Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
I think my previous email address ended up on a spam list or something, because all of my posts were blocked. Trying a new address. On Wed, Jul 21, 2010 at 2:51 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 7/21/2010 8:31 AM, Allen Rex wrote: But, this belief isn't entailed by methodological naturalism. It's a leap of faith. And my position is just that it does no good. And the same goes for any metaphysical theory that claims that our conscious experiences are caused by more fundamental rule-governed processes. No matter what the fundamental components and rules of the proposed ontology are, there is always the question: Why would this rule-driven configuration, and no other, give rise to something like my experience? Cooper has one idea of an answer to this. Bruno has a different one. I don't think either one is fully worked out - but I see them as different possible ways of looking at the question. So first, there's the relatively concrete problem of identifying and representing the recurring patterns in what we observe, and even in what we think. And second, there's the more abstract question of what it means *that* we observe and think. The question I posed is entirely centered on this second point. It seems to me that Cooper tries to explain what we think in terms of what we observe. So his focus seems to almost entirely on the first point. Bruno's goal seems to be to address both points, but I think his approach is largely developed to address the first point, and then because his preferred framework is abstract logic he just goes ahead and claims victory on addressing the abstract second point also. I will address this in more detail in a separate response to him! The extra inferred-from-experience behind the scenes infrastructure serves no (metaphysical) purpose because I can ask the exact same questions about them as I could ask about the consciousness that they supposedly explain. But, if your a hardened skeptic, and a fellow instrumentalist, whose mind never turns to metaphysical questions, then I suppose we really have no disagreement. When I turn to metaphysics I conclude that physics is a human invention created to explain this in terms of that. The laws of physics are not active elements of reality creating this or that. Then what does create this or that? In your opinion? This sounds like a Kantian position: We can only know the phenomenal world...the world of experience. There is a noumenal world which underlies and supports the phenomenal world, but the fact that we actively process information to build our own internal models of reality means that we can never discern the true nature of what exists. To quote Lee Braver in A Thing of This World: The linchpin of this synthesis was what [Kant] called his Copernican Revolution: the epoch-making claim that the mind actively processes or organizes experience in constructing knowledge, rather than passively reflecting an independent reality. To speak metaphorically, the mind is more like a factory than a mirror or soft wax. Continuing later on the subject of true beliefs: When we turn from noumena to phenomena as the possible objects of correspondence, there are two candidates for the aspect of the object with which our beliefs correspond - the matter or the form. The matter would be the sensible manifold which comes to us from the outside and which forms our ‘contact' with things-in-themselves. However, this quickly becomes problematic, for how can a fully formed judgement of experience correspond to an unformed, nonunified sensible manifold? The comparison between a finished, processed item and its raw materials is hard to cash out. In what sense does a window correspond to sand, heat, and bits of wood, or a Matisse painting to a piece of canvas and globs of colored paint? Since perception is an active process, what comes out precisely does *not* correspond to what went in; that's the whole point. This is basically the same problem that confronts correspondence with noumena, which is unsurprising, since the sensible manifold is the closest we get to noumena. If, in a moment of weakness, one's thoughts do turn to metaphysics, then I propose just hypostatizing the skeptical position. Epistemically, the only thing we can be certain of is that our experiences exist. Correction, the only thing you can be certain of is that there is experience now. You is an inference as is the passage of time. I agree, and I'm comfortable with that position. But really, I don't see physicalism as being any better on this point. Once things are reduced changing patterns of matter, perhaps with a real flow of time, perhaps not (block universe), what is an individual? Or, for Bruno, once things are reduced to relations between numbers, then what is an individual? What is time? You're making critical noises about my position, but I don't see that any other position is any
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
On 21 Jul 2010, at 20:17, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/21/2010 4:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: logic is a confusing term. Informally non logic = error, madness, pain, ... To fight against logic is dramatic when you see how people accept so easily conclusion of invalid inference (like in the political health debate). Cooper seems unaware of the branch of math called logic, which illustrates that there is many logics. There is almost as much logic as they are mathematical structures. Then classical logic is the most simple and polite logic to describe all those different logics. Cooper is well aware of that. But he proposes non-classical logics different from modal extensions. To be sure I have not read Cooper. But when I say that classical logic is the best tool for studying non classical logic, I was not thinking of modal extension of classical logic. The success of quantum logic, intuitionistic logic, relevance logic, fuzzy logic, etc. is due to the fact that they have nice semantics as can be shown by using classical logic. It is just false that science is classical-logic centred. Since the Brouwer-Cantor debate, weak logics (non classical sub-logic) have kept the attention of the professional logicians. And in science, classical logic is almost ignored. And in day-life, even much of logic (classical or not) is quasi-systematically ignored. You can be sure that the number of people executed or in jail due to error in logic is very big. Just think about the smoker of cannabis in the USA, to take just one example. SO...taken with the quotes I provided in my initial response to Brent, how friendly do you think he sounds to your position? I think he sounds friendlier to mine! Cooper's position is non sense. I'm afraid. He is the one stuck on Aristotelian logic. He is interested in logic as a component of reason, by which he means decision theory as well as inference. But he notes that decision theory needs to be expanded to consider temporal relations. He proposes to extend logic by finding evolutionarily stable logics. His program is fairly radical - not at all stuck in classical logic. All right then. I am not opposed to such kind of research. I have myself study genetic regulatory system in term of different logics. That may be interesting. Then again, he does not address the comp issue. All what I was asking (to Rex) was why he thought that Cooper's view is not friendly with the consequences of the comp hypothesis, which are radical, but at another level (the level of the origin of the physical laws). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
On Tue, Jul 20, 2010 at 5:16 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, you wrote something great: A rare compliment! Thanks! Rationality is correlated with survival. You are rational, and you survive. But to say that rationality causes survival? What if rationality and survival are both caused by the same underlying processes?... My habituel question when neurologists assign thought (mentality?) to the (measurable) neuronic physiology and claim That causes the mental process. Correlated action, as the application of a 'tool' appears combined with the result of such process and without knowing the details 'scientists' are tempted to look at it as the 'originator' of the combined process. BTW I have to clarify (for myself?) Mihai Nadin's idea about 'cause' which is not in the starting conditions, rather in the aimed-at final stage of the change. His example is the cat, thrown off a building, falls on its feet, while a stone will fall just as it happens. The cat 'visualizes' by inherited trends how to twist while falling, to land without harm. Nadin is basing this on Robert Rosen's anticipatory principle (different from teleology). As for survival: it is an outcome of much more than we can include into our 'rationality' or whatever. The wholeness in its entirety influences the happenings by all the relations between all the unlimited ingredients into an outcome. We know only part of those so our conclusions are illusions. We assume what we presume. John Mikes On 7/20/10, Allen Rex rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Jul 17, 2010 at 2:09 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 7/16/2010 8:51 PM, Allen Rex wrote: So, he seems to imply that initial conditions and causal laws must give rise to rational actors. But as he says, there is no independent standard of rationality. Yes he does. Rationality is what conduces to survival. You insist on reductive chains of laws, but I see it as a virtuous circle of explanation. Rationality is correlated with survival. You are rational, and you survive. But to say that rationality causes survival? What if rationality and survival are both caused by the same underlying processes? Processes involving quarks and electrons being acted on by fundamental laws? So rational is a meaningless label. In his formulation above it just means “whatever ends up being the most commonly manifested behaviors.” But it’s not commonly manifested because it’s rational. Rather, it’s labeled rational because it’s commonly manifested. Only by successful organisms. Successful is just a synonym for “common” here. Assuming physicalism, the causal laws of our universe applied to a suitable set of initial conditions will, in time, exhibit features that we categorize as “evolutionary”. Some of these evolutionary processes may give rise to entities that have conscious experiences, and some of those conscious experiences will be of holding this, that, or the other beliefs about logic. But those beliefs are a result of fundamental laws acting on fundamental entities, and not associated with any sort of independently existing platonic standard of “logical reasoning”. I don't understand that last sentence. Does fundamental laws refer to those theories we use to explain physical processes. No, it refers to the physical processes that are approximately described by our theories. What fundamental entities do you refer to? Those involved in the physical processes you refer to above. And why should not the beliefs we experience be associated with logical reasoning. What are you logically reasoning about? Rex -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
On 20 Jul 2010, at 12:43, Allen Rex wrote: On Sun, Jul 18, 2010 at 4:01 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Are you saying that the book provides evidences that we are not Turing emulable? As far as I know, Cooper doesn’t state his position on this question. Or that the prime character of the number 17 evolves in time/space? So I don’t think this part of the debate is going too far. I’m primarily interested in defending my position. I’m not as interested in defending Cooper’s position. :) If I remember well, your position is that consciousness is the fundamental entity. I tend to appreciate that (religious) position, and I think mechanism somehow can give credit to such a view, or to a rather related view. We have already talked about that. The TOE is given by the elementary arithmetic, or the SK combinators, or any universal system. We could take a universal unitary transformation, but this would prevent the simultaneous derivation of a theory of qualia with the quanta (given that the quanta have to be first person sharable qualia, like with Everett). However, I will quote the passages that made me think he was probably not in sympathy with your views. Also, see the quotes in my initial response to Brent. Today, in the general drift of scientific thought, logic is treated as though it were a central stillness. Although there is ambiguity in current attitudes, for the most part the laws of logic are still taken as fixed and absolute, much as they were for Aristotle. Contemporary theories of scientific methodology are logicocentric. Logic is seen common as an immutable, universeal, meatscientific framework for the sciences as for personal knowledge. Biological evolution is acknowledged, but it accorded only an ancillary role as a sort of biospheric police force whose duty it is to enforce the lgoical law among the recalcitrant. Logical obedience is rewarded and disobedience punished by natural selection, it is thought. [...] Comfortable as that mindset may be, I believe I am not alone in suspecting that it has things backward. There is a different, more biocentric perspective to be considered. In the alternative scheme of things, logic is not the central stillness. The principles of reasoning are neither fixed, absolute, independent, nor elemental. If anything it is the evolutionary dynamic that is elemental. Evolution is not the law enforcer, but the law giver. [...] The Principles of pure Reason, however pure an impression they may give, are in the final analysis propositions about evolutionary processes. Rules of reason evolve out of evolutionary law and nothing else. Logic is a life science. [...] ‘How do humans manage to reason?’ Since the form of this question is the same as that of the first, it would be natural to attack it in a similar two-pronged fashion. One part of the answer, with might naturally be placed at the beginning of a treatise on the question, would consist of logical theory. the different kinds of logic - deductive, inductive, mathematical, etc. - would be expounded and derived from first principles, perhaps in the form of axiomatizations of the various logical calculi. These ideal systems would be taken to define the rules of correct reasoning. The explanation of how humans evolved in ways that exploit these principles would come later on. The stages of adaptation to the rules of logic would be discussed, including some consideration of how well or poorly the human mind succeeds at implementing the fundamental logical principles set forth in the first part. [...] There would again be two parts to the exposition, a first part explaining the laws of logic and a second the laws of evolution. All this seems, on the surface at least, in good analogy with the explanation of bird flight. What the Reducibility Thesis proposes is that it is a *false* analogy. There are no separable laws of logic. It is tempting to think of the power of reasoning as an adaptation to separate principles of logic, just as flying is an adaptation to separate laws of aerodynamcis. The temptation should be resisted. logic is a confusing term. Informally non logic = error, madness, pain, ... To fight against logic is dramatic when you see how people accept so easily conclusion of invalid inference (like in the political health debate). Cooper seems unaware of the branch of math called logic, which illustrates that there is many logics. There is almost as much logic as they are mathematical structures. Then classical logic is the most simple and polite logic to describe all those different logics. SO...taken with the quotes I provided in my initial response to Brent, how friendly do you think he sounds to your position? I think he sounds friendlier to mine! Cooper's position is non sense. I'm afraid. He is the one stuck on Aristotelian logic. Which, to recap is this: If our conscious experiences are caused by
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
Hmmm. Interesting. Part 2 made it, but not part one. Part 1: You never think about how to test and potentially falsify your theories do you. Which makes these discussions fruitless. Brent Did you stop reading there??? It got better! Especially once I got past the Cooper quotes. So I'm not arguing against the Standard Model, of which I take an instrumentalist view. Rather, I'm arguing against the metaphysical position known as Physicalism. Is physicalism falsifiable? I seem to recall that you believe that an external indeterministic physical world exists independently of your observations, where events transpire according to some kind of necessity. Yes? No? But, this belief isn't entailed by methodological naturalism. It's a leap of faith. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
On 7/21/2010 4:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Jul 2010, at 12:43, Allen Rex wrote: On Sun, Jul 18, 2010 at 4:01 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Are you saying that the book provides evidences that we are not Turing emulable? As far as I know, Cooper doesn’t state his position on this question. Or that the prime character of the number 17 evolves in time/space? So I don’t think this part of the debate is going too far. I’m primarily interested in defending my position. I’m not as interested in defending Cooper’s position. :) If I remember well, your position is that consciousness is the fundamental entity. I tend to appreciate that (religious) position, and I think mechanism somehow can give credit to such a view, or to a rather related view. We have already talked about that. The TOE is given by the elementary arithmetic, or the SK combinators, or any universal system. We could take a universal unitary transformation, but this would prevent the simultaneous derivation of a theory of qualia with the quanta (given that the quanta have to be first person sharable qualia, like with Everett). However, I will quote the passages that made me think he was probably not in sympathy with your views. Also, see the quotes in my initial response to Brent. Today, in the general drift of scientific thought, logic is treated as though it were a central stillness. Although there is ambiguity in current attitudes, for the most part the laws of logic are still taken as fixed and absolute, much as they were for Aristotle. Contemporary theories of scientific methodology are logicocentric. Logic is seen common as an immutable, universeal, meatscientific framework for the sciences as for personal knowledge. Biological evolution is acknowledged, but it accorded only an ancillary role as a sort of biospheric police force whose duty it is to enforce the lgoical law among the recalcitrant. Logical obedience is rewarded and disobedience punished by natural selection, it is thought. [...] Comfortable as that mindset may be, I believe I am not alone in suspecting that it has things backward. There is a different, more biocentric perspective to be considered. In the alternative scheme of things, logic is not the central stillness. The principles of reasoning are neither fixed, absolute, independent, nor elemental. If anything it is the evolutionary dynamic that is elemental. Evolution is not the law enforcer, but the law giver. [...] The Principles of pure Reason, however pure an impression they may give, are in the final analysis propositions about evolutionary processes. Rules of reason evolve out of evolutionary law and nothing else. Logic is a life science. [...] ‘How do humans manage to reason?’ Since the form of this question is the same as that of the first, it would be natural to attack it in a similar two-pronged fashion. One part of the answer, with might naturally be placed at the beginning of a treatise on the question, would consist of logical theory. the different kinds of logic - deductive, inductive, mathematical, etc. - would be expounded and derived from first principles, perhaps in the form of axiomatizations of the various logical calculi. These ideal systems would be taken to define the rules of correct reasoning. The explanation of how humans evolved in ways that exploit these principles would come later on. The stages of adaptation to the rules of logic would be discussed, including some consideration of how well or poorly the human mind succeeds at implementing the fundamental logical principles set forth in the first part. [...] There would again be two parts to the exposition, a first part explaining the laws of logic and a second the laws of evolution. All this seems, on the surface at least, in good analogy with the explanation of bird flight. What the Reducibility Thesis proposes is that it is a *false* analogy. There are no separable laws of logic. It is tempting to think of the power of reasoning as an adaptation to separate principles of logic, just as flying is an adaptation to separate laws of aerodynamcis. The temptation should be resisted. logic is a confusing term. Informally non logic = error, madness, pain, ... To fight against logic is dramatic when you see how people accept so easily conclusion of invalid inference (like in the political health debate). Cooper seems unaware of the branch of math called logic, which illustrates that there is many logics. There is almost as much logic as they are mathematical structures. Then classical logic is the most simple and polite logic to describe all those different logics. Cooper is well aware of that. But he proposes non-classical logics different from modal extensions. SO...taken with the quotes I provided in my initial response to Brent, how friendly do you think he sounds to your position? I think he sounds friendlier to mine! Cooper's position is non sense.
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
On Sat, Jul 17, 2010 at 2:09 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 7/16/2010 8:51 PM, Allen Rex wrote: So, he seems to imply that initial conditions and causal laws must give rise to rational actors. But as he says, there is no independent standard of rationality. Yes he does. Rationality is what conduces to survival. You insist on reductive chains of laws, but I see it as a virtuous circle of explanation. Rationality is correlated with survival. You are rational, and you survive. But to say that rationality causes survival? What if rationality and survival are both caused by the same underlying processes? Processes involving quarks and electrons being acted on by fundamental laws? So rational is a meaningless label. In his formulation above it just means “whatever ends up being the most commonly manifested behaviors.” But it’s not commonly manifested because it’s rational. Rather, it’s labeled rational because it’s commonly manifested. Only by successful organisms. Successful is just a synonym for “common” here. Assuming physicalism, the causal laws of our universe applied to a suitable set of initial conditions will, in time, exhibit features that we categorize as “evolutionary”. Some of these evolutionary processes may give rise to entities that have conscious experiences, and some of those conscious experiences will be of holding this, that, or the other beliefs about logic. But those beliefs are a result of fundamental laws acting on fundamental entities, and not associated with any sort of independently existing platonic standard of “logical reasoning”. I don't understand that last sentence. Does fundamental laws refer to those theories we use to explain physical processes. No, it refers to the physical processes that are approximately described by our theories. What fundamental entities do you refer to? Those involved in the physical processes you refer to above. And why should not the beliefs we experience be associated with logical reasoning. What are you logically reasoning about? Rex -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
On Sun, Jul 18, 2010 at 4:01 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Are you saying that the book provides evidences that we are not Turing emulable? As far as I know, Cooper doesn’t state his position on this question. Or that the prime character of the number 17 evolves in time/space? So I don’t think this part of the debate is going too far. I’m primarily interested in defending my position. I’m not as interested in defending Cooper’s position. :) However, I will quote the passages that made me think he was probably not in sympathy with your views. Also, see the quotes in my initial response to Brent. Today, in the general drift of scientific thought, logic is treated as though it were a central stillness. Although there is ambiguity in current attitudes, for the most part the laws of logic are still taken as fixed and absolute, much as they were for Aristotle. Contemporary theories of scientific methodology are logicocentric. Logic is seen common as an immutable, universeal, meatscientific framework for the sciences as for personal knowledge. Biological evolution is acknowledged, but it accorded only an ancillary role as a sort of biospheric police force whose duty it is to enforce the lgoical law among the recalcitrant. Logical obedience is rewarded and disobedience punished by natural selection, it is thought. [...] Comfortable as that mindset may be, I believe I am not alone in suspecting that it has things backward. There is a different, more biocentric perspective to be considered. In the alternative scheme of things, logic is not the central stillness. The principles of reasoning are neither fixed, absolute, independent, nor elemental. If anything it is the evolutionary dynamic that is elemental. Evolution is not the law enforcer, but the law giver. [...] The Principles of pure Reason, however pure an impression they may give, are in the final analysis propositions about evolutionary processes. Rules of reason evolve out of evolutionary law and nothing else. Logic is a life science. [...] ‘How do humans manage to reason?’ Since the form of this question is the same as that of the first, it would be natural to attack it in a similar two-pronged fashion. One part of the answer, with might naturally be placed at the beginning of a treatise on the question, would consist of logical theory. the different kinds of logic - deductive, inductive, mathematical, etc. - would be expounded and derived from first principles, perhaps in the form of axiomatizations of the various logical calculi. These ideal systems would be taken to define the rules of correct reasoning. The explanation of how humans evolved in ways that exploit these principles would come later on. The stages of adaptation to the rules of logic would be discussed, including some consideration of how well or poorly the human mind succeeds at implementing the fundamental logical principles set forth in the first part. [...] There would again be two parts to the exposition, a first part explaining the laws of logic and a second the laws of evolution. All this seems, on the surface at least, in good analogy with the explanation of bird flight. What the Reducibility Thesis proposes is that it is a *false* analogy. There are no separable laws of logic. It is tempting to think of the power of reasoning as an adaptation to separate principles of logic, just as flying is an adaptation to separate laws of aerodynamcis. The temptation should be resisted. SO...taken with the quotes I provided in my initial response to Brent, how friendly do you think he sounds to your position? I think he sounds friendlier to mine! Which, to recap is this: If our conscious experiences are caused by some more fundamental underlying process, then no one presents or believes arguments for reasons of logic or rationality. Instead, one presents and believes arguments because one is *caused* to do so by the underlying process. The underlying process *may* be such that it causes us to present and believe logical and rational arguments, but there is no requirement that this be the case. If the underlying process doesn’t cause us to present and believe rational arguments, there would be no way to detect this, since there is no way to step outside of the process’s control of one’s beliefs to independently verify the reasonableness of the beliefs it generates. In other words: crazy people rarely know that they’re crazy. Wrong people never know that they’re wrong. Further, this is true of every possible position that has conscious experience caused by a more fundamental process. 1) The universe’s initial conditions and causal laws *may* be such that they cause us to have true beliefs about reality, but there is no requirement that this be so. 2) Our God *may* be such that he causes us to have true beliefs about him and reality, but there is no requirement that this be so. 3) Our fundamental and uncaused conscious experiences *may*
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
On 7/20/2010 3:43 AM, Allen Rex wrote: On Sun, Jul 18, 2010 at 4:01 AM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Are you saying that the book provides evidences that we are not Turing emulable? As far as I know, Cooper doesn’t state his position on this question. Or that the prime character of the number 17 evolves in time/space? So I don’t think this part of the debate is going too far. I’m primarily interested in defending my position. You never think about how to test and potentially falsify your theories do you. Which makes these discussions fruitless. Brent I’m not as interested in defending Cooper’s position. :) However, I will quote the passages that made me think he was probably not in sympathy with your views. Also, see the quotes in my initial response to Brent. Today, in the general drift of scientific thought, logic is treated as though it were a central stillness. Although there is ambiguity in current attitudes, for the most part the laws of logic are still taken as fixed and absolute, much as they were for Aristotle. Contemporary theories of scientific methodology are logicocentric. Logic is seen common as an immutable, universeal, meatscientific framework for the sciences as for personal knowledge. Biological evolution is acknowledged, but it accorded only an ancillary role as a sort of biospheric police force whose duty it is to enforce the lgoical law among the recalcitrant. Logical obedience is rewarded and disobedience punished by natural selection, it is thought. [...] Comfortable as that mindset may be, I believe I am not alone in suspecting that it has things backward. There is a different, more biocentric perspective to be considered. In the alternative scheme of things, logic is not the central stillness. The principles of reasoning are neither fixed, absolute, independent, nor elemental. If anything it is the evolutionary dynamic that is elemental. Evolution is not the law enforcer, but the law giver. [...] The Principles of pure Reason, however pure an impression they may give, are in the final analysis propositions about evolutionary processes. Rules of reason evolve out of evolutionary law and nothing else. Logic is a life science. [...] ‘How do humans manage to reason?’ Since the form of this question is the same as that of the first, it would be natural to attack it in a similar two-pronged fashion. One part of the answer, with might naturally be placed at the beginning of a treatise on the question, would consist of logical theory. the different kinds of logic - deductive, inductive, mathematical, etc. - would be expounded and derived from first principles, perhaps in the form of axiomatizations of the various logical calculi. These ideal systems would be taken to define the rules of correct reasoning. The explanation of how humans evolved in ways that exploit these principles would come later on. The stages of adaptation to the rules of logic would be discussed, including some consideration of how well or poorly the human mind succeeds at implementing the fundamental logical principles set forth in the first part. [...] There would again be two parts to the exposition, a first part explaining the laws of logic and a second the laws of evolution. All this seems, on the surface at least, in good analogy with the explanation of bird flight. What the Reducibility Thesis proposes is that it is a *false* analogy. There are no separable laws of logic. It is tempting to think of the power of reasoning as an adaptation to separate principles of logic, just as flying is an adaptation to separate laws of aerodynamcis. The temptation should be resisted. SO...taken with the quotes I provided in my initial response to Brent, how friendly do you think he sounds to your position? I think he sounds friendlier to mine! Which, to recap is this: If our conscious experiences are caused by some more fundamental underlying process, then no one presents or believes arguments for reasons of logic or rationality. Instead, one presents and believes arguments because one is *caused* to do so by the underlying process. The underlying process *may* be such that it causes us to present and believe logical and rational arguments, but there is no requirement that this be the case. If the underlying process doesn’t cause us to present and believe rational arguments, there would be no way to detect this, since there is no way to step outside of the process’s control of one’s beliefs to independently verify the reasonableness of the beliefs it generates. In other words: crazy people rarely know that they’re crazy. Wrong people never know that they’re wrong. Further, this is true of every possible position that has conscious experience caused by a more fundamental process. 1) The universe’s initial conditions and causal laws *may* be such that they cause us to have true beliefs about reality, but there is no requirement that this be
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
Rex, you wrote something great: *Rationality is correlated with survival. You are rational, and you survive. But to say that rationality causes survival? What if rationality and survival are both caused by the same underlying processes?...* ** My habituel question when neurologists assign thought (mentality?) to the (measurable) neuronic physiology and claim That causes the mental process. Correlated action, as the application of a 'tool' appears combined with the result of such process and without knowing the details 'scientists' are tempted to look at it as the 'originator' of the combined process. BTW I have to clarify (for myself?) Mihai Nadin's idea about 'cause' which is not in the starting conditions, rather in the aimed-at final stage of the change. His example is the cat, thrown off a building, falls on its feet, while a stone will fall just as it happens. The cat 'visualizes' by inherited trends how to twist while falling, to land without harm. Nadin is basing this on Robert Rosen's anticipatory principle (different from teleology). *As for survival:* it is an outcome of much more than we can include into our 'rationality' or whatever. The wholeness in its entirety influences the happenings by all the relations between all the unlimited ingredients into an outcome. We know only part of those so our conclusions are illusions. We assume what we presume. John Mikes On 7/20/10, Allen Rex rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Jul 17, 2010 at 2:09 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 7/16/2010 8:51 PM, Allen Rex wrote: So, he seems to imply that initial conditions and causal laws must give rise to rational actors. But as he says, there is no independent standard of rationality. Yes he does. Rationality is what conduces to survival. You insist on reductive chains of laws, but I see it as a virtuous circle of explanation. Rationality is correlated with survival. You are rational, and you survive. But to say that rationality causes survival? What if rationality and survival are both caused by the same underlying processes? Processes involving quarks and electrons being acted on by fundamental laws? So rational is a meaningless label. In his formulation above it just means “whatever ends up being the most commonly manifested behaviors.” But it’s not commonly manifested because it’s rational. Rather, it’s labeled rational because it’s commonly manifested. Only by successful organisms. Successful is just a synonym for “common” here. Assuming physicalism, the causal laws of our universe applied to a suitable set of initial conditions will, in time, exhibit features that we categorize as “evolutionary”. Some of these evolutionary processes may give rise to entities that have conscious experiences, and some of those conscious experiences will be of holding this, that, or the other beliefs about logic. But those beliefs are a result of fundamental laws acting on fundamental entities, and not associated with any sort of independently existing platonic standard of “logical reasoning”. I don't understand that last sentence. Does fundamental laws refer to those theories we use to explain physical processes. No, it refers to the physical processes that are approximately described by our theories. What fundamental entities do you refer to? Those involved in the physical processes you refer to above. And why should not the beliefs we experience be associated with logical reasoning. What are you logically reasoning about? Rex -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
On 19 Jul 2010, at 01:37, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/18/2010 1:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Assuming physicalism, the causal laws of our universe applied to a suitable set of initial conditions will, in time, exhibit features that we categorize as “evolutionary”. Some of these evolutionary processes may give rise to entities that have conscious experiences, and some of those conscious experiences will be of holding this, that, or the other beliefs about logic. But those beliefs are a result of fundamental laws acting on fundamental entities, and not associated with any sort of independently existing platonic standard of “logical reasoning”. I don't understand that last sentence. Does fundamental laws refer to those theories we use to explain physical processes. I don't see how theories can act on entities? What fundamental entities do you refer to? And why should not the beliefs we experience be associated with logical reasoning. If we find a flaw of logic in one of our theories it loses its power to explain or even to have meaning. I agree. Note that you are commenting on Rex text. I asked the same question. The idea that truth is independent of reasoning *is* classical logic or Platonism. Physicalism is platonism with respect to entities, which like the christian creator and creations are posited at the start, and for which nobody has ever give evidences (it is the only difference: to believe that there are physical laws and fundamental substantial entities is an addition to arithmetical realism). The very notion of laws necessitates arithmetical realism. Bruno I didn't cite Cooper as refuting anything. If the same physical processes produce our brains as well as the rest of the world then there is a connection between them which might cause our brains to have somewhat accurate thoughts about the rest of the world. Cooper explains why that should be so. OK. So we agree that Cooper is more a thread for Rex view, and not at all for mechanism and its immaterialist consequences. That was unclear (I think there as been a quoting misinterpretation!). The ball is in Rex's camp. I was indeed just asking Rex why he thinks that Cooper's book is a thread for digital mechanism and/or its immaterialist consequences. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
You agree, but you argue because you disagree on the meanings of words. All misunderstandings arise from differing ideas of the meanings of words. Words only have meaning whrn you have agreed on the meaning in advance. By learning through shared experience. It's the symbol grounding problem. You'll work it out if you keep talking. Everything happens for a reason. Words mean things, and they have their particular meanings for a reason. There are no coincidences. It's no coincidence, for example, that rationalize means both to provide an explanation and to make rational. I'm about to rationalize the universe both ways. --nbsp; Mark Buda lt;her...@acm.orggt; I get my monkeys for nothing and my chimps for free. On Jul 19, 2010 4:32 AM, Bruno Marchal lt;marc...@ulb.ac.begt; wrote: On 19 Jul 2010, at 01:37, Brent Meeker wrote: gt; On 7/18/2010 1:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: gt;gt; gt;gt; gt;gt;gt;gt; gt;gt;gt;gt; gt;gt;gt;gt;gt; Assuming physicalism, the causal laws of our universe applied to a gt;gt;gt;gt;gt; suitable set of initial conditions will, in time, exhibit features gt;gt;gt;gt;gt; that we categorize as “evolutionary”. Some of these evolutionary gt;gt;gt;gt;gt; processes may give rise to entities that have conscious gt;gt;gt;gt;gt; experiences, gt;gt;gt;gt;gt; and some of those conscious experiences will be of holding this, gt;gt;gt;gt;gt; that, gt;gt;gt;gt;gt; or the other beliefs about logic. But those beliefs are a gt;gt;gt;gt;gt; result of gt;gt;gt;gt;gt; fundamental laws acting on fundamental entities, and not gt;gt;gt;gt;gt; associated gt;gt;gt;gt;gt; with any sort of independently existing platonic standard of gt;gt;gt;gt;gt; “logical gt;gt;gt;gt;gt; reasoning”. gt; gt; I don't understand that last sentence. Does fundamental laws gt; refer to those theories we use to explain physical processes. I gt; don't see how theories can act on entities? What fundamental gt; entities do you refer to? And why should not the beliefs we gt; experience be associated with logical reasoning. If we find a flaw gt; of logic in one of our theories it loses its power to explain or gt; even to have meaning. I agree. Note that you are commenting on Rex text. I asked the same question. gt; gt;gt;gt;gt; gt;gt;gt;gt; gt;gt;gt;gt; The idea that truth is independent of reasoning *is* classical gt;gt;gt;gt; logic or Platonism. Physicalism is platonism with respect to gt;gt;gt;gt; entities, which like the christian creator and creations are gt;gt;gt;gt; posited at the start, and for which nobody has ever give gt;gt;gt;gt; evidences (it is the only difference: to believe that there are gt;gt;gt;gt; physical laws and fundamental substantial entities is an addition gt;gt;gt;gt; to arithmetical realism). The very notion of laws necessitates gt;gt;gt;gt; arithmetical realism. gt;gt;gt;gt; gt;gt;gt;gt; gt;gt;gt;gt; Bruno gt; I didn't cite Cooper as refuting anything. If the same physical gt; processes produce our brains as well as the rest of the world then gt; there is a connection between them which might cause our brains to gt; have somewhat accurate thoughts about the rest of the world. Cooper gt; explains why that should be so. OK. So we agree that Cooper is more a thread for Rex view, and not at all for mechanism and its immaterialist consequences. That was unclear (I think there as been a quoting misinterpretation!). The ball is in Rex's camp. I was indeed just asking Rex why he thinks that Cooper's book is a thread for digital mechanism and/or its immaterialist consequences. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
On 17 Jul 2010, at 05:51, Allen Rex wrote: The thesis posited by the book(*) is a bigger problem for Bruno's theory that mine. (*)c.f. The Evolution of Reason by William S. Cooper. Are you saying that the book provides evidences that we are not Turing emulable? Or that the prime character of the number 17 evolves in time/space? There is an evolution of human reason, no doubt. But this does not mean the reason why we are here does evolve. Such a position would make the humans the reason of the big bang, or the reason of evolution. It would be comparable to the belief that God single out the humans from all creature, or a form of solipsism. Assuming physicalism, the causal laws of our universe applied to a suitable set of initial conditions will, in time, exhibit features that we categorize as “evolutionary”. Some of these evolutionary processes may give rise to entities that have conscious experiences, and some of those conscious experiences will be of holding this, that, or the other beliefs about logic. But those beliefs are a result of fundamental laws acting on fundamental entities, and not associated with any sort of independently existing platonic standard of “logical reasoning”. The idea that truth is independent of reasoning *is* classical logic or Platonism. Physicalism is platonism with respect to entities, which like the christian creator and creations are posited at the start, and for which nobody has ever give evidences (it is the only difference: to believe that there are physical laws and fundamental substantial entities is an addition to arithmetical realism). The very notion of laws necessitates arithmetical realism. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
On 7/18/2010 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Jul 2010, at 05:51, Allen Rex wrote: The thesis posited by the book(*) is a bigger problem for Bruno's theory that mine. (*)c.f. The Evolution of Reason by William S. Cooper. Are you saying that the book provides evidences that we are not Turing emulable? Or that the prime character of the number 17 evolves in time/space? No, I'm saying it explains why we think of numbers and physical objects. Brent There is an evolution of human reason, no doubt. But this does not mean the reason why we are here does evolve. Such a position would make the humans the reason of the big bang, or the reason of evolution. It would be comparable to the belief that God single out the humans from all creature, or a form of solipsism. Assuming physicalism, the causal laws of our universe applied to a suitable set of initial conditions will, in time, exhibit features that we categorize as “evolutionary”. Some of these evolutionary processes may give rise to entities that have conscious experiences, and some of those conscious experiences will be of holding this, that, or the other beliefs about logic. But those beliefs are a result of fundamental laws acting on fundamental entities, and not associated with any sort of independently existing platonic standard of “logical reasoning”. The idea that truth is independent of reasoning *is* classical logic or Platonism. Physicalism is platonism with respect to entities, which like the christian creator and creations are posited at the start, and for which nobody has ever give evidences (it is the only difference: to believe that there are physical laws and fundamental substantial entities is an addition to arithmetical realism). The very notion of laws necessitates arithmetical realism. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
On 18 Jul 2010, at 17:38, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/18/2010 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Jul 2010, at 05:51, Allen Rex wrote: The thesis posited by the book(*) is a bigger problem for Bruno's theory that mine. (*)c.f. The Evolution of Reason by William S. Cooper. Are you saying that the book provides evidences that we are not Turing emulable? Or that the prime character of the number 17 evolves in time/space? No, I'm saying it explains why we think of numbers and physical objects. I guess he does. But the question to Rex (I think) was: in which sense is it a problem for mechanism and its consequences? Unless the W. Cooper's book refutes the movie graph argument, for example by justifying Jack Mallah's claim that consciousness stop supervening physically on a machine in case a physical piece of the machine, which is supposed to have no physical activity in the computation concerned, is removed. (But then how could we still say yes to a doctor, who may suppress anything strictly needed for some range of computation). That moves seems an introduction of magical property of both matter and mind of the type precluding any hope to use evolution theory to explain reason. WE have already discussed this. Or does the book refutes the tiny sigma_1 arithmetical realism needed for defining digital. I don't think so. A word like evolution needs a background as least as rich than sigma_1 arithmetical truth. No need to confuse number theory and human's number history. Cooper's book describes the evolution of human's reason. This has not to contradict either quantum mechanic or elementary arithmetic nor digital mechanism and its consequence. Bruno Brent There is an evolution of human reason, no doubt. But this does not mean the reason why we are here does evolve. Such a position would make the humans the reason of the big bang, or the reason of evolution. It would be comparable to the belief that God single out the humans from all creature, or a form of solipsism. Assuming physicalism, the causal laws of our universe applied to a suitable set of initial conditions will, in time, exhibit features that we categorize as “evolutionary”. Some of these evolutionary processes may give rise to entities that have conscious experiences, and some of those conscious experiences will be of holding this, that, or the other beliefs about logic. But those beliefs are a result of fundamental laws acting on fundamental entities, and not associated with any sort of independently existing platonic standard of “logical reasoning”. The idea that truth is independent of reasoning *is* classical logic or Platonism. Physicalism is platonism with respect to entities, which like the christian creator and creations are posited at the start, and for which nobody has ever give evidences (it is the only difference: to believe that there are physical laws and fundamental substantial entities is an addition to arithmetical realism). The very notion of laws necessitates arithmetical realism. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
On 18 Jul 2010, at 17:38, Brent Meeker wrote: Unless the W. Cooper's book refutes the movie graph argument, for example by justifying Jack Mallah's claim that consciousness stop supervening physically on a machine in case a physical piece of the machine, which is supposed to have no physical activity in the computation concerned, is removed. (But then how could we still say yes to a doctor, who may suppress anything strictly needed for some range of computation). That moves seems an introduction of magical property of both matter and mind of the type precluding any hope to use evolution theory to explain reason. WE have already discussed this. Something just occurred to me that might make sense to you guys. It seems like mental properties supervene on physical properties or that physical properties supervene on mental properties, right? I think I've figured out why the mind-body problem is so hard. It hinges on the meaning of words. How may minds do you have? You have two. Which is which? Why didn't anybody see this before? -- Mark Buda her...@acm.org I get my monkeys for nothing and my chimps for free. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
On 7/18/2010 1:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Jul 2010, at 17:38, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/18/2010 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Jul 2010, at 05:51, Allen Rex wrote: The thesis posited by the book(*) is a bigger problem for Bruno's theory that mine. (*)c.f. The Evolution of Reason by William S. Cooper. Are you saying that the book provides evidences that we are not Turing emulable? Or that the prime character of the number 17 evolves in time/space? No, I'm saying it explains why we think of numbers and physical objects. I guess he does. But the question to Rex (I think) was: in which sense is it a problem for mechanism and its consequences? Unless the W. Cooper's book refutes the movie graph argument, for example by justifying Jack Mallah's claim that consciousness stop supervening physically on a machine in case a physical piece of the machine, which is supposed to have no physical activity in the computation concerned, is removed. (But then how could we still say yes to a doctor, who may suppress anything strictly needed for some range of computation). That moves seems an introduction of magical property of both matter and mind of the type precluding any hope to use evolution theory to explain reason. WE have already discussed this. Or does the book refutes the tiny sigma_1 arithmetical realism needed for defining digital. I don't think so. A word like evolution needs a background as least as rich than sigma_1 arithmetical truth. No need to confuse number theory and human's number history. Cooper's book describes the evolution of human's reason. This has not to contradict either quantum mechanic or elementary arithmetic nor digital mechanism and its consequence. Bruno Brent There is an evolution of human reason, no doubt. But this does not mean the reason why we are here does evolve. Such a position would make the humans the reason of the big bang, or the reason of evolution. It would be comparable to the belief that God single out the humans from all creature, or a form of solipsism. Assuming physicalism, the causal laws of our universe applied to a suitable set of initial conditions will, in time, exhibit features that we categorize as “evolutionary”. Some of these evolutionary processes may give rise to entities that have conscious experiences, and some of those conscious experiences will be of holding this, that, or the other beliefs about logic. But those beliefs are a result of fundamental laws acting on fundamental entities, and not associated with any sort of independently existing platonic standard of “logical reasoning”. I don't understand that last sentence. Does fundamental laws refer to those theories we use to explain physical processes. I don't see how theories can act on entities? What fundamental entities do you refer to? And why should not the beliefs we experience be associated with logical reasoning. If we find a flaw of logic in one of our theories it loses its power to explain or even to have meaning. The idea that truth is independent of reasoning *is* classical logic or Platonism. Physicalism is platonism with respect to entities, which like the christian creator and creations are posited at the start, and for which nobody has ever give evidences (it is the only difference: to believe that there are physical laws and fundamental substantial entities is an addition to arithmetical realism). The very notion of laws necessitates arithmetical realism. Bruno I didn't cite Cooper as refuting anything. If the same physical processes produce our brains as well as the rest of the world then there is a connection between them which might cause our brains to have somewhat accurate thoughts about the rest of the world. Cooper explains why that should be so. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
The Irrationality of Physicalism
If Physicalism is true, then the belief in Physicalism can’t be rationally justified. If physicalism is true, then our beliefs and experiences are a result of the universe’s initial conditions and causal laws (which may have a probabilistic aspect). Therefore, assuming physicalism, we don’t present or believe arguments for reasons of logic or rationality. Instead, the arguments that we present and believe are those entailed by the physics that underlies our experiences. It is *possible* that we live in a universe whose initial conditions and causal laws are such that our arguments *are* logical. But in a physicalist framework that’s not why we present or believe those arguments. The fact that the arguments may be logical is superfluous to why we make or believe them. Obviously there’s nothing that says that our physically generated experiences and beliefs have to be true or logical. In fact, we have dreams, hallucinations, delusions, schizophrenics, and madmen as proof that there is no such requirement. So arguing for physicalism is making an argument that states that no one presents or believes arguments for reasons of logic. Note that the exact same argument can be applied to Bruno’s mathematical realism, or any other position that posits that consciousness is caused by or results from some underlying process. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
On 7/16/2010 1:26 PM, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: If Physicalism is true, then the belief in Physicalism can’t be rationally justified. If physicalism is true, then our beliefs and experiences are a result of the universe’s initial conditions and causal laws (which may have a probabilistic aspect). Therefore, assuming physicalism, we don’t present or believe arguments for reasons of logic or rationality. Instead, the arguments that we present and believe are those entailed by the physics that underlies our experiences. It is *possible* that we live in a universe whose initial conditions and causal laws are such that our arguments *are* logical. But in a physicalist framework that’s not why we present or believe those arguments. The fact that the arguments may be logical is superfluous to why we make or believe them. Obviously there’s nothing that says that our physically generated experiences and beliefs have to be true or logical. In fact, we have dreams, hallucinations, delusions, schizophrenics, and madmen as proof that there is no such requirement. So arguing for physicalism is making an argument that states that no one presents or believes arguments for reasons of logic. Note that the exact same argument can be applied to Bruno’s mathematical realism, or any other position that posits that consciousness is caused by or results from some underlying process. And in either case the counter argument is the same, c.f. The Evolution of Reason by William S. Cooper. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Irrationality of Physicalism
On Fri, Jul 16, 2010 at 5:13 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: And in either case the counter argument is the same, c.f. The Evolution of Reason by William S. Cooper. Maybe. But it’s not a very good counter argument. Actually, if his thesis is true, I think it helps my argument more than it hurts. The thesis posited by the book is a bigger problem for Bruno's theory that mine. A long-ish response, but there are several quotes from the book that add up in length. So logic reduces to biology. Fine. And biology reduces to...what? Initial conditions and causal laws, that’s what. “Evolution is not the law enforcer but the law giver - not so much a police force as a legislature. The laws of logic are not independent of biology but implicit in the very evolutionary processes that enforce them. The processes determine the laws. If the latter understanding is correct, logical rules have no separate status of their own but are theoretical constructs of evolutionary biology. Logical theory ought then in some sense to be deducible entirely from biological considerations. The concept of scientific reduction is helpful in expressing that thought. In the received methodological terminology the idea of interest can be articulated as the following hypothesis. REDUCIBILITY THESIS: Logic is reducible to evolutionary theory.” So obviously evolution is not a law enforcer or a law giver. It isn’t a causal law, but rather a consequence of causal laws. Cooper claims that logic reduces to evolutionary theory. And what does evolutionary theory reduce to? Initial conditions and fundamental causal laws acting on fundamental entities. Assuming physicalism, the causal laws of our universe applied to a suitable set of initial conditions will, in time, exhibit features that we categorize as “evolutionary”. Some of these evolutionary processes may give rise to entities that have conscious experiences, and some of those conscious experiences will be of holding this, that, or the other beliefs about logic. But those beliefs are a result of fundamental laws acting on fundamental entities, and not associated with any sort of independently existing platonic standard of “logical reasoning”. This is the gist of my post, and seems to be the main gist of his book. We do part company eventually though. I’ll save that part for last. Continuing: “‘How do humans manage to reason?’ Since the form of this question is the same as that of the first, it would be natural to attack it in a similar two-pronged fashion. [...] Somewhere in the latter part there would be talk of selective forces acting on genetic variation, of fitness, of population models, etc. [...] The laws of Reason should not be addressed independently of evolutionary theory, according to the thesis. Reasoning is different from all other adaptations in that the laws of logic are aspects of the laws of adaptation themselves. Nothing extra is needed to account for logic - only a drawing out of the consequences of known principles of natural selection.” Selective forces? What would have caused those selective forces? What do these selective forces reduce to? Why these selective forces instead of some others? Natural selection? Well, there are causally neutral “filters” (metaphorically speaking), but these metaphorical filters are as much a consequence of the universe’s initial conditions and causal laws as the organisms that are (metaphorically) selected. Evolution is a consequence of causal laws, not a causal law itself. In this it is like the first law of thermodynamics - which is a consequence of the time invariance of the causal laws, not a causal law itself. Evolution and the first law of thermodynamics are descriptions of how things are, not explanations. So as I said, if physicalism is true then the arguments that we present and believe are those entailed by the physics that underlies our experiences, and by nothing else. In this view, evolution is also just a manifestation of those same underlying physical forces. And logic is merely an aspect of the experiences generated by the more fundamental activities of quarks and electrons. In this vein, he says: “If evolutionary considerations control the relevant aspects of decision behavior, and these determine in turn the rest of the machinery of logic, one can begin to discern the implicative chain that makes Reducibility Theory thinkable. [...] If the evolutionary control over the logic is indeed so total as to constrain it entirely, there is no need to perpetuate the fiction that logic has a life of its own. It is tributary to the larger evolutionary mechanism.” All we have to do is add that the universe’s initial conditions and causal laws control the evolutionary considerations, and my point is practically made. The main point of contention between my argument and Cooper’s is: “In this way the general evolutionary tendency to optimize fitness turns out to imply, in and of
