Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On Jun 30, 2008, at 22:56 , Fred Gohlke wrote: re: I see also some benefits in being bound by manifesto and indebtedness and having related 'cliques' already before the election. Then you must be happy with the status quo and all the deceit, obfuscation and corruption that dominate our present political process. I'm only saying that taking a system where all candidates represent just their personal views also loses something (a clear structure) and adds complexity (makes evaluation of the numerous candidates more difficult to the voters). I don't want status quo in most electoral systems of today. It is possible to have methods that allow groupings that could be more fine grained than today. It is also possible to have methods that allow voters to express opinions that deviate from the given party/subgroup structure. re: If there are plenty of candidates it is very useful to know what each candidate stands for (and is morally bound to). Thinking one knows what each candidate stands for (and is morally bound to). in a partisan system is the height of folly. To cite the most obvious case, those who 'knew' that the present President Bush was a fiscal conservative have learned, to their unending anguish, that they 'knew' nothing at all. The tragedy is that they attribute their error to the man rather than the system that produced him ... in spite of the fact that the same deception follows every election in every jurisdiction. The only way you can get any idea what a candidate really stands for is to examine him ... carefully. You won't always be right, but you'll be right more frequently than you will be when you form your judgment by listening to him (or her) tell you why you should vote for her (or him). I also want to avoid the situation where the candidate tells to each voter group different stories on what he/she represents. For poor people he/she would tell that he/she will promote their interests, and to riche people he/she would tell something else. This is where clear statements on groupings might help the poor voters to understand, and would make the candidates be more open on what they intend to do. One example. If both Republicans and Democrats would have clear internal factions against war and pro war then the results of the election could tell clearly what the voters want. If there is no such clear distinction the actual policy after the election could easily be anything. And the voters, even if they would have made detailed analysis of the individual candidates, would not know how much others agreed with their opinion. re: (This need not mean a traditional flat party structure (and large parties) but can also be e.g. a tree like structure that makes it possible to identify the 'green republicans' and to support some of those candidates or that whole block.) I'm unable to visualize such a tree-like structure, or how it would work. The political space could consist of left wing and right wing. The right wing could consist of the conservative party and another more extreme right wing party. The conservative party could have a against war wing and/or a green wing. These groupings could still be divided in smaller fragments. Probably the system (multi-winner elections) would be based on multi seat districts (not single seat districts). It is easiest to think the tree based methods as extensions of the open list based methods. More to the point, and what those who choose their representatives by labels rather than substance I'd expect voters to vote based on substance and analysis of individuals. Labels / identified groups could help them in this task. re: Maybe the key idea is to avoid situations where the parties start dominating the political life, candidate nominations, their opinions etc. more than what is ideal for the society (and thereby making the society more stagnant and causing citizens to lose trust and interest in governing the future of their own society). Is that not a precise description of our present political existence? How, exactly, can we avoid it. Who is to determine what is ideal for the society other than the society itself? I think it is included in the laws of nature that systems often tend to stagnate, leading persons tend to grab more power than what is beneficial for the society etc. We just need to work continuously to keep the system healthy and dynamic and responsive. I've outlined a method that lets the people select candidates from among themselves and, in the process, define the ideals of their society. It avoids the problems you describe. Would that I could make it attractive to you. Finding a good balance is not easy, different societies have different needs, it is easy to jump to new systems since grass often seems greener there. In short, lots of discussions and multiple opinions
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Hi, Juho re: Yes, the new method has some properties that support this (i.e., replacing emotion with reason, flg). It is however not guaranteed that feelings, parties and other differentiating factors will not find their way in and play some role also in that method. You are correct. We can not guarantee the future. All we can do is use our best efforts (1) to insure there IS a future, and (2) accept the lessons of the past as we build toward that future. It is important to recognize that parties will not be dead. Once elected, representatives selected by the method I've outlined will form alliances to advance their ideas. That will happen because partisanship is natural for humans. We seek out and align ourselves with others who share our views. Through them, we hone our ideas and gain courage from the knowledge that we are not alone in our beliefs. Partisanship gives breadth, depth and volume to our voice. In and of itself, partisanship is not only inevitable, it is healthy. As a very good friend wrote me recently about what would happen if members of parliament in his country were selected by such a method ... When people in parliament form cliques, they (would be) building majority opinions on specific issues. They (would not be) bound by manifesto or indebtedness to backers. I would expect different cliques (to) form, in response to each issue raised. ... Before election, cliques are formed to get power, not to solve problems. When considering the problems of society, honest people will differ. It is essential that they should. We advance our common interest by examining conceivable options. The important thing is to ensure that the consideration is done by 'honest people'. The best way to find 'honest people' is to subject candidates to rigorous examination by other candidates who seek the same positions. An important factor bearing on the matter of inhibiting adverse factors is the dynamism of the method. As you said back in March, One interesting property of the proposed system is that current top level representatives, even if very popular, have a high risk of not being re-elected. That flows, not only from the filtering effect of the method, but from the fact that the concerns of the electorate can change considerably between elections. This method always reacts to current circumstances. Of course, as you pointed out, that implies a relatively high turnover of elected officials at each election. So, while that makes the system very dynamic and makes it difficult for rot to find a sticking place, it also makes it difficult for those who take time out of their lives to serve in public office, for they have no career guarantees. Such people must be afforded salary continuation and something similar to the G. I. Bill of Rights ... advanced education, career training, small business loans, and so forth ... to ease their transition back to private life. re: ... or if some single person simply dominates the process and makes the method reflect his/her personal visions (while expecting and reacting to comments from others). That states my case pretty well. I'm not entirely happy with it, for I really don't want to 'dominate'. I'm much more interested in helping. No one person has the wit and wisdom to understand and accommodate the immense variety of human society. Building a solid political foundation must, necessarily, be the work of all of us. Even so, I've learned a great deal from the interaction on this site and hope to learn more. I will, I happily admit, express my views with all the force at my command, but I treasure those who can identify, point out and explain weaknesses in my reasoning. I use those events to expand my views. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On Jun 12, 2008, at 21:01 , Fred Gohlke wrote: As a very good friend wrote me recently about what would happen if members of parliament in his country were selected by such a method ... When people in parliament form cliques, they (would be) building majority opinions on specific issues. They (would not be) bound by manifesto or indebtedness to backers. I would expect different cliques (to) form, in response to each issue raised. ... Before election, cliques are formed to get power, not to solve problems. I see also some benefits in being bound by manifesto and indebtedness and having related cliques already before the election. The cliques certainly serve also as tools to get power but they may also clarify the political field to the voters. If there are plenty of candidates it is very useful to know what each candidate stands for (and is morally bound to). (This need not mean a traditional flat party structure (and large parties) but can also be e.g. a tree like structure that makes it possible to identify the green republicans and to support some of those candidates or that whole block.) Maybe the key idea is to avoid situations where the parties start dominating the political life, candidate nominations, their opinions etc. more than what is ideal for the society (and thereby making the society more stagnant and causing citizens to lose trust and interest in governing the future of their own society). Of course, as you pointed out, that implies a relatively high turnover of elected officials at each election. So, while that makes the system very dynamic and makes it difficult for rot to find a sticking place, it also makes it difficult for those who take time out of their lives to serve in public office, for they have no career guarantees. Such people must be afforded salary continuation and something similar to the G. I. Bill of Rights ... advanced education, career training, small business loans, and so forth ... to ease their transition back to private life. In many places high turnover would be good. There are also rules e.g. on how many terms a president can serve. Keeping half and changing half of the representatives may also work in many cases. Juho __ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
At 10:55 AM 6/6/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote: ou might be interested to know I just learned of a paper written by Professor Jane Mansbridge of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. It concerns candidate selection and is the first work I've seen that provides an academic basis for the electoral method I've outlined on this site. If you'd like to read the paper, it can be downloaded without charge from: http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP08-010 Interesting. I want to thank Mr. Gohlke for drawing our attention to this paper. Indeed, Mansbridge explores the theory of representation, distinguishing between the selection model and the sanctions model, and covering much of the territory that I covered when inventing FA/DP (but with her own specialization, I'm not claiming that I covered what she covered, only that she covered much of what I covered). Delegable Proxy is a pure selection model of representation, but it also, through revocability, incorporates the sanctions model on an immediate basis, because the principal (which I usually call the client) may at any time withdraw the proxy. That is not exactly a sanction, because it does not necessarily cause the loss of an office (this depends on many other factors), but it has the same effect; the principal may hold the representative responsible for his or her actions, and may respond by either continuing to maintain the representation, or by withdrawing it and, perhaps, assigning it to someone else. Mansbridge is writing mostly about the existing system and how some representatives are selected for general compatibility with those who vote with them (selections) whereas others are considered to be motivated by a desire to keep office, so they will act to please their constituents who may otherwise punish them by removing them from office (sanctions). However, she notes that selection works best when a constituency is relatively homogeneous. In Delegable Proxy, the constituency is defined as homogeneous by being the set of all those who have chosen the same proxy, i.e., who consider this person the best to represent them. Mansbridge doesn't seem to be aware that representation (in a proportional representation assembly) through chosen proxy was first proposed by Lewis Carroll (Charles Dodgson) in 1884. He noted that, in an STV election, instead of vote transfers being controlled only by the voter's preferential ballot, voters who preferred to trust a single candidate could do so, and vote transfers could then be under the control of that candidate, as if those votes were his own property. This, of course, is the same metaphor that was used when Warren Smith named his method, in 2004 (?) Asset Voting. Mike Ossipoff and Forest Simmons had earlier called it Candidate Proxy. And, unaware of all this at the time, I called it Delegable Proxy, though I was considering representation only for the purpose of measuring consensus on a large scale but the core idea is the same in all of these: representation by chosen representatives, not elected representatives, in the sense of an oppositional election, with losers. Pure selection, and only the minimal sanction of continued voluntary maintenance of the proxy assignment, or withdrawal. I don't see Ms. Mansbridge's work as well-related to the complex system of elections proposed by Mr. Gohlke, partly because his groups are not self-selected and not homogeneous, generally. Mansbridge is specifically likening selection to Agency, which is precisely equivalent to the institution of the proxy. Proxies are elected, technically, but the election isn't a contested one. It's unanimous. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Good Morning, Dave I think I owe you an apology. Somehow, I failed to make myself clear. What I sought to do was put some marks on a board so you (and others) could tell me how those marks should be changed to create a sound electoral process. I anticipated differences of opinion and planned to seek the reasons behind the conflicting assertions. It was my hope that I could work out an appealing resolution. However naively, I believed we'd be able, among us, to devise a sound electoral process. I'd like to drop the whole thing. It was an unwisely ambitious plan. You might be interested to know I just learned of a paper written by Professor Jane Mansbridge of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. It concerns candidate selection and is the first work I've seen that provides an academic basis for the electoral method I've outlined on this site. If you'd like to read the paper, it can be downloaded without charge from: http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP08-010 Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Good Morning, Juho I haven't been idle. As a result of my discussion with you and others, it occurred to me we should distinguish between the process of selecting candidates and the process of electing those candidates to office. That idea gradually took shape over the past couple of weeks, particularly when I tried to encourage building an electoral process from scratch. The comments on that effort illustrated the need for atomization; reducing the elements to their most basic form. Part of that would be to address the selection and election processes separately. When, this week, I read Professor Jane Mansbridge's treatise, A Selection Model of Political Representation, it jolted me. I was amazed to find there was academic interest in the selection process; a topic that has occupied my mind for many years. The method I have outlined on this site is primarily concerned with selecting the best of our people to serve in our government. It is exciting to know scholarly work is being done in this area. Jane Mansbridge is the Adams Professor of Political Leadership and Democratic Values; Radcliffe Fellow, Kennedy School of Government. If you'd like to read her paper, it can be downloaded without charge from: http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP08-010 You may find it interesting. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On Jun 6, 2008, at 17:53 , Fred Gohlke wrote: re: I just pointed out that it does not guarantee full proportional representation. This point seems to center on what one considers proportional. You appear to believe minorities should have representation in proportion to their size. I do have some sympathies in that direction (but that is of course a separate topic from just pointing out the fact). I understand that you believe the mechanism I described will operate to the detriment of minorities while I believe it gives them a greater advantage than they have in a partisan political structure. I guess that depends on what kind of a political structure we are observing. In my view, the method replaces emotion with reason. As a result, minorities with a rational basis for their goals will achieve them more easily. Yes, the new method has some properties that support this. It is however not guaranteed that feelings, parties and other differentiating factors will not find their way in and play some role also in that method. Partisan politics is based on confrontation and rests, ultimately, on violence. We should avoid it. Yes, artificial division of people into such boxes indeed encourages confrontations. Party life may be more or less sophisticated, and the border lines more or less strict. Democracy is a majority rule concept. Those who would change society and its government must persuade the majority of the people to accept their views. Anything less than that is oligarchical in structure and offensive to reason. That is most typical. I hope also the minorities will be treated well and they will have their opinions heard. ... to be molded by the thoughtful minds on this site into a viable electoral method. The process was a bit confusing since I believe there are many viewpoints and ideas flying around in this mailing list. I think the process works better if there is either some clearly set target that narrows the search space and that everyone can follow, or if some single person simply dominates the process and makes the method reflect his/her personal visions (while expecting and reacting to comments from others). Juho Yahoo! Photos is now offering a quality print service from just 7p a photo. http://uk.photos.yahoo.com Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On Jun 2, 2008, at 1:58 , Fred Gohlke wrote: You apparently found aspects of my suggestion unacceptable. I think that the Active Democracy / groups of three based method is ok. I just pointed out that it does not guarantee full proportional representation. There are however many kind of elections and not all of them require strict proportionality. Therefore, it seemed worthwhile to encourage the development of a different approach. The vote counting of the new proposed method used (conventional) summing of the votes. I was expecting something more radical from you :-), maybe in line with your groups of three style or in line with the random ballot and other styles that I discussed. But the nomination process is anyway something that clearly differs from typical current methods and is very bottom-up as I'd expect from you. The method seems to be quite open for anyone to become a candidate. The rules still seem to contain many options (not as carefully thought yet as the Active Democracy method). They resemble Range voting in the way how the given preferences are summed up. The method also seems to have some elements of IRV in how the order of preference was handled in the votes (it was not quite clear from the explanation if this ordering was used to actually elect the candidates or just check which ones are electable). An aspect of Active Democracy that may have escaped notice is: The process is inherently bi-directional. Because each elected official sits atop a pyramid of known electors, questions on specific issues can easily be transmitted directly to and from the electors for the guidance or instruction of the official. Yes, this relationship is strong. The length of the contact chain is relatively long because of the small size of the groups. Some members of the groups may also not consider the elected member to represent themselves. If the groups are formed geographically based on where people live then the method will obviously create strong local representation. Juho ___ Copy addresses and emails from any email account to Yahoo! Mail - quick, easy and free. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/trueswitch2.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On Jun 2, 2008, at 2:05 , Fred Gohlke wrote: I am concerned about the handling of divergent opinions, but will cross that bridge when I come to it. I have seen plenty of different opinions on various matters on this mailing list, so better to just try to propose methods that would appeal at least to some subgroup of the opinions here. Presenting a well justified proposal that need not be agreed by all is maybe a good approach. I suspect our best course would be to select one race (you've already mentioned 'governor') and build up a method around that. I don't believe there would be a method that would be a good proposal for all needs in all environments at all times. It is therefore important to identify the environment and the target. One could e.g. try to propose a realistic reform to the governor elections of the USA. The current methods in use and the traditions (e.g. use of write-ins in the USA) and the current opinions (is there an interest to make a reform, and how much or how little can be changed) are essential when trying to generate a proposal for such practical situation (defining theoretical ideal models would be another approach). It would also make sense to clearly lay out the basic requirements. In this case I expect that the method should be such that it would not be fully controlled by the current powerful parties but would allow also third parties and/or individuals to be active and influence the outcome. Further more it would help to set some technical targets on what one wants to achieve. Does one want to find a method that is based on small hierarchical groups or maybe a more flat structure method. Maybe one wants to base it on some well known existing methods like Condorcet or some style of ballots (rankings, ratings, bullet voting). The range of election methods is so wide that this kind of limitations are typically needed (to define the intended scope of search and expected range of comments and alternative proposals). - - - Maybe the scope is governor elections in the USA and the idea is to make a proposal that might have chances of success in a few years perspective. I note that e.g. write-ins could be included in the proposal due to the US traditions in this sector. Most other countries might not be interested. One could try to propose a method that is not bound to the current set-up of two leading parties competing about the seat. = This alone could mean that there is no easy to adopt proposals since the incumbents are likely to oppose. But one can try. If seeking for a good basic single-winner method (with no hierarchical groups) then one could consider e.g. the Condorcet methods. If one wants a method that is based on smallish hierarchical groups and discussions within them then we can not get that good help from the long tradition of election method studies but must improvise more. There are many alternatives. (Of course the degree of change when compared to the current system gets bigger and getting the reform accepted becomes trickier.) The nomination process could be an changed if one wants to open new possibilities there. (I don't know much about the current nomination practices so I don't propose anything here.) Some more observations: - requiring some level of education or other properties may not be appropriate in a governor race (I guess the trust of people is more important) - there may be a need to limit the number of candidates somehow = some limitations in the nomination process - - - I'm just trying to point out that if the target and requirements are clear enough then it is much easier to make and discuss concrete proposals and how they would meet the given requirements. (Otherwise the scope of alternative methods and opinions may be too wide to get any good grip of the topic.) Juho ___ Inbox full of spam? Get leading spam protection and 1GB storage with All New Yahoo! Mail. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Good Afternoon, Juho re: One more observation on the risks. Some people may feel participation in a triad to be more challenging than dropping a ballot n a box and therefore avoid taking part in such challenging activities where they are expected to perform and prove their viewpoint. Are we to leave our fate to those unable or unwilling to express their view on the circumstances that govern our lives? There is no requirement that they take part in any 'challenging activities'. At the lowest level, they probably don't even have to go to a polling place or fill out a ballot. All they have to do is discuss their views with two of their neighbors and select one of the two to represent their interest. The extent to which they engage in the process is their option. The point is that they ... and we ... have the option. re: I haven't carefully thought what kind of method would be good for this purpose and I'm also not to familiar with the set-up. Insofar as the outline is concerned, you haven't had time to think carefully about the method and none of us know the form it will take. You apparently found aspects of my suggestion unacceptable. Therefore, it seemed worthwhile to encourage the development of a different approach. All I've done is take some of the points you mentioned and put them in a crude outline. At the moment, it can't be called a method. It will become one, if and when, we, by suggesting and challenging and justifying and discussing, gradually hone it into a semblance of a sound idea. To accomplish that, we must start by recognizing that there's no such thing as 'wrong'. Every idea is an embryo. Our job is to see to its nutrition. All we need contribute is good will, open-mindedness and a genuine desire to craft a sound electoral method. If we are able to do that, we will have realized the power and the promise of the internet. The greatest challenge we'll encounter is handling divergent opinions in a way that informs but does not detract from our joint effort. I'm not sure I have the wit or wisdom to arrange that gracefully, but, if we can make a good start, we can be sure others, more talented than I am, will come to the fore. re: I tried to offer nomination practices that would be 'equal to all'. Ideas for nomination practices are in the outline. They should be challenged, justified, modified and honed until we have an acceptable set of practices. re: There may be also other means to limit the ill effects of costly campaigning. Dave Ketchum has already made the outstanding suggestion that each candidate offer a resume of qualifications and aspirations. The idea deserves examination and enhancement. (I see you, too, approve Dave's approach. I need to include your comment in the outline.) re: In a democracy a strong and persistent majority opinion of the citizens (if one exists) should overrule the opinions of the incumbent politicians. An aspect of Active Democracy that may have escaped notice is: The process is inherently bi-directional. Because each elected official sits atop a pyramid of known electors, questions on specific issues can easily be transmitted directly to and from the electors for the guidance or instruction of the official. At the suggestion of my friend in the U. K., we are using this capability to improve the people's voice in their government. The change is so promising we may change the name of the process from Active Democracy to Inclusive Democracy; it includes the entire electorate in our government. Something has come up that may affect my availability to work on this project. I'll keep working as long as I can and will let you know if you'll need to find a replacement. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On Sun, 01 Jun 2008 19:05:14 -0400 Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Afternoon, Dave I did a very poor job of describing my intentions when I started the outline based on Juho's comments. It struck me it would be a good idea to encourage a joint effort to create a sound electoral method. Several ideas are regularly discussed on [Election-Methods] and, although I'm not intimately familiar with most of them, they seem to favor fixed approaches. Since I don't think any have gained general approval, I thought it might be worthwhile to seek a more flexible approach in the hope of combining the best elements of all of them. The statements in the outline are not intended (or expected) to remain. They should be replaced by more definitive statements as various people challenge this or that assertion and help mold a clear, sound method of electing our public officials. My role in the process is that of a clerk. I fully intend to voice my opinion, but the outline must be what others want it to be, not my impression of what they want it to be. There is the obvious difficulty of properly expressing the views of others, so, my preference is that contributions be written to replace statements in the outline. I am concerned about the handling of divergent opinions, but will cross that bridge when I come to it. Ideally, the outline would be in a fixed location where it could be maintained, but I've no idea of the practicality of that notion. Unless and until we can made such an arrangement, I will append the outline, in it's then-current form, to some of my posts. I'm not certain I'll be available to continue the process, but feel confident that, if the idea has merit, someone will find a way to make it work. I'm writing all this explanation to you because I'm hoping you will restate some of your observations in a way I can copy into the outline. I'd much rather not try to restate your intent. Here are a couple of the comments you've made that I don't know how to handle in their current form: re: Depends on race - even one such page would be overkill for some local races. I suspect our best course would be to select one race (you've already mentioned 'governor') and build up a method around that. Once the method for one race is clearly defined, it should be straightforward to modify it for other races. When I say race below it will be because requirements are stiffer for governor than for village trustee - and even for governor of a large state than for a small state. It varies based on importance of office, size of electorate, and even on experience with the electorate. Examples may be offered for starting thoughts such as for governor of a medium state. re: Degrees are not always the best evidence of ability. How should the requirement be stated? race - degrees are sometimes important, but understanding of task is sometimes more important. re: Internet web pages are, more and more, the best choice. Can you make this an assertion I can include? Idnhahr - I do not have a handy reference. re: There are STRONG arguments against alphabetical order - particular list positions attract voters. The arguments should be presented in a way they can be examined. Idnhahr - but some claim different orders should be used on different ballots to even out benefits of being first. re: Equal approval rating should be permitted (IRV chokes on such, but IRV should be rejected for other reasons). This needs exposition, examination and, perhaps, challenge. When ranking candidates, voters can desire to express equal liking for two or more. Condorcet has no problem with honoring such ranking. If IRV is presented with equal rankings of which one is to be discarded as least liked, fair treatment of remaining such candidates is a challenge. re: Ranking is appropriate, but do it more like the weighting described above. ... and ... Anyway, while bullet voting should be permitted, there should not be more than one other method, such as ranking or weighting. These need itemization and exposition so they can be enhanced. Context was permitting voters to expresses thoughts fitting incompatible election methods. While a new method might be devised using some combinations of such, just letting voters express such without preparing for counting is destructive. For example, ranking for IRV is incompatible with rating for Range. I do believe bullet voting fits with most anything else - though some, such as IRV, may not permit it. re: If IRV tempts, join me on Condorcet, which uses the same ballot but does not have the same failure. As an example A is popular below (and Condorcet would see A's popularity), but IRV would not elect A without more first-place votes: 28 BAC 25 DAE 24 FAG 23 ABC This may be profound but it can not stand without information to support the assertion. I lack the knowledge to flesh it out. IRV would discard least
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Juho a écrit : I agree that for most elections the deterministic methods are more recommendable than the non-deterministic ones. Juho For the simple reason that deterministic methods can lead to a reproductible result, thus reducing potential fraud... S. Rouillon Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
I see governor as the initial office to attend to. Simpler single person offices can be simplified from that base. Presidential race is even more important, but its extra complications deserve a separate discussion after this one. I see Condorcet and RV as the base election methods. I will argue against IRV for its problems, and against methods that are more difficult to do for multiple precincts. On Mon, 26 May 2008 22:14:43 +0300 Juho wrote: On May 26, 2008, at 17:41 , Fred Gohlke wrote: Because our physical needs often dictate the course of our lives, most of those who would make the best leaders are unaware of their political talents and are never able to exercise them. Or may think that it is not possible or tempting for them to first fight their way through the unpleasant jungle to then deliver something better than that fight through the jungle. Or they may think that the system is too rotten or too strong opponent for them to even provide good end results after the fight. Or they may think that those who seem to be more motivated also have better ideas than they do. They are out there. Can we find them? My interest is in doing so. I don't think we can find them but we can increase the probability that they will find their way to the top. In the course of outlining this suggestion, you mention several aspects. I will summarize my understanding of them ... * Nominations are open to the entire electorate. Agreed, but any one nominator cannot sign for more than one nominee - and must be in the electorate. Lists of nominators accessible to all, but not especially publishable. A goal here is to, usually, get a reasonable quantity of candidates: Perhaps aiming for at least five whenever at least that many wish to be candidates - anything working to limit to two major backers (parties) is unacceptable. Twenty should be acceptable, but too many to have as a goal. Number of nominators required to nominate a candidate seems like primary control toward this goal Nominee must accept nomination. Nominee expected to provide a resume, inside size limits, but permissibly linking to whatever else nominee feels needs saying. Election system publishes these resumes accessible to all. * Anyone can nominate anyone else, including oneself, for office, provided the nominated person accepts the nomination. If restrictions on the nominations are established, they might include: - an educational minimum - if expertise is required in the area for which the person is nominated, a degree symbolizing competence in that area. - if trust is required in the area for which the person is nominated, support of at least 100 persons in addition to the nominator, expressed by email or in some other form. By choosing to nominate, the nominators, whatever quantity required, have asserted this. * Nominations (the name of the nominator and nominated) are recorded by an election coordinator. Listing the nominators may not be always needed. In some cases there could be 100 nominators. * The election coordinator publicizes the list of candidates. Plus resumes per above. * The public votes for the candidate of their choice ... I guess public doesn't necessarily mean that the ballot would not be a secret/anonymous ballot. - by voting for a single person, or - by making a list of the candidates the voter approves, in which case the candidates are listed in order of preference. If the first candidate on the list does not get sufficient first place votes for election, that candidate is dropped from the list and the second candidate moves into the first position on that ballot. In this case, since anyone may nominate anyone else, voters may write the name of their candidate on the ballot. REJECT - this has at least the smell of IRV. Condorcet uses the same ballot but shows more interest in honoring voter desires. Write-ins belong. Think on a simplification for counting: Treat write-ins as if a candidate: Usually this will verify that there are not enough to affect results. When there are too many write-ins, redo the count with each such name treated as a separate candidate. - the candidate receiving the greatest number of votes wins. * Alternately, the preceding process is used to select those who will be candidates for election. Then, after these candidates are presented to the voters, an election determines the winner. Condorcet can tolerate a bunch of candidates without getting lost. * The purpose of the method is to ... - make candidacy available beyond the incumbent power structure. By asking for only voter nominations in reasonable quantities. - replace candidates who want a particular job with candidates the people want in that job. BETTER find candidates willing to work. Does address people's desires. - allow the election of good and competent candidates. That was allowed.
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On May 27, 2008, at 18:52 , Dave Ketchum wrote: In summary, yes, that is what the rules could look like. I'm very flexible to what kind of set of rules each user would adopt. The rules also could be much simpler than including all the listed possibilities. My intention is just to show various paths that could be used to make the basic random vote method more applicable to the needs. This puzzles. You need ONE set of rules for all to understand, with a few details such as number of nominators for a nominee tailored to getting reasonable quantities of candidates. Ok, the example below gave one set of rules for one need. Generally I just identified a list of tricks that can be used in a random vote based methods to make them usable in various situations. At the moment, my grasp of your suggestion does not allow a firm opinion. Can we flesh out parts of it with greater detail? I presented the proposal as a family of methods that might use different rules in different ways. In order to go to greater detail (maybe to lesser amount of details too) one could take some example situation and example method. We could for example see what kind of rules could be used in electing ten people of a city to act as trusted citizens monitoring the criminal interrogations of the police. There is probably no reason to require any specific skills = normal people will do. Maybe all volunteers can be expected to have good intentions = no need to control the candidates from this point of view either. Maybe we could require some width of support = let's say three support votes needed. We could allow voters to list e.g. three candidates. After collecting the ballots (and counting the number of support votes for each candidate) we would pick random ballots and elect the first candidate (who has not been elected yet) with at least three support votes overall from each ballot. If we don't know if someone has volunteered we could call him and check (and move to the next candidate or ballot if the answer is negative). If all citizens can be uniquely identified with good enough probability (in unclear cases the previous ten elected citizens may interpret the intended meaning of the vote) there may be no need for a formal nomination process. Good intentions? Desirable, but attempting non-destructive control could, itself, be destructive. My assumption here was that these positions were light weight enough to allow some fellow citizens to make the decisions according to their best understanding, and that would probably not lead to any major conflicts of interest. It is for example not very likely that any of the decision makes would know any of the to be elected candidates here. Random ballots? I admit to choking at the thought: If the voters identify a winner, that should end it. If the leading candidates are near a tie then it matters little which wins, but I would go for chance only on a true tie. This method is quite simple and straight forward and might work well enough for this simple task. Just one example among many. For most elections I am for Condorcet, which permits: Bullet voting, suitable when a voter does not care beyond naming a first choice. Ranking all liked candidates above those liked less. Ranking all candidates, suitable for ranking hated enemies at the end. Random ballot based methods were addressed to offer solutions to (what I thought to be) the requirements of Mr Gohlke. From this perspective random ballots can be used to open up the possibility to elect also some regular citizens in addition to (or instead of) the party controlled candidates. Juho ___ All New Yahoo! Mail Tired of [EMAIL PROTECTED]@! come-ons? Let our SpamGuard protect you. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On May 28, 2008, at 1:24 , Dave Ketchum wrote: On Tue, 27 May 2008 19:33:29 +0300 Juho wrote: On May 27, 2008, at 18:52 , Dave Ketchum wrote: In summary, yes, that is what the rules could look like. I'm very flexible to what kind of set of rules each user would adopt. The rules also could be much simpler than including all the listed possibilities. My intention is just to show various paths that could be used to make the basic random vote method more applicable to the needs. This puzzles. You need ONE set of rules for all to understand, with a few details such as number of nominators for a nominee tailored to getting reasonable quantities of candidates. Ok, the example below gave one set of rules for one need. Generally I just identified a list of tricks that can be used in a random vote based methods to make them usable in various situations. Looking at ALL the races voted on at a precinct, they share ONE set of voters, who can be expected to start asking questions if the rules differ. Yes, if there are several elections for the same set of voters then at least there should be a clear justification of any differences. I think people can understand if there are some extra limitations on who can be elected as the president when compared to who can be elected for some minor duties. Your reference to random vote sounds like a purpose would be to prevent winning by the candidate the voters prefer. Certainly we should want the voters to make intelligent informed choices. I agree that for most elections the deterministic methods are more recommendable than the non-deterministic ones. Juho At the moment, my grasp of your suggestion does not allow a firm opinion. Can we flesh out parts of it with greater detail? I presented the proposal as a family of methods that might use different rules in different ways. In order to go to greater detail (maybe to lesser amount of details too) one could take some example situation and example method. We could for example see what kind of rules could be used in electing ten people of a city to act as trusted citizens monitoring the criminal interrogations of the police. There is probably no reason to require any specific skills = normal people will do. Maybe all volunteers can be expected to have good intentions = no need to control the candidates from this point of view either. Maybe we could require some width of support = let's say three support votes needed. We could allow voters to list e.g. three candidates. After collecting the ballots (and counting the number of support votes for each candidate) we would pick random ballots and elect the first candidate (who has not been elected yet) with at least three support votes overall from each ballot. If we don't know if someone has volunteered we could call him and check (and move to the next candidate or ballot if the answer is negative). If all citizens can be uniquely identified with good enough probability (in unclear cases the previous ten elected citizens may interpret the intended meaning of the vote) there may be no need for a formal nomination process. Good intentions? Desirable, but attempting non-destructive control could, itself, be destructive. My assumption here was that these positions were light weight enough to allow some fellow citizens to make the decisions according to their best understanding, and that would probably not lead to any major conflicts of interest. It is for example not very likely that any of the decision makes would know any of the to be elected candidates here. Again, all races should share one set of rules. Random ballots? I admit to choking at the thought: If the voters identify a winner, that should end it. If the leading candidates are near a tie then it matters little which wins, but I would go for chance only on a true tie. This method is quite simple and straight forward and might work well enough for this simple task. Just one example among many. For most elections I am for Condorcet, which permits: Bullet voting, suitable when a voter does not care beyond naming a first choice. Ranking all liked candidates above those liked less. Ranking all candidates, suitable for ranking hated enemies at the end. Random ballot based methods were addressed to offer solutions to (what I thought to be) the requirements of Mr Gohlke. From this perspective random ballots can be used to open up the possibility to elect also some regular citizens in addition to (or instead of) the party controlled candidates. Juho -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice.
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On May 26, 2008, at 17:41 , Fred Gohlke wrote: Because our physical needs often dictate the course of our lives, most of those who would make the best leaders are unaware of their political talents and are never able to exercise them. Or may think that it is not possible or tempting for them to first fight their way through the unpleasant jungle to then deliver something better than that fight through the jungle. Or they may think that the system is too rotten or too strong opponent for them to even provide good end results after the fight. Or they may think that those who seem to be more motivated also have better ideas than they do. They are out there. Can we find them? My interest is in doing so. I don't think we can find them but we can increase the probability that they will find their way to the top. In the course of outlining this suggestion, you mention several aspects. I will summarize my understanding of them ... * Nominations are open to the entire electorate. * Anyone can nominate anyone else, including oneself, for office, provided the nominated person accepts the nomination. If restrictions on the nominations are established, they might include: - an educational minimum - if expertise is required in the area for which the person is nominated, a degree symbolizing competence in that area. - if trust is required in the area for which the person is nominated, support of at least 100 persons in addition to the nominator, expressed by email or in some other form. * Nominations (the name of the nominator and nominated) are recorded by an election coordinator. Listing the nominators may not be always needed. In some cases there could be 100 nominators. * The election coordinator publicizes the list of candidates. * The public votes for the candidate of their choice ... I guess public doesn't necessarily mean that the ballot would not be a secret/anonymous ballot. - by voting for a single person, or - by making a list of the candidates the voter approves, in which case the candidates are listed in order of preference. If the first candidate on the list does not get sufficient first place votes for election, that candidate is dropped from the list and the second candidate moves into the first position on that ballot. In this case, since anyone may nominate anyone else, voters may write the name of their candidate on the ballot. - the candidate receiving the greatest number of votes wins. * Alternately, the preceding process is used to select those who will be candidates for election. Then, after these candidates are presented to the voters, an election determines the winner. * The purpose of the method is to ... - make candidacy available beyond the incumbent power structure. - replace candidates who want a particular job with candidates the people want in that job. - allow the election of good and competent candidates. - favor candidates who are preferred by one voter and attract the support of many voters. - eliminate the need for a candidate to fight his way against challengers. - be fair to minorities. Yes, I tried to support this type of targets to meet the needs that you might have. * The challenge of the method is to insure that the person elected is the best for the job. In summary, yes, that is what the rules could look like. I'm very flexible to what kind of set of rules each user would adopt. The rules also could be much simpler than including all the listed possibilities. My intention is just to show various paths that could be used to make the basic random vote method more applicable to the needs. You also mentioned the possibility of direct democracy and delegable proxy. As to these ... * I find the description of direct democracy vague. The references I see to it assert it is an absolute good without taking the trouble to explain how that absolute good will work in practice. The closest analogy I've been able to draw is a desire for anarchism. Personally, I don't find that appealing. I was thinking in terms of direct vs. representative democracy. I.e people vote themselves on the decisions instead of electing representatives to vote for them. In my mind Switzerland is a classical example on how this could work in practice. (I don't think this is close to anarchism. Maybe this has some interesting differences to the more typical representative democracies with respect to populism, conservatism, expert vs. common opinions etc.) * Delegable proxy, to the extent I understand it, is the height of folly. The explanation I saw of the method was that a voter could give someone else his proxy, to vote as they see fit. As I said once before on this topic, such a method would have proxies available on eBay before the ink was dry on the enabling legislation. I agree that this is a risk. I'd like to keep the method
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
At 02:23 PM 5/25/2008, Juho wrote: On May 25, 2008, at 4:16 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: How about Asset Voting? It is a truly brillig method. Simple. Invented over a hundred and twenty years ago. I didn't include Asset Voting or related features since it includes cabinet negotiations between the candidates and the to-be-elected representatives. That may be considered to open too many doors for the parties/groups/strong individuals to impact the outcome. Delegable proxy represents the idea of bottom-up influencing in a more basic way. Asset Voting is delegable proxy (or could be) with a secret ballot ground stage. That's all. Tell me, if you were deciding on who is to represent you, wouldn't you want to be able to sit down with candidates and ask questions? Would you want this to be secret or public? Either could be arranged, you know. Sequester the candidates who hold votes, like they did in Venice, give them each a room and a terminal that allows them to send messages to anyone. Public only. But I'm not sure it's a good idea. I can say that personally, I'd like to be able to look the candidates in the eye, see the high-bandwidth information that we get from personal presence, ask questions and see immediate responses, changes in respiration and pulse, body language, etc. Not necessarily consciously. And there is no way to make that public, in fact, with present technology (unless you spend a fortune on each meeting, and even then, what would you do with all that data?) Now, if you can't meet a candidate in person, how about someone you choose meeting the candidate. You choose someone you *can* meet in such a way. And that is whom you vote for in the election. Frankly, it's *stupid* under Asset to vote directly for the famous person who doesn't have time for you. You like that person, fine. Find someone you trust who also likes that person. And if you can't, well, that might say something to you! This is an example of applying party-system thinking to what, though simple, is really a radical reform. Warren Smith didn't get it, he was thinking of a candidate set more or less like what we already see. What I see is that there could be, in a large election, thousands upon thousands of candidates. It would be the *norm* that nobody gets a quota in a multiwinner election in the secret ballot. But what is *not* secret is the vote reassignments. What an asset holder in an Asset election is, is nothing other than an elector, a public voter. That's crucial. The *negotiations* may be private, but the voting is pubic. Some kinds of negotiations might be illegal, that's another matter. Remember, all that is being chosen in an Asset PR election is an assembly. If one thinks that secret deals are going to be prevented by avoiding Asset Voting, what happens, then, once the seats are assigned. There are now -- unless we go whole hog and keep up with direct voting by electors allowed in the assembly -- specific people with voting power. Classic targets for corruption. The more concentrated power, the more attractive it becomes. Asset with direct voting is about the only idea I've seen that could really address this; generally, when power is more broadly distributed, corruption becomes more difficult, because it becomes more expensive. In Asset with direct voting allowed, the seats are proxies and represent the electors in deliberation. They also vote, but if an elector votes directly, this vote power is subtracted (fractionally( from the vote of the seat. So, what a seat crucially does is to present arguments, and that is public. Corrupt a seat, and you may get corrupt arguments. But then around the seat is a penumbra of high-level proxies, i.e., electors holding lots of votes, and these are relatively likely to take an active interest in the business of the assembly. Collectively -- and they are in touch with each other -- they have the power to remove the seat, if needed, and they can gut the seat's voting power immediately even without removal process. On the other hand, because the relationship is voluntary and relatively uncoerced (for most seats), the level of trust and communication between the seat and the direct providers of seat votes should be high. And suddenly the seat is presenting some weird argument that, yes, we should use voting machines with particular specifications that favor a particular vendor. Why, ask the direct supporters of the seat? Uh, well, it's really complicated, I'll get back to you next week You know what I think would really happen? Remember, these people have good communication, they *like* each other. The seat would privately tell the proxies, They offered me ten million dollars if I presented those arguments. Of course they are phoney baloney. I'm about to retire anyway, and, of course, I'm going to publicly present you with excellent arguments that this is great stuff to buy. Privately, you know
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On May 25, 2008, at 4:16 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: How about Asset Voting? It is a truly brillig method. Simple. Invented over a hundred and twenty years ago. I didn't include Asset Voting or related features since it includes cabinet negotiations between the candidates and the to-be-elected representatives. That may be considered to open too many doors for the parties/groups/strong individuals to impact the outcome. Delegable proxy represents the idea of bottom-up influencing in a more basic way. After the lists of electable persons (candidates) have been created we can arrange the election. Winners will be simply picked by random votes. How about simply allowing people to choose who represents them? At the end of my mail I mentioned delegable proxy as one method that is party agnostic. At this point I covered only the random ballot based options (and tried to avoid collegial decision making as much as possible). (There are also other methods that are based on a very bottom-up oriented approach like direct democracy and delegable proxy.) Btw, I should have mentioned also STV as one central party agnostic method. Asset Voting is clean enough and simple enough and really can become DP beyond the secret ballot level. What property makes Asset Voting be better here? (DP and many methods may have problems when votes become public, but why does Asset Voting stand out here?) Juho ___ All New Yahoo! Mail Tired of [EMAIL PROTECTED]@! come-ons? Let our SpamGuard protect you. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
At 12:46 PM 5/22/2008, Juho wrote: Happens to me sometimes. I write interspersed, and some space accumulates at the bottom, and I don't see the rest of the original message. Sorry. When considering your interest to avoid strong party style groupings to take control of the political life, and on the other hand your interest to allow the ordinary people to make the decisions, I came to think that you might like (in addition to your groups of three method) also the following method. One can nominate candidates for some office/task freely. In some cases any nomination and/or volunteering is enough. In some other cases one might require the candidate to have some education/degree in some appropriate area. Or one could require the candidate to have at least 100 listed supporters (or 100 independent emails to the election coordinator). The need for this kind of additional criteria depends on if the position in question requires some specific skills, or some level of trust. But in general the lists of candidates are collected using this kind of open process that is not controlled by any parties or other existing bodies. One could also check from the nominated candidates if they volunteer for the task in case they are elected before their name appears in the candidate list. Wow! It certainly gets complicated when we try to anticipate all the details of a system we are not even close to implementing. How about Asset Voting? It is a truly brillig method. Simple. Invented over a hundred and twenty years ago. After the lists of electable persons (candidates) have been created we can arrange the election. Winners will be simply picked by random votes. How about simply allowing people to choose who represents them? Officer elections can be handled deliberatively, by whatever deliberative body is created. Asset Voting was designed for true, non-party proportional representation. It is not *against* parties, but it makes them unnecessary for the purpose of representation. It finesses the whole question of district representation: let those who want a local rep have a local rep, and those who want an ideological rep for some minority position have that. I think that, practically by definition, most people will have local reps. And several per specific geographical location. The reps won't know, if it is a secret ballot system, which specific voters elected them, but they will know what precincts their votes came from, and, assuming they were not directly elected (I think that will become increasing rare except in assemblies for small-population jurisdictions), they will know what electors transferred votes to them. The voters will be able to see exactly where their vote went, if it's done right. This method also avoids the need of the candidates to be skilled in fighting their way up the ladders against other candidates. And it is reasonably fair towards minorities. (There are also other methods that are based on a very bottom-up oriented approach like direct democracy and delegable proxy.) Couple of years ago, delegable proxy would not have been mentioned. We have made progress. Asset Voting is not exactly delegable proxy, it, as designed, creates a peer assembly where every member has the same voting power, so it is closer to existing structures; it might actually become the government, as distinct from FA/DP organizations which *cannot* be governments. DP could be used in government, but that might also create serious opportunities for corruption that don't exist in the FA/DP model. Asset Voting is clean enough and simple enough and really can become DP beyond the secret ballot level. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
At 12:46 PM 5/22/2008, Juho wrote: Note that there are also cases where the groupings can not be hidden. For example two white persons and one black person in a room might easily elect a white person even if the back person said nothing about the skin colours and all of them would behave politely etc. I also do not have full trust that only good properties of the people would propagate upwards in the election process. It may also be that people that are good at fooling other people and hiding their true (maybe less noble) intentions will reach the top levels more often than others. Where I would agree with some in this discussion is that party representation isn't representation of the people, at least not directly. Political parties are really subsets of the electorate, and the question then arises as to how parties make their decisions. The answer to that has varied, but, often, the process is just as flawed as the overall process, or more flawed. The history of the FA/DP concept, for me, went through a stage where I considered fixed groupings. It never occurred to me to consider groups as small as three as a fixed size; rather, from my experience with group process, I usually thought of ten. Besides, it made the math easy However, I soon realized the loss of representation problem. I also started with the idea of some imposed schedule for meetings, as a national election process, but the bureaucratic complexity of it all, plus the representation problem, nixed that approach for me. Instead of having groups be composed by some external process, what if people voluntarily join groups? Indeed, what if they join groups based on the identity of the representative. Suddenly no election is needed. And, indeed, almost instantly, the possibility of delegable proxy presents itself. Suddenly there is representation that does not depend, at all, on what we ordinarily think of as elections. It is pure representation, voluntary, and chosen, not elected in some kind of contest. There are no losers. Now, TANSTAAFL. If someone is unable to trust others, they will end up, unless others trust them (which is unlikely, mistrust is commonly mutual), unrepresented at levels in such a structure high enough that some restriction must exist on participation. In a small town, individual might simply represent themselves at a Town Meeting. But even with some small towns, individual who do that can sometimes take up so much time that ultimately some controls or restrictions arise. Now, given that very large numbers of people could coherently organize themselves very quickly and efficiently with such a technique (no elections, no campaigns, people just name whom they most trust to represent them when they cannot represent themselves), it becomes possible to consider such organization when there is no public funding, no treasury, no large expenditures of funds. And it then becomes possible to apply this concept entirely outside of government, in very light, efficient organizations that would classically be called anarchist or libertarian, but without the political implications. I.e., they are libertarian because they, rigorously, do not coerce. They encourage participation because participation never is harmful. If you give $20 to some, say, environmental organization, they will decide how to spend it by some mechanism, and it could end up being spent quite contrary to how you would want. But Free Associations, as I came to call these, don't collect funds. They don't collect power. All they do is to facilitate, through the delegable proxy structure, the negotiation and discovery of consensus on a large scale. And then the whole vision of an FA/DP revolution, taking place with little fuss and no violence, the people simply waking up and exercising their natural power, became clear. I *do* think that wisdom and prudence and other qood qualities will increase as we move up the spontaneous hierarchy of a delegable proxy structure. The reason is that people will not be choosing strangers, media images, they will, I predict, in the long run, be choosing people with whom they can and do communicate directly. There really is no reason to do otherwise, you gain nothing by choosing the famous movie star, unless you are one of a few whom he is willing to communicate with directly. So media image becomes irrelevant. As to government, existing structures are already open to the power of the people, the only reason government doesn't function that way is that the people are asleep. And, in fact, the people, as individuals, are not going to wake up, at least not most of them. They have other things to do that don't involve being consciousy involved in government and large-scale cooperation. They will, quite properly, focus on raising their kids, taking care of their houses and their jobs. But they will make one decision with vast import. Among all those they
