[EM] PR in student government...
Hi, I e-mailed this list a while back about election methods in student government. I'm at the University of Michigan, and we use a variant of the Borda count for our elections where you get as many votes as open seats. Slates of candidates typically contest elections as parties, and most discussion of elections revolves around these parties. Anyway, the system as-is works better than at-large plurality, but it still leaves much to be desired. The biggest problem with the current system is that the largest party slate always wins a disproportionately high number of seats - so large, in fact, that competition has generally withered away. As a result, I'm looking at proportional representation systems - and possibly introducing one as a ballot initiative for next year. However, I have experienced great trouble in finding a system that people like. Single Transferable Vote seems ideal, but it has the drawback of being complex (and, as a result, hard for people to comprehend). Party lists are simpler, but they force voters to support an entire party - not ideal at all. Does anyone have any suggestions? I was actually recently elected to a representative seat as the only independent candidate to defeat the dominant party slate, and am planning to introduce something. I just need to be able to convince others... Tim Hull election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] New candidate based PR methods...
Hi, (This relates somewhat to my other e-mail, but is different enough that I figured I'd ask it separately...) Has anyone here looked into candidate-based methods of proportional representation besides Single Transferable Vote? I'm just curious, as I haven't heard of many such methods - especially compared with the multitude of single-winner election methods. By candidate-based methods, I mean methods where voters vote for (or rank) candidates, and those votes/ranks alone determine the winner and not party affiliations/outside bargaining/etc. I have heard of proportional approval voting (and sequential PAV), as well as reweighted range voting (basically its range voting equivalent). However, I haven't heard of much else in this realm. I do, however, have a suggestion of my own - I'd call it proportional cumulative voting or elimination cumulative voting. Basically, it would be the same as equal-and-even cumulative voting, except that after the count, the bottom candidate would be dropped (as in IRV) and votes would be recumulated among remaining candidates for those who voted for the candidate eliminated. This would be repeated until there are only as many candidates left as there are open seats. Granted, there is no rankings in this system, but it is quite simple to explain. In fact, it seems to be the simplest strictly candidate-based PR system I can think of Does anybody have any thoughts on this system? Is it better/worse than SPAV/PAV? Is there any other candidate-based PR systems out there - especially ones simpler than STV? Tim Hull election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] PR in student government...
Tim and all, Among colleges and universities adopting proportional or semi-proportional systems, STV is the overwhelming favorite. If students at (for example) Lane Community College in Eugene, Oregon can figure it out, then students at the University of Michigan probably can too. The (alleged) complexity of STV is entirely a matter of the counting process; the task for the voter is actually very simple. Having said that, the conventional ways of explaining the count invariably lose audiences, and we need to learn how to present it better. If you currently had district elections (from dormitories or neighborhoods), you could propose mixed member proportional (MMP). But that doesn't sound like your situation. Bob Richard Publications Director Californians for Electoral Reform http://www.cfer.org P.O. Box 235 Kentfield, CA 94914-0235 (415) 256-9393 -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Tim Hull Sent: Monday, April 16, 2007 9:30 AM To: election-methods@electorama.com Subject: [EM] PR in student government... Hi, I e-mailed this list a while back about election methods in student government. I'm at the University of Michigan, and we use a variant of the Borda count for our elections where you get as many votes as open seats. Slates of candidates typically contest elections as parties, and most discussion of elections revolves around these parties. Anyway, the system as-is works better than at-large plurality, but it still leaves much to be desired. The biggest problem with the current system is that the largest party slate always wins a disproportionately high number of seats - so large, in fact, that competition has generally withered away. As a result, I'm looking at proportional representation systems - and possibly introducing one as a ballot initiative for next year. However, I have experienced great trouble in finding a system that people like. Single Transferable Vote seems ideal, but it has the drawback of being complex (and, as a result, hard for people to comprehend). Party lists are simpler, but they force voters to support an entire party - not ideal at all. Does anyone have any suggestions? I was actually recently elected to a representative seat as the only independent candidate to defeat the dominant party slate, and am planning to introduce something. I just need to be able to convince others... Tim Hull election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] PR in student government...
Tim Hull wrote: Hi, I e-mailed this list a while back about election methods in student government. I'm at the University of Michigan, and we use a variant of the Borda count for our elections where you get as many votes as open seats. Slates of candidates typically contest elections as parties, and most discussion of elections revolves around these parties. Anyway, the system as-is works better than at-large plurality, but it still leaves much to be desired. The biggest problem with the current system is that the largest party slate always wins a disproportionately high number of seats - so large, in fact, that competition has generally withered away. As a result, I'm looking at proportional representation systems - and possibly introducing one as a ballot initiative for next year. However, I have experienced great trouble in finding a system that people like. Single Transferable Vote seems ideal, but it has the drawback of being complex (and, as a result, hard for people to comprehend). Party lists are simpler, but they force voters to support an entire party - not ideal at all. I would say that from my perspective at least STV is much easer for the voter to understand (what has to be done on the ballot) then Borda count, Although Borda is usually easer to count, once all the voting is done. you don't actually mention in this email what is being elected. but assuming is is some type of council with all members having the same rank and 3-5 seats are coming up for grabs at a time. I would recommend STV, approval or range, I really dislike party list systems. But they are at least more palatable when done in a best looser method. If you recommend range make sure it is simple. ie 1-5 range with instructions to circle the best answer. you should also allow the voter to Leave a candidate blank. However, if your elections include positions like Science Rep, Arts Rep, Engineering Rep, etc... I would suggest a version of MMP with a best looser method of top up. good luck Does anyone have any suggestions? I was actually recently elected to a representative seat as the only independent candidate to defeat the dominant party slate, and am planning to introduce something. I just need to be able to convince others... Tim Hull election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Michel Balinski on Range Voting (read French?)
http://www.ceco.polytechnique.fr/jugement-majoritaire.html Balinski Laraki have apparently done quite a bit of work on range voting or something very similar, including a book (?). However, they advocate use of the MEDIAN rather than the AVERAGE with a certain tie-breaking scheme. I've been trying to speak with Balinski for some time but he ignored me until just now. Anyway, this website summarizes what BL have done. I translated it into English: http://RangeVoting.org/BalinskiL.html wds election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] PR in student government...
Tim asked: How would MMP be done, anyway - especially with uneven constituencies? MMP (at least in the form that I know it) would require single-member consitutuencies, which rules it in many university settings. I mentioned it previously only because it is the most widely suggested alternative to STV, at least for public elections. Bob Richard Publications Director Californians for Electoral Reform http://www.cfer.org P.O. Box 235 Kentfield, CA 94914-0235 (415) 256-9393 -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Tim Hull Sent: Monday, April 16, 2007 10:49 AM To: election-methods@electorama.com Subject: Re: [EM] PR in student government... It's not a strict Borda count (ranking all candidates) per se - it's a point system where your first place vote is worth n votes, second n-1, and so on, n being the number of open seats. What is being elected are representative seats for student government divided proportionally by school/college.and divided between two yearly elections (fall and spring) . The college of Literature, Science, and Arts (LSA) is the largest, receiving 19 seats (9 in one election, 10 in another). Other schools have anywhere from 7 seats (4 in one election, 3 in the other) to 1 seat (assigned to one election or the other). Overall, most of the seats (and the ones that really matter) are elected in the multi-seat constituencies. Approval and range wouldn't work any better than our existing system, as they aren't proportional (i.e. one slate can sweep seats easily). It does seem like STV is best - however, it does seem harder to explain than the existing system. How would MMP be done, anyway - especially with uneven constituencies? Tim election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Approval-Sorted Margins(Ranking) Elimination
Hello, My current favourite plain ranked-ballot method is Approval-Sorted Margins(Ranking) Elimination: 1. Voters rank candidates, truncation and equal-ranking allowed. 2. Interpreting ranking above bottom or equal-bottom as 'approval', initially order the candidates according to their approval scores from the most approved (highest ordered) to the least approved (lowest ordered). 3. If any candidate Y pairwise beats the candidate next highest in the order (X) , then modify the order by switching the order of the XY pair (to YX) that are closest in approval score. Repeat until all the candidates not ordered top are pairwise beaten by the next highest-ordered candidate. 4. Eliminate and drop from the ballots the (now) lowest ordered candidate. 5. Repeat steps 2-4 until one candidate (the winner) remains. Simply electing the highest ordered candidate after step3 is ASM(Ranking): http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins First seed the list in approval order. Then while any alternative X pairwise defeats the alternative Y immediately above it in the list, find the X and Y of this type that have the least difference D in approval, and modify the list by swapping X and Y. It is equivalent to ASM(R) in the situation where there are three candidates in the top cycle with no voter ranking all three above bottom (and in any election with just three candidates). The advantage of this over ASM(R) is that there is less truncation incentive and voters who rank all the viable candidates plus one or more others will normally face little or no disadvantage compared to informed strategists. At some point in the process all except the candidates in the top-cycle will be eliminated, and assuming three remain then from that point it will proceed like an ASM(R) election as though the over-rankers 'approve' their two most preferred candidates (of the 3 in the top cycle). An advantage it has over Winning Votes (BP, RP,River) is that it doesn't have a 0-info. random-fill incentive. Also unlike both WV and Margins it meets the Possible Approval Winner (PAW) criterion. 35: A 10: A=B 30: BC 25: C CA 55-45, AB 35-30, BC 40-25. In this Kevin Venzke example, if we assume that voters rank all approved candidates strictly above all others then it isn't possible for B to be approved on more ballots than A. WV and Margins elect B. ASM(R)E, like ASM(R) and DMC(R), elects C. It seems obvious that ASM(R)E meets Minimal Defense. http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critmd // If more than half of the voters rank candidate A above candidate B, and don't rank candidate B above anyone, then candidate B must be elected with 0% probability.// Referring to this definition, while A and B remain uneliminated A will always be considered to be more 'approved' than B and of course A pairwise beats B, so B will always be ordered below A and so must at some point be eliminated. Chris Benham // election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] PR in student government...
Bob Richard electorama at robertjrichard.com wrote: The (alleged) complexity of STV is entirely a matter of the counting process; the task for the voter is actually very simple. Having said that, the conventional ways of explaining the count invariably lose audiences, and we need to learn how to present it better. There was a site which proposed this as an STV-PR method. Quote = votes/(seats + 1) , rounded up go through each vote in order assign vote to highest ranked remaining candidate on ballot remaining means not elected or eliminated a candidate is elected if he reaches the quota When the pool of votes is empty, eliminating the lowest candidate and return ballots assigned to him to the pool keep going until the number of candidates = number of elected candidates It does have the disadvantage that the order of the votes could have an effect, this leads to some randomness. It might be easier to explain. The real problem with PR-STV is the fractional transfers. They are not very easy to explain. Raphfrk Interesting site what if anyone could modify the laws www.wikocracy.com Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection. election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] PR in student government...
Tim Hull Sent: 16 April 2007 17:30 As a result, I'm looking at proportional representation systems - and possibly introducing one as a ballot initiative for next year. However, I have experienced great trouble in finding a system that people like. Single Transferable Vote seems ideal, but it has the drawback of being complex (and, as a result, hard for people to comprehend). Party lists are simpler, but they force voters to support an entire party - not ideal at all. Does anyone have any suggestions? STV-PR is the only voting system that makes any real sense in the situation you describe. The principles of STV-PR are extremely easy to explain. There are several different accepted methods of counting the votes, and they do, in some circumstances, give small differences in the results. The important point is to choose one of the valid sets of recognised rules (with a clear and unambiguous wording) and stick to them. Make sure you avoid all of the corrupted versions, eg simplified versions with no transfers of surpluses. The principles of any of the counts are not difficult to explain. None of the arithmetic (long division, long multiplication and decimal fractions), except Meek STV, is beyond the last year of Primary School (age 11 years). STV-PR is extremely easy to implement. Student organisations in many UK universities and colleges have computerised the preferential voting (through a secure student portal). There are open source computer programs readily available that will count the ballot data according to any of the versions of the rules that have ever been dreamed up. James Gilmour election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] PR in student government...
--- Tim Hull [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: As a result, I'm looking at proportional representation systems - and possibly introducing one as a ballot initiative for next year. However, I have experienced great trouble in finding a system that people like. Single Transferable Vote seems ideal, but it has the drawback of being complex (and, as a result, hard for people to comprehend). Party lists are simpler, but they force voters to support an entire party - not ideal at all. Tim, I see two problems here: 1) Succumbing to the perspective that the complexity of tabulating votes is or should be a primary point for evaluating an election method. 2) Believing that STV is difficult for people to understand. Focus on current problems and the benefits of change. Focus on the big picture, the failures of flawed student governance. What are the problems on campus that resonate with students? That is where the gold mine of persuasion lies. It should be easy enough to find problems with party dominated politics, even more so with single-party dominated politics. Borda election methods are clearly implicated. For example, Borda methods disproprotionately reward having similar candidates run. I'm guessing that unlike twenty or thirty years ago, student votes are being tabulated by computer now and that students may even be vote electronically. On this scale, the logistical benefits of using Borda, as a summable method, never outweighed its flaws, and with current technologies, the logistical benefits simply evaporate. When they need it, give people an appropriately tailored explanation of STV. The general rule is to keep it simple and short, especially at first. In that regard, voting experts sometimes give the worst explanations. When someone wants a drink, don't give them a firehose. It doesn't work. When you talk about features of STV, always relate them back to the problems of the current system and the benefits of making a change. STV can be explained to just about anyone in 2 minutes or less. Whether it is a 12 year-old student or someone with a Ph.D., after two minutes, they can walk away with an understanding of key points about not only why it is good, but how it is done. Much of that can be packaged into even shorter messages. You do have some advantages. Students already have experience voting with ranked ballots. Students also aren't committed to the current system simply because it is the way it has always been done or because they think it is the only way there is to do elections. The real challenge is developing a message that will convince the beneficiaries of the current system that they should support making a change. Some changes may just have to start at a grassroots level. -- David Cary __ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Approval-Sorted Margins(Ranking) Elimination
I would like to see how the Yee/BOlsen diagrams for this method compare with those of IRNR (Instant Runoff by Normalized Ratings), for example. Chris Benham wrote: Hello, My current favourite plain ranked-ballot method is Approval-Sorted Margins(Ranking) Elimination: 1. Voters rank candidates, truncation and equal-ranking allowed. 2. Interpreting ranking above bottom or equal-bottom as 'approval', initially order the candidates according to their approval scores from the most approved (highest ordered) to the least approved (lowest ordered). 3. If any candidate Y pairwise beats the candidate next highest in the order (X) , then modify the order by switching the order of the XY pair (to YX) that are closest in approval score. Repeat until all the candidates not ordered top are pairwise beaten by the next highest-ordered candidate. 4. Eliminate and drop from the ballots the (now) lowest ordered candidate. 5. Repeat steps 2-4 until one candidate (the winner) remains. Simply electing the highest ordered candidate after step3 is ASM(Ranking): http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins First seed the list in approval order. Then while any alternative X pairwise defeats the alternative Y immediately above it in the list, find the X and Y of this type that have the least difference D in approval, and modify the list by swapping X and Y. It is equivalent to ASM(R) in the situation where there are three candidates in the top cycle with no voter ranking all three above bottom (and in any election with just three candidates). The advantage of this over ASM(R) is that there is less truncation incentive and voters who rank all the viable candidates plus one or more others will normally face little or no disadvantage compared to informed strategists. At some point in the process all except the candidates in the top-cycle will be eliminated, and assuming three remain then from that point it will proceed like an ASM(R) election as though the over-rankers 'approve' their two most preferred candidates (of the 3 in the top cycle). An advantage it has over Winning Votes (BP, RP,River) is that it doesn't have a 0-info. random-fill incentive. Also unlike both WV and Margins it meets the Possible Approval Winner (PAW) criterion. 35: A 10: A=B 30: BC 25: C CA 55-45, AB 35-30, BC 40-25. In this Kevin Venzke example, if we assume that voters rank all approved candidates strictly above all others then it isn't possible for B to be approved on more ballots than A. WV and Margins elect B. ASM(R)E, like ASM(R) and DMC(R), elects C. It seems obvious that ASM(R)E meets Minimal Defense. http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critmd // If more than half of the voters rank candidate A above candidate B, and don't rank candidate B above anyone, then candidate B must be elected with 0% probability.// Referring to this definition, while A and B remain uneliminated A will always be considered to be more 'approved' than B and of course A pairwise beats B, so B will always be ordered below A and so must at some point be eliminated. Chris Benham // election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
