Re: Recommended key size for life long key

2013-09-01 Thread Josef Schneider
I just use 4096 bit because that is the biggest size my OpenPGP Cards can
handle.  In my opinion using a smart card instead of online keys increase
security far more than strange large key sizes!
I also see no point using less than 4096 because modern hardware is fast
enough. Maybe my keys last longer that way.
Am 01.09.2013 02:43 schrieb Robert J. Hansen r...@sixdemonbag.org:

 On 08/31/2013 05:46 AM, Ole Tange wrote:
  The FAQ
 http://www.gnupg.org/faq/GnuPG-FAQ.html#what-is-the-recommended-key-size
  recommends a key size of 1024 bits.
 
  Reading http://www.keylength.com/en/4/ I am puzzled why GnuPG
 recommends that.

 It shouldn't; NIST recommends 2048 bits for 20 years of security.

 NIST notably makes no recommendations past 20 years, as they are deeply
 skeptical of their ability to forecast out that far.  I suspect your
 ability is no greater than theirs is, so I'd be very careful about
 declaring a 10K key to be greater than your natural lifespan.

 Per NIST, a 2048-bit key is of comparable difficulty to breaking 3DES.
 Given the tremendous level of confidence people have in the long-term
 suitability of 3DES, I am convinced a 2048-bit key will outlast my
 ability to remember the passphrase to it.

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Re: Recommended key size for life long key

2013-09-01 Thread Nicholas Cole
On Sun, Sep 1, 2013 at 12:12 PM, Josef Schneider jo...@netpage.dk wrote:

 I just use 4096 bit because that is the biggest size my OpenPGP Cards can
 handle.  In my opinion using a smart card instead of online keys increase
 security far more than strange large key sizes!
 I also see no point using less than 4096 because modern hardware is fast
 enough. Maybe my keys last longer that way.


One of the problems that this kind of discussion highlights is that moving
to new keys is a real pest.  People keep keys long after they really should
and are reluctant to change keys because getting a given key certified and
trusted is a pain - even with the web of trust.

In a more ideal world, no one would want a key to last longer than a few
years, and replacing keys at regular intervals would be the norm.
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Re: Recommended key size for life long key

2013-09-01 Thread Werewolf
On Sun, Sep 01, 2013 at 01:18:12PM +0100, Nicholas Cole wrote:
 On Sun, Sep 1, 2013 at 12:12 PM, Josef Schneider jo...@netpage.dk wrote:
 
  I just use 4096 bit because that is the biggest size my OpenPGP Cards can
  handle.  In my opinion using a smart card instead of online keys increase
  security far more than strange large key sizes!
  I also see no point using less than 4096 because modern hardware is fast
  enough. Maybe my keys last longer that way.
 
 
 One of the problems that this kind of discussion highlights is that moving
 to new keys is a real pest.  People keep keys long after they really should
 and are reluctant to change keys because getting a given key certified and
 trusted is a pain - even with the web of trust.
 
 In a more ideal world, no one would want a key to last longer than a few
 years, and replacing keys at regular intervals would be the norm.

I carried a 1024 bit key for 5 years (2004-2009). For me it was easy to change 
over to newer size in 2009 because never been able to get my key signed.  Next 
set made use of sub keys, in hopes of futur getting them signed, and just using 
bigger/better sub keys as need arose.  Alas, 5 years later and still not found 
any other gpg uses so no signatures.

Wolf



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Re: Recommended key size for life long key

2013-09-01 Thread Larry Brower
On 09/01/2013 02:45 PM, Johan Wevers wrote:

 Why? What's the advantage of that? I replace keys after I they have a
 chance of being compromised, but not before. Same for my mail domain - I
 created a ssh certificate that is valid for 50 years (unlimited was not
 an option) and I'll replace it whan I fear intrusions or crypto
 breakthroughs make it unsecure. Not before.
 

The longer a key is in use the greater the chance of compromise. Just
because you believe it has not been compromised doesn't make it so. By
regenerating keys every so often you drastically lessen the chances of a
key being compromised or of a possible compromise having as much effect
on you. There is a reason things like IPSEC keys are renegotiated after
so many minutes or after so many bytes are transmitted. :)





-- 



Larry Brower, CCNA

Fedora Ambassador - North America
Fedora Quality Assurance
lbro...@fedoraproject.org
http://www.fedoraproject.org/


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Re: Recommended key size for life long key

2013-09-01 Thread Johan Wevers
On 1-9-2013 14:18, Nicholas Cole wrote:

 In a more ideal world, no one would want a key to last longer than a few
 years, and replacing keys at regular intervals would be the norm. 

Why? What's the advantage of that? I replace keys after I they have a
chance of being compromised, but not before. Same for my mail domain - I
created a ssh certificate that is valid for 50 years (unlimited was not
an option) and I'll replace it whan I fear intrusions or crypto
breakthroughs make it unsecure. Not before.

Your advice makes me think of company password policies where you have
to change it every month, leading to passwordprefix01,
passwordprefix02, ..., passwordprefix12. Complete waste of effort.

-- 
Met vriendelijke groet / With kind regards,
Johan Wevers

PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html


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Can I revitalise an old key-pair?

2013-09-01 Thread MartinHvidberg
I'm returning to GPG, and Enigmail, and not for the first time. This means
that I have earlier generated key-pairs and uploaded them to servers like
keys.pgp.net or something like that. I did this first time in 1999 and have
done several new attempts later, and now have seven key-pairs on the server.
Latest I have generated a key-pair in 2011.

Unfortunately, every time my use of GPG fades out, because non of my
contacts really join in. And it's not much fun exchanging signed and
encrypted mails with myself :-)

This time, with all the media on governments peeping into peoples private
mails, I think I have a better chance to get many of my friends to jump
on-bord.

My problem:
I stead of generating yet another key-pair, how do I revitalise on of my
existing key-pairs.
This said, I have only what I can download from a key-server, and I do in
fact remember the password, for some of them.
Do the key-server have all the information I need to re-use an existing
key-pair (provided I remember the password)?

Or do I need to get one of my old computers up and running, hoping to find
some sort of key file there.

If you can point to any online material, tutorial or the likes, that do not
start with 'Generate a key-pair' then I would appreciate the a lot... :-)

Best regards
Martin Hvidberg

Latest fingerprint: D3DA 61B7 610C E8A1 75C7 1DA1 0B24 7DB3 4AF0 1B83



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Re: Can I revitalise an old key-pair?

2013-09-01 Thread Pete Stephenson
On Sun, Sep 1, 2013 at 2:57 PM, MartinHvidberg mar...@hvidberg.net wrote:
 I'm returning to GPG, and Enigmail, and not for the first time. This means
 that I have earlier generated key-pairs and uploaded them to servers like
 keys.pgp.net or something like that. I did this first time in 1999 and have
 done several new attempts later, and now have seven key-pairs on the server.
 Latest I have generated a key-pair in 2011.

While it can be tempting to use particularly old keys (such as those
made in 1999), the maximum length at the time (1024-bit DSA keys)
makes them borderline too-short for modern usage. Even if you regain
access to your 1999-era secret key, you should probably consider
transitioning to a new, stronger keypair. See
http://www.debian-administration.org/users/dkg/weblog/48 for some
useful information on the subject.

 My problem:
 I stead of generating yet another key-pair, how do I revitalise on of my
 existing key-pairs.
 This said, I have only what I can download from a key-server, and I do in
 fact remember the password, for some of them.

The keyservers only store the public part of your key. This is not
sufficient to derive the secret key (if it was, that'd be a Bad
Thing). If you do not have your secret key that corresponds to the
public key you wish to, as you say, revitalize, then there's nothing
you can do except create a new keypair. That, or develop some major
advancements in the field of mathematics that would allow you to
derive the secret key from the public key (which would break the whole
system, rendering the exercise moot).

 Do the key-server have all the information I need to re-use an existing
 key-pair (provided I remember the password)?

Unfortunately not.

 Or do I need to get one of my old computers up and running, hoping to find
 some sort of key file there.

If you go through your old systems and are able to find the relevant
secret key files or the GPG/PGP keyring files, then you can continue
using that keypair. If you cannot find the secret key, you'll need to
create a new keypair. :/

 If you can point to any online material, tutorial or the likes, that do not
 start with 'Generate a key-pair' then I would appreciate the a lot... :-)

I suppose the only step that'd come before that would be find your
secret key. If you can't do that, you're sort of hosed. :)

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Re: Can I revitalise an old key-pair?

2013-09-01 Thread Johan Wevers
On 01-09-2013 23:15, Pete Stephenson wrote:

 While it can be tempting to use particularly old keys (such as those
 made in 1999), the maximum length at the time (1024-bit DSA keys)

PGP 2.6 existed already in that time, with a maximum keysize of 2048 bit
RSA. Those were v3 keys but still perfectly usable.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html


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Re: Can I revitalise an old key-pair?

2013-09-01 Thread John Clizbe
Pete Stephenson wrote:
 On Sun, Sep 1, 2013 at 2:57 PM, MartinHvidberg mar...@hvidberg.net wrote:
 Or do I need to get one of my old computers up and running, hoping to find
 some sort of key file there.
 
 If you go through your old systems and are able to find the relevant
 secret key files or the GPG/PGP keyring files, then you can continue
 using that keypair. If you cannot find the secret key, you'll need to
 create a new keypair. :/
 
On *nix and similar systems (MacOSX, Cygwin) GnuPG stores keyring files in
~/.gnupg (~ = your login directory: /home/username or /Users/username)

On Windows XP and older, keyring files were stored in
drive:\Documents and Settings\username\Application Data\Gnupg

Windows Vista and newer versions use
drive:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\gnupg

You'll want the contents for all of the directories you can find. A tool such
as the linux-based SystemRescueCD [http://www.sysresccd.org/‎ ] makes this
task somewhat easier.

You should be able to use the newest set of keyring files directly. The keys
in the older keyring files may be imported later.

-- 
John P. Clizbe  Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net
SKS/Enigmail/PGP-EKP  or: John ( @ ) Enigmail DAWT net
FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797  hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net  or
 mailto:pgp-public-k...@gingerbear.net?subject=HELP

Q:Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?
A:An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels





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Re: Can I revitalise an old key-pair?

2013-09-01 Thread Werewolf
On Sun, Sep 01, 2013 at 05:57:57AM -0700, MartinHvidberg wrote:
 I'm returning to GPG, and Enigmail, and not for the first time. This means
 that I have earlier generated key-pairs and uploaded them to servers like
 keys.pgp.net or something like that. I did this first time in 1999 and have
 done several new attempts later, and now have seven key-pairs on the server.
 Latest I have generated a key-pair in 2011.
 
 Unfortunately, every time my use of GPG fades out, because non of my
 contacts really join in. And it's not much fun exchanging signed and
 encrypted mails with myself :-)
 
 This time, with all the media on governments peeping into peoples private
 mails, I think I have a better chance to get many of my friends to jump
 on-bord.
 
 My problem:
 I stead of generating yet another key-pair, how do I revitalise on of my
 existing key-pairs.
 This said, I have only what I can download from a key-server, and I do in
 fact remember the password, for some of them.
 Do the key-server have all the information I need to re-use an existing
 key-pair (provided I remember the password)?
 
 Or do I need to get one of my old computers up and running, hoping to find
 some sort of key file there.
 
 If you can point to any online material, tutorial or the likes, that do not
 start with 'Generate a key-pair' then I would appreciate the a lot... :-)
 
 Best regards
 Martin Hvidberg
 
 Latest fingerprint: D3DA 61B7 610C E8A1 75C7 1DA1 0B24 7DB3 4AF0 1B83

Cheers Martin.

You will have to find your old keys on one of your machines.  
Otherwise make a new pair.  hint if make new pair, make a revoke cert for it, 
but saved in a safe place.  So you can revoke it if you lose the secret 
key/passphrase.

And for more paraniod leaning about key stubs (secret key without main key, 
just the sub keys)
http://tjl73.altervista.org/secure_keygen/keygen_frame_en.html

Wolf


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Re: Can I revitalise an old key-pair?

2013-09-01 Thread Henry Hertz Hobbit
On 09/01/2013 09:15 PM, Pete Stephenson wrote:
 On Sun, Sep 1, 2013 at 2:57 PM, MartinHvidberg mar...@hvidberg.net wrote:
 I'm returning to GPG, and Enigmail, and not for the first time. This means
 that I have earlier generated key-pairs and uploaded them to servers like
 keys.pgp.net or something like that. I did this first time in 1999 and have
 done several new attempts later, and now have seven key-pairs on the server.
 Latest I have generated a key-pair in 2011.
 
 While it can be tempting to use particularly old keys (such as those
 made in 1999), the maximum length at the time (1024-bit DSA keys)
 makes them borderline too-short for modern usage. Even if you regain
 access to your 1999-era secret key, you should probably consider
 transitioning to a new, stronger keypair. See
 http://www.debian-administration.org/users/dkg/weblog/48 for some
 useful information on the subject.

Pete, it is not your advice which I agree with whole-heartedly
but Debian's choice of order for their digests and to a certain
extent their symmetric ciphers where they made the unwarranted
assumption that bigger is better and biggest is best.  Remember
the person on the other side may NOT have your latest and
greatest umpteen-core machine. Taking those people into account
this may be better choice (and is NOT what I use but is close):

setpref SHA256 SHA512 SHA384 SHA224

Actually I have SHA1 as the option before SHA384 and don't
have SHA224 due to some statements that lead me to believe
it could cause problem.  Maybe there wouldn't be problems.
But what if SHA1 is all they can do?  Okay, you can do it but
I don't like it. But SHA1 is better than nothing especially if
it is for just a one-off message.

The reason why is if you pick SHA512 first, while more secure
(unless the argument that they are all vulnerable to the same
attack since they are all the same family) your detached
signatures will be awfully large.  SHA384 and SHA224 may have
limited or no support.  Paradoxically, AES256  AES192 had
weaknesses that made them less safe than AES (AES-128) several
years back.  May I humbly suggest TWOFISH or one of the
CAMELLLIA ciphers as a first choice UNTIL you determine whether
or not the fixes for AES-256 and AES-192 are retroactive?  DID
THEY GET THEM FIXED?  I am just assuming they did but that means
I HOPE the older implementation and the newer one can easily be
discerned when you do the decipher. If that can not be done
then you would have needed to decipher the old style AES-256
before the change happened and will be hosed if time rolls on
and that was not done. CAST5 is a good last choice because some
of the time that is all others can handle. Make sure CAST5 is
always a last or next to last choice because that may be all that
they can do with a limited horsepower box.  You may even want
3DES as a last option for those that got stuck there for some
reason.  IDEA?  Your call.  I assume everybody can handle CAST5.

http://www.securemecca.com/public/GnuPG/GnuPG_Prefs.txt

Compression?  The symmetric ciphers seem to always have better
compression than either zlib (gzip) or zip.  They are on par
with either bzip2 or 7-zip (7-zip is not available in OpenPGP).
I would just use and do use Uncompressed.

Even if the orginal writer can dig up their old keys (the
key-servers have only the public side), do they remember their
pass-phrase?  I know others will disagree with me on this but
that is why I say you should have (unless you work for Amnesty
International, a government attache, high levels of a company
with confidential data, etcetera):

1. Keys created with a time to expire.  I know my 10 year
lifetime is ambitious and they will probably have to be revoked
before then.  But keys with no expire dates are just crazy.
If for no other reason a reasonable time-span (10 years is
really stretching it) allows people to walk away and their
old keys on the key servers will gracefully and mercifully
expire. What happens if you got struck by a Peterbilt and were
killed?  But even if you didn't get killed you can NOT use
them forever.  Time marches on and what was good 10+ years
ago (3DES) is no match for modern CPU power. Actually all
those top-secret places should be creating keys that expire
as well.  Keys that last forever are an impossible hope.

2. A revoke file created with --gen-revoke redirected to a
file and then the file enciphered.  See number 4.

3. The pass-phrase written down on a sheet of paper  and stored
in a safe place.  Remember this is advice for normal people.
Did I do this with mine?  No, but that is because I use them
almost every day.  Store this in a DIFFERENT LOCATION than
where the backup of the keys and the backup of revoke are stored
(see next).  Ditto for the passwords of the zips.  Store them
with the pass-phrase, NOT with the zips.  But be sure to store
both where you can get them later.

4. If possible, the backup of the keys themselves in an
an enciphered file, along with the enciphered revoke all 

Re: Can I revitalise an old key-pair?

2013-09-01 Thread Laurent Jumet
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: RIPEMD160


Hello MartinHvidberg !

MartinHvidberg mar...@hvidberg.net wrote:

 My problem:
 I stead of generating yet another key-pair, how do I revitalise on of my
 existing key-pairs.
 This said, I have only what I can download from a key-server, and I do in
 fact remember the password, for some of them.
 Do the key-server have all the information I need to re-use an existing
 key-pair (provided I remember the password)?

The keyserver holds only your public key; obviously you need the secret key
at home.
What you should do in my opinion, is recover all the old key pairs you are 
able to get (with the passphrase), and revoque them but keep them (for the case
you still get a message encrypted with one of those so you can read it anyway),
and send them to the servers.

You can choose one existing key pair (or create a new one), with a signing 
(main) key allowing use of most recent signing algorithms (with a 1024 signing 
key you'll reach RIPEMD160 as a maximum Digest-Algo)

And create subkeys from time to time, depending on the risk (keyloggers if 
you are using non safe PC, USB stealing), and uploading to servers.

- -- 
Laurent Jumet
  KeyID: 0xCFAF704C
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