Re: [liberationtech] CryptoParty in Tunis tomorrow (Saturday, 1st December)
You may be aware that a previous event called CryptoParty was organized during the OpenITP Tech Summit on 27th November. However, the organizers required people to give their real ID in order to participate, requirement that was considered as not acceptable by a number of people, including people from the Tunis hackerspace. It sucks that it turned out this way. I didn't want to at all, and I was looking forward to meeting Hackerspace TN folks, but I totally get why you were turned off by the name policy. I probably would be too in the same situation. Could someone explain why there was a name policy? I am having trouble imagining why? - @djon3s -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Feds Monitor Facebook Likes, Infiltrate Skype Chats To Build Terrorism Case
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/11/29/facebook_likes_skype_used_to_build_fbi_case_against_california_terrorism.html Feds Monitor Facebook Likes, Infiltrate Skype Chats To Build Terrorism Case By Ryan Gallagher Posted Thursday, Nov. 29, 2012, at 4:33 PM ET A like sign at the entrance of Facebook headquarters in Menlo Park, Calif. Photo by Stephen Lam/Getty Images Be careful what you “like” on Facebook—because the feds may be watching. Earlier this month, the FBI’s Los Angeles field office revealed it had charged four men over alleged involvement in an al-Qaeda inspired terror cell based in and around California. Since 2010, the men had, according to the feds, been plotting ways to help provide “material support” to terrorists in order to kill American targets in Afghanistan. The FBI’s complaint against the group was under seal until it was released a few days ago, and it has since attracted attention from activists because of some of the shadowy law enforcement techniques it reveals. The document shows that aside from using the traditional method of paying a “confidential source,” the FBI was also trying to infiltrate the group electronically. Using an “online covert employee,” the feds posed as terrorism sympathisers in order to gauge the potential threat posed by certain individuals. In one case, they say they got a 21-year-old Mexico-born man to admit he was keen to pursue jihad in order to “stop the oppressors.” Other sections of the complaint detail how the FBI was somehow able to obtain audio and video recordings of Skype conversations in which their confidential informant participated. Given that it remains unclear whether it is technically possible to wiretap Skype due to its encryption, it’s possible that the FBI had installed some sort of spyware directly onto the terrorists’ computer in order to bypass any eavesdropping barriers. But perhaps most interesting is how the feds monitored social networks. One part of the complaint, headed “DEFENDANTS' SOCIAL MEDIA,” lists Islamist content the men had “liked”, “shared”, commented on or posted on their Facebook pages. The FBI details how Sohiel Omar Kabir, a U.S. citizen who appears to be the alleged ringleader of the group, posted “photographs of himself, non-extremist content, radical Islamist content, and items reflecting a mistrust of mainstream media, abuses by the government, conspiracy theories, abuses by law enforcement, and the war in Afghanistan.” It adds, in reference to two of the other suspects, “Kabir has ‘shared’ several postings with Santana and/or Deleon, both of whom have ‘liked’ or commented on several other postings by Kabir.” This illustrates how important social media behavior is becoming for law enforcement agencies as they try to build cases against individuals. But it will also raise concerns about how social network monitoring could have a chilling effect on free speech, especially if “liking” or sharing any controversial content on Facebook becomes viewed by authorities as inherently suspicious or criminal. Other countries have already had to face up to controversy over how their law enforcement agencies monitor and penalize social network users. Earlier this month, for instance, two women were arrested in India: one for posting an “offensive” comment on Facebook about a recently deceased political leader, the other for “liking” it. The women have since been released on bail and, the New York Times reports, a police investigation into why they were arrested in the first place has been ordered. -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Renesys: Syrian Internet Is Off The Air
For Iran's case, the government can cut off the Internet at any time but the problem at this stage which they have tried to solve it is the bank/military/etc. communication. If the Iranian government wants to cut the Internet, their communication will cut as well and because of it, they want to launch the national Internet. I believe they want to have an Interanet for their communication that they can turn off the Internet in especial situation such as protests. A Sent from my iPhone On 1 Dec 2012, at 01:22, b.g. white bgw...@gmail.com wrote: Update (01:00 GMT, 30 Nov): The last 5 networks belonging to Syria, a set of smaller netblocks previously advertised by Tata Communications, have been torn down and are no longer routed. These blocks survived today's Internet blackout in Syria, but 12 hours after the onset, they, too are off the air. Traceroutes to these blocks now die on Tata's network in New Jersey, and websites hosted in these blocks are no longer responding. http://www.renesys.com/blog/2012/11/syria-off-the-air.shtml#latest On Nov 30, 2012 1:15 PM, Amir Rahmati rahm...@cs.umass.edu wrote: Nice article. The information about Iran is inaccurate though. Iran only has 2 ASes which are both controlled by the government. They can easily limit or cut internet access at the times of their choosing and have done so frequently in the aftermath of their 2009 election. -- Amir On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 1:46 PM, James S. Tyre jst...@eff.org wrote: Renesys has a nice follow up post today, the title explains the subject. http://www.renesys.com/blog/2012/11/could-it-happen-in-your-countr.shtml Could It Happen In Your Country? By James Cowie on November 30, 2012 11:32 AM -- James S. Tyre Law Offices of James S. Tyre 10736 Jefferson Blvd., #512 Culver City, CA 90230-4969 310-839-4114/310-839-4602(fax) jst...@jstyre.com Policy Fellow, Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Iranian flagpoles for jamming?
I think this report will be useful: http://smallmedia.org.uk/sites/default/files/Satellite%20Jamming.pdf Sent from my iPhone On 30 Nov 2012, at 20:05, Joel Harding joel.k.h...@gmail.com wrote: I have some serious doubts if this is even possible. My thoughts are that an antenna strong enough to hold up a flag would not be an efficient radiating element. Wouldn't the wires be visible at the base? Wouldn't there have to be some sort of a transmitter in fairly close proximity? Is this just being fueled by conspiracy theorists or is this actually being done? I don't recall seeing this before. New flagpoles in Iran spark rumors of clandestine satellite jamming technology By Lisa Daftari Published November 30, 2012 http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/11/30/new-flagpoles-in-iran-spark-rumors-clandestine-satellite-jamming-technology/ Flying the national flag usually signifies a display of pride or patriotism. But in Iran today, it may represent something much more sinister. Sources and blog postings from inside Iran say that what seem to be simple flagpoles popping up all over Tehran and other large Iranian cities are actually clandestine electronic antennas, which use high-frequency waves to jam communications and block ordinary citizens from Internet, TV and radio signals. Some Iranians think the electronic emissions also may be hazardous to humans’ health. Tehran residents and communication experts report an increase in jamming has coincided with the strategic placement of the towering metal flagpoles, as the government continues its ongoing campaign to block some 500 TV channels and 200 radio stations from outside Iran deemed too Western-oriented. “Ever since 2009, the telecommunications masts have increased 10- to 15-fold. It’s not clear where these masts are, but many in Tehran, including myself, believe that these tall flagpoles recently placed around the perimeter of the city are jammers,” said Shahin, a 32-year-old Tehran-based blogger. The flagpoles are present in other large Iranian cities but are most prevalent in the capital, Shahin said. “The regime fears the Internet and satellites coming into the country more than they do the opposition forces living here,” he added. “That’s how we know they would do anything in their power, including risking our health, to protect their existence.” During the 2009 post-election uprisings, Iranian protesters who took to the streets turned to blogs and social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to voice and organize their opposition to the regime. Since then, the Iranian government has worked diligently to block access to such sites. The jammer flagpole scheme “is very much in line with and fits the pattern they have been demonstrating since 2009,” said Austin Heap, executive director of the Censorship Research Center. “The shape of the flagpole lends itself to house such a structure. If you notice the width of the pole decreasing as it gets taller, this is consistent with the design principles for good omni-directional broadcasting. … It’s a kill switch,” Heap explained. “It’s just the next step in controlling what comes in and out of the country,” Heap said. “Iran is looking to become better at controlling the dialogue.” The Iranian government has relied on two jamming techniques, according to Heap. One is the more widely used “satellite-to-satellite” method, in which waves are sent directly from one satellite to the other in an attempt to overwhelm the broadcast signal. But foreign broadcast companies learned to work around that by switching signals, turning the censorship campaign into a cat-and-mouse game that requires more time and effort by the Iranian government to block each channel. The flagpole jammers represent a second method, referred to as on-the-ground or local jamming. That process involves sending high-frequency microwaves over a larger area, saturating signals that jam incoming signals. “This new type of jamming is a catch-all,” Heap said. “It is a one-size-fits-all solution.” The increase in jamming has been noted by the United States and European Union, both of whom announced new communications sanctions and warnings against the Iranian regime in November. Since the 2009 uprisings, roughly $76 million of the total $11.5 billion allocated to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps has been spent on cyber warfare, the Iranian government once reported. Iran’s cyber police monitor the Internet, various websites, blogs and individuals suspected of using circumvention tools designed to evade the censors. In early 2011, Iran unveiled plans for a “halal network,” or an “Islamically permissible” intranet that would disconnect the nation from the rest of the world. Such a service would automatically block popular global sites and search engines like Google, Facebook and Wikipedia. Other experts are more concerned about
Re: [liberationtech] CryptoParty in Tunis tomorrow (Saturday, 1st December)
..on Sat, Dec 01, 2012 at 10:31:25AM +, dan jones wrote: You may be aware that a previous event called CryptoParty was organized during the OpenITP Tech Summit on 27th November. However, the organizers required people to give their real ID in order to participate, requirement that was considered as not acceptable by a number of people, including people from the Tunis hackerspace. It sucks that it turned out this way. I didn't want to at all, and I was looking forward to meeting Hackerspace TN folks, but I totally get why you were turned off by the name policy. I probably would be too in the same situation. Could someone explain why there was a name policy? I am having trouble imagining why? Well it's quite absurd really, given one of the primary concerns addressed at Crypto Parties is protecting the right to anonymity. -- Julian Oliver http://julianoliver.com http://criticalengineering.org -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Internet back in Syria
Secdev detected BGP announcements from Syria as of 7:30 AM Eastern standard time. For our initial monitoring we look at the updates that are broadcast, because dumps of those are available every 15 minutes. However a more complete status is available every two hours, which will provide better insight into when the return of the address space was stabilized. How resources across the country are now reporting connectivity in a number of cities. Rafal Sent by SecDev secure mobile. Please excuse typos or other oddities. -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Syria Re-connects - Secdev Flashnote (v1) 1.12.2012 12:37EST
On December 1st at approximately 14:30 GMT x-apple-data-detectors://1, SecDev's Syria Operations Group monitoring the Syrian Internet witnessed a substantial amount of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) route update announcements related to Syrian Internet Protocol (IP) blocks. The announcements were the precursor to most of the country going back online. BGP routes allow for communication traffic to move from one destination to another. Previously, on Nov. 29th, SecDev had reported that thousands of BGP routes had been withdrawn, effectively disabling Syria’s government-controlled Internet. Reports on social media confirm that users are once again able to use TOR and VPN services. Meanwhile, Psiphon confirmed that by 15:00x-apple-data-detectors://3, 783 users had connected to the Internet, predominantly using its sophisticated Obfuscated Secure Shell cryptographic protocol (OSSH+). Syria’s Minister of Telecommunications, Imad Sabouni, told Al-Ikhbaria news that the Internet returned to the country after technical crews completed repairs. Previously, in contradictory statements, the Syrian Minister of Information had said on Nov. 29 that terrorists targeted an internet cable which resulted in an outage (Elnashra:http://bit.ly/Vbn9d4); however, the Minister of Telecommunications had blamed the outage on a technical error that crews were working hard to repair (Source coming). While most of the country has been reconnected, social media reports claim that in the Deir Ezzour governorate, the Internet remains down and mobile phones are still unavailable in most areas (Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?pid=528327l=ebe35e1aaeid=192472590885921 ). Sent by SecDev secure mobile. Please excuse typos or other oddities. -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Renesys: Syrian Internet Is Off The Air
are you sure? https://www.ripe.net/membership/indices/IR.html On Nov 30, 2012, at 11:15 PM, Amir Rahmati wrote: Nice article. The information about Iran is inaccurate though. Iran only has 2 ASes which are both controlled by the government. They can easily limit or cut internet access at the times of their choosing and have done so frequently in the aftermath of their 2009 election. -- Amir On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 1:46 PM, James S. Tyre jst...@eff.org wrote: Renesys has a nice follow up post today, the title explains the subject. http://www.renesys.com/blog/2012/11/could-it-happen-in-your-countr.shtml Could It Happen In Your Country? By James Cowie on November 30, 2012 11:32 AM -- James S. Tyre Law Offices of James S. Tyre 10736 Jefferson Blvd., #512 Culver City, CA 90230-4969 310-839-4114/310-839-4602(fax) jst...@jstyre.com Policy Fellow, Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus, http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1 It looks like the ProxySG 9000 ( http://www.bluecoat.com/products/proxysg) Rafal-- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
And reading that article now, I wonder what ever happened to that internal investigation Blue coat were running. I also wonder what happened with that Dubai distributor? Something tells me they're still doing business. Restrictions make no difference in these cases when you have one company who will provide a partner service provider who will then provide a service to the persona non grata, possibly or possibly not with the knowledge of the original company. Bernard Connected by Motorola Jillian C. York jilliancy...@gmail.com wrote: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577001911398596328.html *Blue Coat Systemshttp://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djnsymbol=BCSI Inc. of Sunnyvale, Calif., says it shipped the Internet filtering devices to Dubai late last year, believing they were destined for a department of the Iraqi government. However, the devices—which can block websites or record when people visit them—made their way to Syria, a country subject to strict U.S. trade embargoes. * On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Rafal Rohozinski r.rohozin...@psiphon.cawrote: This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus, http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1 It looks like the ProxySG 9000 ( http://www.bluecoat.com/products/proxysg) Rafal -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com http://jilliancyork.com/* | * twitter: @jilliancyork* * We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality - *Vaclav Havel* -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech-- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] CryptoParty in Tunis tomorrow (Saturday, 1st December)
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - From memory (anyone knowing the please correct me if I am wrong) but the London Cryptoparty which was held in the Google Campus also required real names for health and safety reasons. This didn't stop people from signing-up with fake e-mail addresses and names. (Of course not something I would suggest!) On 1 Dec 2012, at 14:01, Julian Oliver wrote: ..on Sat, Dec 01, 2012 at 10:31:25AM +, dan jones wrote: You may be aware that a previous event called CryptoParty was organized during the OpenITP Tech Summit on 27th November. However, the organizers required people to give their real ID in order to participate, requirement that was considered as not acceptable by a number of people, including people from the Tunis hackerspace. It sucks that it turned out this way. I didn't want to at all, and I was looking forward to meeting Hackerspace TN folks, but I totally get why you were turned off by the name policy. I probably would be too in the same situation. Could someone explain why there was a name policy? I am having trouble imagining why? Well it's quite absurd really, given one of the primary concerns addressed at Crypto Parties is protecting the right to anonymity. -- Julian Oliver http://julianoliver.com http://criticalengineering.org -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech - -- Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQumG0AAoJENsz1IO7MIrrPDIIAINxi+RXdkRAiTqZRwmnfiGE ygHQsvHT0PawIZwMp6m3fw6AzYkUIYUgjz5EzCV6q1dzuciyUrnwMfxDnQAqhkYd Y/ltOBK7zLEytFPsBHf2jxdSj+0XwT3bEf2FDgjeZMUK7tr3CnVIIaJcd9KEMADV 30u5OtDY4HQamBtvZfmQqr2K6NXjNajRPvG3KVsQ4q8agSGfBrjLr51VTvhoma4E oKSLnC0QeZugcU4wXsJdjKPjP9I3x7eGSv6LnDNnDpVTV/EJvrdIEPLl3y51yvyj mbC7uOTKQkrfr8Ms3BsjPacy2eMSJsG3n4IQHKkbu6h4vSeyfy/OaSq63Ohu8n0= =UHXJ -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
If anyone can get the name of the office or location, or specific names of Syrian authorities involved, I might be able to do something with that. Douglas Email/PGP: d...@riseup.net 880B7171. On 12/01/2012 01:36 PM, Bernard Tyers wrote: About the photo: is there any idea where that photo was taken, and what date? Is it possible to get photos of the back of the rack? To me the location for that kit looks strange. The surrounding look like an office, however that equipment would not be suitable for general office surroundings. That is indeed an SG9000. This is purely personal opinion and I could be mistaken but the equipment in the rack beside the 9000 has some physical features of some ZTE kit. Based on searches ZTE have in the past hired for telecoms engineers and account managers for clients in Damascus. Regards, Bernard Rafal Rohozinski r.rohozin...@psiphon.ca wrote: This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus, http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1 It looks like the ProxySG 9000 ( http://www.bluecoat.com/products/proxysg) Rafal -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
Oh, I'm with you - I just wanted to send it along in case there were folks who hadn't heard about it. On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 11:44 AM, Bernard Tyers ei8...@ei8fdb.org wrote: And reading that article now, I wonder what ever happened to that internal investigation Blue coat were running. I also wonder what happened with that Dubai distributor? Something tells me they're still doing business. Restrictions make no difference in these cases when you have one company who will provide a partner service provider who will then provide a service to the persona non grata, possibly or possibly not with the knowledge of the original company. Bernard Connected by Motorola Jillian C. York jilliancy...@gmail.com wrote: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577001911398596328.html *Blue Coat Systemshttp://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djnsymbol=BCSI Inc. of Sunnyvale, Calif., says it shipped the Internet filtering devices to Dubai late last year, believing they were destined for a department of the Iraqi government. However, the devices—which can block websites or record when people visit them—made their way to Syria, a country subject to strict U.S. trade embargoes. * On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Rafal Rohozinski r.rohozin...@psiphon.ca wrote: This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus, http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1 It looks like the ProxySG 9000 ( http://www.bluecoat.com/products/proxysg ) Rafal -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com http://jilliancyork.com/* | * twitter: @jilliancyork* * We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality - *Vaclav Havel* -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com http://jilliancyork.com/* | * twitter: @jilliancyork* * We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality - *Vaclav Havel* -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 True - it would be useful for a journalist to make some enquiries as to the outcome of that investigation. My guess would be nothing. It's also interesting that the article says 14 SG9000s made their way to Syria - and there are 8 being used in that single rack. That means 3/4 chassis are either a) being held as spares, which would be possible but slightly strange in normal circumstances, but I guess these are not normal circumstances, b) lost/faulty/out-of-service, or c) being used in some other location. Bernard On 1 Dec 2012, at 20:11, Jillian C. York wrote: Oh, I'm with you - I just wanted to send it along in case there were folks who hadn't heard about it. On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 11:44 AM, Bernard Tyers ei8...@ei8fdb.org wrote: And reading that article now, I wonder what ever happened to that internal investigation Blue coat were running. I also wonder what happened with that Dubai distributor? Something tells me they're still doing business. Restrictions make no difference in these cases when you have one company who will provide a partner service provider who will then provide a service to the persona non grata, possibly or possibly not with the knowledge of the original company. Bernard Connected by Motorola Jillian C. York jilliancy...@gmail.com wrote: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577001911398596328.html Blue Coat Systems Inc. of Sunnyvale, Calif., says it shipped the Internet filtering devices to Dubai late last year, believing they were destined for a department of the Iraqi government. However, the devices—which can block websites or record when people visit them—made their way to Syria, a country subject to strict U.S. trade embargoes. On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Rafal Rohozinski r.rohozin...@psiphon.ca wrote: This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus, http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1 It looks like the ProxySG 9000 ( http://www.bluecoat.com/products/proxysg) Rafal -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com | twitter: @jilliancyork We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality - Vaclav Havel -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com | twitter: @jilliancyork We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality - Vaclav Havel -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech - -- Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQumWEAAoJENsz1IO7MIrrgPIH/3VgSfjRYIUCf6jTV5cjOw2c bxo5e0fQS4P7CcNI7ria2go8FcOEeO2ok551sKhI9HRzPXk72MrTxqQPo5TP6o3f o4yT7AP2RuiKem9Ms0ge+bHysm3BEcSq0RYWK0CV5ukGreNmYpjmd4n9BYibrep4 4Rwmug9YxGXj+/OOwQnd1BncqghEoGIS+xApuKrIjWPCI/dMgV5duBux7YE9wSJc LD0OFW0u0TYwzLg2Vw8B0UkFvQhohHla5PjZv9SJRUTsBU/IaUPmDUtBAXdqLUaO KndaRcyOujWQ9hqvCcGVbDlrJgSYqxg1aDNhPtyJMJBqx925tn1IyE2ADCKGWk8= =AIPd -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
Can anyone pull the exif data from the photo? I'm not having any luck, but I'm an amateur. On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 12:06 PM, Douglas Lucas d...@riseup.net wrote: If anyone can get the name of the office or location, or specific names of Syrian authorities involved, I might be able to do something with that. Douglas Email/PGP: d...@riseup.net 880B7171. On 12/01/2012 01:36 PM, Bernard Tyers wrote: About the photo: is there any idea where that photo was taken, and what date? Is it possible to get photos of the back of the rack? To me the location for that kit looks strange. The surrounding look like an office, however that equipment would not be suitable for general office surroundings. That is indeed an SG9000. This is purely personal opinion and I could be mistaken but the equipment in the rack beside the 9000 has some physical features of some ZTE kit. Based on searches ZTE have in the past hired for telecoms engineers and account managers for clients in Damascus. Regards, Bernard Rafal Rohozinski r.rohozin...@psiphon.ca wrote: This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus, http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1 It looks like the ProxySG 9000 ( http://www.bluecoat.com/products/proxysg) Rafal -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com http://jilliancyork.com/* | * twitter: @jilliancyork* * We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality - *Vaclav Havel* -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
As I wrote in the initial post, this tweet picture *allegedly* shows equipment in Damascus. That needs to be verified. These are, after all, exciting and excitable times :-) Rafal Sent by PsiPhone mobile. Please excuse typos or other oddities. On 2012-12-01, at 3:34 PM, Jillian C. York jilliancy...@gmail.com wrote: Can anyone pull the exif data from the photo? I'm not having any luck, but I'm an amateur. On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 12:06 PM, Douglas Lucas d...@riseup.net wrote: If anyone can get the name of the office or location, or specific names of Syrian authorities involved, I might be able to do something with that. Douglas Email/PGP: d...@riseup.net 880B7171. On 12/01/2012 01:36 PM, Bernard Tyers wrote: About the photo: is there any idea where that photo was taken, and what date? Is it possible to get photos of the back of the rack? To me the location for that kit looks strange. The surrounding look like an office, however that equipment would not be suitable for general office surroundings. That is indeed an SG9000. This is purely personal opinion and I could be mistaken but the equipment in the rack beside the 9000 has some physical features of some ZTE kit. Based on searches ZTE have in the past hired for telecoms engineers and account managers for clients in Damascus. Regards, Bernard Rafal Rohozinski r.rohozin...@psiphon.ca wrote: This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus, http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1 It looks like the ProxySG 9000 ( http://www.bluecoat.com/products/proxysg) Rafal -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com http://jilliancyork.com/* | * twitter: @jilliancyork* * We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality - *Vaclav Havel* -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 01/12/2012 19:44, Bernard Tyers wrote: I also wonder what happened with that Dubai distributor? Last I heard was that, about a year ago, the US dept of commerce put restrictions on a man called Waseem Jawad who was operating in the UAE under the company name Info Tech. He was put on an entity list, designed to restrict him from receiving controlled exports from the US in the future. Source: http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2011/bis_press12152011.htm On 01/12/2012 19:44, Bernard Tyers wrote: And reading that article now, I wonder what ever happened to that internal investigation Blue coat were running. I also wonder what happened with that Dubai distributor? Something tells me they're still doing business. Restrictions make no difference in these cases when you have one company who will provide a partner service provider who will then provide a service to the persona non grata, possibly or possibly not with the knowledge of the original company. Bernard Connected by Motorola Jillian C. York jilliancy...@gmail.com wrote: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577001911398596328.html /Blue Coat Systems http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djnsymbol=BCSI Inc. of Sunnyvale, Calif., says it shipped the Internet filtering devices to Dubai late last year, believing they were destined for a department of the Iraqi government. However, the devices—which can block websites or record when people visit them—made their way to Syria, a country subject to strict U.S. trade embargoes. / On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Rafal Rohozinski r.rohozin...@psiphon.ca mailto:r.rohozin...@psiphon.ca wrote: This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus, http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1 It looks like the ProxySG 9000 ( http://www.bluecoat.com/products/proxysg) Rafal -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com http://jilliancyork.com/*| *twitter: @jilliancyork* * We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality - /Vaclav Havel/ -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQumzbAAoJEOYbWlT/pqR6fSwH/0e/BRhTEuRjb1BsbdxMRyl7 +GuVLeZNHBXVfdrr1CoVTxgNWQeevvy+IdQsSS+cH0oCV1xO9/eWyr0VCxc+GSW7 7iqeBv68gaq1bkLC45U+b9Jl69Ilaj5TbK6vF6emZI2NIrMsVJ2FTmxYkxryZv3k EU1pCeaN8E7ZzOZcmawUUwk8i/DP6IgwPSLrjImdl87dfV7oNETOlKGiiYnuCvfA M6XJKrYDe6XSASLRSrTgjkmqJZ2n596PlJLsCGG9LgCSvuqVRf5TBXOf7wg1Jylx k+p4BITy2j7BBxwtrc8pOfe6SIrztqKmh6s/gNvYKNZ57wJUT50F1FN8/0jjt04= =XUek -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Renesys: Syrian Internet Is Off The Air
Actually, the whole bandwidth comes from one source and then divides amongst ISPs Sent from my iPhone On 1 Dec 2012, at 18:30, Burkov Dmitry dvb...@gmail.com wrote: are you sure? https://www.ripe.net/membership/indices/IR.html On Nov 30, 2012, at 11:15 PM, Amir Rahmati wrote: Nice article. The information about Iran is inaccurate though. Iran only has 2 ASes which are both controlled by the government. They can easily limit or cut internet access at the times of their choosing and have done so frequently in the aftermath of their 2009 election. -- Amir On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 1:46 PM, James S. Tyre jst...@eff.org wrote: Renesys has a nice follow up post today, the title explains the subject. http://www.renesys.com/blog/2012/11/could-it-happen-in-your-countr.shtml Could It Happen In Your Country? By James Cowie on November 30, 2012 11:32 AM -- James S. Tyre Law Offices of James S. Tyre 10736 Jefferson Blvd., #512 Culver City, CA 90230-4969 310-839-4114/310-839-4602(fax) jst...@jstyre.com Policy Fellow, Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
Here's the original posting from Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=433109386756486set=a.190671704333590.47245.188677754532985type=1 Worth trying that version for EXIF data? The caption reads, roughly: *Damascus | 12-1 | Pictures of a Damascus comm hubs showing the devices used to monitor the http Internet manufactured by US company BlueCoat, which is prohibited from selling to the Syrian regime.* The group that posted it states the following as their mission (again, roughly): To transparently deliver the reality of what is happening in Syria. There's a contact address (shahed.3ayan...@gmail.com) On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 12:47 PM, Ryan Gallagher r...@rjgallagher.co.ukwrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 01/12/2012 19:44, Bernard Tyers wrote: I also wonder what happened with that Dubai distributor? Last I heard was that, about a year ago, the US dept of commerce put restrictions on a man called Waseem Jawad who was operating in the UAE under the company name Info Tech. He was put on an entity list, designed to restrict him from receiving controlled exports from the US in the future. Source: http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2011/bis_press12152011.htm On 01/12/2012 19:44, Bernard Tyers wrote: And reading that article now, I wonder what ever happened to that internal investigation Blue coat were running. I also wonder what happened with that Dubai distributor? Something tells me they're still doing business. Restrictions make no difference in these cases when you have one company who will provide a partner service provider who will then provide a service to the persona non grata, possibly or possibly not with the knowledge of the original company. Bernard Connected by Motorola Jillian C. York jilliancy...@gmail.com wrote: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577001911398596328.html /Blue Coat Systems http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djnsymbol=BCSI Inc. of Sunnyvale, Calif., says it shipped the Internet filtering devices to Dubai late last year, believing they were destined for a department of the Iraqi government. However, the devices—which can block websites or record when people visit them—made their way to Syria, a country subject to strict U.S. trade embargoes. / On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Rafal Rohozinski r.rohozin...@psiphon.ca mailto:r.rohozin...@psiphon.ca wrote: This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus, http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1 It looks like the ProxySG 9000 ( http://www.bluecoat.com/products/proxysg) Rafal -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com http://jilliancyork.com/*| *twitter: @jilliancyork* * We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality - /Vaclav Havel/ -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQumzbAAoJEOYbWlT/pqR6fSwH/0e/BRhTEuRjb1BsbdxMRyl7 +GuVLeZNHBXVfdrr1CoVTxgNWQeevvy+IdQsSS+cH0oCV1xO9/eWyr0VCxc+GSW7 7iqeBv68gaq1bkLC45U+b9Jl69Ilaj5TbK6vF6emZI2NIrMsVJ2FTmxYkxryZv3k EU1pCeaN8E7ZzOZcmawUUwk8i/DP6IgwPSLrjImdl87dfV7oNETOlKGiiYnuCvfA M6XJKrYDe6XSASLRSrTgjkmqJZ2n596PlJLsCGG9LgCSvuqVRf5TBXOf7wg1Jylx k+p4BITy2j7BBxwtrc8pOfe6SIrztqKmh6s/gNvYKNZ57wJUT50F1FN8/0jjt04= =XUek -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com http://jilliancyork.com/* | * twitter: @jilliancyork* * We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality - *Vaclav Havel* -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Renesys: Syrian Internet Is Off The Air
All of the smaller ASes have to go through ITC to reach outside networks. This also makes the filtering/DPI much easier as it can all happen at the ITC gateway. -- Amir On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 1:30 PM, Burkov Dmitry dvb...@gmail.com wrote: are you sure? https://www.ripe.net/membership/indices/IR.html On Nov 30, 2012, at 11:15 PM, Amir Rahmati wrote: Nice article. The information about Iran is inaccurate though. Iran only has 2 ASes which are both controlled by the government. They can easily limit or cut internet access at the times of their choosing and have done so frequently in the aftermath of their 2009 election. -- Amir On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 1:46 PM, James S. Tyre jst...@eff.org wrote: Renesys has a nice follow up post today, the title explains the subject.* *** ** ** http://www.renesys.com/blog/2012/11/could-it-happen-in-your-countr.shtml* *** ** ** Could It Happen In Your Country? ** ** By James Cowie on November 30, 2012 11:32 AM ** ** -- James S. Tyre Law Offices of James S. Tyre 10736 Jefferson Blvd., #512 Culver City, CA 90230-4969 310-839-4114/310-839-4602(fax) jst...@jstyre.com Policy Fellow, Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org ** ** -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
There is another photo that is on a Tarasul/STE Facebook fan page that shows the same rack and some of the rest of the data center, that has been around since this summer. As for the rest of the devices, they are hooked up and functioning, just in a different rack. There is a internal network diagram from late 2011 that shows the internal design of the network as well as a RFP from Tarasul looking for new gear and a response from hauwei that provides some details on the bluecoat deployment, with additional info like the role of Brocade devices in routing the traffic through the bluecoats(it's a common deployment scenario and brocade specifically markets that solution for ISP level proxies). Let me dig up the docs and I will pass them along. On Dec 2, 2012, at 10:04 AM, Jillian C. York jilliancy...@gmail.com wrote: Here's the original posting from Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=433109386756486set=a.190671704333590.47245.188677754532985type=1 Worth trying that version for EXIF data? The caption reads, roughly: *Damascus | 12-1 | Pictures of a Damascus comm hubs showing the devices used to monitor the http Internet manufactured by US company BlueCoat, which is prohibited from selling to the Syrian regime.* The group that posted it states the following as their mission (again, roughly): To transparently deliver the reality of what is happening in Syria. There's a contact address (shahed.3ayan...@gmail.com) On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 12:47 PM, Ryan Gallagher r...@rjgallagher.co.ukwrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 01/12/2012 19:44, Bernard Tyers wrote: I also wonder what happened with that Dubai distributor? Last I heard was that, about a year ago, the US dept of commerce put restrictions on a man called Waseem Jawad who was operating in the UAE under the company name Info Tech. He was put on an entity list, designed to restrict him from receiving controlled exports from the US in the future. Source: http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2011/bis_press12152011.htm On 01/12/2012 19:44, Bernard Tyers wrote: And reading that article now, I wonder what ever happened to that internal investigation Blue coat were running. I also wonder what happened with that Dubai distributor? Something tells me they're still doing business. Restrictions make no difference in these cases when you have one company who will provide a partner service provider who will then provide a service to the persona non grata, possibly or possibly not with the knowledge of the original company. Bernard Connected by Motorola Jillian C. York jilliancy...@gmail.com wrote: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577001911398596328.html /Blue Coat Systems http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djnsymbol=BCSI Inc. of Sunnyvale, Calif., says it shipped the Internet filtering devices to Dubai late last year, believing they were destined for a department of the Iraqi government. However, the devices—which can block websites or record when people visit them—made their way to Syria, a country subject to strict U.S. trade embargoes. / On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Rafal Rohozinski r.rohozin...@psiphon.ca mailto:r.rohozin...@psiphon.ca wrote: This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus, http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1 It looks like the ProxySG 9000 ( http://www.bluecoat.com/products/proxysg) Rafal -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com http://jilliancyork.com/*| *twitter: @jilliancyork* * We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality - /Vaclav Havel/ -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQumzbAAoJEOYbWlT/pqR6fSwH/0e/BRhTEuRjb1BsbdxMRyl7 +GuVLeZNHBXVfdrr1CoVTxgNWQeevvy+IdQsSS+cH0oCV1xO9/eWyr0VCxc+GSW7 7iqeBv68gaq1bkLC45U+b9Jl69Ilaj5TbK6vF6emZI2NIrMsVJ2FTmxYkxryZv3k EU1pCeaN8E7ZzOZcmawUUwk8i/DP6IgwPSLrjImdl87dfV7oNETOlKGiiYnuCvfA M6XJKrYDe6XSASLRSrTgjkmqJZ2n596PlJLsCGG9LgCSvuqVRf5TBXOf7wg1Jylx k+p4BITy2j7BBxwtrc8pOfe6SIrztqKmh6s/gNvYKNZ57wJUT50F1FN8/0jjt04= =XUek -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com http://jilliancyork.com/* | * twitter: @jilliancyork* * We must not be afraid of dreaming the
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
Here is a link to the Hauwei diagrams and internal structure of Tarassul. I'll add other stuff as I dig it up. https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0B2zVAXgUsk22Mk9NeHNQLVZ3VFU/edit -Andrew On Dec 2, 2012, at 11:38 AM, Andrew Lewis m...@andrewlew.is wrote: There is another photo that is on a Tarasul/STE Facebook fan page that shows the same rack and some of the rest of the data center, that has been around since this summer. As for the rest of the devices, they are hooked up and functioning, just in a different rack. There is a internal network diagram from late 2011 that shows the internal design of the network as well as a RFP from Tarasul looking for new gear and a response from hauwei that provides some details on the bluecoat deployment, with additional info like the role of Brocade devices in routing the traffic through the bluecoats(it's a common deployment scenario and brocade specifically markets that solution for ISP level proxies). Let me dig up the docs and I will pass them along. On Dec 2, 2012, at 10:04 AM, Jillian C. York jilliancy...@gmail.com wrote: Here's the original posting from Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=433109386756486set=a.190671704333590.47245.188677754532985type=1 Worth trying that version for EXIF data? The caption reads, roughly: Damascus | 12-1 | Pictures of a Damascus comm hubs showing the devices used to monitor the http Internet manufactured by US company BlueCoat, which is prohibited from selling to the Syrian regime. The group that posted it states the following as their mission (again, roughly): To transparently deliver the reality of what is happening in Syria. There's a contact address (shahed.3ayan...@gmail.com) On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 12:47 PM, Ryan Gallagher r...@rjgallagher.co.uk wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 01/12/2012 19:44, Bernard Tyers wrote: I also wonder what happened with that Dubai distributor? Last I heard was that, about a year ago, the US dept of commerce put restrictions on a man called Waseem Jawad who was operating in the UAE under the company name Info Tech. He was put on an entity list, designed to restrict him from receiving controlled exports from the US in the future. Source: http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2011/bis_press12152011.htm On 01/12/2012 19:44, Bernard Tyers wrote: And reading that article now, I wonder what ever happened to that internal investigation Blue coat were running. I also wonder what happened with that Dubai distributor? Something tells me they're still doing business. Restrictions make no difference in these cases when you have one company who will provide a partner service provider who will then provide a service to the persona non grata, possibly or possibly not with the knowledge of the original company. Bernard Connected by Motorola Jillian C. York jilliancy...@gmail.com wrote: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577001911398596328.html /Blue Coat Systems http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djnsymbol=BCSI Inc. of Sunnyvale, Calif., says it shipped the Internet filtering devices to Dubai late last year, believing they were destined for a department of the Iraqi government. However, the devices—which can block websites or record when people visit them—made their way to Syria, a country subject to strict U.S. trade embargoes. / On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Rafal Rohozinski r.rohozin...@psiphon.ca mailto:r.rohozin...@psiphon.ca wrote: This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus, http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1 It looks like the ProxySG 9000 ( http://www.bluecoat.com/products/proxysg) Rafal -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com http://jilliancyork.com/*| *twitter: @jilliancyork* * We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality - /Vaclav Havel/ -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQumzbAAoJEOYbWlT/pqR6fSwH/0e/BRhTEuRjb1BsbdxMRyl7 +GuVLeZNHBXVfdrr1CoVTxgNWQeevvy+IdQsSS+cH0oCV1xO9/eWyr0VCxc+GSW7 7iqeBv68gaq1bkLC45U+b9Jl69Ilaj5TbK6vF6emZI2NIrMsVJ2FTmxYkxryZv3k EU1pCeaN8E7ZzOZcmawUUwk8i/DP6IgwPSLrjImdl87dfV7oNETOlKGiiYnuCvfA M6XJKrYDe6XSASLRSrTgjkmqJZ2n596PlJLsCGG9LgCSvuqVRf5TBXOf7wg1Jylx k+p4BITy2j7BBxwtrc8pOfe6SIrztqKmh6s/gNvYKNZ57wJUT50F1FN8/0jjt04= =XUek
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
Hi everyone, Le 01/12/2012 20:36, Bernard Tyers a écrit : About the photo: is there any idea where that photo was taken, and what date? Is it possible to get photos of the back of the rack? A similar picture was seen quite a while ago, on what was said to be the official Tarassul (main ISP in Syria, strongly linked to STE) Facebook page. Here it is: https://resources.telecomix.ceops.eu/material/bluecoat-Syria/tarassul-datacenter.jpg Clearly shows a number of BlueCoat appliances too, in a technical center containing servers etc. The BlueCoats are known to be technically on the Tarassul network, even though they are used for more than just this ISP. Cheers, KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
Both are dead now apparently. On Dec 2, 2012, at 12:30 PM, KheOps khe...@ceops.eu wrote: Hi everyone, Le 01/12/2012 20:36, Bernard Tyers a écrit : About the photo: is there any idea where that photo was taken, and what date? Is it possible to get photos of the back of the rack? A similar picture was seen quite a while ago, on what was said to be the official Tarassul (main ISP in Syria, strongly linked to STE) Facebook page. Here it is: https://resources.telecomix.ceops.eu/material/bluecoat-Syria/tarassul-datacenter.jpg Clearly shows a number of BlueCoat appliances too, in a technical center containing servers etc. The BlueCoats are known to be technically on the Tarassul network, even though they are used for more than just this ISP. Cheers, KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
Hey, I'm thinking something that could be a total nonsense, but just in case I would like to share my thougths. Le 01/12/2012 19:39, Rafal Rohozinski a écrit : This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus, http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1 This picture just popped up on Twitter. A long time ago there was a picture taken from the official Tarassul Facebook pages that obviously show the same devices in the same office - https://resources.telecomix.ceops.eu/material/bluecoat-Syria/tarassul-datacenter.jpg What if that second picture - the one that popped up today - had been taken just recently by some opponent to the regime who managed to gain access to the Tarassul technical office; that intrusion could have lead the regime to do a kind of massive shutdown? As I said, this might make no sense at all. But in a way, such a total disruption, including the governmental/stock exchange/whatever websites could be something the regime itself did not really want. -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] @BaltoSpectator
As @MTarro stated: http://twitter.com/MTarro/status/275097615727726593 Just bizarre to read the @BaltoSpectator swat situation play out on Twitter. Almost like seeing IDF and Hamas tweet attacks. Lots to sort out here, but certainly a few things to talk about. Here's some loosely vetted resources to help track this event. Website: http://www.baltimorespectator.com/ Spreaker audio broadcast from the event: http://www.spreaker.com/user/baltimorespectator/live_stand_off_surrounded_by_cops Tweets from earlier, implicated in Baltimore PD's decision to recalibrate force when serving a Failure To Appear warrant? http://storify.com/drspaulding/earlier-tweets-baltospectator https://twitter.com/kennethlipp/status/275089232027078657 A Maryland State Delegate mentioned by @BaltoSpectator as potential counsel? http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/mdmanual/06hse/html/msa13966.html http://twitter.com/jillpcarter A fellow with a close view: http://twitter.com/justin_fenton An alleged screencap of an arrest record: http://twitter.com/cattyidiot/status/275097802898538496/photo/1 Video of @BaltoSpectator being taken into custody: http://telly.com/5GFKL Ended his audio broadcast with a recording of a Ron Paul speech. As @MissBeaE stated: http://twitter.com/MissBeaE/status/275090723156660225 Say what you will, @BaltoSpectator #BaltimoreSpectator has reminded people of the role and importance of independent radio. gf -- Gregory Foster || gfos...@entersection.org @gregoryfoster http://entersection.com/ -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] @BaltoSpectator
I should add that, gauging from @BaltoSpectator's tweets over the last 24 hours or so, his feelings about the detainment or commitment, and/or the act of revealing them, may have precipitated tonight's event. On 12/01/2012 11:49 PM, Douglas Lucas wrote: In the most recent post on his site, dated Dec 1 - http://baltimorespectator.blogspot.com/2012/12/freedom-under-fire-i-will-die-free.html - @BaltoSpectator claims he was detained for 40 days without charge, bail, or warrant, and that a lawyer and state Senator were told he wasn't there. Seeing my tweet about the above, @justin_fenton, crime reporter for the Baltimore Sun, said: It was an involuntary commitment, as I recall. That's a whole convoluted tale that I dont have facts on https://twitter.com/justin_fenton/status/275100147229278208 -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] X.25 in Syria?
Hi, I wonder - has anyone been scanning (for) X.25 pads in Syria? Leased lines such as the one in Alexandria stayed up in Egypt during the killswitch flipping; the same was true for X.25. I guess neither of those will rely on IP networks and thus BGP route withdraw won't impact them very much, if at all. All the best, Jake -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
