[ANNOUNCE] NSS 3.15.2 Release

2013-09-26 Thread Ryan Sleevi
The NSS team has released Network Security Services (NSS) 3.15.2, which is
a minor release.

The HG tag is NSS_3_15_2_RTM. NSS 3.15.2 requires NSPR 4.10 or newer.

Detailed release notes are available at
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/NSS/NSS_3.15.2_release_notes and
reproduced below.

This release includes security-relevant fixes (CVE-2013-1739).


Introduction

Network Security Services (NSS) 3.15.2 is a patch release for NSS 3.15.
The bug fixes in NSS 3.15.2 are described in the Bugs Fixed section
below.

Distribution Information

NSS 3.15.2 source distributions are also available on ftp.mozilla.org for
secure HTTPS download:
* Source tarballs:
https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/mozilla.org/security/nss/releases/NSS_3_15_2_RTM/src/


Security Advisories

The following security-relevant bugs have been resolved in NSS 3.15.2.
Users are encouraged to upgrade immediately.
* Bug 894370 - (CVE-2013-1739) Avoid uninitialized data read in the event
of a decryption failure.

New in NSS 3.15.2

New Functionality
* AES-GCM Ciphersuites: AES-GCM cipher suite (RFC 5288 and RFC 5289)
support has been added when TLS 1.2 is negotiated. Specifically, the
following cipher suites are now supported:
  - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

New Functions
* PK11_CipherFinal has been introduced, which is a simple alias for
PK11_DigestFinal.

New Types
* No new types have been introduced.

New PKCS #11 Mechanisms
* No new PKCS#11 mechanisms have been introduced

Notable Changes in NSS 3.15.2
* Bug 880543 - Support for AES-GCM ciphersuites that use the SHA-256 PRF
* Bug 663313 - MD2, MD4, and MD5 signatures are no longer accepted for
OCSP or CRLs, consistent with their handling for general certificate
signatures.
* Bug 884178 - Add PK11_CipherFinal macro

Bugs fixed in NSS 3.15.2
* Bug 734007 - sizeof() used incorrectly
* Bug 900971 - nssutil_ReadSecmodDB() leaks memory
* Bug 681839 - Allow SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension to be called before
the handshake is finished.
* Bug 848384 - Deprecate the SSL cipher policy code, as it's no longer
relevant. It is no longer necessary to call NSS_SetDomesticPolicy because
all cipher suites are now allowed by default.

A complete list of all bugs resolved in this release can be obtained at
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/buglist.cgi?resolution=FIXEDclassification=Componentsquery_format=advancedtarget_milestone=3.15.2product=NSSlist_id=7982238

Compatibility

NSS 3.15.2 shared libraries are backward compatible with all older NSS 3.x
shared libraries. A program linked with older NSS 3.x shared libraries
will work with NSS 3.15.2 shared libraries without recompiling or
relinking. Furthermore, applications that restrict their use of NSS APIs
to the functions listed in NSS Public Functions will remain compatible
with future versions of the NSS shared libraries.

Feedback

Bugs discovered should be reported by filing a bug report with
bugzilla.mozilla.org (product NSS).

-- 
dev-tech-crypto mailing list
dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto


Re: Removal of generateCRMFRequest

2013-09-26 Thread Brian Smith
On Mon, Apr 8, 2013 at 2:52 AM, helpcrypto helpcrypto
helpcry...@gmail.com wrote:

 While awaiting to http://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/ Java applets for
 client signning, signText and keygen are needed.
 Also things like Handling smart card events or Loading PKCS #11
 modules is being use by many.
 So, you _CANT_ remove
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/JavaScript_crypto

 If you want/need more detailed discussions, dont hesitate to ask me.

Hi,

Yes, I am interested in hearing why you think we cannot remove these functions.

I have met with several members of our DOM and web API teams and we've
tentatively agreed that we should remove these functions if at all
possible--as soon as 2014Q1. That is, we're hoping to remove all of
window.crypto.* except getRandomValues, and all of window.pkcs11.*
(smart card events). Mozilla's policy about web API removal is to make
an announcement that gives websites at least three releases (18 weeks)
of notice. This is not that announcement, but I hope to make such an
announcement soon.

We don't expect other browsers to ever implement this API, so they are
effectively a Mozilla-proprietary API. We are trying to avoid creating
our own proprietary APIs in the hopes that other browsers will do the
same. You can see some of the guidelines we are working on here:
https://wiki.mozilla.org/User:Overholt/APIExposurePolicy

If we were to try to standardize this functionality, we would almost
definitely have to make substantial changes to the APIs as part of the
standardization process. For example, the current APIs assume some
equivalence relation between RSA key sizes and ECC curve strength.

I think smart card events are especially problematic because they seem
to add additional privacy/fingerprinting exposure.

generateCRMFRequest seems like it can be replaced by some JavaScript +
keygen + server-side processing, and we suspect that sites that are
using GenerateCRMFRequest in Firefox must already do this for other
browsers. I understand that keygen is not the greatest thing in the
world either, but it has the benefit of at least having a
specification for browsers to follow.

signText seems to be the most difficult thing to remove because there
is no way to emulate its smart card access capabilities with standard
web APIs. At the same time, the way signText works is problematic
enough that I suspect no other browser will ever implement it.

We are working on creating a multi-process sandbox for web content,
similar to the sandboxes used in other web browsers. This is one of
the few remaining APIs that isn't implemented in a
multi-process-friendly manner, and given all the above issues we don't
want to spent time converting it to be multi-process-friendly.

Instead, I would like to figure out what, if any, alternative to
signText we can provide, and also what we need to do to enhance our
kegen implementation to help websites migrate away from
generateCRMFRequest.

I am very curious, in particular, what products that use
generateCRMFRequest and/or signText do for other browsers, especially
Chrome.

Cheers,
Brian
-- 
Mozilla Networking/Crypto/Security (Necko/NSS/PSM)
-- 
dev-tech-crypto mailing list
dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto