Re: [EM] Stable PR governments
Markus Schulze wrote: The Swedish Method guarantees that the possibility to dissolve the parliament cannot be misused to "corriger la fortune." Therefore, probably, the Swedish parliament (Riksdagen) has never in history been dissolved before the end of its regular mandate period. Coalitions just postpone difficult decisions and stumble on until the end, sometimes with minority support because one party leaves the coalition, rather than investing in costly extraordinary elections (extra val) for a mandate that is going to last only 1 or 2 years. So in practice, the Swedish method seems to work out the same way as the Norwegian one (where extraordinary elections are not possible). I do not think either of these methods is better or worse than the Dutch situation (where the government falls when it loses its majority in parliament and new elections are held for a normal parliamentary term). My main problem with each of this methods is that elections are just not the appropriate means for asking the electorate's opinion on one specific subject (namely, the particular issue that was the cause of the split in government ranks). Better might be a combination of the Dutch or Swedish method (as a way out for general cooperation problems or distrust within the coalition) with a referendum (as a way out when only one particular issue splits the coalition ranks). Herman - Herman Beun Arnhem, Gelderland, Nederland, EU [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.euronet.nl/~in000622/ - Opschudding in D66: http://welcome.to/opschudding - Representative democracy is a contradiction in 4 year terms -
Re: [EM] Stability WITHIN legislatures
In parliamentary systems, the opposite tends to occur- the mass parties of the left and right (who have the blessing, like it or not, of the smaller more extremist parties) seek the support of small centrist groups. The most obvious case of this is in Germany, where the Centre-Left is in coalition with the Left-Centre, while the smaller "ex-communist" left party looks on. On Mon, 23 Aug 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The major near-center parties tend to exclude the other nearest competitor, form coalitions with the more extreme parties on their own areas of the political spectrum?
Re: [EM] Stable PR governments
Dear Blake, you wrote (22 Aug 1999): Election dates should be fixed and outside the control of the legislature. Often it is suggested that the legislature or cabinet needs to be able to call an early election to resolve an impasse in the legislature. My response is that such a rule has the opposite effect to that intended. In general, as the opinions of voters change, it will frequently occur that a majority, or near majority in the legislature see a new election as likely to increase their standing. If an impasse triggers an election, they have good reason to create an impasse. If cabinet must be defeated on a major bill, they will seek an opportunity. Also, if an early election does occur, it is not guaranteed to remedy the situation, and frequently doesn't. Furthermore, fixed terms have been used in PR municipalities, and some PR countries, such as Norway, without any obvious increase in governmental ineffectiveness over other PR jurisdictions. I prefer the Swedish Method. The Swedish Method says that there are ordinary elections on fixed days (e.g. on the first Thursday of October of every year with a date dividable by five). Extraordinary elections are possible. But the term of the then elected parliament ends with the next ordinary elections. The Swedish Method guarantees that the possibility to dissolve the parliament cannot be misused to "corriger la fortune." Markus Schulze
Re: [EM] Stability WITHIN legislatures
It is not possible to discuss the effects of elections and legislative/executive organisation without some analysis of the realities of political behaviour- after all, there's no such thing as the perfect electoral system etc. for all situations, so we need to choose election methods etc. with the situation in mind. I'll say something with which I hope Tom Round will chime- assemblies should never be run by autocracy. Queensland during the Bjelke-Petersen years had no effective opposition, not just because the opposition was in disorder, but also because the standing orders of parliament were rigged against any input from the opposition. When Joh B-P was finally toppled, the parliament began a series of reforms which included- extensive committees (which are established by an Act, last I heard), question time, and a review of standing orders to lessen the impact of gagging and guillotining (spelling's awful, I know). The important fact is that these were all initiatives of successive governments and are based more or less on their good will and on public opinion (the essential ingredient?). On Mon, 23 Aug 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: BUT CAN WE GET MORE DISCUSSION OF WHAT IS WRONG with giving legislatures freedom to structure themselves however they will? Meaning however some largest organized plurality wishes to do it? That was the point of my original message. I don't want to get sidetracked. Lloyd Anderson Ecological Linguistics PS what in the funk is ecological linguistics?
Re: [EM] Stable PR governments
Hi Markus, The words "never in history" in my last mail were indeed somewhat confusing. On 23 Aug 99, at 22:53, Markus Schulze wrote: There have been extraordinary elections in Sweden in 1887, in 1914, in 1958, and in 1970. Stimmt (probably), but I was merely thinking of Sweden under the present system, which dates from 1971 (unicameralism) or 1975 (constitution) depending on the definition. I am just back from a visit to the Swedish parliament :-) and have here a (quite extensive BTW) 'faktablad' with info about 'extra val', quoting: "Extra val r ovanligt i Sverige. Efter demokratins genombrott har endast ett extra val frekommit. Det var valet till andra kammaren 1 juni 1958." (Extra elections are uncommon in Sweden. After the breakthrough of democracy there has been only one extra election. That was the election for the second chamber on June 1st 1958). The elections in 1970, ISTR, were held because in that year (actually on January 1st 1971) the Swedish Riksdag became unicameral. I don't know about 1887 and 1914, but I suppose the faktablad counts them as "innan demokratins genombrott". Since 1971, several governments have fallen before the end of their term (Carlsson 1990, Flldin 1978 and 1981, the present government Persson is weak but still there), but no new elections (extra val) were held and new coalitions were formed instead. Herman - Herman Beun Arnhem, Gelderland, Nederland, EU [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.euronet.nl/~in000622/ - Opschudding in D66: http://welcome.to/opschudding - Representative democracy is a contradiction in 4 year terms -
[EM] Stability WITHIN legislatures
On stable PR and coalition goverments, recent discussion: Isn't the problem created by the way in which coalitions are created, and this true also of systems like the US Congress? The major near-center parties tend to exclude the other nearest competitor, form coalitions with the more extreme parties on their own areas of the political spectrum? Instead of SOME members of each of the near-center parties combining together to form a stable governing coalition, STABLE in the sense that it avoids wild swings of policy depending on a fraction of a percentage change in popular votes for parties, STABLE in the sense that because it is the real center, a few individuals dropping out of the coalition or adding to it will be random, and all the margins of the center, and will not affect it? To achieve this, do we not need to enter frankly into a discussion of rules for operation WITHIN legislatures... rules requiring that the "speaker" or prime minister be a condorcet winner, NOT chosen secondarily by a winning party so as to be pushed far from the center of the legislature's membership, but rather a centrist who is trusted by all points of view to be fair and non-manipulative? rules such as requiring all alternative proposals on the same topic to be considered simultaneously (with preference voting of the appropriate type), rather than manipulating a sequence of pairwise or up-or-down votes that prevent certain alternatives from being considered, often the more central ones? I do not think this is unrealistic to discuss, in a context in which the people are increasingly sceptical about parties which seem to be more interested in their own welfare than in the welfare of their nation... Currently, we discuss how to improve elections to legislatures, but then seem to take for granted that within the legislatures, we shall have law of the jungle, with all of the same evils completely unaddressed. Seems to me, overt discussion of this has advantages, in that it promotes stability more than anything else we can do, it resonates with popular perceptions of current problems, dislike of sudden big swings in policy, it does not require one to argue in any way against a two-party system, because it has all of those advantages, and does promote stable cooperation (the most cogent argument of those in favor of two-party systems rather than multi-party systems). The ONLY disadvantage I know of, is if one considers that some alternation of policies is desirable, so a country can experiment ... but the place for that would seem to be better in the individual states of a federal system, where possible, grant them more freedom to experiment in legitimate ways, and in the compromises that a stable centrist-led leadership of a legislatures would tend to craft or permit to be crafted, finding balanced middle grounds. And of course, in the loss of some drama, artificial conflicts created by the structure of the legislature or the election systems. I feel confident our news media can find other sources of entertainment and drama. Our well-being does not depend on artificially hyped-up conflict in our legislatures. Lloyd Anderson
