Re: Restricting SSL cert issuance within specified domain

2010-06-02 Thread Kathleen Wilson

On 6/1/10 2:05 PM, Nelson B Bolyard wrote:

On 2010/06/01 11:38 PDT, Kathleen Wilson wrote:

Is there support in NSS to restrict an intermediate CA to only be able
to issue SSL certificates within a specified domain?


Yes, the issuer of the intermediate CA cert can constrain the names that
may appear in certificates issued by that subordinate intermediate CA.


If yes, does this support apply to both SANs and CNs?


In current releases, it does not apply to CNs, because the standard does
not define that constraint as applying to CNs.  However, in the next
forthcoming release, it will apply to CNs.  Whether it's standard or not,
the constraint is pretty useless if it does not apply to CNs, so we've
changed it.  There seems to be agreement among a subset of browser vendors
that this is the right thing to do.



That's great news! Is there a corresponding bug number or other way I 
can track the progress to see which version of NSS it gets into?



It would be reasonable, IMO, for Mozilla policy to require CAs to constrain
the subordinate intermediate CA certificates that they issue.


Yes, we are considering this for the third-party private (or 
enterprise) subordinate CAs.


Thanks!
Kathleen
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RE: Restricting SSL cert issuance within specified domain

2010-06-02 Thread Ryan Sleevi
 That's great news! Is there a corresponding bug number or other way I
 can track the progress to see which version of NSS it gets into?

https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=394919

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Re: Restricting SSL cert issuance within specified domain

2010-06-02 Thread Kathleen Wilson

On 6/2/10 11:13 AM, Ryan Sleevi wrote:

That's great news! Is there a corresponding bug number or other way I
can track the progress to see which version of NSS it gets into?


https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=394919



Excellent!  Thanks!

Kathleen

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Re: Restricting SSL cert issuance within specified domain

2010-06-01 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
On 2010/06/01 11:38 PDT, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
 Is there support in NSS to restrict an intermediate CA to only be able 
 to issue SSL certificates within a specified domain?

Yes, the issuer of the intermediate CA cert can constrain the names that
may appear in certificates issued by that subordinate intermediate CA.

 If yes, does this support apply to both SANs and CNs?

In current releases, it does not apply to CNs, because the standard does
not define that constraint as applying to CNs.  However, in the next
forthcoming release, it will apply to CNs.  Whether it's standard or not,
the constraint is pretty useless if it does not apply to CNs, so we've
changed it.  There seems to be agreement among a subset of browser vendors
that this is the right thing to do.

 Can you point me to documentation on how to use this?

http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt
Section 4.2.1.10.  Name Constraints

 The reason that I’m asking is because there has been recent discussions 
 in m.d.s.policy about subordinate CAs that chain up to root certificates 
 that are included in NSS. The discussions have prompted a significant 
 update to the following wiki page:
 https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:SubordinateCA_checklist
 
 My questions above are in regards to the “Third-party private (or 
 enterprise) subordinate CAs” defined in this wiki page.

It would be reasonable, IMO, for Mozilla policy to require CAs to constrain
the subordinate intermediate CA certificates that they issue.
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