date:20211221

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:15 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

>
*> So if you say that there is a 50% chance the atom will decay in the next
> hour what does that mean, given that there is also a 100% chance the atom
> will decay in the next hour under MWI?*
>

By utilizing a complex set of observations it is actually possible to delay
the radioactive decay of an atom indefinitely, for practical reasons when
this experiment is actually performed the delay is small but statistically
significant. This is how Many Worlds would explain that. Suppose an atom
has a halflife of one second, the universe splits and so do I after one
second.  In one universe the atom decays and in the other it doesn't. In
the universe where it didn't decay after another second the universe splits
again, and again in one universe it decays but in the other it has not, it
survived for 2 full seconds. So there will be a version of me that observes
this atom with a one second half life surviving for 3 seconds, and 4
seconds, and 5 years, and 6 centuries, and you name it. By utilizing a
series of increasingly complex and difficult procedures in the lab it is
possible for the lab to be in the tiny minority of universes that contains
observers that see the atom surviving for an arbitrary length of time. But
the longer the time and the more atoms involved the more difficult the
procedures become and soon becomes ridiculously impractical.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

ww3

umu

>
>
>
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> Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Wed, 22 Dec 2021 at 09:02, John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 4:47 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> *>>> But you have said in the past, with regard to copying experiments,
 that there is a 100% chance that you (i.e. John Clark) will see both
 outcomes.*

>>>
>>> >> Yes, John Clark did say that and sees no reason to retract it
>>> because all the John Clark's have as equal a right to that name as the John
>>> Clark that is writing this email, even those John Clark's that have
>>> observed rare events at the outer edges of the Bell Curve.
>>>
>>
>> *> So given that John Clark has a 100% probability of seeing each
>> outcome, to whom do the other probabilities apply?*
>>
>
> This may or may not be the answer because I'm not sure I understand your
> question, but John Clark will either see event X or see event Y, so there
> is a 100% chance John Clark will see event X and only event X,  and a 100%
> chance John Clark will see event Y and only event Y. And the same would
> be true for people with other names.
>

So if you say that there is a 50% chance the atom will decay in the next
hour what does that mean, given that there is also a 100% chance the atom
will decay in the next hour under MWI?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 4:47 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

*>>> But you have said in the past, with regard to copying experiments,
>>> that there is a 100% chance that you (i.e. John Clark) will see both
>>> outcomes.*
>>>
>>
>> >> Yes, John Clark did say that and sees no reason to retract it because
>> all the John Clark's have as equal a right to that name as the John Clark
>> that is writing this email, even those John Clark's that have observed rare
>> events at the outer edges of the Bell Curve.
>>
>
> *> So given that John Clark has a 100% probability of seeing each outcome,
> to whom do the other probabilities apply?*
>

This may or may not be the answer because I'm not sure I understand your
question, but John Clark will either see event X or see event Y, so there
is a 100% chance John Clark will see event X and only event X,  and a 100%
chance John Clark will see event Y and only event Y. And the same would be
true for people with other names.
John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

umu

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 12:53 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 21-12-2021 07:12, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 4:40 PM Jesse Mazer 
> > wrote:
> >
> > I wasn't linking to the paper for the argument about semantics (there
> > doesn't seem to be any agreed-upon definition of 'realism' distinct
> > from local realism in physics, from what I've seen) but rather for the
> > toy model they provide in section 5 with the experimenters being
> > duplicated when they try to measure the entangled particle. The point
> > is that Alice is locally duplicated when she measures her particle,
> > and Bob is locally duplicated when he measures his, but there is no
> > need for the universe to decide which copy of Bob inhabits the same
> > "world" as a given copy of Alice, or vice versa, until there's been
> > time for signals limited by the speed of light to pass between them
> > (or to a third observer). This is not the sort of "local realist"
> > theory that Bell was trying to refute (one of the implicit assumptions
> > in his derivation was that each spin measurement produces exactly one
> > of two possible outcomes), but the dynamics of such splitting can be
> > perfectly local, and it can still be true that if you randomly select
> > one of the copies of an observer in a Bell type experiment, the
> > probabilities that your randomly selected copy will see various
> > outcomes can be made to match the QM predictions that violate Bell
> > inequalities.
> >
> > This seems to be the hand-waving way in which this is usually argued.
> > I was asking for something a little more concrete.
> >
> > There is a fairly simple argument that shows that many worlds ideas
> > can have no role to play in the violation of the Bell inequalities. In
> > other words, there is an indirect no-go theorem for the idea that MWI
> > makes these experiments completely local.
> >
> > The argument goes like this. Take Alice and Bob measuring spin states
> > on members of entangled pairs of particles -- they are presumed to be
> > distant from each other, and independent. Alice, say, measures a
> > sequence of particles at random polarizer orientations, randomizing
> > the polarizer angle between measurements. She records her results (up
> > or down) in a lab book. After N such pairs have been measured, her lab
> > book contains a sequence of N 0s or 1s (for up/down), with a record of
> > the relevant polarizer angle for each measurement. If MWI is correct,
> > there are 2^N copies of Alice, each with a lab book containing a
> > similar binary sequence. Over the 2^N copies of Alice, all possible
> > binary sequences are covered. Bob does the same, so he has a lab book
> > with some binary sequence of 0s and 1s (and 2^N copies with different
> > lab books). For each copy of Bob, and each lab book, all N
> > measurements were necessarily made in the same world (because
> > individuals cannot move between worlds).
> >
> >  After all measurements are complete, Alice and Bob meet and compare
> > their lab books in order to calculate the correlations between results
> > for different relative measurement angles. Once Alice and Bob meet,
> > they are necessarily in the same world. And since they carry their lab
> > books with them, the measurements made in each lab book must all have
> > been made in that same, single, world. The correlations that Alice and
> > Bob calculate are shown to violate the Bell inequality. (That is
> > experimentally verified). But this violation of the inequality takes
> > place in just one world, as has been seen by the above construction.
> > The alternative copies of Alice and Bob also meet to compare results.
> > As before, all these meetings take place in the same worlds as all the
> > relevant measurements were made. Consequently, the many-worlds
> > analysis for each Alice-Bob pair is exactly the same as the single
> > world analysis obtained if collapse is assumed. Many-worlds adds
> > nothing to the analysis, so MWI cannot give any alternative
> > explanation of the correlations. In particular, MWI cannot give a
> > local account.
> >
> > Bruce
>
> It is the violation of the Bell inequality in each world that is the
> evidence of the existence of the other worlds.


Huh?

The problem is with
> comparing with collapse hypothesis and then saying that there is no
> difference.


If there is no difference, where is the problem?

But the whole problem is that when Alice makes her
> measurement that she gains some amount of information about what Bob is
> going to find, even though they are spacelike separated.


In general, that is not true. When both Alice and Bob set their polarizers
randomly while the particles are in flight, the fact that Alice might get
|up> tells her nothing about what Bob will get at some randomly different
polarizer orientation. You seem to be stuck with thinking in terms of
parallel polarizer orientations.


In the MWI
> there is no such mysterious gain of information due to the

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Wed, 22 Dec 2021 at 07:50, John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 3:34 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> >> You may ask, how different can "you" be before it no longer deserves
>>> the right to be called "you"? I admit that limit is somewhat arbitrary, but
>>> the important point is that whatever limit you choose, as long as it's
>>> consistent, it makes no difference if high precision is demanded for
>>> something to be called "you" or if extreame sloppiness can be tolerated,
>>> either way it will still remain true that there will be more "yous" near
>>> the center of the Bell Curve than at the trailing edges.
>>>
>>
>> *> But you have said in the past, with regard to copying experiments,
>> that there is a 100% chance that you (i.e. John Clark) will see both
>> outcomes.*
>>
>
> Yes, John Clark did say that and sees no reason to retract it because all
> the John Clark's have as equal a right to that name as the John Clark that
> is writing this email, even those John Clark's that have observed rare
> events at the outer edges of the Bell Curve.
>

So given that John Clark has a 100% probability of seeing each outcome, to
whom do the other probabilities apply?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

2021-12-21 Thread Brent Meeker

On 12/21/2021 5:27 AM, smitra wrote:

On 20-12-2021 23:15, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 12/20/2021 1:03 AM, smitra wrote:

On 20-12-2021 03:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 12:23 PM John Clark
wrote:

On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 7:59 PM Brent Meeker
wrote:

On 12/19/2021 5:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
By contrast the Many Worlds Theory only makes one assumption,
Schrodinger's Equation means what it says. So Many Worlds wins.

_> It also makes the assumption that the eigenvalues of a
measurement are realized probabilistically._

What is the eigenvalue of a temperature of 72°F? It doesn't have one.
A measurement doesn't have an eigenvalue but a matrix does, such as
the one that describes the Schrodinger Wave. And no quantum
interpretation needs to assume there is a relationship between the
square of the absolute value of that wave and probability because it
is observed to be true.

The Born Rule cannot be derived from the Schrodinger equation; it has
to be added as a further independent assumption. So it is not true
that Many Worlds makes only one assumption. It requires just as many
assumptions as collapse theories.

Bruce

Yes, but with those assumptions it yields an unambiguous framework
for a fundamental theory. In case of collapse theories, you're stuck
with a phenomenological theory that cannot be improved, because you
are not allowed to describe observers and observations within the
collapse frameworks. It's a bit like the difference between
statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, if in the latter case
textbooks were to insist that you are only allowed to consider
certain types of heat engines that operate in the quasistatic limit.

Yes, but it is decoherence theory that extends the theory of
measurement beyond just phenomenological projectors. And it doesn't
reach to explaining the probabilistic nature of QM. ISTM that the
steps in Everett's account of measurement where instrument variables
become correlated with quantum system variables and cross terms form
superpositions are set to zero are almost has "hand wavy" as the CI
projection operators. They seem to be just motivated by "This must
be the way the Schroedinger equation works for macroscopic instruments
in order that we get the same answer as the CI projector after we
assume Born's rule."

Brent

I agree that this is a problem. But as as I explained just now to
Jesse Mazer, one should be able to make progress by including an
observer defined as an algorithm. This should amount to the same thing
as is done by Everett, but it's then motivated by the actual physics.

That would be better than just hand waving. But can a macroscopic
observer really be approximated by a simple algorithm? One of the
things that makes an "observer" is that it interacts with an environment
and has an effectively infinite degrees of freedom.

Brent

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 3:34 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

>> You may ask, how different can "you" be before it no longer deserves the
>> right to be called "you"? I admit that limit is somewhat arbitrary, but the
>> important point is that whatever limit you choose, as long as it's
>> consistent, it makes no difference if high precision is demanded for
>> something to be called "you" or if extreame sloppiness can be tolerated,
>> either way it will still remain true that there will be more "yous" near
>> the center of the Bell Curve than at the trailing edges.
>>
>
> *> But you have said in the past, with regard to copying experiments, that
> there is a 100% chance that you (i.e. John Clark) will see both outcomes.*
>

Yes, John Clark did say that and sees no reason to retract it because all
the John Clark's have as equal a right to that name as the John Clark that
is writing this email, even those John Clark's that have observed rare
events at the outer edges of the Bell Curve.
John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

bew

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

2021-12-21 Thread Brent Meeker

On 12/21/2021 2:30 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 20:29, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 7:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 19:35, Bruce Kellett
wrote:

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 18:12, Bruce Kellett
wrote:

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis
Papaioannou wrote:

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker
wrote:

On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:

The probabilities come from the fact that
observers consider themselves unique
individuals persisting through time.

But that doesn't imply any kind of
probability unless they regard themselves
as the one member of an ensemble that is
unique, e.g. the one that really exists or
the one that's really me. Otherwise they
are just like the duplicate Captain Kirks.

Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the
one true continuation of the original even
though they know that they are not, because
that is the nature of first person experience.

You still need to introduce an independent notion
of probability because each member must consider
himself to be a random selection from the
ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot
be defined without reference to some prior notion
of probability.

Yes, but you don't need any specific theory about how
your identity moves from one body into the next.

You just need some credible evidence that such a notion
even begins to make sense.

It makes sense that I feel myself to be a unique individual
persisting through time, because everyone understands what it
means. Some people try to come up with theories based on this
feeling, such as the existence of an immaterial soul, but that
doesn’t follow. My feeling that I am a unique individual
persisting through time stands independently of whatever
entity or gives rise to this feeling.

I don't know where you think you are going with this. Continuation
of personal identity through time was not what we were talking
about. Persistence through time does not involve self-locating
uncertainty from an ensemble at a point in time.

If one version of me will see the atom decay and the other version of
me will not see the atom decay, there is a 1/2 chance that I will see
the atom decay, because of the symmetry of the situation and because I
feel myself to be a unique individual persisting through time, even
though I might know the objective details of what is occurring.

Yes, but symmetric examples are deceptive. What do you fell when the
probability of decay is 1/100 and non-decay 99/100.

Brent

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Wed, 22 Dec 2021 at 04:01, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 10:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> >*but** there are events such as the decay of an atom within a half life
>> period that one version of you will see and another version of you will
>> see, which is interpreted as a 1/2 probability of you seeing the atom
>> decay, if you have a normal human brain without telepathic communication
>> with other copies.*
>
>
> All versions of "you" that live in worlds that have the same fundamental
> laws of physics (and those that don't would be so different they probably
> wouldn't deserve to be called "you") would agree that Neptunium 240 has a
> half-life of one hour, in other words that mode of decay would be the most
> common and most of "you" in the multi-verse would see an atom of Neptunium
> decay at around the one hour mark. But most does not mean all and if we're
> talking about one particular Neptunium 240 atom a minority of "you" will
> not see it decay after 5 hours even though you know it's half life is only
> one hour, and a very tiny minority will not see it decay even after 5
> million years, and another very tiny minority of "you" will see it decay
> after only 5 nanoseconds.
>
> You may ask, how different can "you" be before it no longer deserves the
> right to be called "you"? I admit that limit is somewhat arbitrary, but the
> important point is that whatever limit you choose, as long as it's
> consistent, it makes no difference if high precision is demanded for
> something to be called "you" or if extreame sloppiness can be tolerated,
> either way it will still remain true that there will be more "yous" near
> the center of the Bell Curve than at the trailing edges.
>

But you have said in the past, with regard to copying experiments, that
there is a 100% chance that you (i.e. John Clark) will see both outcomes.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

2021-12-21 Thread Jesse Mazer

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 1:12 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 4:40 PM Jesse Mazer  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 8:10 PM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 11:53 AM Jesse Mazer 
>>> wrote:
>>>

 But one of the big selling points of the MWI is to give some sort of
 objective picture of reality in which "measurements" have no distinguished
 role, but are simply treated using the usual rules of quantum interactions.

>>>
>>> At one time, that might have been a point on which to prefer MWI over
>>> Bohr's version of the CI, but that is no longer true. Modern collapse
>>> theories do not have to distinguish particular "measurement" events, and do
>>> not have to assume a classical superstructure . In modern fGRW, for
>>> example, everything can be treated as quantum, and the theory is completely
>>> objective.
>>>
>>> fGRW has the added advantage that it is an inherently stochastic theory.
>>> Probability is treated as a primitive notion that is not based on
>>> anything else. MWI struggles with the concept of probability, and while it
>>> has to reject a frequentist basis for probability, it cannot really supply
>>> anything else. Self-locating uncertainty does not, in itself, serve to
>>> define probability. You have to have some notion of a random selection from
>>> a set, and that is not available in either the Schrodinger equation or in
>>> self-locating uncertainty.
>>>
>>
>> What does fGRW stand for?
>>
>
> It is short for Flash-GRW, in which the random collapse interactions of
> GRW are replaced by "flashes". The point here is that this formulation is
> Lorentz invariant and completely relativistic.
>

I assume the flashes are collapses to eigenstates, with probabilities given
by the Born rule, even if these collapses are not necessarily caused by
interactions? If so, what factors affect the probability a collapse happens
at any given moment? Does it depend on the mass of the entangled system
(thus becoming more likely as the system becomes entangled with its
environment), as in Penrose's suggestion?


>
> If it's stochastic, do you mean it's one of those theories that involves
>> stochastic spontaneous collapse? Such theories are usually in principle
>> experimentally distinguishable from QM, would that be true of this theory
>> as well?
>>
>
> In principle this collapse model is distinguishable from no-collapse
> models. The experiments to detect this might be outside current
> capabilities.
>
> If you have to say "OK, I believe in the MWI plus Born rule for
 measurements" with there being no dynamical definition of what qualifies as
 a measurement, where the moments we call 'measurements' are just something
 we feed into the theory on a know-it-when-I-see-it basis, then this claim
 to objectivity is lost and it's not clear what theoretical appeal it has
 over the Copenhagen interpretation.

 Personally I still lean towards some version of the MWI being true
 mainly because you can come up with a toy model with MWI-style splitting
 that deals with Bell style experiments in a way that preserves locality

>>>
>>> No you can't.
>>>
 but doesn't require hidden variables (see
 https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm ) but I see it as a sort of
 work in progress rather than a complete interpretation.

>>>
>>> They set up a contrast between realism and locality.
>>>
>>
>> I wasn't linking to the paper for the argument about semantics (there
>> doesn't seem to be any agreed-upon definition of 'realism' distinct from
>> local realism in physics, from what I've seen) but rather for the toy model
>> they provide in section 5 with the experimenters being duplicated when they
>> try to measure the entangled particle. The point is that Alice is locally
>> duplicated when she measures her particle, and Bob is locally duplicated
>> when he measures his, but there is no need for the universe to decide which
>> copy of Bob inhabits the same "world" as a given copy of Alice, or vice
>> versa, until there's been time for signals limited by the speed of light to
>> pass between them (or to a third observer). This is not the sort of "local
>> realist" theory that Bell was trying to refute (one of the implicit
>> assumptions in his derivation was that each spin measurement produces
>> exactly one of two possible outcomes), but the dynamics of such splitting
>> can be perfectly local, and it can still be true that if you randomly
>> select one of the copies of an observer in a Bell type experiment, the
>> probabilities that your randomly selected copy will see various outcomes
>> can be made to match the QM predictions that violate Bell inequalities.
>>
>
> This seems to be the hand-waving way in which this is usually argued. I
> was asking for something a little more concrete.
>
> There is a fairly simple argument that shows that many worlds ideas can
> have no role to play in the violation of the

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 10:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

>*but** there are events such as the decay of an atom within a half life
> period that one version of you will see and another version of you will
> see, which is interpreted as a 1/2 probability of you seeing the atom
> decay, if you have a normal human brain without telepathic communication
> with other copies.*

All versions of "you" that live in worlds that have the same fundamental
laws of physics (and those that don't would be so different they probably
wouldn't deserve to be called "you") would agree that Neptunium 240 has a
half-life of one hour, in other words that mode of decay would be the most
common and most of "you" in the multi-verse would see an atom of Neptunium
decay at around the one hour mark. But most does not mean all and if we're
talking about one particular Neptunium 240 atom a minority of "you" will
not see it decay after 5 hours even though you know it's half life is only
one hour, and a very tiny minority will not see it decay even after 5
million years, and another very tiny minority of "you" will see it decay
after only 5 nanoseconds.

You may ask, how different can "you" be before it no longer deserves the
right to be called "you"? I admit that limit is somewhat arbitrary, but the
important point is that whatever limit you choose, as long as it's
consistent, it makes no difference if high precision is demanded for
something to be called "you" or if extreame sloppiness can be tolerated,
either way it will still remain true that there will be more "yous" near
the center of the Bell Curve than at the trailing edges.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

emc

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder


On 21-12-2021 07:12, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 4:40 PM Jesse Mazer 
wrote:


On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 8:10 PM Bruce Kellett
 wrote:

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 11:53 AM Jesse Mazer 
wrote:

But one of the big selling points of the MWI is to give some sort of
objective picture of reality in which "measurements" have no
distinguished role, but are simply treated using the usual rules of
quantum interactions.

At one time, that might have been a point on which to prefer MWI
over Bohr's version of the CI, but that is no longer true. Modern
collapse theories do not have to distinguish particular
"measurement" events, and do not have to assume a classical
superstructure . In modern fGRW, for example, everything can be
treated as quantum, and the theory is completely objective.

fGRW has the added advantage that it is an inherently stochastic
theory. Probability is treated as a primitive notion that is not
based on anything else. MWI struggles with the concept of
probability, and while it has to reject a frequentist basis for
probability, it cannot really supply anything else. Self-locating
uncertainty does not, in itself, serve to define probability. You
have to have some notion of a random selection from a set, and that
is not available in either the Schrodinger equation or in
self-locating uncertainty.


What does fGRW stand for?

It is short for Flash-GRW, in which the random collapse interactions
of GRW are replaced by "flashes". The point here is that this
formulation is Lorentz invariant and completely relativistic.


If it's stochastic, do you mean it's one of those theories that
involves stochastic spontaneous collapse? Such theories are usually
in principle experimentally distinguishable from QM, would that be
true of this theory as well?


In principle this collapse model is distinguishable from no-collapse
models. The experiments to detect this might be outside current
capabilities.


If you have to say "OK, I believe in the MWI plus Born rule for
measurements" with there being no dynamical definition of what
qualifies as a measurement, where the moments we call 'measurements'
are just something we feed into the theory on a
know-it-when-I-see-it basis, then this claim to objectivity is lost
and it's not clear what theoretical appeal it has over the
Copenhagen interpretation.

Personally I still lean towards some version of the MWI being true
mainly because you can come up with a toy model with MWI-style
splitting that deals with Bell style experiments in a way that
preserves locality

No you can't.

but doesn't require hidden variables (see
https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm ) but I see it as a sort
of work in progress rather than a complete interpretation.

They set up a contrast between realism and locality.


I wasn't linking to the paper for the argument about semantics (there
doesn't seem to be any agreed-upon definition of 'realism' distinct
from local realism in physics, from what I've seen) but rather for the
toy model they provide in section 5 with the experimenters being
duplicated when they try to measure the entangled particle. The point
is that Alice is locally duplicated when she measures her particle,
and Bob is locally duplicated when he measures his, but there is no
need for the universe to decide which copy of Bob inhabits the same
"world" as a given copy of Alice, or vice versa, until there's been
time for signals limited by the speed of light to pass between them
(or to a third observer). This is not the sort of "local realist"
theory that Bell was trying to refute (one of the implicit assumptions
in his derivation was that each spin measurement produces exactly one
of two possible outcomes), but the dynamics of such splitting can be
perfectly local, and it can still be true that if you randomly select
one of the copies of an observer in a Bell type experiment, the
probabilities that your randomly selected copy will see various
outcomes can be made to match the QM predictions that violate Bell
inequalities.

This seems to be the hand-waving way in which this is usually argued.
I was asking for something a little more concrete.

There is a fairly simple argument that shows that many worlds ideas
can have no role to play in the violation of the Bell inequalities. In
other words, there is an indirect no-go theorem for the idea that MWI
makes these experiments completely local.

The argument goes like this. Take Alice and Bob measuring spin states
on members of entangled pairs of particles -- they are presumed to be
distant from each other, and independent. Alice, say, measures a
sequence of particles at random polarizer orientations, randomizing
the polarizer angle between measurements. She records her results (up
or down) in a lab book. After N such pairs have been measured, her lab
book contains a sequence of N 0s or 1s (for up/down), with a record of
the relevant polarizer angle for each measurement. If MWI is correct,
there are 2^N copies of Alice, each

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On 20-12-2021 23:15, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 12/20/2021 1:03 AM, smitra wrote:

On 20-12-2021 03:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 12:23 PM John Clark
wrote:

On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 7:59 PM Brent Meeker
wrote:

On 12/19/2021 5:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
By contrast the Many Worlds Theory only makes one assumption,
Schrodinger's Equation means what it says. So Many Worlds wins.

_> It also makes the assumption that the eigenvalues of a
measurement are realized probabilistically._

Bruce

Yes, but with those assumptions it yields an unambiguous framework for
a fundamental theory. In case of collapse theories, you're stuck with
a phenomenological theory that cannot be improved, because you are not
allowed to describe observers and observations within the collapse
frameworks. It's a bit like the difference between statistical
mechanics and thermodynamics, if in the latter case textbooks were to
insist that you are only allowed to consider certain types of heat
engines that operate in the quasistatic limit.

Brent

I agree that this is a problem. But as as I explained just now to Jesse
Mazer, one should be able to make progress by including an observer
defined as an algorithm. This should amount to the same thing as is done
by Everett, but it's then motivated by the actual physics.

Saibal

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

One needs to define the observer + measurement apparatus. In 
conventional QM one associates to a measurement device made ready to 
measure some property of a system a Hermitian operator. But if we pursue 
the MWI rigorously, then one should associate a set of commuting 
operators to a conscious experience of an observer. And this should then 
follow from a description of consciousness as the computational state of 
some algorithm.


So, at this very moment my experience while I'm typing these words must 
be the result of a particular algorithm that is processing a particular 
set of data. I cannot in principle see the difference of that exact 
algorithm being implemented in different parts of the multiverse. At 
least not at that very moment when that particular set of data is 
processed.


An algorithm can be described by a time evolution operator U that acts 
on an input state and maps it to the state one computational step later. 
The preferred basis then arises from selecting the sectors where the 
algorithm representing the observer exists. The algorithm will have some 
valid input states |input> and corresponding output states |output(in)> 
= U|input>, we can then write:


U = sum over all |input>, |output> of |output>sum over all |input> of |output(input)>



Suppose that we seek the observer represented by the operator U who has 
some definite experience. Whatever the observer is experiencing will be 
some course grained description of the precise inputs the actual data 
that U could be processing. So, we then consider limiting the summation 
above to only those input states that correspond to the specified coarse 
grained description. So, one can say that we need to narrow down U to 
some definite experience, but we then still end up summing over a very 
large set of states, because a particular conscious experience does not 
correspond to a definite physical state.


A simple example is to consider simulating a spin measurement using a 
quantum computer. The spin is then represent by a qbuit and the 
"observer" measuring the spin would then be the CNOT operator that takes 
the qubit representing the spin as the control qubit while the other 
qubit that it acts on is initialized to be |0>. So, one can then say 
that there exists a "CNOT observer". This definition is then well 
defined w.r.t. changing the basis.


Saibal



On 20-12-2021 18:01, Jesse Mazer wrote:

When you say the MWI + Born rule "yields an unambiguous framework for
a fundamental theory" are you assuming the idea of probability being
equal to amplitude squared only applies to "measurements", or that it
would somehow apply at all times in the MWI? If the former there would
seem to be some ambiguity about what a "measurement" is; if the
latter, I believe MWI advocates still don't have an agreed-upon answer
to the "preferred basis problem" discussed at
https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/65177/is-the-preferred-basis-problem-solved

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 4:03 AM smitra  wrote:


On 20-12-2021 03:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 12:23 PM John Clark 
wrote:


On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 7:59 PM Brent Meeker



wrote:

On 12/19/2021 5:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
By contrast the Many Worlds Theory only makes one assumption,
Schrodinger's Equation means what it says. So Many Worlds wins.

_> It also makes the assumption that the eigenvalues of a
measurement are realized probabilistically._


What is the eigenvalue of a temperature of 72°F? It doesn't have

one.

A measurement doesn't have an eigenvalue but a matrix does, such

as

the one that describes the Schrodinger Wave. And no quantum
interpretation needs to assume there is a relationship between the
square of the absolute value of that wave and probability because

it

is observed to be true.

The Born Rule cannot be derived from the Schrodinger equation; it

has

to be added as a further independent assumption. So it is not true
that Many Worlds makes only one assumption. It requires just as

many

assumptions as collapse theories.

Bruce


Yes, but with those assumptions it yields an unambiguous framework
for a
fundamental theory. In case of collapse theories, you're stuck with
a
phenomenological theory that cannot be improved, because you are not

allowed to describe observers and observations within the collapse
frameworks. It's a bit like the difference between statistical
mechanics
and thermodynamics, if in the latter case textbooks were to insist
that
you are only allowed to consider certain types of heat engines that
operate in the quasistatic limit.

Saibal




If it were not true Schrodinger's Wave would be completely

useless

and there would be no reason any physicist would bother to

calculate

it.


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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On 20-12-2021 11:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 8:03 PM smitra wrote:

On 20-12-2021 03:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

The Born Rule cannot be derived from the Schrodinger equation; it

has

to be added as a further independent assumption. So it is not true
that Many Worlds makes only one assumption. It requires just as

many

assumptions as collapse theories.

Bruce

allowed to describe observers and observations within the collapse
frameworks.

I think you are stuck on a very old-fashioned view of collapse
theories -- perhaps you are thinking only in terms of theories
dominated by Bohr's idea of a separation between the quantum and the
classical -- with the classical world necessary to give quantum
results meaning. In other words, a fundamental separation between the
observer and the observed. This, of course, is problematic in that you
cannot describe the observer in quantum terms.

But modern collapse theories, such as Flash-GRW, do not have this
limitation. There is no observer/observed distinction in such
theories, and they can easily accommodate the idea that everything,
including the observer, is quantum.

Besides, MWI is far from unambiguous. For instance, the notion of
probability is decidedly problematic in Everettian theory.

Bruce

Yes, I agree, I've read about such theories some time ago. I don't
remember the details, but I think they do predict new physics, so they
can be tested and falsified.

The notion of probability in Everettian theory is indeed problematic,
but you'll have similar problems in a Bruno-type copying experiment
where I make 99 copies of you that will observe one thing and 1 copy
will observe something else. Then all 100 observations will exist, but
you can still say that you'll expect to observe the first outcome with
99% probability.

Saibal

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 21:51, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 9:31 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 20:29, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 7:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 19:35, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 18:12, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker 
 wrote:

> On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider
> themselves unique individuals persisting through time.
>
>
> But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard
> themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the 
> one
> that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are 
> just
> like the duplicate Captain Kirks.
>

 Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation
 of the original even though they know that they are not, because that 
 is
 the nature of first person experience.

>>>
>>> You still need to introduce an independent notion of probability
>>> because each member must consider himself to be a random selection from 
>>> the
>>> ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot be defined without
>>> reference to some prior notion of probability.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, but you don't need any specific theory about how your identity
>> moves from one body into the next.
>>
>
>
> You just need some credible evidence that such a notion even begins to
> make sense.
>

 It makes sense that I feel myself to be a unique individual persisting
 through time, because everyone understands what it means. Some people try
 to come up with theories based on this feeling, such as the existence of an
 immaterial soul, but that doesn’t follow. My feeling that I am a unique
 individual persisting through time stands independently of whatever entity
 or gives rise to this feeling.

>>>
>>> I don't know where you think you are going with this. Continuation of
>>>  personal identity through time was not what we were talking about.
>>> Persistence through time does not involve self-locating uncertainty from an
>>> ensemble at a point in time.
>>>
>>
>> If one version of me will see the atom decay and the other version of me
>> will not see the atom decay, there is a 1/2 chance that I will see the atom
>> decay, because of the symmetry of the situation and because I feel myself
>> to be a unique individual persisting through time, even though I might know
>> the objective details of what is occurring.
>>
>
> I don't see how persistence through time has any bearing on the
> probability. If there is a split, then the probability that you will see
> one or the other result depends on the magnitudes of the wave function for
> the branches. That is the Born rule, and it is an independent assumption,
> as is the fact that there is a probability interpretation at all.
> Self-locating uncertainty only gives you a measure of the probability if
> the number of branches with each outcome matches the Born probabilities.
>

Under MWI every outcome happens, so the probability of each outcome is 1.
How do you justify calculating probabilities for outcomes that are less
than 1?

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:11 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>> Maybe someday GRW Will do better but that would require a complete
>> rewrite, and the prospects are not looking good:
>>
>> Impossibility of extending the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber model to
>> relativistic particles
>> 
>>
>
>
> *> Flash-GRW is Lorentz invariant and completely relativistic*
>

You should submit a paper to Physical Review to compete with the one they
just published.


> *> Getting rid of the determinism of the Schrodinger equation is a good
> thing if you want a theory that is going to predict probabilities.*
>

That doesn't follow because there is a difference between ontology and
epistemology.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

xx2


>
>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 9:52 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 5:28 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> >*modern collapse theories, such as Flash-GRW, do not have this
>> limitation. There is no observer/observed distinction in such theories, and
>> they can easily accommodate the idea that everything, including the
>> observer, is quantum.*
>>
>
> One thing GRW can't accommodate is Special Relativity, so it's
> inconsistent with observation, so it's not yet a quantum interpretation at
> all, but Many Worlds had no difficulty in accommodating Special Relativity
> from day one. Unlike Many Worlds GRW is not deterministic, it adds a random
> term to Schrodinger's equation that only does 4 things:
>
> 1) It makes the new equation inconsistent with special relativity and thus
> observation.
> 2) It makes an equation that was already very difficult to solve even more
> difficult.
> 3) It makes Schrodinger's equation become nondeterministic.
> 4) It gets rid of those Many Worlds that so many people hate and fear.
>
> Maybe someday GRW Will do better but that would require a complete
> rewrite, and the prospects are not looking good:
>
> Impossibility of extending the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber model to relativistic
> particles
> 
>


Flash-GRW is Lorentz invariant and completely relativistic because it is
based on light cone physics. Getting rid of the determinism of the
Schrodinger equation is a good thing if you want a theory that is going to
predict probabilities.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 5:28 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>*modern collapse theories, such as Flash-GRW, do not have this limitation.
> There is no observer/observed distinction in such theories, and they can
> easily accommodate the idea that everything, including the observer, is
> quantum.*
>

One thing GRW can't accommodate is Special Relativity, so it's inconsistent
with observation, so it's not yet a quantum interpretation at all, but Many
Worlds had no difficulty in accommodating Special Relativity from day one.
Unlike Many Worlds GRW is not deterministic, it adds a random term to
Schrodinger's equation that only does 4 things:

1) It makes the new equation inconsistent with special relativity and thus
observation.
2) It makes an equation that was already very difficult to solve even more
difficult.
3) It makes Schrodinger's equation become nondeterministic.
4) It gets rid of those Many Worlds that so many people hate and fear.

Maybe someday GRW Will do better but that would require a complete rewrite,
and the prospects are not looking good:

Impossibility of extending the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber model to relativistic
particles

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

wrd

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 9:31 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 20:29, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 7:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 19:35, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
 wrote:

> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 18:12, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider
 themselves unique individuals persisting through time.


 But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard
 themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the 
 one
 that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are 
 just
 like the duplicate Captain Kirks.

>>>
>>> Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation
>>> of the original even though they know that they are not, because that is
>>> the nature of first person experience.
>>>
>>
>> You still need to introduce an independent notion of probability
>> because each member must consider himself to be a random selection from 
>> the
>> ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot be defined without
>> reference to some prior notion of probability.
>>
>
> Yes, but you don't need any specific theory about how your identity
> moves from one body into the next.
>


 You just need some credible evidence that such a notion even begins to
 make sense.

>>>
>>> It makes sense that I feel myself to be a unique individual persisting
>>> through time, because everyone understands what it means. Some people try
>>> to come up with theories based on this feeling, such as the existence of an
>>> immaterial soul, but that doesn’t follow. My feeling that I am a unique
>>> individual persisting through time stands independently of whatever entity
>>> or gives rise to this feeling.
>>>
>>
>> I don't know where you think you are going with this. Continuation of
>>  personal identity through time was not what we were talking about.
>> Persistence through time does not involve self-locating uncertainty from an
>> ensemble at a point in time.
>>
>
> If one version of me will see the atom decay and the other version of me
> will not see the atom decay, there is a 1/2 chance that I will see the atom
> decay, because of the symmetry of the situation and because I feel myself
> to be a unique individual persisting through time, even though I might know
> the objective details of what is occurring.
>

I don't see how persistence through time has any bearing on the
probability. If there is a split, then the probability that you will see
one or the other result depends on the magnitudes of the wave function for
the branches. That is the Born rule, and it is an independent assumption,
as is the fact that there is a probability interpretation at all.
Self-locating uncertainty only gives you a measure of the probability if
the number of branches with each outcome matches the Born probabilities.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 20:29, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 7:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 19:35, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 18:12, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider
>>> themselves unique individuals persisting through time.
>>>
>>>
>>> But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard
>>> themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the one
>>> that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are just
>>> like the duplicate Captain Kirks.
>>>
>>
>> Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation
>> of the original even though they know that they are not, because that is
>> the nature of first person experience.
>>
>
> You still need to introduce an independent notion of probability
> because each member must consider himself to be a random selection from 
> the
> ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot be defined without
> reference to some prior notion of probability.
>

 Yes, but you don't need any specific theory about how your identity
 moves from one body into the next.

>>>
>>>
>>> You just need some credible evidence that such a notion even begins to
>>> make sense.
>>>
>>
>> It makes sense that I feel myself to be a unique individual persisting
>> through time, because everyone understands what it means. Some people try
>> to come up with theories based on this feeling, such as the existence of an
>> immaterial soul, but that doesn’t follow. My feeling that I am a unique
>> individual persisting through time stands independently of whatever entity
>> or gives rise to this feeling.
>>
>
> I don't know where you think you are going with this. Continuation of
>  personal identity through time was not what we were talking about.
> Persistence through time does not involve self-locating uncertainty from an
> ensemble at a point in time.
>

If one version of me will see the atom decay and the other version of me
will not see the atom decay, there is a 1/2 chance that I will see the atom
decay, because of the symmetry of the situation and because I feel myself
to be a unique individual persisting through time, even though I might know
the objective details of what is occurring.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 12:32 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>> that is the one assumption you have to make in the MWI, you have to
>> assume that the Schrodinger wave equation means what it says, and in words
>> it says  "*The rate of change of a wave function is proportional to the
>> energy of the quantum system and the high energy parts of the wave function
>> evolve rapidly while the low energy parts evolve slowly*". It would be
>> expected that more things happen in the rapidly evolving parts then the 
>> slowly
>> evolving parts.
>
>
>
> *> Whether the Geiger counter detects five alpha particles in a second or
> four doesn't depend on some atoms evolving slowly or quickly.*
>

Yes, but that is in no way inconsistent with what I said in the above, in
fact that's the reason that all versions of "you" agree on what the half
life of a radioactive element is, although they may disagree on whether a
particular atom has decayed or not.

*> MWI finesses this by saying that you observe all possible outcomes...but
>>> in other worlds. *
>>
>>
>> >> That depends on the meaning of the pronoun "you". In the fast
>> evolving part of the wave function more things are happening but there are
>> also more versions of "you" to see them, and some parts contain no energy
>> at all and thus nothing happens there at all. It is physically impossible
>> for some things to happen so no version of "you" sees it.
>
>
> > *That's a strange thing to say.*
>

Yes it's a very strange thing to say no doubt about it, but there is
absolutely positively no way any quantum interpretation that is compatible
with observation will EVER be able to make the quantum world not seem
strange. When you get down into the quantum realm things just seem weird,
but they never become logically paradoxical. The reason things seem so
strange to us is that there would've been no Evolutionarily advantage to
our hominid ancestors on the African savanna if our minds were constructed
in such a way that such things seemed intuitively obvious, so instead
evolution made our brains good at other things, like avoiding predators and
detecting prey.

>   > In the last few seconds thousands of cosmic rays shot thru you and
> you didn't see or detect them in any way.
>

Yes.

> > *Yet according Everett they split the world into as many copies because
> they left traces that could be observed where they passed thru solid
> objects. *
>

Yes. Is there supposed to be a problem with that?

>> And if the Born rule had been proven to be inconsistent with Hilbert
>> space physicist would not have gotten rid of the Born rule, instead they
>> would've gotten rid of Hilbert space, because the Born rule would have
>> continued to work regardless of what Hilbert space's opinion of it is.
>
>
> > *Without Hilbert space they'd have no state vector to apply the Born
> rule.*
>

And that would be a pity, but physicists would still have the ability to
multiply numbers and find their square roots, they were doing such
numerical manipulation long before anybody knew anything about Hilbert space
, so they could still use the Born rule. Regardless of what a mathematician
might say physicists will never abandon the Born rule as long as it retains
its ability to make successful predictions.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

q92

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 7:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 19:35, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 18:12, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
 wrote:

> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>> On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider
>> themselves unique individuals persisting through time.
>>
>>
>> But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard
>> themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the one
>> that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are just
>> like the duplicate Captain Kirks.
>>
>
> Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation of
> the original even though they know that they are not, because that is the
> nature of first person experience.
>

 You still need to introduce an independent notion of probability
 because each member must consider himself to be a random selection from the
 ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot be defined without
 reference to some prior notion of probability.

>>>
>>> Yes, but you don't need any specific theory about how your identity
>>> moves from one body into the next.
>>>
>>
>>
>> You just need some credible evidence that such a notion even begins to
>> make sense.
>>
>
> It makes sense that I feel myself to be a unique individual persisting
> through time, because everyone understands what it means. Some people try
> to come up with theories based on this feeling, such as the existence of an
> immaterial soul, but that doesn’t follow. My feeling that I am a unique
> individual persisting through time stands independently of whatever entity
> or gives rise to this feeling.
>

I don't know where you think you are going with this. Continuation of
 personal identity through time was not what we were talking about.
Persistence through time does not involve self-locating uncertainty from an
ensemble at a point in time.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 19:35, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 18:12, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker 
 wrote:

> On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider
> themselves unique individuals persisting through time.
>
>
> But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard
> themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the one
> that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are just
> like the duplicate Captain Kirks.
>

 Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation of
 the original even though they know that they are not, because that is the
 nature of first person experience.

>>>
>>> You still need to introduce an independent notion of probability because
>>> each member must consider himself to be a random selection from the
>>> ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot be defined without
>>> reference to some prior notion of probability.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, but you don't need any specific theory about how your identity moves
>> from one body into the next.
>>
>
>
> You just need some credible evidence that such a notion even begins to
> make sense.
>

It makes sense that I feel myself to be a unique individual persisting
through time, because everyone understands what it means. Some people try
to come up with theories based on this feeling, such as the existence of an
immaterial soul, but that doesn’t follow. My feeling that I am a unique
individual persisting through time stands independently of whatever entity
or gives rise to this feeling.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder