goof. I still maintain there's a difference (because the intent of the developers is more obvious), but you're right about the minimum discussion period. The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. You really think that winner doesn't have quorum, but some option it beat does is a worthwhile scenario? [You might be right -- I'm trying to understand if there's a reason behind this viewpoint.] No, I'm not interested in it at all. Look, I realise this has other features, but right now, I don't care about them. I'm trying to get you to understand what supermajority stuff is about. Ok. I think this ties together, but let's see how it pans out. This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). Supermajority options which don't meet supermajority requirement but do meet a lesser majority requirement will (by definition) pairwise beat other options [which don't have that requirement]. You're using a particular definition for `supermajority requirement' there, that I don't accept or agree with. Can we avoid assuming you're right for the moment, and see if there's a reasonable justification for thinking that way? Er.. I thought I was using your definition of supermajority options, in that paragraph. Let me try a different explanation for what a bias is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. No problem. Now, I probably should have added: a completely unbiassed vote isn't something we want. We want to bias towards (at least) the status-quo because we know it works. This is at least what quorum is about, and IMO, what supermajority is about. I'll agree that quorum biases against any change (when there aren't enough voters). I'll also note, here, that quorum is different from supermajority. I'll only agree that supermajority biases against certain forms of change (changing the constitution, for example). Ok, here you're defining the effect of supermajority as bias. I'm saying that supermajority requirements is a particular kind of bias, yes. Ok. What you're also saying, though, is that given three options, A, B and Status-Quo, say, where A requires a 3:1 supermajority, but B doesn't, that if the vote went like: 60 votes B over A over S 40 votes A over B over S then B should clearly win (which I agree with), but also, if A and B were swapped, so that you had: 60 votes A over B over S 40 votes B over A over S that B should still win. That is, you're biassed towards accepting any option that doesn't require a supermajority over any that does. Sure, this validates your underlying assumption: that a supermajority requirement is a bias. I can accept this definition, but using the terms in the way you've indicated: I don't see that taking the bias out of the voting system means anything other than taking the effect of supermajority out of the voting system. It'd also take quorum out of the voting system too. Well, it could mean that, but
