RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Peter Jones writes: Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. At the turn of last century Rutherford showed that atoms were mostly empty space. Tables and chairs did not suddenly become less solid as a result, but it became clear that their apparent solidity was not actually evidence that atoms are solid all the way through. In a similar fashion, the apparent solidity of matter is not actually evidence that it isn't just fluff all the way down, or part of a computer simulation. Our physical theories describe the behaviour of matter without formally addressing this question at all, despite what prejudices and working assumptions physicists may have about the true basis of physical reality. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 21-août-06, à 16:23, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit : If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it. I can hardly not agree with that. If numbers do not explain my existence -- explaining how a strucuture like a physial world would emerge from a UD if a UD existed does not explain my *existence* -- then something else does, such as matter. 1) I don't think think so at all. Even if numbers cannot explain your existence, it does not follows that matter can explain it, nor God, nor anything else a priori. Matter has been a succesful explanation for many centuries -- an aposteriori explanation. Who said that only apriori explanations are acceptable ? Is that the premiss underlying your other premisses ? I talk about primitive or primary matter. Just show me one text where that notion explain anything. I have never find a physical theory using it, except that it is implicitly assume in the background, but the notion are never referred too. Actually, assuming the comp hyp., the UDA shows precisely why a notion of primitive matter cannot explain the mind. Matter can explain anything computationalism or mathematics can explain, since any computaiotnal or mathematical structurecan be implmented in matter. Read UDA. Primary matter is shown to be without any explanatory purpose. You can still believe in it, like anyone can believe that car are really pulled by invisible horses, and no thermodynamician will be able to prove that wrong. They can only argue it is unnecessary. All the same with UDA: it shows that primary matter has no purpose. It can also provide support for time and qulia, and explain away HP universes. All serious people in the philosophy of mind agree that the mind-body problem is not yet solved. Even Dennett agrees on this in the last chapter of his consciousness explained. Matter makes things worst because, at least with comp, we have to justify it without positing it. 2) Numbers, and the UD, by existing just in the usual sense of realist mathematicians (like in statements similar to it exists a perfect number) explains completely your (correct, non illusory) *feeling* of existence, including both the sharable part of it (quanta) and the unsharable part of it (the qualia). Only if the usual sense of realist mathematicians is a sense amouting to the kind of existence I actually have (even if I mistakenly think that is material existence, I still have ot exist in some sense in order to make the mistake!). But that is what I have been saying all along. The argumentative work is being done by the hidden assumption of Platonism, not the explicit assumption of computationalism. 3) ... and all this in a testable way, given that comp makes precise predictions. Let me simplify to be clearer. The TOE has made progress: 1) Copenhagen TOE: -Numbers -Wave equation -Unintelligible mind theory (collapse) 2) Everett TOE: -Wave equation Everett is compatible with standard computationalism. It doesn't have to assume computationalism. Any non-magical theory of mind will do. Well, actually I do agree a bit with you here. But comp is assumed by almost all many-worlder. This is because comp is the only known theory of mind which does not posit actual infinities, and in general people attracted to MW are motivated by searching a theory compatatible with reasonable approach to the mind. Not just computationalism, because you need to assume a UD exists No. The UD exists by AR, without which CT would not make sense. I recall that by the UD exists, I mean just that the truth of some existential proposition in number theory is independent of me. I'm afraid you are defending a (widespread) aristotelian misconception of Platonia, like if it was some magical realm in which the numbers exists, when I just mean the usual meaning of existence of numbers. Yes the usual meaning is platonist. Mathematicians are almost all platonist about natural numbers, even the week-end. I think that if you study the UDA, it will be easier for you to interpret the terms by the use I make of them. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 21-août-06, à 17:42, 1Z a écrit : The point I was trying to make was that I don't have to define exactly what my existence is. (Bruno's rationalism makes him think no question can can be settled unless it can be exactly defined; my empiricism makes me believe there are Brute Facts which are true even if we don't understand their nature). And then we can at least propose theory to figure out where those non definable things come from. Note that I show that the notion of first person is necessarily not definable by any first person. precisely: a lobian machine can define it for a much simpler lobian machine. No lobian machine can defined its own notion of first person. It is necessarily fuzzy, from her point of view. This requires some notion in mathematical logic. See the roadmap posts. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Le 21-août-06, à 19:48, Tom Caylor a écrit : I'd rather go with Pascal. ;) Comp has its own Pascal wag, when the doctor said that either you will die soon or you accept an artificial brain. Some people will believe an artificial brain could be a last chance to ... see their grand grand children married, or to follow the next soccer championship, or whatever. As I remember it, my interpretation/expansion of the Yes Doctor assumption is that 1) there is a (finite of course) level of (digital) substitution (called the correct level of substitution) that is sufficient to represent all that I am, and all that I could be if I hadn't undergone a substitution, and 2) we (including the doctor) cannot know what the correct level of substitution is, therefore we have to gamble that the doctor will get it right when we say Yes Doctor. Suppose that the level of substitution actually *performed* by the Doctor is S_p. Denote the *correct* level of substitution S_c. S_p can be expressed by a finite number, since the substitution itself can be expressed by a finite number (whatever is written on the tape/CD or other storage/transmitting device). We know what S_p is and it is a *fixed* finite number. But since S_c (*correct* level) is totally unknowable, all we know about it is our assumption that it is finite. The next *obvious* step in the logical process is that the probability that S_p = S_c is infinitesimal. Why? If the level is high it could be that even a drunk doctor will always choose it correctly. Your inference does not seem valid. I.e. the probability that the doctor got it right is zilch. This is because most numbers are bigger than any fixed finite number S_p. With progress, people will have lower and lower level of substitution proposed by doctors having more and more sophisticated substitution tools. I guess the *must* will be quantum protected classical coding, so as to diminish the risk of being copied by some devil sadistic Eve. So it seems that our step of faith in saying Yes Doctor in not well founded. It's definitely a bad bet. I don't see why. For many people it will be like a choice between dying in the usual sense (which of course is unknown for a computationalist), and having a chance to live a bit longer. It seems that we need a stronger statement than S_c is finite. I don't follow you here. It is obvious that the finiteness of the level is not enough, the substitution must be functionally genuine at that level. This is in the definition of comp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain is almost completely cut out from the environment during rem sleep. The brain didn't evolve to dream. Clearly the brain *did* evolve to dream, although we don't really understand the evolutionary advantage of dreaming, or for that matter sleeping. But that is beside the point: the question is whether interaction with an external environment is necessary for consciousness, and I think dreaming is one situation which shows that it is not. (To be fair, one could argue that dreaming does involve environmental input in that at the very least there is proprioceptive feedback from the rapid eye movements, and there is no dreaming during non-REM sleep. However, I think that is just a technical detail, as it is easy enough to imagine a brain dreaming without this input, or with the input provided by self-exciting neurons.) Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 21-août-06, à 18:55, David Nyman a écrit : I don't think Bruno and Stathis are arguing that numbers are neceesarily the only things that exist (although a standard Platonist might argue that that they are the only things that exist necessarily..) But aren't they claiming that numbers are the only things necessary (together with the operations required for CT+YD, whatever they might be) to account for *our* existence? If not, what else is required? Since the failure of logicism, by Godel's theorem, we can argue that numbers does not necessarily exist. Numbers does not come from logic alone. If you want them, you have to do a ontological commitment. To believe, like all mathematicians, in the structure (N,+,*,0,1) is enough for that (actually to believe in (N,+,*,0,1) is too much, but I don't want to enter in the technical details before it is really necessary). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: It's a mad mad mad world (was computationalism and supervenience)]
Le 21-août-06, à 22:01, George Levy a écrit : Slight correction: If you are sane then you're not sure that you are sane, OK. then you would have to be crazy to say Yes Doctor... Why? You can hope. Like you can hope you are sane, and that you will remain sane after a comp-substitution. You would only be crazy if you believe you can communicate, in some thrid person way, that you will survive, or that you have survived such a substitution. You would be crazy if you belief that science has shown the human brain is a machine. You would be crazy if you forget that comp is a (meta) religion ...yet a man could say it but not a sane machine. ? Bruno's quest based on machine psychology runs the risk of leaving unanswered the really big quest based on human psychology. Human psychology is interesting, but if comp is correct it is just a sub-branch of machine psychology. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 21-août-06, à 21:12, 1Z a écrit : If Everythingism is the combination of rationalsim (all truths are necessary apriori truths) and Mathematical Monism (mathematical objects exist, and are all that exist), it may be self-defeating , in that the second claim, ie Mathematical Monism, is not a necessary truth. Because somewhere you say I am a rationalist (which I appreciate), I must say that I do not believe all truth are necessary apriori truth at all. Indeed, everything intelligible, sensible, observable, are build from modal logics of necessity and possibility, themselves build from incompleteness in arithmetic (which entails that notion of possibility makes sense in the world of numbers and machines). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Are First Person prime?
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP): Every physical system contains if-then statements. If the grooves on the record were different, then the sound coming out of the speakers would also be different. That's not a statement contained in the physical system; it's a statement about other similar physical systems that you consider possible. You could as well say, (print Hello world.) contains an if-then because if the characters in the string were different the output would be different. I don't see how you could make the distinction well-defined. That's my point. Counterfactuals are defined relative to some environment/data/input which we suppose to be possibly different. It's not so much that it's not well defined, but that it's aribtrarily defined. So I think lz's point about intelligence requiring counterfactuals is the same as saying intelligence is relative to some environment - a view with which I agree. In the case of reproducing organisms the organism/environment distinction is clear. In a simulation it's not. Sorry to keep returning to this, but it's important. I still don't see how you can distinguish between the conditionals in a computer program and the conditionals inherent in any physical system. A computer is a device set up so that input A results in output B, while input C results in output D. The conditional is inherent even if the C-D branch is never realised because it *could* be realised. But a rock is also a device set up so that input A results in output B while input C results in output D: if you push it on its left side (A) it moves to the right (B) while if you push it on its right side (C) it moves to the left (D). The rock has this inherent conditional behaviour even if the C-D branch is never realised, because it *could* be realised if things had been different. If you include the computer's data in the program then it becomes an inputless system, a self-contained simulation. If you include yourself, the rock and everything else that might interact with it in one system you have a self-contained, inputless universe. Both the closed simulation and the universe (in the absence of CI type quantum randomness) are at least as deterministic as what we normally call a recording, despite all the conditionals, because it is rather more likely that I will change a recording than that God will intervene to push rocks around or provide computers with miraculous inputs. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computationalism and supervenience
Various people write: blah blah ...recording... blah blah... consciousness... blah blah But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in a recording at the moment? True, I am surprised by my experiences and believe I could have acted differently had I wanted to, but that might all be part of the script to which I am not privy, so that things could only have been different if the recording had been different. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 21-août-06, à 21:12, 1Z a écrit : If Everythingism is the combination of rationalsim (all truths are necessary apriori truths) and Mathematical Monism (mathematical objects exist, and are all that exist), it may be self-defeating , in that the second claim, ie Mathematical Monism, is not a necessary truth. Because somewhere you say I am a rationalist (which I appreciate), I must say that I do not believe all truth are necessary apriori truth at all. Indeed, everything intelligible, sensible, observable, are build from modal logics of necessity and possibility, themselves build from incompleteness in arithmetic (which entails that notion of possibility makes sense in the world of numbers and machines). There are many interpretations of the box and diamond. Incompleteness introduces ideas if necessity and possibility based on provability (or provability within a system). But there are, and always were, ideas of necessity based on truth rather than provability. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 21-août-06, à 18:55, David Nyman a écrit : I don't think Bruno and Stathis are arguing that numbers are neceesarily the only things that exist (although a standard Platonist might argue that that they are the only things that exist necessarily..) But aren't they claiming that numbers are the only things necessary (together with the operations required for CT+YD, whatever they might be) to account for *our* existence? If not, what else is required? Since the failure of logicism, by Godel's theorem, we can argue that numbers does not necessarily exist. Numbers does not come from logic alone. If you want them, to exist you have to do a ontological commitment. ..and if you want to play with them as a formal system, you don't. To believe, like all mathematicians, in the structure (N,+,*,0,1) is enough for that (actually to believe in (N,+,*,0,1) is too much, but I don't want to enter in the technical details before it is really necessary). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. Hence the need for a metaphysical account of matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 22-août-06, à 12:37, 1Z a écrit : Tom Caylor wrote: I'd say a candidate for making AR false is the behavior of the prime numbers, as has been discussed regarding your Riemann zeta function TOE. As I suggested on that thread, it could be that the behavior of the Riemann zeta function follows a collapse that is dependent on the observer. That's the strangest thign I've read ina long I said something along such line some times ago. I can provide a (short) explanation. The reason is the Hilbert-Polya conjecture according to which the non trivial zero of the complex Riemann Zeta function could perhaps be shown to stay on the complex line 1/2 + gt, if it was the case that those zero describe the spectrum of some quantum operator. This has not been proved, but this has been confirmed experimentally on many zeroes thanks to Odlyzko, Montgommery etc. But instead of finding something like the universal wave function, the spectrum seems to describe quantum chaos. but as every schoolboy knows there is no quantum chaos. Quantum chaos can only appears in a branch of the universal quantum wave. It requires measurement. Now the zeroes controls and are controlled by the distribution of the prime numbers (Riemann). So it looks like the prime number describes a reduced universal wave function, like if a collapse did occur. I can understand Tom Caylor wanting then that the prime numbers themselves (or the zeta description) result from some abstract collapse. One day I will send a post on many Pythagorean TOE like that. (They all miss the quanta/qualia distinction, unlike the lobian interview). To infer from the Riemann Zeta TOE, that there is a problem for Arithmetical Realism (AR) is a bit quick, though. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 22-août-06, à 08:36, Tom Caylor a écrit : I believe that we are finite, but as I said in the computationalsim and supervenience thread, it doesn't seem that this is a strong enough statement to be useful in a TOE. It seems that you cannot have YD without CT, but if true I would leave Bruno to explain exactly why. I am not sure I have said that YD needs CT. CT is needed to use the informal digital instead of the turing, java python seemingly restriction. For someone not believing in CT, digital could have a wider meaning than turing emulable. Now CT needs AR. CT is equivalent with the statement that all universal digital machine can emulate each other. i.e If a Universal Digital macine exists, it can emulate another one. No ontological commitment there. To make this precise (or just to define universal machine/number) you need to believe in numbers. To make something precise you need a precise *definition*. For a formalist, there is nothing to numbers except definitions (axoms, etc),. The numbers themselves do not have to exist. So there is still no necessary ontological commitment in CT. (But just in the usual sense of any number theorist). Which will depend on whether the individual number theorist is a Platonist, Formalist, or whatever. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 22-août-06, à 18:06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : So where is the key to translate number-monsters into thought-monsters? In front of you. Computer or universal machine, or universal numbers. More explanation in the posts. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 22-août-06, à 18:36, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). I believe so. This does not entail per se that matter is primitive. Also I prefer to define physics by the science of the observables. It is more neutral and misleading than by using the notion of matter, which is so different when considered along Plato line or Aristotle one. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Le 22-août-06, à 13:45, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 21-août-06, à 16:01, 1Z a écrit : Exactly. And if non-phsyical systems (Plato' Heaven) don't implement counterfactuals, then they can't run programmes, and if Plato's heaven can't run programmes, it can't be running us as programmes. I would say that only non-physical system implement counterfactuals. A counterfactual is somethingthat could have happened, but didn't. A static, immaterial systems can only handle counterfactuals by turning them into factuals -- everything that can happen does happen. It can fully capture the *conditional* structure of a programme, (unlike a recording) at the expense of not being a process. A programme is not the same thing as a process. I agree. Like a corpse is not the same as a life. Computationalism refers to real, physical processes running on material computers. Words like real, physical material needs to be (re)defined or at least clarify in front of the UDA. Proponents of the argument need to show that the causality and dynamism are inessential (that there is no relevant difference between process and programme) before you can have consciousness implemented Platonically. I would say there is no relevant difference, from the first person point of view, between a process in a real universe and a relative computation in Platonia. To exist Platonically is to exist eternally and necessarily. There is no time or changein Plato's heave. All partial recursive solutions of Schroedinger or Dirac equation exists in Platonia, and define through that block description notion of internal time quite analogous to Everett subjective probabilities. Therefore, to gain entry, a computational mind will have to be translated from a running process into something static and acausal. One route is to replace the process with a programme. After all, the programme does specify all the possible counterfactual behaviour, and it is basically a string of 1's and 0's, and therefore a suitabale occupant of Plato's heaven. But a specification of counterfactual behaviour is not actual counterfactual behaviour. The information is the same, but they are not the same thing. A program is basically the same as a number. A process or a computation is a finite or infinite sequence of numbers (possibly branching, and defined relatively to a universal numbers). The UD build all such (branching) sequences. No-one would believe that a brain-scan, however detailed, is conscious, Of course. so not computationalist, however ardent, is required to believe that a progamme on a disk, gathering dust on a shelf, is sentient, however good a piece of AI code it may be! Of course. Another route is record the actual behaviour, under some circumstances of a process, into a stream of data (ultimately, a string of numbers, and therefore soemthing already in Plato's heaven). OK then. This route loses the conditonal structure, the counterfactuals that are vital to computer programmes and therefore to computationalism. Not in the all computations view. Computer programmes contain conditional (if-then) statements. A given run of the programme will in general not explore every branch. yet the unexplored branches are part of the programme. A branch of an if-then statement that is not executed on a particular run of a programme will constitute a counterfactual, a situation that could have happened but didn't. Without counterfactuals you cannot tell which programme (algorithm) a process is implementing because two algorithms could have the same execution path but different unexecuted branches. The UD generates all such branching sequences. And the non triviality of computer science gives reasons to add different relative weigh on the branches (already like the MWI). Since a recording is not computation as such, the computationalist need not attribute mentality to it -- it need not have a mind of its own, any more than the characters in a movie. Right. (Another way of looking at this is via the Turing Test; a mere recording would never pass a TT since it has no condiitonal/counterfactual behaviour and therfore cannot answer unexpected questions). OK (but not quite relevant imo, because I can attribute a mind to a sleeping person, although it lacks inputs and outputs). That counterfactuality is the essence of (immaterial) comp. Although here Russell has a point: the quantum multiverse seems to handle counterfactual. Multiverse theories seek to turn the 3rd-person X could have happened but didn't into the 1st-person X could have been observed by me, but wasn't. OK. Now if comp is correct, I cannot distinguish a genuine quantum multiverse from any of its emulation in Platonia, A quantum multiverse is sitll only a tiny corner of Platonia. A priori. But if the quantum hypothesis is correct, and if
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 22-août-06, à 23:03, David Nyman a écrit : But this suggests to me that comp, in the 'instantiation-free' AR+CT+YD sense, *cannot* be correct, precisely because it makes 'existential' claims for the 'axiomatisation of indexical existence in a 3rd-person way'. The key issue here is surely the distinction between 'existence' and 'truth' as Peter specifies in his post to me. Comp makes only the assumption that there are numbers (although technically it is just about the number 0, and its successor). The 'axiomatisation of indexical existence in a 3rd person way' is derived from that. This is a key point. I think my discussion with Pete is terminological. When I say numbers exist, Pete seems to think I believe in some magical realm were numbers exist in I don't know which sense. But when I say number exist, I just mean that the proposition numbers exists is true independently of myself. I know since a long time that the word platonist is slightly ambiguous when used by modern mathematician, and that is why I prefer to say realism instead of Platonism. My ontic theory is really no more than Robinson Arithmetic (Q). Well to be sure I have more cute ontic theories, like the SK-combinators, or like a unique equation for an universal diophantine polynomials, etc. Some are more useful than others in some context, but they are all equivalent with respect to the derivation of physics from numbers. Your post is long, and I would like to comment Russell still today. Will read the rest of your post tomorrow. perhaps we should try to write shorter post on very specific points. It would help, if only the mail boxes :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 22-août-06, à 18:36, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). I believe so. This does not entail per se that matter is primitive. A philosophical notion of pimitive matter is both constent and useful. Also I prefer to define physics by the science of the observables. It isn't, de facto. Machian physics is a side-issue or minority interest, like intuitionism in maths. It is more neutral and misleading than by using the notion of matter, which is so different when considered along Plato line or Aristotle one. People have come up with different theories about the same thing ?! Next, you'll be telling me there is more than one philosophy-of-maths...so obviously maths must be dicarded wholesale , to avoid confusion. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Le 22-août-06, à 05:53, Russell Standish a écrit : This is a very interesting remark, although I am not convinced. I have also believed for a while that a material universe could be saved by the way the quantum multiverse actualizes the counterfactuals. But if that were true, consciousness would not supervene on a *classical* machine running deterministically an emulation of a universal quantum turing itself running my brain, making comp false. I have put this to you in the past, but you have always responded that the multiple universes always emerges out of the UD, leaving me most confused as to whether I support the COMP position or not. I think you are confusing two points. Indeed the many computations emerges right at the start from the AR part of comp. Then a unique physical mutiverse appears from the UD reasoning. But then, from the movie-graph or from Maudlin's Olympia argument, a possibility remains that a real physical mutltiverse emerges (real in the putative Aristotelian-Jones sense!). But as I said, this moves does not succeed in justifying the real part of it (good because that notion of realness is quite vague to say the least). We can come back on this latter, in some movie-graph posts, perhaps. Physical supervenience is not equivalent to assuming a concrete primitive material world. The latter is an additional assumption. This depends entirely of what you mean by physical. If physical-supervenience alludes to the comp-physics, then ok. If this alludes to physics as understood by a aristotelian-matter physicist, then physical supervenience need it. Maudlin talk only about supervenience. For him it is just obvious that comp makes it physical. Of course he is wrong there (or UDA contains an error, but this remains to be shown). I have coined the term physical supervenience, with physical having its standard aristotelian sense just to distinguish it with the comp-supervenience idea that mind relies on the immaterial computations (an infinity of them to be precise). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 22-août-06, à 12:37, 1Z a écrit : Tom Caylor wrote: I'd say a candidate for making AR false is the behavior of the prime numbers, as has been discussed regarding your Riemann zeta function TOE. As I suggested on that thread, it could be that the behavior of the Riemann zeta function follows a collapse that is dependent on the observer. That's the strangest thign I've read ina long I said something along such line some times ago. I can provide a (short) explanation. The reason is the Hilbert-Polya conjecture according to which the non trivial zero of the complex Riemann Zeta function could perhaps be shown to stay on the complex line 1/2 + gt, if it was the case that those zero describe the spectrum of some quantum operator. The *spectrum* of a quantum operator is not observer-dependent. What is observer-dependent, according to some, is the particular value on the spectrum that is actually observed. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 23-août-06, à 03:58, Brent Meeker a écrit : People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain is almost completely cut out from the environment during rem sleep. Almost is not completely. I am glad you don't insist. In any case, I don't think consciousness is maintained indefinitely with no inputs. I think a brain-in-a-vat would go into an endless loop without external stimulus. OK, but for our reasoning it is enough consciousness is maintained a nanosecond (relatively to us). I guess they have no problem with comatose people either. Comatose people are generally referred to as unconscious. ? ? ? I mean this *is* the question. In mind'sI (Dennett Hofstadter) we learn that a woman has been in comatose state during 50 years (if I remember correctly), and said she never stop to be conscious. They are more than one form of comatose state. To say they are unconscious is debatable at the least. And then there is the case of dreams. And for those who does not like dream, what about the following question: take a child and enclose him/her in a box completely isolated from the environement. Would that fact suppress his/her consciousness? Some parents will appreciate and feel less guilty with such ideas ... Of course they cannot be even just troubled by the UD, which is a program without inputs and without outputs. As I understood the UD the program itself was not conscious, but rather that some parts are supposed to be, relative to a simulated environment. Yes. some person attached to (infinity) of special computations, indeed. Now, without digging in the movie-graph, I would still be interested if someone accepting standard comp (Peter's expression) could explain how a digital machine could correctly decide that her environment is real-physical. Decide is ambiguous. She could very well form that hypothesis and find much confirming and no contrary evidence. What are you asking for? a proof from some axioms? Which axioms? Sorry, I have used the word decide in the logician sense (like in undecidable). To decide = to proof, or to test, or to solve, in some math sense. Which axioms? Indeed, good question, that's makes my point. Well, I was thinking about some physical theory the someone would argue for. Anyone a priori. If such machine and reasoning exist, it will be done in Platonia, and, worst, assuming comp, it will be done as correctly as the real machine argument. This would lead to the fact that in Platonia, there are (many) immaterial machines proving *correctly* that they are immaterial. Contradiction. Suppose a physical machine implements computation and proves relative to some axioms that physical machines don't exist. Contradiction? If by physical you mean what Peter Jones means, then indeed the physical machine is in contradiction. This means that her axioms are indeed contradictory. If moreover, the physical machine gives a correct proof, as as I say in the quotes, then we get a total contradiction, like a proof that PI is an integer, for example. That we are in contradiction. As far as we are consistent, this just means that no X-machine can correctly proof that X-machine does not exist. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: I think my discussion with Pete is terminological. When I say numbers exist, Pete seems to think I believe in some magical realm were numbers exist in I don't know which sense. But when I say number exist, I just mean that the proposition numbers exists is true independently of myself. I know since a long time that the word platonist is slightly ambiguous when used by modern mathematician, and that is why I prefer to say realism instead of Platonism. This is the heart of the disagreement. Of course I agree that 'numbers exist' is true independent of myself, but for me this just means that I believe that such 'mathematical objects' - abstracted from other putative features of what-exists - are instantiated in what-exists independently of any instantiation of myself. That's all. And I challenge you to show that this is insufficient for any actual mathematics that is, has been, or could be practised. I also prefer to say 'realism', in this case in place of 'Aristotelianism'. And this is the parting of the ways. If we choose to be 'realist' about numbers, we also choose not to explain them further. If our 'realism' relates to observables - e.g. my primitive 'figure/ ground reflexivity' - then we have OR (observable arithmetic) derived from its instantiation in a posited differentiable what-exists. I've chosen the latter because my intuition favours starting from what is reflexively manifested. This is clearly not mandatory. But choose we must, and what is then 'explicable' follows ineluctably from this. perhaps we should try to write shorter post on very specific points. It would help, if only the mail boxes :) I'm trying! David Le 22-août-06, à 23:03, David Nyman a écrit : But this suggests to me that comp, in the 'instantiation-free' AR+CT+YD sense, *cannot* be correct, precisely because it makes 'existential' claims for the 'axiomatisation of indexical existence in a 3rd-person way'. The key issue here is surely the distinction between 'existence' and 'truth' as Peter specifies in his post to me. Comp makes only the assumption that there are numbers (although technically it is just about the number 0, and its successor). The 'axiomatisation of indexical existence in a 3rd person way' is derived from that. This is a key point. I think my discussion with Pete is terminological. When I say numbers exist, Pete seems to think I believe in some magical realm were numbers exist in I don't know which sense. But when I say number exist, I just mean that the proposition numbers exists is true independently of myself. I know since a long time that the word platonist is slightly ambiguous when used by modern mathematician, and that is why I prefer to say realism instead of Platonism. My ontic theory is really no more than Robinson Arithmetic (Q). Well to be sure I have more cute ontic theories, like the SK-combinators, or like a unique equation for an universal diophantine polynomials, etc. Some are more useful than others in some context, but they are all equivalent with respect to the derivation of physics from numbers. Your post is long, and I would like to comment Russell still today. Will read the rest of your post tomorrow. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Stathis,
you touched the 'truth' (a word I put into - because I don't believe it).
Matter
cannot be an is - actually or virtually. Rutherford's empty atom shows the
dichotomy between 'effects' ('affects'?) and 'explanation' (more than just
words).
The figment 'matter' is a product of 'mental evolution' in this universe, to
catch imputes we cannot handle. 'We' is here the mental evolution of the
universe. It was not man, or the old ape who decided let there be matter in
our thinking - it was a zillion-stepwise development to cope with 'affects'
we experienced without better explanation. So we (humans and animals)
nowadays (~1b years?) accept the notion that 'there IS matter' and we can
interact with it. Physics is a product in this development of reductionist
efforts to 'organize' our world for ourselves.
And then came the other sciences as well, in the same reductionism.
We better do not chase a figment, as long as we are living IN IT - accept
its use and the uncertainty of whatever we talk about. It looks like a basic
tenet in our percept of reality - the what we see is what we live with
from which I TRY to get to a better understanding (not yet achieved, of
course). All our life, the base knowledge, the technology, the mental
construct, is a product of this figment.
Yes, matter is not matterly, just believed so. Energy is a cop-out - a
'name' for something we cannot put our finger on (mentally). And so are
numbers.
The theories you decry, or promote, all of them, are in the same circle.
Regards
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 1Z everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 5:11 AM
Subject: RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Peter Jones writes:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. At
the turn of last century Rutherford showed that atoms were mostly
empty space. Tables and chairs did not suddenly become less solid as
a result, but it became clear that their apparent solidity was not
actually evidence that atoms are solid all the way through. In a similar
fashion, the apparent solidity of matter is not actually evidence that it
isn't just fluff all the way down, or part of a computer simulation. Our
physical theories describe the behaviour of matter without formally
addressing this question at all, despite what prejudices and working
assumptions physicists may have about the true basis of physical reality.
Stathis Papaioannou
_
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Re: computationalism and supervenience
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 21-août-06, à 22:49, Brent Meeker a écrit : But leaving that aside, I think there is another question in play: What kind of computation implements intelligence? ...consciousness? Is it every computation, with differences only of degree? Or are there distinct requirements? You need at least some relatively self-referentially correct machine. The machine has to be self-referentially correct relatively to its most probable computations. To have reflexive consciousness the self-referentially correct machine must be sufficiently rich in introspective ability, like lobian machine are. Bruno I take this to be what is needed to be self-conscious. But is that the same as having an inner narrative? Is it the same as passing the mirror test? Is my dog conscious - or must he first do arithmetic? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP): Every physical system contains if-then statements. If the grooves on the record were different, then the sound coming out of the speakers would also be different. That's not a statement contained in the physical system; it's a statement about other similar physical systems that you consider possible. You could as well say, (print Hello world.) contains an if-then because if the characters in the string were different the output would be different. I don't see how you could make the distinction well-defined. That's my point. Counterfactuals are defined relative to some environment/data/input which we suppose to be possibly different. It's not so much that it's not well defined, but that it's aribtrarily defined. So I think lz's point about intelligence requiring counterfactuals is the same as saying intelligence is relative to some environment - a view with which I agree. In the case of reproducing organisms the organism/environment distinction is clear. In a simulation it's not. Sorry to keep returning to this, but it's important. I still don't see how you can distinguish between the conditionals in a computer program and the conditionals inherent in any physical system. A computer is a device set up so that input A results in output B, while input C results in output D. The conditional is inherent even if the C-D branch is never realised because it *could* be realised. But a rock is also a device set up so that input A results in output B while input C results in output D: if you push it on its left side (A) it moves to the right (B) while if you push it on its right side (C) it moves to the left (D). The rock has this inherent conditional behaviour even if the C-D branch is never realised, because it *could* be realised if things had been different. OK, I take your point. But the movement of the rock right or left is not a property of the rock. The rock is not computing its motion. But by including spacetime, inertia, etc, I will grant that the system computes. And it has implicit if-thens because you suppose you could have pushed it the other way; even if you don't. If you include the computer's data in the program then it becomes an inputless system, a self-contained simulation. If you include yourself, the rock and everything else that might interact with it in one system you have a self-contained, inputless universe. Both the closed simulation and the universe (in the absence of CI type quantum randomness) are at least as deterministic as what we normally call a recording, despite all the conditionals, because it is rather more likely that I will change a recording than that God will intervene to push rocks around or provide computers with miraculous inputs. Right. So within this simulation you may say there are intelligent subsystems by making a somewhat arbitrary cut between subsystem and environment. This still seems different from a recording though. The recording is only of the paths actually taken, whereas looking at the program you can see other paths that could have been taken - just as you say the rock computes because you *could have* pushed it the other way. And in anycase there does seem to be quantum randomness. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Almost is not completely. In any case, I don't think consciousness is maintained indefinitely with no inputs. I think a brain-in-a-vat would go into an endless loop without external stimulus. That's an assumption, No, it has empirical support. It is what is reported by people in extended sensory deprivation experiments. but even if true it would only say something about the nature of human brains. It is easy enough to imagine a brain with self-excitatory neurons that provide the same kind of input as the environment does, modulating their activity in response to feedback from other neurons. It would just be a technical problem to ensure that it didn't go into an endless loop. Without inherent (quantum) randomness? I don't think so. Close deterministic systems have a Poincare return time. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno: why do I have difficulties to go along with many of you? E.g. when you wrote (and not you brought up the ominous "axiom"): "...Which axioms? Indeed, good question, that's makes my point. Well, I was thinking about some physical theory the "someone" would argue for. Anyone a priori." I dislike 'axioms', but do not trust my dislike, so I looked up Wikipedia's definition to have something to argue against G. It said: An axiom is a sentence or proposition that is taken for granted as true, and serves as a starting point for deducing other truths. In many usage axiom and postulate are used as synonyms. In certain epistemological theories, an axiom is a self-evident truth upon which other knowledge must rest, and from which other knowledge is built up. An axiom in this sense can be known before one knows any of these other propostions. Not all epistemologists agree that any axioms, understood in that sense, exist. In logic and mathematics, an axiom is not necessarily a self-evident truth, but rather a formal logical _expression_ used in a deduction to yield further results. To axiomatize a system of knowledge is to show that all of its claims can be derived from a small set of sentences that are independent of one another. This does not imply that they could have been known independently; and there are typically multiple ways to axiomatize a given system of knowledge (such as arithmetic). Mathematics distinguishes two types of axioms: logical axioms and non-logical axioms. It speaks for itself. "We" (not you and me) create axioms to make 'our' theories work. Then we consider the 'system' in question based on such axioms. I try to scrutinize them, to find alternates and scrutinize those also. The other one is an 'a priori (physical?) theory' - sounds in physics similar to 'your' numbers which you may consider 'a priori' existing. If I may ask: what 'natural' senses may detect numbers? Unless. of course, you consider our mind a 'natural sense' (what may be true). As I 'believe': anything recognized by our 'senses' are our mental interpretations of the unattainable 'reality' (if we condone its validity). "My world" is a posteriori. Cheerz John M - Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 10:31 AM Subject: Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really... Le 23-août-06, à 03:58, Brent Meeker a écrit : People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain is almost completely cut out from the environment during rem sleep. Almost is not completely.I am glad you don't insist. In any case, I don't think consciousness is maintained indefinitely with no inputs. I think a "brain-in-a-vat" would go into an endless loop without external stimulus.OK, but for our reasoning it is enough consciousness is maintained a nanosecond (relatively to us). I guess they have no problem with comatose people either. Comatose people are generally referred to as "unconscious".? ? ?I mean this *is* the question. In mind'sI (Dennett Hofstadter) we learn that a woman has been in comatose state during 50 years (if I remember correctly), and said she never stop to be conscious.They are more than one form of comatose state. To say they are "unconscious" is debatable at the least. And then there is the case of dreams. And for those who does not like dream, what about the following question: take a child and enclose him/her in a box completely isolated from the environement. Would that fact suppress his/her consciousness?Some parents will appreciate and feel less guilty with such ideas ... Of course they cannot be even just troubled by the UD, which is a program without inputs and without outputs. As I understood the UD the program itself was not conscious, but rather that some parts are supposed to be, relative to a simulated environment.Yes. some "person" attached to (infinity) of special computations, indeed. Now, without digging in the movie-graph, I would still be interested if someone accepting "standard comp" (Peter's _expression_) could explain how a digital machine could correctly decide that her environment is "real-physical". "Decide" is ambiguous. She could very well form that hypothesis and find much confirming and no contrary evidence. What are you asking for? a proof from some axioms? Which axioms?Sorry, I have used the word "decide" in the logician sense (like in undecidable). To decide = to proof, or to test, or to solve, in some math sense.Which axioms? Indeed, good question, that's makes my point. Well, I was thinking about some physical theory the "someone" would argue for. Anyone a priori. If such machine and reasoning exist, it will be done in Platonia, and, worst, assuming
Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
- Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 7:56 AM Subject: Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really... Le 22-août-06, à 18:06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : So where is the key to translate number-monsters into thought-monsters? In front of you. Computer or universal machine, or universal numbers. More explanation in the posts. Bruno --- Not as I see it. I tried to describe what I thought and ended up with the question you emphasized above. The posts (many of them) take the 'translational' key for granted, others have similar doubts to mine. No understandable bridging occurred for those who do not start from the inside of the number world. In any religion: you have to believe to believe. John -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.405 / Virus Database: 268.11.5/425 - Release Date: 08/22/06 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. Hence the need for a metaphysical account of matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. If that is done isn't what you call metaphysics the 'actual physics' and the physicist's account of 'matter-as-behaviour' the metaphysics? Just a rhetorical terminological gripe. Also, if the universe is treated as a mathematics ( of matter-as-bare-substance ), isn't the scientist its metamathematics, built of it? (With all the Godellian implications..) i.e. Scientists are what could be called the 'metamathematics of the noumenon'? andTo be an instance of this metamathematics.. is to be a scientist and have qualia. The scientist and the qualia would both be natural expressions of the same noumenon. The existence of qualia _at all_ is logical proof that the choice of which 'matter-as-Bare-Substance' (to make a universe with scientists in it) is limited to be only that class which are capable of expressing what might be termed qualia. Hence this is a scientific proposition. It might not predict to a comfortable level of specificity (as to what this matter-as-bare-substance is) , but it certainly is a scientific (empirically supportable) constraint. Qualia thus become an empirical key to a door to the noumenon. Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory. All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. Hence the need for a metaphysical account of matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. If that is done isn't what you call metaphysics the 'actual physics' and the physicist's account of 'matter-as-behaviour' the metaphysics? Just a rhetorical terminological gripe. The meta in metaphysics doesn't operate like the meta in metamathematics. 'The title of the work is Τῶν μετὰ τὰ φύσικα (literally, of the things after physics). This is generally supposed to mean that this is just a collection of works that later editors placed after Aristotle's treatises on physics, but it may well mean that the budding philosopher should study these subjects after studying physical matters such as motion, time, and animal life.' Also, if the universe is treated as a mathematics ( of matter-as-bare-substance ), isn't the scientist its metamathematics, built of it? (With all the Godellian implications..) i.e. Scientists are what could be called the 'metamathematics of the noumenon'? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Supervenience requires a token, or object in the physical world, that consciousness supervenes. All I'm saying is that this token must really implement all the counterfactual situations, ie exist in a Multiverse. Conscious experience (the inside view) will only be of one of the histories in the Multiverse. On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 08:32:04PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Russell Standish writes: Not really, as conscious experience is only associated with one branch, but multiple branches are needed to have any conscious experience at all. What does this mean? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Its a fair point, given that we can't exactly define consciousness, but doesn't it seem a tad unlikely to you? The point is that in a Multiverse our own consciousnesses are not equivalent to recordings is suggestive, but not conclusive, that recordings aren't conscious. The Maudlin/movie-graph argument relies upon the equivalence *in fact* of recordings and computations in a single universe. Hence the focus on *counter fact*. Cheers BTW - I'm travelling to Melbourne next Wednesday on business - I'm not sure of my schedule yet, but maybe there's a chance of getting a coffee together if you're around and handy to the CBD. On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 09:13:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Various people write: blah blah ...recording... blah blah... consciousness... blah blah But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in a recording at the moment? True, I am surprised by my experiences and believe I could have acted differently had I wanted to, but that might all be part of the script to which I am not privy, so that things could only have been different if the recording had been different. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Peter Jones writes: All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. Hence the need for a metaphysical account of matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. That would be like theology. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make
predictions about how the world works. If physists get carried away and say
this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth then they are
talking metaphysics, not physics.
Stathis Papaioannou
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2006 11:51:07 -0400
Stathis,
you touched the 'truth' (a word I put into - because I don't believe it).
Matter
cannot be an is - actually or virtually. Rutherford's empty atom shows the
dichotomy between 'effects' ('affects'?) and 'explanation' (more than just
words).
The figment 'matter' is a product of 'mental evolution' in this universe, to
catch imputes we cannot handle. 'We' is here the mental evolution of the
universe. It was not man, or the old ape who decided let there be matter in
our thinking - it was a zillion-stepwise development to cope with 'affects'
we experienced without better explanation. So we (humans and animals)
nowadays (~1b years?) accept the notion that 'there IS matter' and we can
interact with it. Physics is a product in this development of reductionist
efforts to 'organize' our world for ourselves.
And then came the other sciences as well, in the same reductionism.
We better do not chase a figment, as long as we are living IN IT - accept
its use and the uncertainty of whatever we talk about. It looks like a basic
tenet in our percept of reality - the what we see is what we live with
from which I TRY to get to a better understanding (not yet achieved, of
course). All our life, the base knowledge, the technology, the mental
construct, is a product of this figment.
Yes, matter is not matterly, just believed so. Energy is a cop-out - a
'name' for something we cannot put our finger on (mentally). And so are
numbers.
The theories you decry, or promote, all of them, are in the same circle.
Regards
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 1Z everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 5:11 AM
Subject: RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Peter Jones writes:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. At
the turn of last century Rutherford showed that atoms were mostly
empty space. Tables and chairs did not suddenly become less solid as
a result, but it became clear that their apparent solidity was not
actually evidence that atoms are solid all the way through. In a similar
fashion, the apparent solidity of matter is not actually evidence that it
isn't just fluff all the way down, or part of a computer simulation. Our
physical theories describe the behaviour of matter without formally
addressing this question at all, despite what prejudices and working
assumptions physicists may have about the true basis of physical reality.
Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Are First Person prime?
Brent Meeker writes: If you include the computer's data in the program then it becomes an inputless system, a self-contained simulation. If you include yourself, the rock and everything else that might interact with it in one system you have a self-contained, inputless universe. Both the closed simulation and the universe (in the absence of CI type quantum randomness) are at least as deterministic as what we normally call a recording, despite all the conditionals, because it is rather more likely that I will change a recording than that God will intervene to push rocks around or provide computers with miraculous inputs. Right. So within this simulation you may say there are intelligent subsystems by making a somewhat arbitrary cut between subsystem and environment. This still seems different from a recording though. The recording is only of the paths actually taken, whereas looking at the program you can see other paths that could have been taken - just as you say the rock computes because you *could have* pushed it the other way. In a deterministic universe, saying that things could have turned out differently had initial conditions or physical laws been different is analogous to saying the sound coming out of the speakers could have been different if the grooves on the record or the equalisation in the preamp stage had been different. And in anycase there does seem to be quantum randomness. There does, although the MWI is deterministic. I can't think of any good reason why true or apparent quantum randomness should be necessary for intelligent behaviour or consciousness. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: If you include the computer's data in the program then it becomes an inputless system, a self-contained simulation. If you include yourself, the rock and everything else that might interact with it in one system you have a self-contained, inputless universe. Both the closed simulation and the universe (in the absence of CI type quantum randomness) are at least as deterministic as what we normally call a recording, despite all the conditionals, because it is rather more likely that I will change a recording than that God will intervene to push rocks around or provide computers with miraculous inputs. Right. So within this simulation you may say there are intelligent subsystems by making a somewhat arbitrary cut between subsystem and environment. This still seems different from a recording though. The recording is only of the paths actually taken, whereas looking at the program you can see other paths that could have been taken - just as you say the rock computes because you *could have* pushed it the other way. In a deterministic universe, saying that things could have turned out differently had initial conditions or physical laws been different is analogous to saying the sound coming out of the speakers could have been different if the grooves on the record or the equalisation in the preamp stage had been different. That still sounds like a cheat to me. If it's recording of the universe it's an inputless program, since there is no environment outside the universe. But when you invoke the analogy of the record, you conceive the grooves and the initial conditions as input. And in anycase there does seem to be quantum randomness. There does, although the MWI is deterministic. I can't think of any good reason why true or apparent quantum randomness should be necessary for intelligent behaviour or consciousness. I can't either, although Henry Stapp thinks he has such a theory: quant-ph/0003065. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
