Re: FIN Again (was: Re: James Higgo)
From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] I don't understand your objection. It seems to me that it is perfectly coherent to imagine a TOE which includes both a universal objective measure on the set of all observer-moments and also a relative conditional probability which tells me what the probability is I'll have experience B in the future if I'm having experience A right now. You is just a matter of definition. As for the conditional effective probability of an observation with characteristics A given that it includes characteristics B, p(A|B), that is automatically defined as p(A|B) = M(A and B) / M(B). There is no room to have a rival relative conditional probability. (E.g. A = I think I'm in the USA at 12:00 today, B=I think I'm Bob.) In statistics we have both absolute and conditional probability, so what's wrong with having the same thing in a TOE? In fact there is no choice but to have conditional probability - as long as it's the one that the absolute measure distribution automatically defines. I suppose one objection might be that once we have an objective measure, we understand everything we need to know about why I find myself having the types of experiences I do Indeed so. and that defining an additional conditional probability measure on the set of all observer-moments would be purely epiphenomenal and inelegant. Is that what your problem with the idea is? It's not just inelegant. It's impossible, if by additional you mean one that's not the automatic one. self-sampling assumption--what does it mean to say that I should reason as if I had an equal probability of being any one of all possible observer-moments? It means - and I admit it does take a little thought here - _I want to follow a guessing procedure that, in general, maximizes the fraction of those people (who use that procedure) who get the right guess_. (Why would I want a more error-prone method?) So I use Bayesian reasoning with the best prior available, the uniform one on observer-moments, which maximizes the fraction of observer-moments who guess right. No soul-hopping in that reasoning, I assure you. if I am about to step into a machine that will replicate one copy of me in heaven and one copy in hell, then as I step into the imaging chamber I will be in suspense about where I will find myself a moment from now, and if the conditional probability of each possible future observer-moment is 50% given my current observer-moment, then I will interpret that as a 50/50 chance that I'm about to experience torture or bliss. That depends on the definition of you. In any case, one copy will be happy (the one partying with the succubi in hell) and the other will be sad (the one stuck hanging out with Christians). So your utility function should be about even. I assume you'd care about both future copies at that point. Surely you agree that there is nothing *mathematically* incoherent about defining both absolute and conditional probability measures on the set of all observer-moments. So what's your basis for calling the idea crazy? I've explained that in other posts, but as you see, the idea is indeed mathematically incoherent - unless you just mean the conditional effective probability which a measure distribution defines by definition. And _that_ one, of course, leads to a finite expectation value for ones's observed age (that is, no immortality). - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate I know what no one else knows - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/ _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
RE: FIN
Hi, I have just joined this list after seeing it mentioned on the Fabric of Reality list Would someone mind briefly explaining what FIN is (or at least what the letters stand for)? Is it some version of QTI (Quantum theory of immortality) ? Assuming it *is* related to QTI... Why should a typical observer find himself to be older than the apparent lifetime of his species? Given that survival for indefinite time becomes thermodynamically unlikely (TU) after some age (i.e. has a measure incredibly close to zero compared to other outcomes for anyone except the observer concerned) - say this age is 120 for a human being, then he still has to live through 120 years to get there. But most of his copies in the multiverse (you are assuming MWI for this argument, I assume?) will in fact die at a reasonable age, so *very* few observeres are going to notice the TU versions of anyone else. So the only way to actually experience this phenomenon is to live to be that old yourself. I must ask, though, what makes you think that a typical observer ISN'T much older than the lifetime of his species would allow? Given that you can't observe anyone but yourself in this state (or it's TU that you ever will) (and I'm assuming you haven't reached 120 yet), you can't really use a self-sampling argument on this, surely? if FIN isn't related to QTI (it appears to be from the stuff I'm replying to but you never know) please ignore the above comments :-) Charles -Original Message- From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Thursday, 30 August 2001 9:05 p.m. To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: FIN Jacques Mallah wrote: From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] Jacques Mallah wrote: `` I have repeated pointed out the obvious consequence that if that were true, then a typical observer would find himself to be much older than the apparent lifetime of his species would allow; the fact that you do not find yourself so old gives their hypothesis a probability of about 0 that it is the truth. However, they hold fast to their incomprehensible beliefs.´´ According to FIN, however, the probability of being alive at all is almost zero, which contradicts our experience of being alive. Whatchya mean? I wouldn't mind acquiring a new argument against FIN to add to the ones I give, but your statement doesn't appear to make any sense. You wrote earlier that consciousness can't be transferred to a copy. But consciousness isn't transferred, the copies had the same consciousness already because they were identical. I would say: I exist because somewhere I am computed. You appear to say that (forgive me if I am wrong) I must identify myself with one computation. Even an identical computation performed somewhere else will have a different identity. My objection is that the brain is constantly changing due to various processes. The typical timescales of these processes is about a millisecond. FIN thus predicts that I shouldn't find myself alive after a few milliseconds. Saibal
Re: FIN
Jacques Mallah wrote: From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] Jacques Mallah wrote: `` I have repeated pointed out the obvious consequence that if that were true, then a typical observer would find himself to be much older than the apparent lifetime of his species would allow; the fact that you do not find yourself so old gives their hypothesis a probability of about 0 that it is the truth. However, they hold fast to their incomprehensible beliefs.´´ According to FIN, however, the probability of being alive at all is almost zero, which contradicts our experience of being alive. Whatchya mean? I wouldn't mind acquiring a new argument against FIN to add to the ones I give, but your statement doesn't appear to make any sense. You wrote earlier that consciousness can't be transferred to a copy. But consciousness isn't transferred, the copies had the same consciousness already because they were identical. I would say: I exist because somewhere I am computed. You appear to say that (forgive me if I am wrong) I must identify myself with one computation. Even an identical computation performed somewhere else will have a different identity. My objection is that the brain is constantly changing due to various processes. The typical timescales of these processes is about a millisecond. FIN thus predicts that I shouldn't find myself alive after a few milliseconds. Saibal
Re: FIN
From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] You wrote earlier that consciousness can't be transferred to a copy. But consciousness isn't transferred, the copies had the same consciousness already because they were identical. No, they weren't _identical_. They were different people, who happened to have the same type of experiences and the same brain design. I would say: I exist because somewhere I am computed. You appear to say that (forgive me if I am wrong) I must identify myself with one computation. Even an identical computation performed somewhere else will have a different identity. Ok, although I would say to be more precise that you should identify yourself with an implementation of a computation. A computation must be performed (implemented) for it to give rise to consciousness. At this point I would like to reiterate something I have stated in the past. We all agree, I think, that not all computations have the same measure associated with them. But what you don't seem to realize is the implication of that fact: the mere existance of the abstract computation is not what is associated with measure of consciousness, so the number of implementations must be what determines the measure. That's why leaping is a necessary part of the Fallacious Immortality Nonsense (FIN). The mind must be associated with an implementation, and if it termintates that measure then is said to (in effect) leap to the remaining implementations. (Although, as I have also said, in that case the remaining implemementations would really be of a different computation.) This also means that knowing the current situation would not be enough, for one who believes the FIN, to in principle determine the measure distribution either at that time or any time in the future. In other words, the FIN requires mind-like hidden variables. the brain is constantly changing due to various processes. The typical timescales of these processes is about a millisecond. True. FIN thus predicts that I shouldn't find myself alive after a few milliseconds. I'm guessing here that you misunderstood what I meant by FIN. By FIN I mean that belief which some have called QTI. So I guess you are attacking my position, but I don't see on what grounds. Suppose that your current implementation is indeed localized in time, and that at other moments you are considered to be a different person. (It's really just a matter a definition, especially if input is allowed.) So what? All that means is that the old you sees only that moment. Now there is a new you seeing this moment. So if you want to just define yourself to be a one-moment guy, then indeed you are no longer with the living. By the same token, the would be a new guy in your body and (hypothetically, not that you would) he'd be the one typing nonsense like I'm still here. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate I know what no one else knows - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/ _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
RE: FIN too
From: Charles Goodwin [EMAIL PROTECTED] Hi, I have just joined this list after seeing it mentioned on the Fabric of Reality list Hi. BTW, what's up on the FOR list? Ever see anything interesting there? I thought the book sucked except for chapter 2 (I think; the one explaining the MWI), but at least there are some MWIers on that list I would think. Would someone mind briefly explaining what FIN is (or at least what the letters stand for)? Is it some version of QTI (Quantum theory of immortality) ? Yes, any version of QTI is FIN. Why should a typical observer find himself to be older than the apparent lifetime of his species? I guess you mean assuming FIN, why ... so *very* few observeres are going to notice the TU versions of anyone else. So the only way to actually experience this phenomenon is to live to be that old yourself. Right ... I must ask, though, what makes you think that a typical observer ISN'T much older than the lifetime of his species would allow? I'm not so old, but if FIN were true, the effective chance of me being old would be 100%. So by Bayesian reasoning, it must be false. Given that you can't observe anyone but yourself in this state (or it's TU that you ever will) (and I'm assuming you haven't reached 120 yet), you can't really use a self-sampling argument on this, surely? On the contrary, you do use a SSA. After all, you will never (for any question) have more than the one data point for use in the SSA. But with a probability of 0% or 100%, that's plenty! It means - and I admit it does take a little thought here - _I want to follow a guessing procedure that, in general, maximizes the fraction of those people (who use that procedure) who get the right guess_. (Why would I want a more error-prone method?) So I use Bayesian reasoning with the best prior available, the uniform one on observer-moments, which maximizes the fraction of observer-moments who guess right. No soul-hopping in that reasoning, I assure you. I'm sorry, I still don't see how that applies to me. If I know which observer moments I'm in (e.g. I know how old I am) why should I reason as though I don't? Because you want to know things, don't you? It's no different from any Bayesian reasoning, in that regard. Suppose you know that you just flipped a coin 10 times in a row, and it landed on heads all ten times. Now you can apply Bayesian reasoning to guess whether it is a 2-headed coin, or a regular coin. How to do it? p(2-headed|got 10 heads) = [p(got 10 heads|2-headed) p_0(2-headed)] / N p(1-headed|got 10 heads) = [p(got 10 heads|1-headed) p_0(1-headed)] / N where N = p(got 10 heads) is the normalization factor so that these two conditional probabilities sum to 1 (they are the only possibilities). That's a standard use of Bayes' theorem. But - whoa there - what's the p(got 10 heads) and the like? You already _know_ you got 10 heads, so why not just set p(got 10 heads) to 1? Obviously, you consider the counterfactual case of (didn't get 10 heads) for a reason - that is, to help you guess something about the coin. In the same way, the SSA helps you guess things. It's just a procedure to follow which usually helps the people that use it to make correct guesses. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate I know what no one else knows - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/ _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
Re: FIN
Hello, One might take the position that consciousness just is..., and is focused at a particular point we might call an identity. If we assume time is an illusion, the idea of being much older than the apparent vehicle consciousness, would hold. As for the statement: I exist because somewhere I am computed. under the assumption of infinite consciousness, it is its own computation. The machinery to compute and the thing to compute are the same thing. It exists everywhere existence is. In this model the physical body would be a focal point. In this model, an identical computation could not yield a separate consciousness. One might consider, if it is the method of observation which determines what is observed. If one assumes a limited perspective as the initial conditions of observation, then one observes only what he expects. Those things defying explanation, tend to be ignored less the whole framework collapse. If one considers the kind of thinking and theory generation possible with the thinking prevalent 100 years ago as compared with today, one can see that the initial assumptions seem to be the limiting factor in what can be explained. For example, 100 years ago, it was scarcely believable that powered flight was possible, much less a mission to the moon. This is not just a matter of data in a book to derive one's possible creative space. I maintain it has more to do with consciousness expansion. That is, one cannot help but have expanded consciousness as the result of experiencing, thinking, and creating. A very simplistic example involves learning to drive a car with a manual transmission. At first one labors to consider the coordination of clutch, brake, throttle, and gear shift. Ten years with such experience this same person can drop into any vehicle with a manual transmission and drive it, adapting quickly to the given parameters of the given vehicle. From one perspective this is just a hardwired skill set. But upon close inspection, one can describe just about all aspects of the state space of operating a manual transmission vehicle, even what would happen if things are done incorrectly. This demonstrates a tie between a skill and consciousness. One can further learn to operate any machinery that involves torque control and perhaps a clutch very quickly based on the experience of operating a manual transmission vehicle. This implies extrapolation of fundamental dynamic elements into a new model, all done very quickly. If a mechanic drives a car and in the process of operating it feels certain things, he can quickly determine what if anything is causing the disturbance. This implies not only the consciousness development of a casual operator, but also that of a mechanic, who can model the mechanical workings in his head on the fly. This is not a simple model either, feel, vibration, sound, all tie into a model which he can then verbally describe at length. The point of these examples is to demonstrate that consciousness grows with experience and learning. This example also demonstrates crudely that the expanded consciousness can grow faster with each new addition to it. Now again consider the observer observing his own consciousness. He makes some simple observations in terms of language and established bodies of knowledge. What he learns by observation is flavored by what he has to compare it to. As he learns what's possible to learn by observation of his consciousness, it grows with each observation. Forcing the observer to hit a target that moves faster the more it is observed. One might then consider another possibility. If my theory is correct about consciousness, then this moving target would continue to move toward infinite awareness. That is, aware of all things in the universe, multiverse, or what have you. (It also could move within the space such that it spirals in circles and leads no where.) This could be tested. Consider that thoughts can also serve to expand consciousness. One creates a thought, this thought facilitates consciousness expansion by creating a kind of tool for seeing consciousness. In general we do this anyway. Anytime one creates an explanation of a concept that more readily facilitates understanding by other observers, he's created a kind of dynamic tool for seeing. To continue, the experimenter might consider abstract thoughts that target the most direct route to a goal. This goal being rapid expansion of consciousness. The thoughts would be created and chained successively. (observation is done through awareness, not theory fitting or direct probing. Doing so causes consciousness to collapse on itself) To illustrate: One clears his mind, imagines a thought/awareness that facilitates expansion, then releases the thought and holds his mind blank to disallow preconceived thinking to interfere with what is created. One then continues to repeat the process as gently and as quietly as possible. With practice this process gets easier and easier.