Re: A new theory of consciousness: conditionalism

[Jason Resch]

Thank you John for your thoughts. I few notes below:

On Sat, Aug 26, 2023 at 7:17 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, Aug 25, 2023 at 1:47 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> *> At a high level, states of consciousness are states of knowledge,*
>>
>
> That is certainly true, but what about the reverse, does a high state of
> knowledge imply consciousness?  I'll never be able to prove it but I
> believe it does but of course for this idea to be practical there must be
> some way of demonstrating that the thing in question does indeed have a
> high state of knowledge, and the test for that is the Turing Test, and
> the fact that my fellow human beings have passed the Turing test is the
> only reason I believe that I am NOT the only conscious being in the
> universe.
>

Yes, I believe there's an identity between states of knowledge and states
of consciousness. That is almost implicit in the definition of
consciousness:
con- means "with"
-scious- means "knowledge"
-ness means "the state of being"
con-scious-ness -> the state of being with knowledge.

Then, the question becomes: what is a state of knowledge? How do we
implement or instantiate a knowledge state, physically or otherwise?

My intuition is that it requires a process of differentiation, such that
some truth becomes entangled with the system's existence.


>
> *> A conditional is a means by which a system can enter/reach a state of
>> knowledge (i.e. a state of consciousness) if and only if some fact is true.*
>>
>
> Then "conditional" is not a useful philosophical term because you could be
> conscious of and know a lot about Greek mythology. but none of it is true
> except for the fact that Greek mythology is about Greek mythology.
>

Yes. Here, the truth doesn't have to be some objective truth, it can be
truth of what causes ones mind to reach a particular state. E.g., here it
would be the truth of what particular sensory data came into the scholar's
eyes as he read a book of Greek mythology.



> >  *Consciousness is revealed as an immaterial, ephemeral relation, not
>> any particular physical thing we can point at or hold.*
>>
>
> I mostly agree with that but that doesn't imply there's anything mystical
> going on, information is also immaterial and you can't point to *ANY
> PARTICULAR* physical thing
>

I agree.

 (although you can always point to *SOME *physical thing) and I believe
> it's a brute fact that consciousness is the way information feels when it
> is being processed intelligently.
>

I like this analogy, but I think it is incomplete. Can information (by
itself) feel? Can information (by itself) have meaning?

I see value in making a distinction between information and "the system to
be informed." I think the pair are necessary for there to be meaning, or
consciousness.


However there is nothing ephemeral about information, as far as we can tell
> the laws of physics are unitary, that is information can't be destroyed
> and the probability of all possible outcomes must add up to 100%. For a
> while Stephen Hawking thought that Black Holes destroyed information but he
> later changed his mind, Kip Thorne still thinks it may do so but he is in
> the minority.
>

I agree information can't be destroyed. But note that what I called
ephemeral was the conditional relation, which (at least usually) seems to
occur and last during a short time.



>
> *> All we need to do is link some action to a state of knowledge.*
>>
>
> At the most fundamental level that pretty much defines what a computer
> programmer does to make a living.
>

Yes.



> * > It shows the close relationship between consciousness and information,
>> where information is defined as "a difference that makes a difference",*
>>
>
> And the smallest difference that still makes a difference is the
> difference between one and zero, or on and off.
>

The bit is the simplest unit of information, but interestingly, there can
also be fractional bits. For example, if there's a 75% chance of some
event, like two coin tossings not both being heads, and I tell you that two
coin tossings were not both heads, then I have only
communicated -log2(0.75) ~= 0.415 bits of information to you.



> > *It shows a close relationship between consciousness and
>> computationalism,*
>>
>
> I strongly agree with that,  it makes no difference if the thing doing
> that computation is carbon-based and wet and squishy, or silicon-based and
> dry and hard.
>

Absolutely  


>  >  It is also supportive of functionalism and it's multiple
>> realizability, as there are many possibile physical arrangements that lead
>> to conditionals.
>
>
> YES!
>
> *> It's clear there neural networks firings is all about conditionals and
>> combining them in whether or not a neuron will fire and which other neurons
>> have fired binds up many conditional relations into one larger one. It
>> seems no intelligent (reactive, deliberative, contemplative, reflective,
>> etc.) process can be made that does not contain at least some 

A new theory of consciousness: conditionalism

[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 25, 2023 at 1:47 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

*> At a high level, states of consciousness are states of knowledge,*
>

That is certainly true, but what about the reverse, does a high state of
knowledge imply consciousness?  I'll never be able to prove it but I
believe it does but of course for this idea to be practical there must be
some way of demonstrating that the thing in question does indeed have a
high state of knowledge, and the test for that is the Turing Test, and the
fact that my fellow human beings have passed the Turing test is the only
reason I believe that I am NOT the only conscious being in the universe.

*> A conditional is a means by which a system can enter/reach a state of
> knowledge (i.e. a state of consciousness) if and only if some fact is true.*
>

Then "conditional" is not a useful philosophical term because you could be
conscious of and know a lot about Greek mythology. but none of it is true
except for the fact that Greek mythology is about Greek mythology.

>  *Consciousness is revealed as an immaterial, ephemeral relation, not any
> particular physical thing we can point at or hold.*
>

I mostly agree with that but that doesn't imply there's anything mystical
going on, information is also immaterial and you can't point to *ANY
PARTICULAR* physical thing (although you can always point to *SOME *physical
thing) and I believe it's a brute fact that consciousness is the way
information feels when it is being processed intelligently. However there
is nothing ephemeral about information, as far as we can tell the laws of
physics are unitary, that is information can't be destroyed and the
probability of all possible outcomes must add up to 100%. For a while
Stephen Hawking thought that Black Holes destroyed information but he later
changed his mind, Kip Thorne still thinks it may do so but he is in the
minority.

*> All we need to do is link some action to a state of knowledge.*
>

At the most fundamental level that pretty much defines what a computer
programmer does to make a living.

* > It shows the close relationship between consciousness and information,
> where information is defined as "a difference that makes a difference",*
>

And the smallest difference that still makes a difference is the difference
between one and zero, or on and off.

> *It shows a close relationship between consciousness and
> computationalism,*
>

I strongly agree with that,  it makes no difference if the thing doing that
computation is carbon-based and wet and squishy, or silicon-based and dry
and hard.

 >  It is also supportive of functionalism and it's multiple realizability,
> as there are many possibile physical arrangements that lead to conditionals.


YES!

*> It's clear there neural networks firings is all about conditionals and
> combining them in whether or not a neuron will fire and which other neurons
> have fired binds up many conditional relations into one larger one. It
> seems no intelligent (reactive, deliberative, contemplative, reflective,
> etc.) process can be made that does not contain at least some conditionals.
> As without them, there can be no responsiveness. This explains the
> biological necessity to evolve conditionals and apply them in the guidance
> of behavior. In other words, consciousness (states of knowledge) would be
> strictly necessary for intelligence to evolve.*
>

I agree with all of that.
 John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

xex

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Re: A new theory of consciousness: conditionalism

[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 25, 2023 at 1:47 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

*> At a high level, states of consciousness are states of knowledge,*
>

That is certainly true, but what about the reverse, does a high state of
knowledge imply consciousness?  I'll never be able to prove it but I
believe it does but of course for this idea to be practical there must be
some way of demonstrating that the thing in question does indeed have a
high state of knowledge, and the test for that is the Turing Test, and the
fact that my fellow human beings have passed the Turing test is the only
reason I believe that I am NOT the only conscious being in the universe.

*> A conditional is a means by which a system can enter/reach a state of
> knowledge (i.e. a state of consciousness) if and only if some fact is true.*
>

Then "conditional" is not a useful philosophical term because you could be
conscious of and know a lot about Greek mythology. but none of it is true
except for the fact that Greek mythology is about Greek mythology.

>  *Consciousness is revealed as an immaterial, ephemeral relation, not any
> particular physical thing we can point at or hold.*
>

I mostly agree with that but that doesn't imply there's anything mystical
going on, information is also immaterial and you can't point to *ANY
PARTICULAR* physical thing (although you can always point to *SOME *physical
thing) and I believe it's a brute fact that consciousness is the way
information feels when it is being processed intelligently. However there
is nothing ephemeral about information, as far as we can tell the laws of
physics are unitary, that is information can't be destroyed and the
probability of all possible outcomes must add up to 100%. For a while
Stephen Hawking thought that Black Holes destroyed information but he later
changed his mind, Kip Thorne still thinks it may do so but he is in the
minority.

*> All we need to do is link some action to a state of knowledge.*
>

At the most fundamental level that pretty much defines what a computer
programmer does to make a living.

* > It shows the close relationship between consciousness and information,
> where information is defined as "a difference that makes a difference",*
>

And the smallest difference that still makes a difference is the difference
between one and zero, or on and off.

> *It shows a close relationship between consciousness and
> computationalism,*
>

I strongly agree with that,  it makes no difference if the thing doing that
computation is carbon-based and wet and squishy, or silicon-based and dry
and hard.

 >  It is also supportive of functionalism and it's multiple realizability,
> as there are many possibile physical arrangements that lead to conditionals.


YES!

*> It's clear there neural networks firings is all about conditionals and
> combining them in whether or not a neuron will fire and which other neurons
> have fired binds up many conditional relations into one larger one. It
> seems no intelligent (reactive, deliberative, contemplative, reflective,
> etc.) process can be made that does not contain at least some conditionals.
> As without them, there can be no responsiveness. This explains the
> biological necessity to evolve conditionals and apply them in the guidance
> of behavior. In other words, consciousness (states of knowledge) would be
> strictly necessary for intelligence to evolve.*
>

I agree with all of that.
 John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

xex

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Re: A new theory of consciousness: conditionalism

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, 26 Aug 2023 at 03:47, Jason Resch  wrote:

> I would like to propose a theory of consciousness which I think might have
> some merit, but more importantly I would like to see what criticism others
> might have for it.
>
> I have chosen the name "conditionalism" for this theory, as it is based
> loosely on the notion of conditional statements as they appear in both
> regular language, mathematics, and programming languages.
>
> At a high level, states of consciousness are states of knowledge, and
> knowledge is embodied by the existence of some relation to some truth.
>
> A conditional is a means by which a system can enter/reach a state of
> knowledge (i.e. a state of consciousness) if and only if some fact is true.
> A simple example using a programming language:
>
> if (x >= 5) then {
>// knowledge state of x being greater than or equal to 5
> }
>
> I think this way of considering consciousness, as that existing between
> those two braces: { } can explain a lot.
>
> 1. Consciousness is revealed as an immaterial, ephemeral relation, not any
> particular physical thing we can point at or hold.
>
> 2. It provides for a straight-forward way to bind complex states of
> consciousness, though conjunction, for example:
> If (a and b) {
> // knowledge of the simultaneous truth of both a and b
> }
> This allows states of consciousness to be arbitrarily complex and varied.
>
> 3. It explains the causal efficacy of states of consciousness. All we need
> to do is link some action to a state of knowledge. Consciousness is then
> seen as antecedent to, and a prerequisite for, any intelligent behavior.
> For example:
> If (light == color.red) {
> slowDown();
> }
>
> 4. It shows the close relationship between consciousness and information,
> where information is defined as "a difference that makes a difference", as
> conditionals are all about what differences make which differences.
>
> 5. It shows a close relationship between consciousness and
> computationalism, since computations are all about counterfactual and
> conditional relations.
>
> 6. It is also supportive of functionalism and it's multiple realizability,
> as there are many possibile physical arrangements that lead to conditionals.
>
> 7. It's clear there neural networks firings is all about conditionals and
> combining them in whether or not a neuron will fire and which other neurons
> have fired binds up many conditional relations into one larger one.
>
> 8. It seems no intelligent (reactive, deliberative, contemplative,
> reflective, etc.) process can be made that does not contain at least some
> conditionals. As without them, there can be no responsiveness. This
> explains the biological necessity to evolve conditionals and apply them in
> the guidance of behavior. In other words, consciousness (states of
> knowledge) would be strictly necessary for intelligence to evolve.
>

I agree with all this and as usual it is very well put and explained. What
I have difficulty with is the concept of implementation. This is
straightforward if we consider cases where the machine interacts with its
environment, but puzzling when we consider similar physical processes in a
different situation where such interaction is not possible. A certain
sequence of movement of gears and springs may be implementing completely
different computations or experiences in different machines, just as a
certain string of Latin characters might mean different things in different
languages. The semantics seems dependent on the observer, and there may be
multiple possible observers, no observer, in the case of a conscious
computation a self-generated observer, and in the case of an inputless
conscious computation a self-generated observer not dependent on any
external observer or other environmental input.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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A new theory of consciousness: conditionalism

[Jason Resch]

I would like to propose a theory of consciousness which I think might have
some merit, but more importantly I would like to see what criticism others
might have for it.

I have chosen the name "conditionalism" for this theory, as it is based
loosely on the notion of conditional statements as they appear in both
regular language, mathematics, and programming languages.

At a high level, states of consciousness are states of knowledge, and
knowledge is embodied by the existence of some relation to some truth.

A conditional is a means by which a system can enter/reach a state of
knowledge (i.e. a state of consciousness) if and only if some fact is true.
A simple example using a programming language:

if (x >= 5) then {
   // knowledge state of x being greater than or equal to 5
}

I think this way of considering consciousness, as that existing between
those two braces: { } can explain a lot.

1. Consciousness is revealed as an immaterial, ephemeral relation, not any
particular physical thing we can point at or hold.

2. It provides for a straight-forward way to bind complex states of
consciousness, though conjunction, for example:
If (a and b) {
// knowledge of the simultaneous truth of both a and b
}
This allows states of consciousness to be arbitrarily complex and varied.

3. It explains the causal efficacy of states of consciousness. All we need
to do is link some action to a state of knowledge. Consciousness is then
seen as antecedent to, and a prerequisite for, any intelligent behavior.
For example:
If (light == color.red) {
slowDown();
}

4. It shows the close relationship between consciousness and information,
where information is defined as "a difference that makes a difference", as
conditionals are all about what differences make which differences.

5. It shows a close relationship between consciousness and
computationalism, since computations are all about counterfactual and
conditional relations.

6. It is also supportive of functionalism and it's multiple realizability,
as there are many possibile physical arrangements that lead to conditionals.

7. It's clear there neural networks firings is all about conditionals and
combining them in whether or not a neuron will fire and which other neurons
have fired binds up many conditional relations into one larger one.

8. It seems no intelligent (reactive, deliberative, contemplative,
reflective, etc.) process can be made that does not contain at least some
conditionals. As without them, there can be no responsiveness. This
explains the biological necessity to evolve conditionals and apply them in
the guidance of behavior. In other words, consciousness (states of
knowledge) would be strictly necessary for intelligence to evolve.


Jason

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