Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-15 Thread Niall Smart

 And pidentd will still be supported. Eventually, I'd like to have those
 huge majority who do not use DES tokens with pidentd move to the
 inetd identd (when committed)...

How about a standalone identd with DES `tokens' and any other nice
to haves that it doesn't make sense to implement in a built-in identd?

Regards,

Niall


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-14 Thread Doug

On Wed, 14 Jul 1999, Garance A Drosihn wrote:

 At 11:47 PM -0400 7/13/99, Brian F. Feldman wrote:
  We don't _need_ pidentd anymore. It will load down a system more
  than the inetd's implementation of ident will. Therefore, pidentd
  should be phased out. Other than that, pidentd should be using
  http://www.FreeBSD.org/~green/freebsd4.c and not linking with
  libkvm.
 
 I am not sure I understand what you are saying.  pident is currently
 a port, under 'security'.  I can understand the idea that maybe it
 should be under 'net' instead (in fact, that's where I first looked
 for it when I went to install it on my machine).

I agree that it shouldn't be under security, but if we move it now
there will be a lot of complaining from the people who already know where
it is. Not that that is necessarily a bad thing, but there you have it. 

As for the rest of it, you've wandered into the middle of a fairly
silly argument. One camp says, "We don't need to have a built-in FreeBSD
version of ident because we have a port of it available to those who need
it." The other camp seems to be saying get rid of the port, but what they
are really saying is that, "The current ident options all suck, so it
would be nice to have a freebsd version that we know will work, and once
we have that then people won't need the port, but they can install it if
they want to." 

Frankly I don't see why we're still discussing this, but then
again, I do.

Hope this helps,

Doug
-- 
On account of being a democracy and run by the people, we are the only
nation in the world that has to keep a government four years, no matter
what it does.
-- Will Rogers



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-14 Thread Harold Gutch

On Tue, Jul 13, 1999 at 11:47:33PM -0400, Brian F. Feldman wrote:
 We don't _need_ pidentd anymore. It will load down a system more than
 the inetd's implementation of ident will. Therefore, pidentd should be
 phased out. Other than that, pidentd should be using
 http://www.FreeBSD.org/~green/freebsd4.c and not linking with libkvm.
 
pidentd supports DES-encrypted tokens as replies instead of the
plaintext usernames. As long as your identd (or any other
replacement) does not support this, there is still valid use for
pidentd.

bye,
  Harold

-- 
Shabby Sleep is an abstinence syndrome wich occurs due to lack of caffein.
Wed Mar  4 04:53:33 CET 1998   #unix, ircnet


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-14 Thread Brian F. Feldman

On Thu, 15 Jul 1999, Harold Gutch wrote:

 On Tue, Jul 13, 1999 at 11:47:33PM -0400, Brian F. Feldman wrote:
  We don't _need_ pidentd anymore. It will load down a system more than
  the inetd's implementation of ident will. Therefore, pidentd should be
  phased out. Other than that, pidentd should be using
  http://www.FreeBSD.org/~green/freebsd4.c and not linking with libkvm.
  
 pidentd supports DES-encrypted tokens as replies instead of the
 plaintext usernames. As long as your identd (or any other
 replacement) does not support this, there is still valid use for
 pidentd.

And pidentd will still be supported. Eventually, I'd like to have those
huge majority who do not use DES tokens with pidentd move to the
inetd identd (when committed)...

 
 bye,
   Harold
 
 -- 
 Shabby Sleep is an abstinence syndrome wich occurs due to lack of caffein.
 Wed Mar  4 04:53:33 CET 1998   #unix, ircnet
 

 Brian Fundakowski Feldman  _ __ ___   ___ ___ ___  
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]   _ __ ___ | _ ) __|   \ 
 FreeBSD: The Power to Serve!_ __ | _ \._ \ |) |
   http://www.FreeBSD.org/  _ |___/___/___/ 



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-14 Thread Garance A Drosihn
At 11:47 PM -0400 7/13/99, Brian F. Feldman wrote:
 We don't _need_ pidentd anymore. It will load down a system more
 than the inetd's implementation of ident will. Therefore, pidentd
 should be phased out. Other than that, pidentd should be using
 http://www.FreeBSD.org/~green/freebsd4.c and not linking with
 libkvm.

I am not sure I understand what you are saying.  pident is currently
a port, under 'security'.  I can understand the idea that maybe it
should be under 'net' instead (in fact, that's where I first looked
for it when I went to install it on my machine).

It sounds like you want it removed from the ports collection.  Given
that I have yet to see a real specific complaint against it (vague
comments about it loads down the system or it's really buggy
have not convinced me of much), I do not see why anyone would care
if it remains in the ports collection.  There are certainly other
ports with bugs (hell, the base OS has bugs), and there are other
things which load down a system (funny, my system does not seem
to be loaded down by pident).  What is it with this crusade to
completely eridicate (phase out) pident?

Or am I missing something here?

---
Garance Alistair Drosehn   =   g...@eclipse.acs.rpi.edu
Senior Systems Programmer  or  dro...@rpi.edu
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-14 Thread Doug
On Wed, 14 Jul 1999, Garance A Drosihn wrote:

 At 11:47 PM -0400 7/13/99, Brian F. Feldman wrote:
  We don't _need_ pidentd anymore. It will load down a system more
  than the inetd's implementation of ident will. Therefore, pidentd
  should be phased out. Other than that, pidentd should be using
  http://www.FreeBSD.org/~green/freebsd4.c and not linking with
  libkvm.
 
 I am not sure I understand what you are saying.  pident is currently
 a port, under 'security'.  I can understand the idea that maybe it
 should be under 'net' instead (in fact, that's where I first looked
 for it when I went to install it on my machine).

I agree that it shouldn't be under security, but if we move it now
there will be a lot of complaining from the people who already know where
it is. Not that that is necessarily a bad thing, but there you have it. 

As for the rest of it, you've wandered into the middle of a fairly
silly argument. One camp says, We don't need to have a built-in FreeBSD
version of ident because we have a port of it available to those who need
it. The other camp seems to be saying get rid of the port, but what they
are really saying is that, The current ident options all suck, so it
would be nice to have a freebsd version that we know will work, and once
we have that then people won't need the port, but they can install it if
they want to. 

Frankly I don't see why we're still discussing this, but then
again, I do.

Hope this helps,

Doug
-- 
On account of being a democracy and run by the people, we are the only
nation in the world that has to keep a government four years, no matter
what it does.
-- Will Rogers



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-14 Thread Harold Gutch
On Tue, Jul 13, 1999 at 11:47:33PM -0400, Brian F. Feldman wrote:
 We don't _need_ pidentd anymore. It will load down a system more than
 the inetd's implementation of ident will. Therefore, pidentd should be
 phased out. Other than that, pidentd should be using
 http://www.FreeBSD.org/~green/freebsd4.c and not linking with libkvm.
 
pidentd supports DES-encrypted tokens as replies instead of the
plaintext usernames. As long as your identd (or any other
replacement) does not support this, there is still valid use for
pidentd.

bye,
  Harold

-- 
Shabby Sleep is an abstinence syndrome wich occurs due to lack of caffein.
Wed Mar  4 04:53:33 CET 1998   #unix, ircnet


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-14 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Thu, 15 Jul 1999, Harold Gutch wrote:

 On Tue, Jul 13, 1999 at 11:47:33PM -0400, Brian F. Feldman wrote:
  We don't _need_ pidentd anymore. It will load down a system more than
  the inetd's implementation of ident will. Therefore, pidentd should be
  phased out. Other than that, pidentd should be using
  http://www.FreeBSD.org/~green/freebsd4.c and not linking with libkvm.
  
 pidentd supports DES-encrypted tokens as replies instead of the
 plaintext usernames. As long as your identd (or any other
 replacement) does not support this, there is still valid use for
 pidentd.

And pidentd will still be supported. Eventually, I'd like to have those
huge majority who do not use DES tokens with pidentd move to the
inetd identd (when committed)...

 
 bye,
   Harold
 
 -- 
 Shabby Sleep is an abstinence syndrome wich occurs due to lack of caffein.
 Wed Mar  4 04:53:33 CET 1998   #unix, ircnet
 

 Brian Fundakowski Feldman  _ __ ___   ___ ___ ___  
 gr...@freebsd.org   _ __ ___ | _ ) __|   \ 
 FreeBSD: The Power to Serve!_ __ | _ \._ \ |) |
   http://www.FreeBSD.org/  _ |___/___/___/ 



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread Niall Smart

"Brian F. Feldman" wrote:

 On Mon, 12 Jul 1999, Sheldon Hearn wrote:
  On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 12:47:30 MST, Doug wrote:
 
 Finally, Brian might want to search the bugtraq archives before
   he commits anything. There have been quite a few identd related
   discussions, and it would be points in our favor if we didn't come out
   with anything that had known exploits.
[snip]
 
 It's "out with the bad, in with the good." Pidentd code is pretty terrible.

Agreed, nobody wants a monstrosity of an ident daemon in the base
system.

 The only security concerns with my code were wrt FAKEID, and those were
 mostly fixed (mostly meaning that a symlink _may_ be opened, but it won't
 be read.)

Your code is still insecure, I can still obtain 16 characters of the
first line of any file in the system just by symlinking to it.  I
don't see how you expect your checks to defeat that.  What you should
do is setgid  setuid to the user returned by net.inet.tcp.getcred
immediately after doing the sysctl.

Or even better take out this FAKEID stuff.

 If anyone wants to audit my code for security, I invite them to.
 But frankly, I highly doubt anyone will find anything to exploit.

Heh, famous last words.

And, why would bugtraq advisories against other identds apply to my
 ident_stream service? This is an entirely different code base.

That doesn't matter, different programmers make the same mistakes
and assumptions when solving the same problem (there is research
into the effectiveness of N-way programming which shows this) and
many attacks are against subtle implementation mistakes which you
may also make.

Regards,

Niall


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread Ian Dowse

In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Bria
n F. Feldman" writes:
On 13 Jul 1999, Ville-Pertti Keinonen wrote:

 
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Brian F. Feldman) writes:
 
  It's "out with the bad, in with the good." Pidentd code is pretty terrible
.
  The only security concerns with my code were wrt FAKEID, and those were
  mostly fixed (mostly meaning that a symlink _may_ be opened, but it won't
  be read.) If anyone wants to audit my code for security, I invite them to.
 
 Did you mean to avoid reading through symlinks using the open + fstat
 method mentioned earlier in the thread?

No, I meant to avoid opening a file the user couldn't, or reading from a dev.

Why not actually store the fake ID in a symbolic link? That way you just
do a readlink(), which would be safer, neater and faster than reading a
file. A user can set up a fake ID with something like:

ln -s "Warm-Fuzzy" .fakeid

Ian


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread John Polstra

In article [EMAIL PROTECTED],
Ian Dowse  [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 Why not actually store the fake ID in a symbolic link? That way you just
 do a readlink(), which would be safer, neater and faster than reading a
 file. A user can set up a fake ID with something like:
   
   ln -s "Warm-Fuzzy" .fakeid

Ick.  Please, no more abuse of symbolic links!  Once (malloc) was
enough.

Data is held in files, not in filenames.

John
-- 
  John Polstra   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  John D. Polstra  Co., Inc.Seattle, Washington USA
  "No matter how cynical I get, I just can't keep up."-- Nora Ephron


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread Kevin Day

 Doug wrote:
  John Polstra wrote:
  
  Are you sure?  If you simply don't run an identd, the queries will
  get an instant connection refused error.  That's even faster than
  sending back a bogus response.
 
Many daemons that request ident, and almost all IRC daemons
  that I'm aware of don't take "NO" for an answer. They sit waiting
  for a valid response, and timeout after X seconds, where X is c. 30
  seconds.
 
 Really??  Even though their connect() call failed?  Ick!  I know
 sendmail doesn't behave that way.  I'll take your word about the IRC
 daemons -- I don't know anything about them.
 
  Whether this behavior is good or not begs the question,
 
 Agreed.

Every ircd i've ever seen will immediately return on a connection refused
response.

With ident:

[15:22] -irc.dragondata.com- Looking up your hostname...
[15:22] -irc.dragondata.com- Found your hostname, cached
[15:22] -irc.dragondata.com- Checking Ident
*** Identd request from 204.137.237.3
*** Identd replied: 1063, 4242 : USERID : UNIX : toasty
[15:22] -irc.dragondata.com- Got Ident response
PING? PONG!
Welcome to Newnet Toasty9
Your host is irc.dragondata.com, running version nn-1.3devel.tmnotefix.noudpspam.hnam

Elapsed time was less than 1 second.


With no ident:

[15:21] -irc.dragondata.com- Looking up your hostname...
[15:21] -irc.dragondata.com- Checking Ident
[15:21] -irc.dragondata.com- Found your hostname
ToastyMan Nickname is already in use.
PING? PONG!
Welcome to Newnet Toasty9
Your host is irc.dragondata.com, running version nn-1.3devel.tmnotefix.noudpspam.hnam

Elapsed time was less than 1 second.

(I just tested this in NewNet, DALnet, EFnet, and Undernet)


The only time I see it sitting there for 30 seconds is if ircd gets no
response at all back, (no 'connection refused')


Kevin


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread Sheldon Hearn



On Mon, 12 Jul 1999 15:12:49 -0400, "Brian F. Feldman" wrote:

 It's "out with the bad, in with the good." Pidentd code is pretty
 terrible.

Hi Brian,

I let your comment above go at the time that you said it and I waited
for Kevin Day to substantiate similar claims. Kevin very kindly took
the time to submit a PR which has helped me demonstrate to him that
the problems which he was seeing that led him to declare pidentd buggy
were in fact caused by a bug (bugs?) in the version of inetd that he's
running.

So while I take to heart Mike Smith's comments ("I'm ... worried about
... where the seniority of a code entity is considered more significant
than its functionality") I do think that this exercise serves no purpose
as long as pidentd is doing its job properly.

For detail on the inetd bugs causing apparent pidentd instability, I
invite you to examine PR 12596. If you feel there are other problems
with pidentd, I invite you to take Kevin's lead and file a PR.

Ciao,
Sheldon.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread Ville-Pertti Keinonen

gr...@freebsd.org (Brian F. Feldman) writes:

 It's out with the bad, in with the good. Pidentd code is pretty terrible.
 The only security concerns with my code were wrt FAKEID, and those were
 mostly fixed (mostly meaning that a symlink _may_ be opened, but it won't
 be read.) If anyone wants to audit my code for security, I invite them to.

Did you mean to avoid reading through symlinks using the open + fstat
method mentioned earlier in the thread?

I thought I'd misunderstood, that you had to be discussing something
else, since you and whoever else was involved both agreed that open +
fstat is sufficient, and I thought that several people can't possibly
be so completely confused.

If you really want to avoid reading through symlinks, you need to
lstat, open and fstat (the order doesn't really matter).


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread Niall Smart
Brian F. Feldman wrote:

 On Mon, 12 Jul 1999, Sheldon Hearn wrote:
  On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 12:47:30 MST, Doug wrote:
 
 Finally, Brian might want to search the bugtraq archives before
   he commits anything. There have been quite a few identd related
   discussions, and it would be points in our favor if we didn't come out
   with anything that had known exploits.
[snip]
 
 It's out with the bad, in with the good. Pidentd code is pretty terrible.

Agreed, nobody wants a monstrosity of an ident daemon in the base
system.

 The only security concerns with my code were wrt FAKEID, and those were
 mostly fixed (mostly meaning that a symlink _may_ be opened, but it won't
 be read.)

Your code is still insecure, I can still obtain 16 characters of the
first line of any file in the system just by symlinking to it.  I
don't see how you expect your checks to defeat that.  What you should
do is setgid  setuid to the user returned by net.inet.tcp.getcred
immediately after doing the sysctl.

Or even better take out this FAKEID stuff.

 If anyone wants to audit my code for security, I invite them to.
 But frankly, I highly doubt anyone will find anything to exploit.

Heh, famous last words.

And, why would bugtraq advisories against other identds apply to my
 ident_stream service? This is an entirely different code base.

That doesn't matter, different programmers make the same mistakes
and assumptions when solving the same problem (there is research
into the effectiveness of N-way programming which shows this) and
many attacks are against subtle implementation mistakes which you
may also make.

Regards,

Niall


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On 13 Jul 1999, Ville-Pertti Keinonen wrote:

 
 gr...@freebsd.org (Brian F. Feldman) writes:
 
  It's out with the bad, in with the good. Pidentd code is pretty terrible.
  The only security concerns with my code were wrt FAKEID, and those were
  mostly fixed (mostly meaning that a symlink _may_ be opened, but it won't
  be read.) If anyone wants to audit my code for security, I invite them to.
 
 Did you mean to avoid reading through symlinks using the open + fstat
 method mentioned earlier in the thread?

No, I meant to avoid opening a file the user couldn't, or reading from a dev.

 
 I thought I'd misunderstood, that you had to be discussing something
 else, since you and whoever else was involved both agreed that open +
 fstat is sufficient, and I thought that several people can't possibly
 be so completely confused.
 
 If you really want to avoid reading through symlinks, you need to
 lstat, open and fstat (the order doesn't really matter).
 

I don't care about symlinks. I care about the underlying file.

 
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 FreeBSD: The Power to Serve!_ __ | _ \._ \ |) |
   http://www.FreeBSD.org/  _ |___/___/___/ 



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Tue, 13 Jul 1999, Niall Smart wrote:

 Brian F. Feldman wrote:
 
  On Mon, 12 Jul 1999, Sheldon Hearn wrote:
   On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 12:47:30 MST, Doug wrote:
  
  Finally, Brian might want to search the bugtraq archives before
he commits anything. There have been quite a few identd related
discussions, and it would be points in our favor if we didn't come out
with anything that had known exploits.
 [snip]
  
  It's out with the bad, in with the good. Pidentd code is pretty terrible.
 
 Agreed, nobody wants a monstrosity of an ident daemon in the base
 system.
 
  The only security concerns with my code were wrt FAKEID, and those were
  mostly fixed (mostly meaning that a symlink _may_ be opened, but it won't
  be read.)
 
 Your code is still insecure, I can still obtain 16 characters of the
 first line of any file in the system just by symlinking to it.  I
 don't see how you expect your checks to defeat that.  What you should
 do is setgid  setuid to the user returned by net.inet.tcp.getcred
 immediately after doing the sysctl.

Actually, I need to seteuid and setegid, because a setuid/setgid gives the
user access to ident's process space. Anyway, I just forgot to upload the
latest version of the patch. I also nuked it on MY system :/ But I just
rewrote it (a bit better, too.) It's updated on freefall now.

 
 Or even better take out this FAKEID stuff.

I'd rather keep it in, non-default, and semi-supported.

 
  If anyone wants to audit my code for security, I invite them to.
  But frankly, I highly doubt anyone will find anything to exploit.
 
 Heh, famous last words.

Is this my last stand?

 
 And, why would bugtraq advisories against other identds apply to my
  ident_stream service? This is an entirely different code base.
 
 That doesn't matter, different programmers make the same mistakes
 and assumptions when solving the same problem (there is research
 into the effectiveness of N-way programming which shows this) and
 many attacks are against subtle implementation mistakes which you
 may also make.

Ahh, but I don't make assumptions on input. I know that anything can happen.
so prepare for the worst. Most mistakes are made by programmers when they
assume that all input is safe. *

 
 Regards,
 
 Niall
 

 Brian Fundakowski Feldman  _ __ ___   ___ ___ ___  
 gr...@freebsd.org   _ __ ___ | _ ) __|   \ 
 FreeBSD: The Power to Serve!_ __ | _ \._ \ |) |
   http://www.FreeBSD.org/  _ |___/___/___/ 

* exploitable security holes



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread Ian Dowse
In message pine.bsf.4.10.9907130946220.76301-100...@janus.syracuse.net, Bria
n F. Feldman writes:
On 13 Jul 1999, Ville-Pertti Keinonen wrote:

 
 gr...@freebsd.org (Brian F. Feldman) writes:
 
  It's out with the bad, in with the good. Pidentd code is pretty terrible
.
  The only security concerns with my code were wrt FAKEID, and those were
  mostly fixed (mostly meaning that a symlink _may_ be opened, but it won't
  be read.) If anyone wants to audit my code for security, I invite them to.
 
 Did you mean to avoid reading through symlinks using the open + fstat
 method mentioned earlier in the thread?

No, I meant to avoid opening a file the user couldn't, or reading from a dev.

Why not actually store the fake ID in a symbolic link? That way you just
do a readlink(), which would be safer, neater and faster than reading a
file. A user can set up a fake ID with something like:

ln -s Warm-Fuzzy .fakeid

Ian


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Tue, 13 Jul 1999, Ian Dowse wrote:

 In message pine.bsf.4.10.9907130946220.76301-100...@janus.syracuse.net, 
 Bria
 n F. Feldman writes:
 On 13 Jul 1999, Ville-Pertti Keinonen wrote:
 
  
  gr...@freebsd.org (Brian F. Feldman) writes:
  
   It's out with the bad, in with the good. Pidentd code is pretty 
   terrible
 .
   The only security concerns with my code were wrt FAKEID, and those were
   mostly fixed (mostly meaning that a symlink _may_ be opened, but it won't
   be read.) If anyone wants to audit my code for security, I invite them 
   to.
  
  Did you mean to avoid reading through symlinks using the open + fstat
  method mentioned earlier in the thread?
 
 No, I meant to avoid opening a file the user couldn't, or reading from a dev.
 
 Why not actually store the fake ID in a symbolic link? That way you just
 do a readlink(), which would be safer, neater and faster than reading a
 file. A user can set up a fake ID with something like:
   
   ln -s Warm-Fuzzy .fakeid

Hysterical raisins. ~/.fakeid being a text file is how it's always been done.
That would be a better idea if I didn't mind confusing the hell out of
people :)

 
 Ian
 

 Brian Fundakowski Feldman  _ __ ___   ___ ___ ___  
 gr...@freebsd.org   _ __ ___ | _ ) __|   \ 
 FreeBSD: The Power to Serve!_ __ | _ \._ \ |) |
   http://www.FreeBSD.org/  _ |___/___/___/ 



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread David Malone
On Tue, Jul 13, 1999 at 03:12:51PM -0400, Brian F. Feldman wrote:

  Why not actually store the fake ID in a symbolic link? That way you just
  do a readlink(), which would be safer, neater and faster than reading a
  file. A user can set up a fake ID with something like:
  
  ln -s Warm-Fuzzy .fakeid
 
 Hysterical raisins. ~/.fakeid being a text file is how it's always been done.
 That would be a better idea if I didn't mind confusing the hell out of
 people :)

You could tell them to do:

ln -s `cat .fakeid` .fakeidnew
mv .fakeid `cat .fakeid`
mv .fakeidnew .fakeid

Also - I guess if you're goting to patch inetd to do this stuff it should
be runtime configurable to be able to:

1) return the traditional :ERROR:HIDDEN-USER,
2) return the real user always,
3) return the fakeid if it exists, and otherwise use the read user id,

You should probably use uname to get the OS name too?

David.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread John Polstra
In article 199907132004.aa08...@salmon.maths.tcd.ie,
Ian Dowse  iedo...@maths.tcd.ie wrote:
 
 Why not actually store the fake ID in a symbolic link? That way you just
 do a readlink(), which would be safer, neater and faster than reading a
 file. A user can set up a fake ID with something like:
   
   ln -s Warm-Fuzzy .fakeid

Ick.  Please, no more abuse of symbolic links!  Once (malloc) was
enough.

Data is held in files, not in filenames.

John
-- 
  John Polstra   j...@polstra.com
  John D. Polstra  Co., Inc.Seattle, Washington USA
  No matter how cynical I get, I just can't keep up.-- Nora Ephron


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread Kevin Day
 Doug wrote:
  John Polstra wrote:
  
  Are you sure?  If you simply don't run an identd, the queries will
  get an instant connection refused error.  That's even faster than
  sending back a bogus response.
 
Many daemons that request ident, and almost all IRC daemons
  that I'm aware of don't take NO for an answer. They sit waiting
  for a valid response, and timeout after X seconds, where X is c. 30
  seconds.
 
 Really??  Even though their connect() call failed?  Ick!  I know
 sendmail doesn't behave that way.  I'll take your word about the IRC
 daemons -- I don't know anything about them.
 
  Whether this behavior is good or not begs the question,
 
 Agreed.

Every ircd i've ever seen will immediately return on a connection refused
response.

With ident:

[15:22] -irc.dragondata.com- Looking up your hostname...
[15:22] -irc.dragondata.com- Found your hostname, cached
[15:22] -irc.dragondata.com- Checking Ident
*** Identd request from 204.137.237.3
*** Identd replied: 1063, 4242 : USERID : UNIX : toasty
[15:22] -irc.dragondata.com- Got Ident response
PING? PONG!
Welcome to Newnet Toasty9
Your host is irc.dragondata.com, running version 
nn-1.3devel.tmnotefix.noudpspam.hnam

Elapsed time was less than 1 second.


With no ident:

[15:21] -irc.dragondata.com- Looking up your hostname...
[15:21] -irc.dragondata.com- Checking Ident
[15:21] -irc.dragondata.com- Found your hostname
ToastyMan Nickname is already in use.
PING? PONG!
Welcome to Newnet Toasty9
Your host is irc.dragondata.com, running version 
nn-1.3devel.tmnotefix.noudpspam.hnam

Elapsed time was less than 1 second.

(I just tested this in NewNet, DALnet, EFnet, and Undernet)


The only time I see it sitting there for 30 seconds is if ircd gets no
response at all back, (no 'connection refused')


Kevin


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread Sheldon Hearn


On Mon, 12 Jul 1999 15:12:49 -0400, Brian F. Feldman wrote:

 It's out with the bad, in with the good. Pidentd code is pretty
 terrible.

Hi Brian,

I let your comment above go at the time that you said it and I waited
for Kevin Day to substantiate similar claims. Kevin very kindly took
the time to submit a PR which has helped me demonstrate to him that
the problems which he was seeing that led him to declare pidentd buggy
were in fact caused by a bug (bugs?) in the version of inetd that he's
running.

So while I take to heart Mike Smith's comments (I'm ... worried about
... where the seniority of a code entity is considered more significant
than its functionality) I do think that this exercise serves no purpose
as long as pidentd is doing its job properly.

For detail on the inetd bugs causing apparent pidentd instability, I
invite you to examine PR 12596. If you feel there are other problems
with pidentd, I invite you to take Kevin's lead and file a PR.

Ciao,
Sheldon.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-13 Thread Brian F. Feldman
We don't _need_ pidentd anymore. It will load down a system more than
the inetd's implementation of ident will. Therefore, pidentd should be
phased out. Other than that, pidentd should be using
http://www.FreeBSD.org/~green/freebsd4.c and not linking with libkvm.

 Brian Fundakowski Feldman  _ __ ___   ___ ___ ___  
 gr...@freebsd.org   _ __ ___ | _ ) __|   \ 
 FreeBSD: The Power to Serve!_ __ | _ \._ \ |) |
   http://www.FreeBSD.org/  _ |___/___/___/ 



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-12 Thread Sheldon Hearn



On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 22:34:09 +0200, Mark Murray wrote:

 As long as the documentation is _clear_ that this is not a front-line
 security tool, but rather a thing to marginally augment logs with
 user-supplied info, then I'll buy it.

This is why I put forward a motion to move pidentd out of security and
into net / sysutils last year. The suggestion wasn't well received, but
I still think it'd help. I'd also like for the DESCR file for the port
to say:

"This service offers remote users some identity to report back
 to the local admin when complaining about abuse / break-ins
 originating from the local host."

Ciao,
Sheldon.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-12 Thread Sheldon Hearn



On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 12:47:30 MST, Doug wrote:

   Finally, Brian might want to search the bugtraq archives before
 he commits anything. There have been quite a few identd related
 discussions, and it would be points in our favor if we didn't come out
 with anything that had known exploits.

I like this suggestion. I worry about a trend I'm seeing, with more and
more people keen to replace existing code with their own virgin code
which hasn't had any serious field time behind it.

This seems like a very Linuxy development trend. It's the way the Bazaar
works, but not in a Cathedral. Rather, you have a look at what's already
there and try to work on it. You don't start your own wing a few feet
from the Cathedral in the hopes that someone will bash down a similar
wing elsewhere and join yours to the main building.

Waffle waffle.

Ciao,
Sheldon.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-12 Thread Brian F. Feldman

On Mon, 12 Jul 1999, Sheldon Hearn wrote:

 
 
 On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 12:47:30 MST, Doug wrote:
 
Finally, Brian might want to search the bugtraq archives before
  he commits anything. There have been quite a few identd related
  discussions, and it would be points in our favor if we didn't come out
  with anything that had known exploits.
 
 I like this suggestion. I worry about a trend I'm seeing, with more and
 more people keen to replace existing code with their own virgin code
 which hasn't had any serious field time behind it.
 
 This seems like a very Linuxy development trend. It's the way the Bazaar
 works, but not in a Cathedral. Rather, you have a look at what's already
 there and try to work on it. You don't start your own wing a few feet
 from the Cathedral in the hopes that someone will bash down a similar
 wing elsewhere and join yours to the main building.

It's "out with the bad, in with the good." Pidentd code is pretty terrible.
The only security concerns with my code were wrt FAKEID, and those were
mostly fixed (mostly meaning that a symlink _may_ be opened, but it won't
be read.) If anyone wants to audit my code for security, I invite them to.
But frankly, I highly doubt anyone will find anything to exploit.
   And, why would bugtraq advisories against other identds apply to my
ident_stream service? This is an entirely different code base.

 
 Waffle waffle.
 
 Ciao,
 Sheldon.
 
 
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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-12 Thread Sheldon Hearn


On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 22:34:09 +0200, Mark Murray wrote:

 As long as the documentation is _clear_ that this is not a front-line
 security tool, but rather a thing to marginally augment logs with
 user-supplied info, then I'll buy it.

This is why I put forward a motion to move pidentd out of security and
into net / sysutils last year. The suggestion wasn't well received, but
I still think it'd help. I'd also like for the DESCR file for the port
to say:

This service offers remote users some identity to report back
 to the local admin when complaining about abuse / break-ins
 originating from the local host.

Ciao,
Sheldon.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-12 Thread Sheldon Hearn


On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 12:47:30 MST, Doug wrote:

   Finally, Brian might want to search the bugtraq archives before
 he commits anything. There have been quite a few identd related
 discussions, and it would be points in our favor if we didn't come out
 with anything that had known exploits.

I like this suggestion. I worry about a trend I'm seeing, with more and
more people keen to replace existing code with their own virgin code
which hasn't had any serious field time behind it.

This seems like a very Linuxy development trend. It's the way the Bazaar
works, but not in a Cathedral. Rather, you have a look at what's already
there and try to work on it. You don't start your own wing a few feet
from the Cathedral in the hopes that someone will bash down a similar
wing elsewhere and join yours to the main building.

Waffle waffle.

Ciao,
Sheldon.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-12 Thread Mark Murray
 On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 22:34:09 +0200, Mark Murray wrote:
 
  As long as the documentation is _clear_ that this is not a front-line
  security tool, but rather a thing to marginally augment logs with
  user-supplied info, then I'll buy it.
 
 This is why I put forward a motion to move pidentd out of security and
 into net / sysutils last year. The suggestion wasn't well received, but
 I still think it'd help. I'd also like for the DESCR file for the port
 to say:
 
   This service offers remote users some identity to report back
to the local admin when complaining about abuse / break-ins
originating from the local host.

This issue is way to religious. As long as folk don't do anything
blatantly stupid, and as long as the caveats are well documented, it
is probably a good idea to just let this one stand, and lean on it
gently :-)

M
--
Mark Murray
Join the anti-SPAM movement: http://www.cauce.org


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-12 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Mon, 12 Jul 1999, Sheldon Hearn wrote:

 
 
 On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 12:47:30 MST, Doug wrote:
 
Finally, Brian might want to search the bugtraq archives before
  he commits anything. There have been quite a few identd related
  discussions, and it would be points in our favor if we didn't come out
  with anything that had known exploits.
 
 I like this suggestion. I worry about a trend I'm seeing, with more and
 more people keen to replace existing code with their own virgin code
 which hasn't had any serious field time behind it.
 
 This seems like a very Linuxy development trend. It's the way the Bazaar
 works, but not in a Cathedral. Rather, you have a look at what's already
 there and try to work on it. You don't start your own wing a few feet
 from the Cathedral in the hopes that someone will bash down a similar
 wing elsewhere and join yours to the main building.

It's out with the bad, in with the good. Pidentd code is pretty terrible.
The only security concerns with my code were wrt FAKEID, and those were
mostly fixed (mostly meaning that a symlink _may_ be opened, but it won't
be read.) If anyone wants to audit my code for security, I invite them to.
But frankly, I highly doubt anyone will find anything to exploit.
   And, why would bugtraq advisories against other identds apply to my
ident_stream service? This is an entirely different code base.

 
 Waffle waffle.
 
 Ciao,
 Sheldon.
 
 
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 FreeBSD: The Power to Serve!_ __ | _ \._ \ |) |
   http://www.FreeBSD.org/  _ |___/___/___/ 



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-12 Thread Jordan K. Hubbard
Whatever you do with identd, just make it work through NAT.  That's
the #1 request from folks where this is concerned.

- Jordan


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-12 Thread Mike Smith
 
 I like this suggestion. I worry about a trend I'm seeing, with more and
 more people keen to replace existing code with their own virgin code
 which hasn't had any serious field time behind it.

I'm actually more worried about the opposing trend that you espouse, 
where the seniority of a code entity is considered more significant 
than its functionality.

-- 
\\  The mind's the standard   \\  Mike Smith
\\  of the man.   \\  msm...@freebsd.org
\\-- Joseph Merrick   \\  msm...@cdrom.com




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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Mark Murray

The whole point of ident was -- and still is -- to
 authenticate or verify who created a specific TCP connection.  If
 the machine is untouched (i.e., has not had the root account
 compromised), then ident responses are usually trustworthy
 enough.  It is generally not applicable to single user operating
 systems like Windows, Mac OS, or DOS.

...in other words it is not applicable to the vast majority
of operating systems where it is used.

Where is ident used? Predominantly with IRC, with a minority holding
in tcp_wrappers and mail servers. In a "hard" wrapping environment,
by the time you need ident, it is most likely compromised.

M
--
Mark Murray
Join the anti-SPAM movement: http://www.cauce.org


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Mark Murray

 Just because it's useless in some situations doesn't mean it's not useful
 in others.  Yours is an argument against _misusing_ identd, not an argument
 against _using_ it.  

No. It is an argument against trusting it. :-)

M
--
Mark Murray
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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Sheldon Hearn



On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 01:49:59 -0400, "Brian F. Feldman" wrote:

 inetd already has the built-in equivalent to that. Maybe it's possible
 to make a REAL ident (*cough* the one I wrote) an option, inetd has
 that service off by default.

That sounds much more like it. I will say that I suspect this is a bad
move. The more I think about it, the more I think we don't want the
kitchen sink in there.

Inetd only offers a limited auth service to prevent delays in the
servicing of requests from local users on remote hosts. Anyone who wants
to use the auth service for other things should probably use a
specialized piece of software to do that.

I don't think inetd needs this functionality built in. I think that what
you really want is pidentd imported into the base system. And while it's
noble to want a GNU-free base system and I applaud efforts in that
direction, you should probably slow down and read pidentd's license
agreement. :-)

Personally, I don't think there's anything wrong with leaving pidentd as
a port.

 Then the user can select one of two lines for a real ident
 service or a fake one.

DES has some interesting ideas in this direction. Take a look at closed
PR 11796 if and when you start thinking about how to implement this.

Ciao,
Sheldon.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Sheldon Hearn



On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 00:49:59 EST, Kevin Day wrote:

 However, pidentd is rather buggy of late, and tends to freak out a
 lot. If we could have an 'official' identd, I'd like it. :)

I hope you can back that up with more than a desire to see "an official
identd", whatever that means. Can you actually give examples of buggy
behaviour?

If so, I'd suggest sending in a PR, not discussing it here.

Ciao,
Sheldon.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Niall Smart


 I don't see a point to that. However, I am finished. Please go to
 http://www.FreeBSD.org/~green/ and get getcred.patch and inetd_ident.patch.

Hmm,

+#ifdef FAKEID
+   snprintf(fakeid_path, sizeof(fakeid_path), "%s/.fakeid",
pw-pw_dir);
+   fakeid = fopen(fakeid_path, "r");
+   if (fakeid) {

$ ln -s /etc/master.passwd ~/.fakeid

Ouch.  (One possible saving grace here is that you truncate
after 16 characters).

+   if (!*cp || getpwnam(cp)) {
+   pw = getpwuid(uc.cr_uid);
+   cp = pw-pw_name;
+   goto printit;
+   }

What is this code trying to do?  If the ~/.fakeid file is invalid
or the user is attempting to impersonate another then revert?  A
comment would be nice.  You forget to check for pw == NULL here
(but you don't earlier ;) and I don't think the goto is necessary.

Regards,

Niall


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Kevin Day

 
 
 On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 00:49:59 EST, Kevin Day wrote:
 
  However, pidentd is rather buggy of late, and tends to freak out a
  lot. If we could have an 'official' identd, I'd like it. :)
 
 I hope you can back that up with more than a desire to see "an official
 identd", whatever that means. Can you actually give examples of buggy
 behaviour?
 
 If so, I'd suggest sending in a PR, not discussing it here.
 
 Ciao,
 Sheldon.
 

Please see:

ports/12596   (just added)
ports/8042 


Thanks,

Kevin



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Brian F. Feldman

On Sun, 11 Jul 1999, Sheldon Hearn wrote:

 
 
 On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 01:49:59 -0400, "Brian F. Feldman" wrote:
 
  inetd already has the built-in equivalent to that. Maybe it's possible
  to make a REAL ident (*cough* the one I wrote) an option, inetd has
  that service off by default.
 
 That sounds much more like it. I will say that I suspect this is a bad
 move. The more I think about it, the more I think we don't want the
 kitchen sink in there.
 
 Inetd only offers a limited auth service to prevent delays in the
 servicing of requests from local users on remote hosts. Anyone who wants
 to use the auth service for other things should probably use a
 specialized piece of software to do that.
 
 I don't think inetd needs this functionality built in. I think that what
 you really want is pidentd imported into the base system. And while it's
 noble to want a GNU-free base system and I applaud efforts in that
 direction, you should probably slow down and read pidentd's license
 agreement. :-)
 
 Personally, I don't think there's anything wrong with leaving pidentd as
 a port.

I find pidentd gross, to say the least. I don't see why not to kill it...
And this service is very small, so it doesn't make inetd "huge". It's
not feeping creaturism because I replaced the ident service there with
a working one.

 
  Then the user can select one of two lines for a real ident
  service or a fake one.
 
 DES has some interesting ideas in this direction. Take a look at closed
 PR 11796 if and when you start thinking about how to implement this.
 
 Ciao,
 Sheldon.
 

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 [EMAIL PROTECTED]   _ __ ___ | _ ) __|   \ 
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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Sheldon Hearn



On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 14:03:29 -0400, "Brian F. Feldman" wrote:

 And this service is very small, so it doesn't make inetd "huge". It's
 not feeping creaturism because I replaced the ident service there with
 a working one.

Perhaps this is where we're missing each other. The ident service
supplied with inetd isn't "broken", it's just designed to do something
different from what your replacement was designed to do.

Ciao,
Sheldon.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Doug

John Polstra wrote:
 
 In article [EMAIL PROTECTED],
 Warner Losh  [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
  Some ftpd and sendmail servers make the queries.  When I have my fake
  identd in place, they go much faster... :-)
 
 Are you sure?  If you simply don't run an identd, the queries will get
 an instant connection refused error.  That's even faster than sending
 back a bogus response.

Many daemons that request ident, and almost all IRC daemons that I'm aware
of don't take "NO" for an answer. They sit waiting for a valid response,
and timeout after X seconds, where X is c. 30 seconds. Whether this
behavior is good or not begs the question, that is how it works. 

I'd also like to throw in some thoughts on ident in general, since I have
several years of experience both in IRC administration and having been
through this debate several times. :) 

1. ident is useful as far as it goes. It shouldn't be trusted as
authentication, but it can give you a good idea of where to start when
tracking down problem users. 

2. Most shell services do a good job of keeping ident reliable. They need
to do that because most IRC networks heavily penalize clients that don't
return any ident. 

3. Having a built in version of a "real" ident run out of inetd would be
*very* welcome by the people that need it. pidentd is a bloated, buggy pig.

4. I agree with Sheldon that returning "real" responses by default would be
a bad thing. The current ability to send fake responses is a good thing,
but having the option to do real ident would also be good. 

Finally, Brian might want to search the bugtraq archives before he commits
anything. There have been quite a few identd related discussions, and it
would be points in our favor if we didn't come out with anything that had
known exploits. 

HTH,

Doug


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Sheldon Hearn



On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 12:54:03 EST, Kevin Day wrote:

 Please see:
 
 ports/12596   (just added)
 ports/8042 

Thanks! I've seen 8042 before, but yours looks a lot more useful,
as I can't make sense of the older one.

Ciao,
Sheldon.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread John Polstra

Doug wrote:
 John Polstra wrote:
 
 Are you sure?  If you simply don't run an identd, the queries will
 get an instant connection refused error.  That's even faster than
 sending back a bogus response.

   Many daemons that request ident, and almost all IRC daemons
 that I'm aware of don't take "NO" for an answer. They sit waiting
 for a valid response, and timeout after X seconds, where X is c. 30
 seconds.

Really??  Even though their connect() call failed?  Ick!  I know
sendmail doesn't behave that way.  I'll take your word about the IRC
daemons -- I don't know anything about them.

 Whether this behavior is good or not begs the question,

Agreed.

John
---
  John Polstra   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  John D. Polstra  Co., Inc.Seattle, Washington USA
  "No matter how cynical I get, I just can't keep up."-- Nora Ephron



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Peter Wemm

John Polstra wrote:
 Doug wrote:
  John Polstra wrote:
  
  Are you sure?  If you simply don't run an identd, the queries will
  get an instant connection refused error.  That's even faster than
  sending back a bogus response.
 
Many daemons that request ident, and almost all IRC daemons
  that I'm aware of don't take "NO" for an answer. They sit waiting
  for a valid response, and timeout after X seconds, where X is c. 30
  seconds.
 
 Really??  Even though their connect() call failed?  Ick!  I know
 sendmail doesn't behave that way.  I'll take your word about the IRC
 daemons -- I don't know anything about them.

No, they connect().  If it times out (eg: packet filter), it kicks you out.
If it gets through and the ident server doesn't respond within the 30
second timeout, it drops you again.  If it connects and gets a 'Warm-Fuzzy'
or an error of some sort, it drops you.  If it gets a non-UNIX username
response, it kicks you out.  Basically, to use a well connected irc server,
you *must* run an identd that returns a valid username response, and that
username is used in your conversations.  Some servers will let you on
without a fully functional identd, but in my experience they seem to be the
most unreliable as they are the most abused.

ISP's run identd on their shell servers.  That's so that when their servers
get banned from IRC, they can find out which of their shell users from their
shell users to have taken out and shot.

Cheers,
-Peter



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Mark Murray

 1. ident is useful as far as it goes. It shouldn't be trusted as
 authentication, but it can give you a good idea of where to start when
 tracking down problem users. 

First thing you say to yourself after a compromise is "trust nothing".
Things like idents can/will/should/are targets.

 2. Most shell services do a good job of keeping ident reliable. They need
 to do that because most IRC networks heavily penalize clients that don't
 return any ident. 

This is changing. In the face of ${BIGNUM} Windoze boxes giving ident
answers like "HAX0r", there is little point, except for the administrator
of the box _giving_ the ident. If that was me, it would be _low_ on my
list.

 3. Having a built in version of a "real" ident run out of inetd would be
 *very* welcome by the people that need it. pidentd is a bloated, buggy pig.

Small set of people. Much larger set of dupes who would believe/trust
this.

 4. I agree with Sheldon that returning "real" responses by default would be
 a bad thing. The current ability to send fake responses is a good thing,
 but having the option to do real ident would also be good. 

As long as the documentation is _clear_ that this is not a front-line
security tool, but rather a thing to marginally augment logs with
user-supplied info, then I'll buy it.

M
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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Brian F. Feldman

On Sun, 11 Jul 1999, Doug wrote:

 3. Having a built in version of a "real" ident run out of inetd would be
 *very* welcome by the people that need it. pidentd is a bloated, buggy pig.

Thank you. That's why I wrote it.

 
 4. I agree with Sheldon that returning "real" responses by default would be
 a bad thing. The current ability to send fake responses is a good thing,
 but having the option to do real ident would also be good. 
 
   Finally, Brian might want to search the bugtraq archives before he commits
 anything. There have been quite a few identd related discussions, and it
 would be points in our favor if we didn't come out with anything that had
 known exploits. 

How in the world could my inetd ident service be exploited? I just fixed
the only problematic feature, fake id, to make it not read anything but a
regular file and not let you try to use  someone else's name. I can't see
any way that any part of it could be exploited...

 
 HTH,
 
 Doug
 
 
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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Matthew Dillon

: 2. Most shell services do a good job of keeping ident reliable. They need
: to do that because most IRC networks heavily penalize clients that don't
: return any ident. 
:
:This is changing. In the face of ${BIGNUM} Windoze boxes giving ident
:answers like "HAX0r", there is little point, except for the administrator
:of the box _giving_ the ident. If that was me, it would be _low_ on my
:list.

ident is extremely useful when taken in the proper context.  It doesn't
really matter what a user-owned box returns.  An IRC administrator only
cares about two things:

* If the irc client is connecting from an (ISP's) multi-user shell 
  machine, that the ident contain sufficient information to identify
  the user.

* If the irc client is connecting from a single-user machine, such as
  a windoz box, the IRC administrator has the IP address and times
  involved, which is again sufficient for the user's ISP to identify
  the user.

When a user is abusing an IRC server, the IRC administrator has two 
choices:

* If it is coming from an ISP who takes abuse seriously, the IRC 
  administrator need only identify the user sufficiently (IP and time,
  or ident info if coming from a shared shell box) such that the ISP
  can kick the user off the service.

* If it is coming from an ISP who does not take abuse seriously, the
  IRC administrator locks out the entire ISP.

At BEST ident was turned on on all machines and it returned the user's
real user name.  It did that because it made it a whole lot easier for us
to handle abuse issues, it cut abuse significantly, and it cut 
abuse-related email from remote IRC admins significantly because they
could lockout specific users based on the ident info without having to 
contact us.

I don't work at BEST any more, but I would love to see kernel support
for ident lookups.  To make identd work reasonably well, I had to hack
the server to timeout after a few seconds worth of cpu-bound searching
through KVM, because it would sometimes get into scanning loops.

-Matt



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Matthew Dillon

:How in the world could my inetd ident service be exploited? I just fixed
:the only problematic feature, fake id, to make it not read anything but a
:regular file and not let you try to use  someone else's name. I can't see
:any way that any part of it could be exploited...

Typically the exploitation of identd is in the form of a denial-of-service
attack.  What we saw at BEST were denial-of-service attacks against identd
to prevent users on a particular shell machine from being able to initiate
an IRC client session (because the remote IRC server would not be able to
obtain ident info).  Early versions of Identd could be used for port
scanning purposes, but not any more.  Since identd will only resolve
connections comming from the client IP making the connection, there aren't
very many "interesting" ways to abuse it.

-Matt


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Jonathan Lemon

In article local.mail.freebsd-hackers/[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
you write:
response, it kicks you out.  Basically, to use a well connected irc server,
you *must* run an identd that returns a valid username response, and that
username is used in your conversations.  Some servers will let you on
without a fully functional identd, but in my experience they seem to be the
most unreliable as they are the most abused.

Uh, not always.  I've been on/off of IRC for the last, oh, 7 years 
or so, and _still_ don't bother to run identd.  It's a nuisance, and
as I'm the admin on my machines, I don't need it.  I've always managed
to find some well-run servers that don't require identd.
--
Jonathan


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Warner Losh

In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] "Brian F. 
Feldman" writes:
: Good idea. I'll have it check to see that it's a regular file.

Make sure that you do this with the stat, open, fstat interlocking so
that there isn't a race here.

Warner


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Warner Losh

In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] John Polstra writes:
: Really??  Even though their connect() call failed?  Ick!  I know
: sendmail doesn't behave that way.  I'll take your word about the IRC
: daemons -- I don't know anything about them.

Yes.  At least that's what I've observed.  However, I believe the
culprit was a firewall that just dropped the packets for the
connection request, so it had to wait 30 seconds to timeout.

Warner


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Brian F. Feldman

On Sun, 11 Jul 1999, Warner Losh wrote:

 In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] "Brian F. 
Feldman" writes:
 : Good idea. I'll have it check to see that it's a regular file.
 
 Make sure that you do this with the stat, open, fstat interlocking so
 that there isn't a race here.

I have this fixed in my latest code (on freefall of course). I did not
use an original stat because that's pointless, as it adds another race
condition. The only downside to my approach is that if it's a symlink
to a dev, the dev can get opened/closed, and d_open/d_close be called.

 
 Warner
 

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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Warner Losh

In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] "Brian F. 
Feldman" writes:
: I have this fixed in my latest code (on freefall of course). I did not
: use an original stat because that's pointless, as it adds another race
: condition. The only downside to my approach is that if it's a symlink
: to a dev, the dev can get opened/closed, and d_open/d_close be called.

How does the original stat add a race condition.  You stat the file,
open it, then fstat it.  If the two match you know you're good.  If
they don't, you can detect that something bad has happened

Warner



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Warner Losh

In message
[EMAIL PROTECTED] "Brian
F. Feldman" writes:
: Ahh, I misunderstood you. In _this_ case you just proposed, the stat is
: really pointless. What good would it do?

It would let you know if you should even try to open the file...  But
that doesn't solve the race.  The fstat tells you if what you opened
was what you thought you were opening...  However, for this, the
original stat might not be completely necessary unless you were trying 
to specifically detect someone trying to race you.  You are right that 
it won't buy you anything.

I was confusing this with the tree walking case.  The stat + fstat
check there was needed...

Warner


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Sun, 11 Jul 1999, Kevin Day wrote:

   Is it worth it to write an identd for FreeBSD? With one sysctl added, it's
   trivial to implement. If an identd would be desired, then should I make a
   separate one, or rewrite the current inetd's internal identd shim? I
   don't see a reason for pidentd when we could have an identd built in by
   me fixing inetd up, and it would all take up less space.
  
  There is the question - what for? identd is of questionable use at best.
  
  The best use of identd I have seen is crypted cookies that would allow
  an attackee to identify an attacker in a non-privacy-invasive manner.
  In 3 years of running this at an ISP, I have never seen it used in anger.
  
  Under normal circumstances (${BIGNUM} Wintendo boxes running IRC 
  clients), the info given is completely useless.
  
 
 Just to add a counter-point here, I run an ISP that offers shell accounts.
 We get idiot customers using IRC for all sorts of nasty things at times, and
 identd is the only method I have for knowing who did it when I get
 complaints.
 
 However, pidentd is rather buggy of late, and tends to freak out a lot. If
 we could have an 'official' identd, I'd like it. :)

Go ahead and try out mine then! You'll need the following patches from
http://www.FreeBSD.org/~green/ :
socred.patch (not necessary for 4.0; some parts require manual attention in 
  3.X, as it won't patch perfectly; this is already applied in 4.0)
getcred.patch
inetd_ident.patch

Patch them in in order, making sure they apply correctly. Then make includes,
rebuild the kernel, rebuild modules, install kernel and modules, rebuild
inetd, edit inetd.conf to enable the built-in auth service, and
reboot. Let me know how it goes. I hope to make this standard as part of 4.0 :)

 
 Kevin
 

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 gr...@freebsd.org   _ __ ___ | _ ) __|   \ 
 FreeBSD: The Power to Serve!_ __ | _ \._ \ |) |
   http://www.FreeBSD.org/  _ |___/___/___/ 



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Mark Murray
The whole point of ident was -- and still is -- to
 authenticate or verify who created a specific TCP connection.  If
 the machine is untouched (i.e., has not had the root account
 compromised), then ident responses are usually trustworthy
 enough.  It is generally not applicable to single user operating
 systems like Windows, Mac OS, or DOS.

...in other words it is not applicable to the vast majority
of operating systems where it is used.

Where is ident used? Predominantly with IRC, with a minority holding
in tcp_wrappers and mail servers. In a hard wrapping environment,
by the time you need ident, it is most likely compromised.

M
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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Mark Murray
 Just because it's useless in some situations doesn't mean it's not useful
 in others.  Yours is an argument against _misusing_ identd, not an argument
 against _using_ it.  

No. It is an argument against trusting it. :-)

M
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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Sheldon Hearn


On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 01:49:59 -0400, Brian F. Feldman wrote:

 inetd already has the built-in equivalent to that. Maybe it's possible
 to make a REAL ident (*cough* the one I wrote) an option, inetd has
 that service off by default.

That sounds much more like it. I will say that I suspect this is a bad
move. The more I think about it, the more I think we don't want the
kitchen sink in there.

Inetd only offers a limited auth service to prevent delays in the
servicing of requests from local users on remote hosts. Anyone who wants
to use the auth service for other things should probably use a
specialized piece of software to do that.

I don't think inetd needs this functionality built in. I think that what
you really want is pidentd imported into the base system. And while it's
noble to want a GNU-free base system and I applaud efforts in that
direction, you should probably slow down and read pidentd's license
agreement. :-)

Personally, I don't think there's anything wrong with leaving pidentd as
a port.

 Then the user can select one of two lines for a real ident
 service or a fake one.

DES has some interesting ideas in this direction. Take a look at closed
PR 11796 if and when you start thinking about how to implement this.

Ciao,
Sheldon.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Sheldon Hearn


On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 00:49:59 EST, Kevin Day wrote:

 However, pidentd is rather buggy of late, and tends to freak out a
 lot. If we could have an 'official' identd, I'd like it. :)

I hope you can back that up with more than a desire to see an official
identd, whatever that means. Can you actually give examples of buggy
behaviour?

If so, I'd suggest sending in a PR, not discussing it here.

Ciao,
Sheldon.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Niall Smart

 I don't see a point to that. However, I am finished. Please go to
 http://www.FreeBSD.org/~green/ and get getcred.patch and inetd_ident.patch.

Hmm,

+#ifdef FAKEID
+   snprintf(fakeid_path, sizeof(fakeid_path), %s/.fakeid,
pw-pw_dir);
+   fakeid = fopen(fakeid_path, r);
+   if (fakeid) {

$ ln -s /etc/master.passwd ~/.fakeid

Ouch.  (One possible saving grace here is that you truncate
after 16 characters).

+   if (!*cp || getpwnam(cp)) {
+   pw = getpwuid(uc.cr_uid);
+   cp = pw-pw_name;
+   goto printit;
+   }

What is this code trying to do?  If the ~/.fakeid file is invalid
or the user is attempting to impersonate another then revert?  A
comment would be nice.  You forget to check for pw == NULL here
(but you don't earlier ;) and I don't think the goto is necessary.

Regards,

Niall


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread John Polstra
In article 199907102150.paa33...@harmony.village.org,
Warner Losh  i...@village.org wrote:
 
 Some ftpd and sendmail servers make the queries.  When I have my fake
 identd in place, they go much faster... :-)

Are you sure?  If you simply don't run an identd, the queries will get
an instant connection refused error.  That's even faster than sending
back a bogus response.

The only way a long timeout can occur is if you have a filter rule
installed that drops the incoming packets without responding to them.
You can block the incoming packets but still avoid the timeout with a
filter rule that sends back a reset:

add reset tcp from any to any auth setup in via etha16

John
-- 
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  John D. Polstra  Co., Inc.Seattle, Washington USA
  No matter how cynical I get, I just can't keep up.-- Nora Ephron


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Kevin Day
 
 
 On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 00:49:59 EST, Kevin Day wrote:
 
  However, pidentd is rather buggy of late, and tends to freak out a
  lot. If we could have an 'official' identd, I'd like it. :)
 
 I hope you can back that up with more than a desire to see an official
 identd, whatever that means. Can you actually give examples of buggy
 behaviour?
 
 If so, I'd suggest sending in a PR, not discussing it here.
 
 Ciao,
 Sheldon.
 

Please see:

ports/12596   (just added)
ports/8042 


Thanks,

Kevin



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Sun, 11 Jul 1999, Sheldon Hearn wrote:

 
 
 On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 01:49:59 -0400, Brian F. Feldman wrote:
 
  inetd already has the built-in equivalent to that. Maybe it's possible
  to make a REAL ident (*cough* the one I wrote) an option, inetd has
  that service off by default.
 
 That sounds much more like it. I will say that I suspect this is a bad
 move. The more I think about it, the more I think we don't want the
 kitchen sink in there.
 
 Inetd only offers a limited auth service to prevent delays in the
 servicing of requests from local users on remote hosts. Anyone who wants
 to use the auth service for other things should probably use a
 specialized piece of software to do that.
 
 I don't think inetd needs this functionality built in. I think that what
 you really want is pidentd imported into the base system. And while it's
 noble to want a GNU-free base system and I applaud efforts in that
 direction, you should probably slow down and read pidentd's license
 agreement. :-)
 
 Personally, I don't think there's anything wrong with leaving pidentd as
 a port.

I find pidentd gross, to say the least. I don't see why not to kill it...
And this service is very small, so it doesn't make inetd huge. It's
not feeping creaturism because I replaced the ident service there with
a working one.

 
  Then the user can select one of two lines for a real ident
  service or a fake one.
 
 DES has some interesting ideas in this direction. Take a look at closed
 PR 11796 if and when you start thinking about how to implement this.
 
 Ciao,
 Sheldon.
 

 Brian Fundakowski Feldman  _ __ ___   ___ ___ ___  
 gr...@freebsd.org   _ __ ___ | _ ) __|   \ 
 FreeBSD: The Power to Serve!_ __ | _ \._ \ |) |
   http://www.FreeBSD.org/  _ |___/___/___/ 



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Sun, 11 Jul 1999, Niall Smart wrote:

 
  I don't see a point to that. However, I am finished. Please go to
  http://www.FreeBSD.org/~green/ and get getcred.patch and inetd_ident.patch.
 
 Hmm,
 
 +#ifdef FAKEID
 +   snprintf(fakeid_path, sizeof(fakeid_path), %s/.fakeid,
 pw-pw_dir);
 +   fakeid = fopen(fakeid_path, r);
 +   if (fakeid) {
 
 $ ln -s /etc/master.passwd ~/.fakeid
 
 Ouch.  (One possible saving grace here is that you truncate
 after 16 characters).

Good idea. I'll have it check to see that it's a regular file.

 
 +   if (!*cp || getpwnam(cp)) {
 +   pw = getpwuid(uc.cr_uid);
 +   cp = pw-pw_name;
 +   goto printit;
 +   }
 
 What is this code trying to do?  If the ~/.fakeid file is invalid
 or the user is attempting to impersonate another then revert?  A
 comment would be nice.  You forget to check for pw == NULL here
 (but you don't earlier ;) and I don't think the goto is necessary.

If pw lookup for that uid succeeded before, why won't it succeed now? In
fact, I didn't even need the pw = , but that would be depending on
current static behavior...

 
 Regards,
 
 Niall
 

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 FreeBSD: The Power to Serve!_ __ | _ \._ \ |) |
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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Sheldon Hearn


On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 14:03:29 -0400, Brian F. Feldman wrote:

 And this service is very small, so it doesn't make inetd huge. It's
 not feeping creaturism because I replaced the ident service there with
 a working one.

Perhaps this is where we're missing each other. The ident service
supplied with inetd isn't broken, it's just designed to do something
different from what your replacement was designed to do.

Ciao,
Sheldon.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Doug
John Polstra wrote:
 
 In article 199907102150.paa33...@harmony.village.org,
 Warner Losh  i...@village.org wrote:
 
  Some ftpd and sendmail servers make the queries.  When I have my fake
  identd in place, they go much faster... :-)
 
 Are you sure?  If you simply don't run an identd, the queries will get
 an instant connection refused error.  That's even faster than sending
 back a bogus response.

Many daemons that request ident, and almost all IRC daemons that I'm 
aware
of don't take NO for an answer. They sit waiting for a valid response,
and timeout after X seconds, where X is c. 30 seconds. Whether this
behavior is good or not begs the question, that is how it works. 

I'd also like to throw in some thoughts on ident in general, since I 
have
several years of experience both in IRC administration and having been
through this debate several times. :) 

1. ident is useful as far as it goes. It shouldn't be trusted as
authentication, but it can give you a good idea of where to start when
tracking down problem users. 

2. Most shell services do a good job of keeping ident reliable. They need
to do that because most IRC networks heavily penalize clients that don't
return any ident. 

3. Having a built in version of a real ident run out of inetd would be
*very* welcome by the people that need it. pidentd is a bloated, buggy pig.

4. I agree with Sheldon that returning real responses by default would be
a bad thing. The current ability to send fake responses is a good thing,
but having the option to do real ident would also be good. 

Finally, Brian might want to search the bugtraq archives before he 
commits
anything. There have been quite a few identd related discussions, and it
would be points in our favor if we didn't come out with anything that had
known exploits. 

HTH,

Doug


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Sheldon Hearn


On Sun, 11 Jul 1999 12:54:03 EST, Kevin Day wrote:

 Please see:
 
 ports/12596   (just added)
 ports/8042 

Thanks! I've seen 8042 before, but yours looks a lot more useful,
as I can't make sense of the older one.

Ciao,
Sheldon.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread John Polstra
Doug wrote:
 John Polstra wrote:
 
 Are you sure?  If you simply don't run an identd, the queries will
 get an instant connection refused error.  That's even faster than
 sending back a bogus response.

   Many daemons that request ident, and almost all IRC daemons
 that I'm aware of don't take NO for an answer. They sit waiting
 for a valid response, and timeout after X seconds, where X is c. 30
 seconds.

Really??  Even though their connect() call failed?  Ick!  I know
sendmail doesn't behave that way.  I'll take your word about the IRC
daemons -- I don't know anything about them.

 Whether this behavior is good or not begs the question,

Agreed.

John
---
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  John D. Polstra  Co., Inc.Seattle, Washington USA
  No matter how cynical I get, I just can't keep up.-- Nora Ephron



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Peter Wemm
John Polstra wrote:
 Doug wrote:
  John Polstra wrote:
  
  Are you sure?  If you simply don't run an identd, the queries will
  get an instant connection refused error.  That's even faster than
  sending back a bogus response.
 
Many daemons that request ident, and almost all IRC daemons
  that I'm aware of don't take NO for an answer. They sit waiting
  for a valid response, and timeout after X seconds, where X is c. 30
  seconds.
 
 Really??  Even though their connect() call failed?  Ick!  I know
 sendmail doesn't behave that way.  I'll take your word about the IRC
 daemons -- I don't know anything about them.

No, they connect().  If it times out (eg: packet filter), it kicks you out.
If it gets through and the ident server doesn't respond within the 30
second timeout, it drops you again.  If it connects and gets a 'Warm-Fuzzy'
or an error of some sort, it drops you.  If it gets a non-UNIX username
response, it kicks you out.  Basically, to use a well connected irc server,
you *must* run an identd that returns a valid username response, and that
username is used in your conversations.  Some servers will let you on
without a fully functional identd, but in my experience they seem to be the
most unreliable as they are the most abused.

ISP's run identd on their shell servers.  That's so that when their servers
get banned from IRC, they can find out which of their shell users from their
shell users to have taken out and shot.

Cheers,
-Peter



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Mark Murray
 1. ident is useful as far as it goes. It shouldn't be trusted as
 authentication, but it can give you a good idea of where to start when
 tracking down problem users. 

First thing you say to yourself after a compromise is trust nothing.
Things like idents can/will/should/are targets.

 2. Most shell services do a good job of keeping ident reliable. They need
 to do that because most IRC networks heavily penalize clients that don't
 return any ident. 

This is changing. In the face of ${BIGNUM} Windoze boxes giving ident
answers like HAX0r, there is little point, except for the administrator
of the box _giving_ the ident. If that was me, it would be _low_ on my
list.

 3. Having a built in version of a real ident run out of inetd would be
 *very* welcome by the people that need it. pidentd is a bloated, buggy pig.

Small set of people. Much larger set of dupes who would believe/trust
this.

 4. I agree with Sheldon that returning real responses by default would be
 a bad thing. The current ability to send fake responses is a good thing,
 but having the option to do real ident would also be good. 

As long as the documentation is _clear_ that this is not a front-line
security tool, but rather a thing to marginally augment logs with
user-supplied info, then I'll buy it.

M
--
Mark Murray
Join the anti-SPAM movement: http://www.cauce.org


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Sun, 11 Jul 1999, Doug wrote:

 3. Having a built in version of a real ident run out of inetd would be
 *very* welcome by the people that need it. pidentd is a bloated, buggy pig.

Thank you. That's why I wrote it.

 
 4. I agree with Sheldon that returning real responses by default would be
 a bad thing. The current ability to send fake responses is a good thing,
 but having the option to do real ident would also be good. 
 
   Finally, Brian might want to search the bugtraq archives before he 
 commits
 anything. There have been quite a few identd related discussions, and it
 would be points in our favor if we didn't come out with anything that had
 known exploits. 

How in the world could my inetd ident service be exploited? I just fixed
the only problematic feature, fake id, to make it not read anything but a
regular file and not let you try to use  someone else's name. I can't see
any way that any part of it could be exploited...

 
 HTH,
 
 Doug
 
 
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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Matthew Dillon
: 2. Most shell services do a good job of keeping ident reliable. They need
: to do that because most IRC networks heavily penalize clients that don't
: return any ident. 
:
:This is changing. In the face of ${BIGNUM} Windoze boxes giving ident
:answers like HAX0r, there is little point, except for the administrator
:of the box _giving_ the ident. If that was me, it would be _low_ on my
:list.

ident is extremely useful when taken in the proper context.  It doesn't
really matter what a user-owned box returns.  An IRC administrator only
cares about two things:

* If the irc client is connecting from an (ISP's) multi-user shell 
  machine, that the ident contain sufficient information to identify
  the user.

* If the irc client is connecting from a single-user machine, such as
  a windoz box, the IRC administrator has the IP address and times
  involved, which is again sufficient for the user's ISP to identify
  the user.

When a user is abusing an IRC server, the IRC administrator has two 
choices:

* If it is coming from an ISP who takes abuse seriously, the IRC 
  administrator need only identify the user sufficiently (IP and time,
  or ident info if coming from a shared shell box) such that the ISP
  can kick the user off the service.

* If it is coming from an ISP who does not take abuse seriously, the
  IRC administrator locks out the entire ISP.

At BEST ident was turned on on all machines and it returned the user's
real user name.  It did that because it made it a whole lot easier for us
to handle abuse issues, it cut abuse significantly, and it cut 
abuse-related email from remote IRC admins significantly because they
could lockout specific users based on the ident info without having to 
contact us.

I don't work at BEST any more, but I would love to see kernel support
for ident lookups.  To make identd work reasonably well, I had to hack
the server to timeout after a few seconds worth of cpu-bound searching
through KVM, because it would sometimes get into scanning loops.

-Matt



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Matthew Dillon
:How in the world could my inetd ident service be exploited? I just fixed
:the only problematic feature, fake id, to make it not read anything but a
:regular file and not let you try to use  someone else's name. I can't see
:any way that any part of it could be exploited...

Typically the exploitation of identd is in the form of a denial-of-service
attack.  What we saw at BEST were denial-of-service attacks against identd
to prevent users on a particular shell machine from being able to initiate
an IRC client session (because the remote IRC server would not be able to
obtain ident info).  Early versions of Identd could be used for port
scanning purposes, but not any more.  Since identd will only resolve
connections comming from the client IP making the connection, there aren't
very many interesting ways to abuse it.

-Matt


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Doug
Mark Murray wrote:
 
  1. ident is useful as far as it goes. It shouldn't be trusted as
  authentication, but it can give you a good idea of where to start when
  tracking down problem users.
 
 First thing you say to yourself after a compromise is trust nothing.
 Things like idents can/will/should/are targets.

Sure, but I don't think that compromised boxes are the norm, unless I'm
missing something here. 

  2. Most shell services do a good job of keeping ident reliable. They need
  to do that because most IRC networks heavily penalize clients that don't
  return any ident.
 
 This is changing. In the face of ${BIGNUM} Windoze boxes giving ident
 answers like HAX0r, there is little point, except for the administrator
 of the box _giving_ the ident. If that was me, it would be _low_ on my
 list.

I'm talking shell services, not ISP's. All of the large IRC networks 
have
either implemented a global ban system (like dalnet and undernet) or have a
kline information sharing system (like efnet and ircnet) that allows them
to effectively prevent access from the shell system to IRC. Since most
shells are sold for IRC, the administrators of these systems are doing
everything they can to cooperate with the IRC networks in tracking problem
users, and ident is one of the tools to help do this. I agree that windows
users being able to supply their own ident makes it less valuable in the
general case, but not completely unvaluable. 
 
  3. Having a built in version of a real ident run out of inetd would be
  *very* welcome by the people that need it. pidentd is a bloated, buggy pig.
 
 Small set of people. Much larger set of dupes who would believe/trust
 this.

How much code is in the system now that benefits a small set of 
people?
That said, I am definitely an anti-bloatist and would almost prefer that
this identd be a port. But from what Brian is saying it sounds like this
would be a very small addition, and for those few people that need it this
would be a huge benefit. I believe the cost:benefit analysis comes out in
favor of including it, but perhaps my perspective is biased. 
 
  4. I agree with Sheldon that returning real responses by default would be
  a bad thing. The current ability to send fake responses is a good thing,
  but having the option to do real ident would also be good.
 
 As long as the documentation is _clear_ that this is not a front-line
 security tool, but rather a thing to marginally augment logs with
 user-supplied info, then I'll buy it.

Yes, I agree wholeheartedly with this point.

Doug


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Sun, 11 Jul 1999, Matthew Dillon wrote:

 : 2. Most shell services do a good job of keeping ident reliable. They need
 : to do that because most IRC networks heavily penalize clients that don't
 : return any ident. 
 :
 :This is changing. In the face of ${BIGNUM} Windoze boxes giving ident
 :answers like HAX0r, there is little point, except for the administrator
 :of the box _giving_ the ident. If that was me, it would be _low_ on my
 :list.
 
 ident is extremely useful when taken in the proper context.  It doesn't
 really matter what a user-owned box returns.  An IRC administrator only
 cares about two things:
 
   * If the irc client is connecting from an (ISP's) multi-user shell 
 machine, that the ident contain sufficient information to identify
 the user.
 
   * If the irc client is connecting from a single-user machine, such as
 a windoz box, the IRC administrator has the IP address and times
 involved, which is again sufficient for the user's ISP to identify
 the user.
 
 When a user is abusing an IRC server, the IRC administrator has two 
 choices:
 
   * If it is coming from an ISP who takes abuse seriously, the IRC 
 administrator need only identify the user sufficiently (IP and time,
 or ident info if coming from a shared shell box) such that the ISP
 can kick the user off the service.
 
   * If it is coming from an ISP who does not take abuse seriously, the
 IRC administrator locks out the entire ISP.
 
 At BEST ident was turned on on all machines and it returned the user's
 real user name.  It did that because it made it a whole lot easier for us
 to handle abuse issues, it cut abuse significantly, and it cut 
 abuse-related email from remote IRC admins significantly because they
 could lockout specific users based on the ident info without having to 
 contact us.
 
 I don't work at BEST any more, but I would love to see kernel support
 for ident lookups.  To make identd work reasonably well, I had to hack
 the server to timeout after a few seconds worth of cpu-bound searching
 through KVM, because it would sometimes get into scanning loops.

Well, it's here now. I've committed it in 4.0, and would MFC it except it
would require the struct socket changes I made in -CURRENT. See my pidentd
freebsd.c replacement (using this) at http://www.FreeBSD.org/~green/freebsd4.c

 
   -Matt
 
 
 
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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Jon Hamilton

In message 199907112034.waa17...@gratis.grondar.za, Mark Murray wrote:
}  1. ident is useful as far as it goes. It shouldn't be trusted as
}  authentication, but it can give you a good idea of where to start when
}  tracking down problem users. 
} 
} First thing you say to yourself after a compromise is trust nothing.
} Things like idents can/will/should/are targets.

As has been said over and over, identd isn't useful to track a compromise
of the machine running it, but can be useful if machine A is running it
and hasn't been compromised, and machine A is used to break into machine
B.  Of course even then you have to be careful about trusting logs, but
in a well set up environment it's certainly better than nothing.  And
it's useful for tracking abuse that's not related to breaking into machines.

[ ... ]

}  3. Having a built in version of a real ident run out of inetd would be
}  *very* welcome by the people that need it. pidentd is a bloated, buggy pig.
} 
} Small set of people. Much larger set of dupes who would believe/trust
} this.

While that's true, I'll say again that it's an argument against _abusing_
identd and not an argument against _using_ it.  You may not like/want/need
it, but other people do, and not all of them are idiots.  Just because
someone else's usage model differs from yours doesn't make their experiences
or desires invalid.

-- 
   Jon Hamilton  
   hamil...@pobox.com



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Jonathan Lemon
In article 
local.mail.freebsd-hackers/19990711203203.b320...@overcee.netplex.com.au you 
write:
response, it kicks you out.  Basically, to use a well connected irc server,
you *must* run an identd that returns a valid username response, and that
username is used in your conversations.  Some servers will let you on
without a fully functional identd, but in my experience they seem to be the
most unreliable as they are the most abused.

Uh, not always.  I've been on/off of IRC for the last, oh, 7 years 
or so, and _still_ don't bother to run identd.  It's a nuisance, and
as I'm the admin on my machines, I don't need it.  I've always managed
to find some well-run servers that don't require identd.
--
Jonathan


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Warner Losh
In message pine.bsf.4.10.9907111649160.27818-100...@janus.syracuse.net Brian 
F. Feldman writes:
: How in the world could my inetd ident service be exploited? I just fixed
: the only problematic feature, fake id, to make it not read anything but a
: regular file and not let you try to use  someone else's name. I can't see
: any way that any part of it could be exploited...

Typically how that was exploited is as a buffer overflow on the remote 
side (eg there was an exploit in sendmail where the attacker would
send a very long string when the ident request came accross.  Sendmail 
would record this in a fixed length buffer on the stack, which
overflowed allowing an egg to execute).  The text file that you read
could be used to make it easier to setup such a hostile host, since if 
I recall correctly, the entire EGG was printable characters.  There
are no limits in the size of responses for ident...

Thankfully, this exploit is long since dead.  However, with irc
servers using it as a honest people's lock to keep honest people
honest maybe there is something that can be done there.

Also, at one time one could open the ident service port up and just
sit there, never sending data.  After a short period of time, all the
ident server slots would be in use, and then the attacker could begin
to attack the remote side in earnest (this is a reason that I had
forgotten why identd was considered to be a very weak protocol).
There was also some trick of using identd to scan ports (eg, connect
to identd and ask for each port, in succession, since some early
identds weren't selective enough about the data they returned).

I also recall seeing on some of the blacker lists that I've bumped
into instructions for using TTCP and/or half open connections to
confuse identd as well.  I can't find the references right now, but
these may also have boiled down to the TCP SYN-class of attacks that
was so popular a while ago.

There is also a danger in accepting source routed packets as well
(which I think we turn off at the system level by default).  They
could be used to figure out who other connections belonged to by
disguising the source address to be one other than the originator to
gain information about any user connected to your machine.

Well, you did ask how it might be abused :-)

Warner


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Warner Losh
In message pine.bsf.4.10.9907111408060.25135-100...@janus.syracuse.net Brian 
F. Feldman writes:
: Good idea. I'll have it check to see that it's a regular file.

Make sure that you do this with the stat, open, fstat interlocking so
that there isn't a race here.

Warner


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Warner Losh
In message xfmail.990711131918@polstra.com John Polstra writes:
: Really??  Even though their connect() call failed?  Ick!  I know
: sendmail doesn't behave that way.  I'll take your word about the IRC
: daemons -- I don't know anything about them.

Yes.  At least that's what I've observed.  However, I believe the
culprit was a firewall that just dropped the packets for the
connection request, so it had to wait 30 seconds to timeout.

Warner


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Warner Losh
In message 37890518.aa3d7...@gorean.org Doug writes:
:   Sure, but I don't think that compromised boxes are the norm, unless I'm
: missing something here. 

The response doesn't have to come from the box being asked the
question in order for it to be accepted.  If you can load the box
being asked highly enough, you can sniff the packets from another
machine and then use that knowledge to win the race to make the
connection.  If you win the race, and the target machine responds, its 
answer will silently be tossed away.

Warner


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Sun, 11 Jul 1999, Warner Losh wrote:

 In message pine.bsf.4.10.9907111408060.25135-100...@janus.syracuse.net 
 Brian F. Feldman writes:
 : Good idea. I'll have it check to see that it's a regular file.
 
 Make sure that you do this with the stat, open, fstat interlocking so
 that there isn't a race here.

I have this fixed in my latest code (on freefall of course). I did not
use an original stat because that's pointless, as it adds another race
condition. The only downside to my approach is that if it's a symlink
to a dev, the dev can get opened/closed, and d_open/d_close be called.

 
 Warner
 

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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Warner Losh
In message pine.bsf.4.10.9907112031200.31726-100...@janus.syracuse.net Brian 
F. Feldman writes:
: I have this fixed in my latest code (on freefall of course). I did not
: use an original stat because that's pointless, as it adds another race
: condition. The only downside to my approach is that if it's a symlink
: to a dev, the dev can get opened/closed, and d_open/d_close be called.

How does the original stat add a race condition.  You stat the file,
open it, then fstat it.  If the two match you know you're good.  If
they don't, you can detect that something bad has happened

Warner



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Brian F. Feldman
On Sun, 11 Jul 1999, Warner Losh wrote:

 In message pine.bsf.4.10.9907112031200.31726-100...@janus.syracuse.net 
 Brian F. Feldman writes:
 : I have this fixed in my latest code (on freefall of course). I did not
 : use an original stat because that's pointless, as it adds another race
 : condition. The only downside to my approach is that if it's a symlink
 : to a dev, the dev can get opened/closed, and d_open/d_close be called.
 
 How does the original stat add a race condition.  You stat the file,
 open it, then fstat it.  If the two match you know you're good.  If
 they don't, you can detect that something bad has happened

Ahh, I misunderstood you. In _this_ case you just proposed, the stat is
really pointless. What good would it do?

 
 Warner
 
 

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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-11 Thread Warner Losh
In message
pine.bsf.4.10.9907112242280.34006-100...@janus.syracuse.net Brian
F. Feldman writes:
: Ahh, I misunderstood you. In _this_ case you just proposed, the stat is
: really pointless. What good would it do?

It would let you know if you should even try to open the file...  But
that doesn't solve the race.  The fstat tells you if what you opened
was what you thought you were opening...  However, for this, the
original stat might not be completely necessary unless you were trying 
to specifically detect someone trying to race you.  You are right that 
it won't buy you anything.

I was confusing this with the tree walking case.  The stat + fstat
check there was needed...

Warner


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a BSD identd

1999-07-10 Thread Brian F. Feldman

Is it worth it to write an identd for FreeBSD? With one sysctl added, it's
trivial to implement. If an identd would be desired, then should I make a
separate one, or rewrite the current inetd's internal identd shim? I
don't see a reason for pidentd when we could have an identd built in by
me fixing inetd up, and it would all take up less space.

 Brian Fundakowski Feldman  _ __ ___   ___ ___ ___  
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]   _ __ ___ | _ ) __|   \ 
 FreeBSD: The Power to Serve!_ __ | _ \._ \ |) |
   http://www.FreeBSD.org/  _ |___/___/___/ 



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-10 Thread Brian F. Feldman

On Sat, 10 Jul 1999, Sheldon Hearn wrote:

 
 
 On Sat, 10 Jul 1999 11:50:01 -0400, "Brian F. Feldman" wrote:
 
  I don't see a reason for pidentd when we could have an identd built in
  by me fixing inetd up, and it would all take up less space.
 
 Hi Brian,
 
 If you do end up messing with inetd's existing ident service, please
 make sure that the default behaviour remains the same and that the
 operator must do something to enable an ident service that reports more
 than just "UNKNOWN-ERROR".
 
 Thanks,
 Sheldon.
 

I don't see a point to that. However, I am finished. Please go to
http://www.FreeBSD.org/~green/ and get getcred.patch and inetd_ident.patch.

=)

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 [EMAIL PROTECTED]   _ __ ___ | _ ) __|   \ 
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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-10 Thread Mark Murray

 Is it worth it to write an identd for FreeBSD? With one sysctl added, it's
 trivial to implement. If an identd would be desired, then should I make a
 separate one, or rewrite the current inetd's internal identd shim? I
 don't see a reason for pidentd when we could have an identd built in by
 me fixing inetd up, and it would all take up less space.

There is the question - what for? identd is of questionable use at best.

The best use of identd I have seen is crypted cookies that would allow
an attackee to identify an attacker in a non-privacy-invasive manner.
In 3 years of running this at an ISP, I have never seen it used in anger.

Under normal circumstances (${BIGNUM} Wintendo boxes running IRC 
clients), the info given is completely useless.

M
--
Mark Murray
Join the anti-SPAM movement: http://www.cauce.org


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-10 Thread Sheldon Hearn



On Sat, 10 Jul 1999 13:06:33 -0400, "Brian F. Feldman" wrote:

 I don't see a point to that. 

I'm not sure whether you don't see the point in the existing behaviour,
or whether you don't see the point in doing as I ask and supporting
consistent behaviour in FreeBSD.

The existing ident implementation is designed to answer queries without
answering with any information. This is done so that services MTA's and
irc daemons don't end up waiting for ages for the ident request to time
out.

Why do I want you to work your changes in as an extension that isn't
turned on by default? The Principle Of Least Astonishment. If I have a
system that hasn't been giving out local usernames in answser to ident
queries, I sure as hell don't want it to suddenly start doing so without
my telling it to.

 However, I am finished. Please go to http://www.FreeBSD.org/~green/
 and get getcred.patch and inetd_ident.patch.

I'll look at your inetd-related patches on Sunday evening or Monday and
get back to you on Monday, but I do hope you see the light in what I've
said above. :-)

Ciao,
Sheldon.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-10 Thread Ben Rosengart

On Sat, 10 Jul 1999, Mark Murray wrote:

 There is the question - what for? identd is of questionable use at best.

I used to run a public shell machine, and one of my users cracked
someone else's site.  Identd made it much easier to figure out who the
problem user was.

--
 Ben

UNIX Systems Engineer, Skunk Group
StarMedia Network, Inc.



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-10 Thread Mark Murray

 On Sat, 10 Jul 1999, Mark Murray wrote:
 
  There is the question - what for? identd is of questionable use at best.
 
 I used to run a public shell machine, and one of my users cracked
 someone else's site.  Identd made it much easier to figure out who the
 problem user was.

That represents tiny percentage of identd use. The rest is noise.

Pidentd+DES _is_ useful in the situation you mention above. It is
on average useless to most security folk, as it can also be used
to obfuscate the problem. Crack root on the box, and identd is no
longer trustworthy.

M
--
Mark Murray
Join the anti-SPAM movement: http://www.cauce.org


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-10 Thread Chris Costello

On Sat, Jul 10, 1999, Mark Murray wrote:
  I used to run a public shell machine, and one of my users cracked
  someone else's site.  Identd made it much easier to figure out who the
  problem user was.
 
 That represents tiny percentage of identd use. The rest is noise.
 
 Pidentd+DES _is_ useful in the situation you mention above. It is
 on average useless to most security folk, as it can also be used
 to obfuscate the problem. Crack root on the box, and identd is no
 longer trustworthy.

   You have an interesting point, however, once a user gains root
access, nothing on the machine should be considered trustworthy.

-- 
Chris Costello[EMAIL PROTECTED]
If a train station is where the train stops, what is a work station?


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-10 Thread Mark Murray

  Pidentd+DES _is_ useful in the situation you mention above. It is
  on average useless to most security folk, as it can also be used
  to obfuscate the problem. Crack root on the box, and identd is no
  longer trustworthy.
 
You have an interesting point, however, once a user gains root
 access, nothing on the machine should be considered trustworthy.

Right - but ident is an "after the fact" tool; one which at the time
you really need results is at its least trustworthy. I need that like
an extra hole in the head. :-)

M
--
Mark Murray
Join the anti-SPAM movement: http://www.cauce.org


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-10 Thread Chris Costello

On Sat, Jul 10, 1999, Mark Murray wrote:
   Pidentd+DES _is_ useful in the situation you mention above. It is
   on average useless to most security folk, as it can also be used
   to obfuscate the problem. Crack root on the box, and identd is no
   longer trustworthy.
  
 You have an interesting point, however, once a user gains root
  access, nothing on the machine should be considered trustworthy.
 
 Right - but ident is an "after the fact" tool; one which at the time
 you really need results is at its least trustworthy. I need that like
 an extra hole in the head. :-)

   The whole point of ident was -- and still is -- to
authenticate or verify who created a specific TCP connection.  If
the machine is untouched (i.e., has not had the root account
compromised), then ident responses are usually trustworthy
enough.  It is generally not applicable to single user operating
systems like Windows, Mac OS, or DOS.

-- 
Chris Costello[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sure it's user-friendly...if you know what you're doing.


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-10 Thread Warner Losh

In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sheldon Hearn writes:
: If you do end up messing with inetd's existing ident service, please
: make sure that the default behaviour remains the same and that the
: operator must do something to enable an ident service that reports more
: than just "UNKNOWN-ERROR".

Yes.  I'd love to replace my perl script:

#!/usr/local/bin/perl
($a, $b) = split(/[,\n\r ]+/,);
print "$a , $b : USERID : UNIX : Warm-Fuzzy\r\n";

with something a little less heavy-weight.

Warner


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-10 Thread Warner Losh

:  I don't see a point to that. 

Some ftpd and sendmail servers make the queries.  When I have my fake
identd in place, they go much faster... :-)

Warner


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-10 Thread Warner Losh

In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ben Rosengart 
writes:
: I used to run a public shell machine, and one of my users cracked
: someone else's site.  Identd made it much easier to figure out who the
: problem user was.

Unfortunately, I've seen the dark side of identd which makes me *HATE*
it with a passion.  There have been several places that I worked that
ran identd, but from which I never sent mail from.  The spammers
started hitting me there  They got the address from the ident
replies

From this, I'm *NEVER* going to run a identd that gives out real
names  Hence "Warm-Fuzzy" in my fake script.

Warner


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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-10 Thread Peter Wemm

Warner Losh wrote:
 In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sheldon Hearn writes:
 : If you do end up messing with inetd's existing ident service, please
 : make sure that the default behaviour remains the same and that the
 : operator must do something to enable an ident service that reports more
 : than just "UNKNOWN-ERROR".
 
 Yes.  I'd love to replace my perl script:
 
 #!/usr/local/bin/perl
 ($a, $b) = split(/[,\n\r ]+/,);
 print "$a , $b : USERID : UNIX : Warm-Fuzzy\r\n";
 
 with something a little less heavy-weight.

Come on guys!  identd is one of those topics that also comes under the
banner of "religion", and no one solution works for everyone.  It is often
abused, has too much credibility placed on it at times that it is really
meaningless, and it *does* have legitimate uses.  It all depends on the
circumstances.

I just wish that the inetd builtins could take arguments to allow selection
of behavior according to what the the person using needs or wants. (ie:
real, fake, "unknown error", "piss off", etc results).

I also like pidentd's DES encrypted cookie as it is a nice solution to the
forgery problem.  (I actually had this happen once, a long time ago).

Cheers,
-Peter



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Re: a BSD identd

1999-07-10 Thread Warner Losh

In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] Chris Costello writes:
:The whole point of ident was -- and still is -- to
: authenticate or verify who created a specific TCP connection.

NO.  The IDENT protocol was never intended to authenticate who was on
the other end.  *NEVER*.  People ABUSED it as such, but its value is
only as good as the person providing the information.

: If
: the machine is untouched (i.e., has not had the root account
: compromised), then ident responses are usually trustworthy
: enough.  It is generally not applicable to single user operating
: systems like Windows, Mac OS, or DOS.

FALSE.  If I can hit the remote side faster than the machine that is
untouched with a response (by sniffing the packets on a network and
heavily loading the machine that I'm attacking from, but haven't
penetrated root), then the information is bogus as well.

At best, the information provides who might be on the other end of the
end of the link...

Warner


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