[EM] voting reform effort in DENVER - PLEASE HELP
Denver city councilwoman Kathleen MacKenzie is leading an effort to get rid of their Plurality + delayed runoff election method, used for electing city council members and a few other city officers, and replacing it with IRV. 10 days ago I attended a meeting of that group. There were about 12 people attending. At the moment, I'd say there is about a 50% chance that they will be successful in enacting some change. I would like for Denver to adopt something better than plain old IRV. Everyone attending the meeting except me was only supporting IRV. I spoke for a total of maybe 5 minutes about other methods (mainly approval) and they listened politely, but weren't much interested in changing course. I posted a message to their mailing list mainly pointing out some of the problems with IRV, and briefly mentioning a few alternatives. Rob Richie of Center of Voting and Democracy replied, and has posted several other messages promoting IRV (although he says ideally he would prefer proportional representation for the city council) and generally helping the reform effort, for example, he posted a message about voting machines and IRV. I think a victory for IRV in Denver would be a step SIDEways for voting reform in general. Yes, IRV is better than Plurality + delayed top-two runoff. Yes, a victory for IRV would get the issue of voting reform a little more into the public consciousness; certainly CVD would use its resources to publicize it. The problem is that it could entrench IRV even more firmly as the only alternative voting method that anyone ever talks about or seriously considers as a replacement for existing Plurality elections. US Rep Jesse Jackson's IRV bill might get passed, and it might be impossible to change after that. I think we need to get other methods into use - several of them. Let's not get stuck with just one! In any case, if you would like to influence the course of voting reform in Denver, HERE ARE SOME WAYS YOU CAN HELP: 1. Get on the irv-l mailing list, by signing up at www.irvdenver.org . When I did that, it took several hours before I got a confirmation message, so please go sign up NOW. 2. If you know anyone in Denver that might be willing to help, even if it is just to lend their name in support, please contact them and ask them to sign up. 3. Read the IRV Overview at www.irvdenver.org/docs/overview.pdf which explains the Denver situation. 4. When you get onto the irv-l list, read some of the archive messages. I posted a message about problems with IRV. I'll post (as soon as I can) a comparison of IRV and Approval. Kathleen MacKenzie has posted some time line and other info. 5. Post a message to irv-l saying what course of action you think they should take, or which method(s) you support. If the message is brief, you can just send it to me, and I will consolidate whatever messages I get in the next few days and post them to the irv-l list as one message. NOTE: most of the people on the irv-l list are political activists, not mathematicians. Most are not very familiar with methods other than IRV. Please don't get too technical with them. That's all I can think of at the moment. Here are several alternative voting methods that I think may be viable: 1. Proportional Representation. Rob Richie prefers it, several others favor it, I fully support it (though I haven't studied it in any depth), Gary Swing (a Coloradoan who has some expertise in PR) supports it... Where there's a will, there's a way... By the way, resistance to change from incumbent council members could be reduced by merging districts into one common PR district when the incumbent doesn't run for re-election, or loses an election. 1a. Asset Voting (which could be done with a Range Voting ballot - just normalize...), or Fractional Approval Asset Voting (which can be done with an Approval Voting style ballot). http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/multiwin.pdf . I'll mention this to Rob Richie and the irv-l list as a SIMPLER way to achieve PR than STV. Who knows, if Rob really wants PR but has been holding back because he thinks STV is too complicated, maybe he will take an interest in some version of Asset Voting. 1b. I just noticed this paper as well... http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/rerange.pdf - Reweighted Range Voting. I'll need to read it before deciding whether to recommend it. 2. Approval Voting. It's as simple as it gets! Many voters may not even notice the change. Because this is the simplest, cheapest change (other than reverting to straight Plurality), I think this is equal or better than IRV in viability. 2a. AV+. If people object to giving an identical vote to their favorite and the lesser evil, we could propose AV+, which allows voters to mark a candidate as Favorite, Approved, or nothing (disapproved). Favorite and Approved votes are counted and reported separately, but are added together for determining the winner. Any existing voting machines can count AV+ ballots, and make sure that
Re: [EM] voting reform effort in DENVER - PLEASE HELP
Jan Kok [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think a victory for IRV in Denver would be a step SIDEways for voting reform in general. Yes, IRV is better than Plurality + delayed top-two runoff. Yes, a victory for IRV would get the issue of voting reform a little more into the public consciousness; certainly CVD would use its resources to publicize it. It is a pretty general problem. Even if everyone agrees there is a problem, they might not be able to decide on a solution. What about suggesting something like letting the voters decide on a district by district basis. Every election the voters would be asked what voting method they want to use for the next election. You are sorta back to where you started as you need to find a way to decide on the voting system to use for the vote system vote. However, plurity would not be quite so bad as a method to choose the voting method as long as all that is being voted on is the voting method. Also, one of the options would have to be be no change. I think AV supporters would vote for IRV if it was one of the top 2 methods as at the next vote choice vote, AV and IRV could be the top 2 methods. Separating out the choice of voting method from the choice of government allows people to make a better choice for the voting method and thus a better choice for government. Districts which want to be part of PR-STV would be merged (though still count as separate for choosing the voting method) and Districts that want to be single seat staying as a single seat district. As an alternative, Mike Ossipoff made a suggestion for how to handle a vote when you can't agree on voting procedure: http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/vote/noagree.html However, that is likely not necessary as any voting system should work reasonably here. Also, there might be specific tactical effects of such a hybrid voting system. The problem is that it could entrench IRV even more firmly as the only alternative voting method that anyone ever talks about or seriously considers as a replacement for existing Plurality elections. US Rep Jesse Jackson's IRV bill might get passed, and it might be impossible to change after that. Right. However, the real problem is that it is hard to change the voting system as the current winners are exactly the people who do best under the current (no matter which) system. The is an arguement that Labour (UK) are waiting until they are going to lose an upcomming election before they change the voting system. Then they benefit from the modified one. (It is currently plurity in the UK). I am not sure how true that is, but I can imagine it being considered. 1. Proportional Representation. Rob Richie prefers it, several others favor it, I fully support it (though I haven't studied it in any depth), Gary Swing (a Coloradoan who has some expertise in PR) supports it... Where there's a will, there's a way... By the way, resistance to change from incumbent council members could be reduced by merging districts into one common PR district when the incumbent doesn't run for re-election, or loses an election. That is a really good idea about the incumbents. Maybe when allowing the voters to choose the voting system, make a rule so that changes only take effect when the current incumbent loses/resigns/retires. (or say 50% of the incumbents in a multi seat district). ___ Try the New Netscape Mail Today! Virtually Spam-Free | More Storage | Import Your Contact List http://mail.netscape.com election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] voting reform effort in DENVER - PLEASE HELP
I've removed the Approval Voting address from the To: header since I'm banned there. Jan can forward this if he thinks it relevant to that list. At 08:24 AM 6/11/2006, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Right. However, the real problem is that it is hard to change the voting system as the current winners are exactly the people who do best under the current (no matter which) system. This is the persistence of inequities effect that I've described so many times. If a structural characteristic gives excess power to some faction (incumbents in this case), that faction will resist change, and since the characteristic gives them excess power This is not necessarily a matter of greed for power. People who are in positions of excess authority often believe that this is quite proper and necessary for the benefit of society. They might even be right, under some circumstances. It was proposed that any electoral change take place when incumbents resign or are otherwise no longer running. However, were I an incumbent, I wouldn't touch that with a ten-foot pole. Why? Well, come the next election, if I had supported this, it *would* be raised that I protected my own position at the expense of democracy. After all, if it is a good idea for the future, why not now? No, I would argue against the reform. Unless I believed in it, in which case I'd support it from the beginning. There is a better way. Focus on situations for reform where there is a majority failure, where third parties are actually spoiling elections, or would if they ran candidates. Under these conditions, a coalition of the third parties with the losing major party could have a majority and could be able to push through reform. It would be in their collective interest. This requires organizing outside the parties, that is, there must be some metastructure which could coordinate the efforts of the individual parties, which might otherwise not be on particularly good speaking terms CVD is a small group of people with some money. They made their strategic decision to support IRV, and they are utterly uninterested in democratic process when it comes to making strategic or tactical decisions. This is, in fact, typical of far too many democratic reform organizations. Democracy is good for public elections, they will say, but behind this is often simple self-interest. They don't like the present outcomes of public elections. If they really believed in democracy, they would apply it to their own process. But they *don't* believe in democracy, unless it produces the results they desire. They fear that democracy is a messy and inefficient process, and that it is unworkable, essentially. They only tolerate it. I think differently. I believe that the central problem of democracy is that efficient democratic structures exist, both in practice and even more in theory, but there is no general knowledge about this. We, including social scientists in general, are blinded by the status quo. The more sophisticated among us know that direct democracy works quite well in small groups, but then we assume that because it is known to break down in large groups, for well-known reasons, there is no satisfactory method of extending the benefits of direct democracy to large constituencies, so we must compromise on electoral representative democracy in spite of its severe limitations and the fact that it was long considered not to be democracy at all. Democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others. This famous quotation from Winston Churchill assumes that democracy is electoral democracy, it is what Churchill knew. One living in a small town, say, under 1000 people, with Town Meeting government, would never say this. We will have serious election reform when we reform the process by which we attempt to gain it. We will have true democracy when we have true democracy in the voluntary organizations we create and participate in. It starts with us. Instead, we organize undemocratically and attempt to get others to reform. Sometimes we are successful, but somehow the reform doesn't accomplish the desired goals. It is not surprising. We are trying to scrub a dirty blanket with a piece of coal. There are solutions to the problem of scale in democracy, and we do not need to change the laws to implement them. If we implement them, legal reforms, if they are still needed, will be almost trivial. http://metaparty.beyondpolitics.org election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] voting reform effort in DENVER - PLEASE HELP
Jan Kok wrote: I would like for Denver to adopt something better than plain old IRV. Looking at the link, I was glad to see that they were proposing to implement IRV properly, and not some abomination like automated Top-Two Runoff (TTR) or not allowing full ranking. 1. Proportional Representation. Rob Richie prefers it, several others favor it, I fully support it (though I haven't studied it in any depth), Gary Swing (a Coloradoan who has some expertise in PR) supports it... Where there's a will, there's a way... By the way, resistance to change from incumbent council members could be reduced by merging districts into one common PR district when the incumbent doesn't run for re-election, or loses an election. 1a. Asset Voting (which could be done with a Range Voting ballot - just normalize...), or Fractional Approval Asset Voting (which can be done with an Approval Voting style ballot). http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/multiwin.pdf . I'll mention this to Rob Richie and the irv-l list as a SIMPLER way to achieve PR than STV. Who knows, if Rob really wants PR but has been holding back because he thinks STV is too complicated, maybe he will take an interest in some version of Asset Voting. 1b. I just noticed this paper as well... http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/rerange.pdf - Reweighted Range Voting. I'll need to read it before deciding whether to recommend it. 2. Approval Voting. It's as simple as it gets! Many voters may not even notice the change. Because this is the simplest, cheapest change (other than reverting to straight Plurality), I think this is equal or better than IRV in viability. 2a. AV+. If people object to giving an identical vote to their favorite and the lesser evil, we could propose AV+, which allows voters to mark a candidate as Favorite, Approved, or nothing (disapproved). Favorite and Approved votes are counted and reported separately, but are added together for determining the winner. Any existing voting machines can count AV+ ballots, and make sure that voters don't mark a candidate as both Favorite and Approved. 2b. AV+PW (pairwise) An Abd Lomax invention, I think. Is this Condorcet with equal rankings allowed and three levels (favorite, approved and nothing)? If so, isn't there the possibility of circular ties? If so, what is the completion method? Is there a simple way to describe the method that ordinary people can grok? This method probably requires the voting machines to store and send ballot images, so it can't be done with primitive voting machines, but it should be doable on voting machines that can handle IRV. 3. IRV/AV hybrid. (Thanks to Abd Lomax for bringing this idea to my attention.) Use ranked ballots with equal rankings allowed. A ballot like A=BC=D contributes one vote to A and one vote to B as long as either A or B survives, then contributes one vote to C and one vote to D as long as either of them survive. In each round, eliminate the candidate with the fewest votes. If someone sees something horribly wrong with this method, please say so on the EM list, before I embarrass myself on the irv-l list by proposing this. 4. BTR-IRV (equivalent to Condorcet with Plurality completion). A candidate is lowest ranked on a given ballot if he is mentioned in last place among all surviving candidates, or he is not mentioned at all on the ballot. In each round, eliminate the candidate who is lowest ranked on the most ballots, until there is just one survivor. (I've stated that a bit differently than before, but I think it's equivalent, right? And there is a reasonably simple hand counting procedure: count up the number of mentions of each candidate on all the ballots, eliminating duplicate mentions on any ballot, and subtract that from the number of ballots, to obtain the number of ballots that don't mention each candidate. Then sort the ballots according to last choices. In each round, eliminate the candidate who is lowest ranked on the most ballots, and redistribute the ballots to the last surviving choices.) 5. BTR-IRV/AV hybrid (The mongrel method? :-) It's tempting to think this is equivalent to Condorcet with Approval completion, but I'm not sure it is. This needs more thought... Would the counting procedure given above for BTR-IRV work here and do the right thing? The only alternative on this list that I agree is really better than IRV is PR Elections should be decided directly by the votes of voters, and as far as practicably possible all voters should have equal/power weight in this process. So I reject Asset Voting. Candidates should not be super-voters. Approval Voting doesn't meet Majority for Solid Coalitions and is vulnerable to disinformation. The one you give as IRV/AV hybrid is ER-IRV(whole) and in my view is far worse than standard IRV because it is much more vulnerable to paradoxical Pushover-like strategy, as I pointed out with an an example here a while ago. I suggest that if you are looking for good
Re: [EM] voting reform effort in DENVER - PLEASE HELP
Once again, this message is sent to a series of lists, including the Approval Voting list, where I'm banned. I've deleted that from the series, Mr. Kok can forward it if he thinks it relevant. At 12:09 PM 6/11/2006, Chris Benham wrote: Elections should be decided directly by the votes of voters, and as far as practicably possible all voters should have equal/power weight in this process. So I reject Asset Voting. All voters have equal/power weight under Asset Voting. Indeed, I could easily argue that nearly other method fails this to some degree. This is because of wasted votes, votes which did not choose a winner. Asset allows these votes to be recast deliberately and in consideration of the electoral context, by someone much more likely to be familiar with the consequences, and able to use the voter's power in negotiations, so much less voter power is wasted, if any. Candidates should not be super-voters. What if voters want to assign this power to candidates? Fundamentally, the position expressed here is that voters are not to be allowed this freedom. Were it not prohibited, it would be a common-law right. It is quite clear that the prohibition of voluntary amalgamation of votes by voters is the major restraint preventing true democracy from existing outside of small groups. Mr. Benham has not stated why vote delegation should not be permitted. Note that, ultimately, power *is* delegated, with any election method. To the winner or winners of the election. So why not during the election process itself? If voters are to have equal power, literally, with no exceptions, then the only system that meets this requirement is Direct Democracy. As soon as you have representative democracy, you have effectively concentrated voting power into elected representatives. This is disguised when the system elects a peer assembly, since it seems that in that assembly all members have equal voting power. But this is only just when members have equal constituencies. If members have unequal constituencies, it would be more just if they had unequal voting power. And if we are going to be concerned about the inequity of unequal constituencies, we should be concerned about the even more inequitable situation of comparing one representative, elected by unanimity, with another, elected by a mere majority or even a mere plurality. It is this inequity which allows under some conditions a minority party to control the assembly. It is this inequity which so famously can result in a President elected while getting a minority of the popular vote. All this would disappear with proxy voting; Asset Voting is really proxy voting designed to create a peer assembly, when used multiwinner. The alternatives that I've seen, the ones that Mr. Benham apparently supports, result in wasted votes and effectively disenfranchised voters. Approval Voting doesn't meet Majority for Solid Coalitions and is vulnerable to disinformation. As if any election method is not vulnerable to disinformation! Asset Voting, in fact, is the least vulnerable, since votes end up being ultimately distributed according to the decisions of trusted candidates who have better access to information than the general voter. With Asset Voting, a voter need make no strategic decisions; it is enough to find a single candidate that one trusts; but Asset also allows voters to distribute the trust among a set of candidates. election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] voting reform effort in DENVER - PLEASE HELP
The approach I'm taking is to write all the good methods into law and allow the election official in charge (secretary of state, county clerk, etc) to pick from an approved method. I've been writing something up sorta in the format of California Law which I think is almost ready and I plan to send to my state legislators this week. http://bolson.org/voting/law/ElectionSystemsCode.html Comments on that are welcome, and if we have boilerplate legalese-ish specifications of election methods that might help them be good to go wherever the law needs to be changed. I'm promoting these methods in what I've written up so far: Approval Voting Yes/No Vote (for initiatives, judge retention, etc. Anything single- issue yes or no.) Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings (because it's my baby) Instant Runoff Voting (because IRVists will demand it) Virtual Round Robin Tournament (aka Condorcet. with CSSD) Single Transferrable Vote (with droop quota and meek reweighting. for multi-seat elections) Brian Olson http://bolson.org/ election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] voting reform effort in DENVER - PLEASE HELP
At 03:45 PM 6/11/2006, Chris Benham wrote: That assumes that the interests and/or preferences of voters are identical to the candidates they vote for. This is an argument against representative democracy, isn't it? Mr. Benham is assuming, first of all, that candidates in an Asset Voting situation would be the same kind of candidates as we have today. In prior discussions of Asset, it has been pointed out that we would probably see *many* more candidates, so many that ballot design could become an issue. In Asset, as I'd implement it, one does not have to be a candidate to be elected. Candidates in Asset are really candidates for the position of elector; and they *may* elect themselves, or another candidate, or anyone eligible for the office. The interests and preferences of voters are certainly not identical to that of anyone other than the voter. But they could be similar, and under Asset, the voters could vote for the candidate who they believe will most closely represent their interests. I've entered this discussion many times. I don't expect politicians to advance my personal interests. I expect them to consider the interests and welfare of the whole society and to come to their best judgement and decision regarding it. I assume that they will be, as professionals dedicated to the job, generally better informed than I. Surely information can shift preferences. However, I do expect them to *listen*. And it could be that I know something they have overlooked. When a good politician has a large constituency, he or she will prudently have good staff to filter communication. Good is the key word here. It means staff that is trustworthy and knowledgeable enough to recognize new information from what is redundant What if voters want to assign this power to candidates? And what if they don't? Then they vote for a candidate who thinks like them, who will not reassign their vote. Of course, that would be a weak action, when other voters can take stronger action. However, remember candidate-list? Some candidates could publish their preference order. It is even possible that preference order could be written into the law; that is, a candidate who publishes such an order would be constrained to follow it, until it was exhausted. Fundamentally, the position expressed here is that voters are not to be allowed this freedom. No, the shoe is on the other foot. Mr. Benham is clearly arguing that votes should not be delegable. The only reason we don't clearly see this immediately as a loss of power for the voters is that we are accustomed to it. We are almost universally disempowered in this way. Has it ever occurred to us that people of wealth delegate authority when they can? If vote delegation is a bad idea, why is it universal in business? After all, the interests of proxies are not identical to the interests of the shareholders they represent. But proxies attempt to serve the shareholders they represent, if they are worthy of the position. The same is true of politicians. Voters can choose the politicians who accomplish this the best. And they do. But this same process is not allowed to take place in public elections (it does take place in corporate elections). Why? I have *never* seen a cogent explanation. It's like Approval Voting. Overvoting is prohibited, almost universally. Why? Mr. Benham has not stated why vote delegation should not be permitted. Because that is a completely different issue. I must be confused. He argued against asset because it allows votes to be delegated to candidates. There is nothing in Asset that restricts candidates to those who will actually serve in the office. Indeed, Asset allows *all* candidates who receive votes to serve a function; they are, quite precisely, electors. Note that, ultimately, power *is* delegated, with any election method. To the winner or winners of the election. So why not during the election process itself? That doesn't make any sense at all. To Mr. Benham. He's right in that sense. The voters have little power, occasionally getting to elect representatives/office holders with no (or next- to- no) control over them between elections. The power to choose these office-holders (directly, by their votes) is obviously greater than the power to choose who chooses. It may be obvious to Mr. Benham, but it is not obvious to me, and, indeed, it is incorrect. The power to choose who chooses is greater, in general, than the power to choose. The power to choose, to be real power, is dependent on many factors that are quite often absent. Deliberative process is required for genuine choice to be exercised. Asset can be used single-winner, and vote delegation is only relevant when a candidate does not gain a majority. If a majority of voters choose a candidate, that candidate wins, quite simply. (The simplest form of Asset is actually standard single-vote with revoting allowed. This could be
