Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
I'd like reply-to-all On 21 March 2013 09:10, Guido Witmond gu...@witmond.nl wrote: Dear Yosem, I vote for reply-to-poster. Your message really points out the problem: You ask us to connect to you, however, the reply button replies to the list. My 2cts. Guido Witmond. On 03/21/2013 02:17 AM, Yosem Companys wrote: Dear Liberationtech list subscribers, Several of you have petitioned to change Liberationtech mailing list's default reply to option from reply-to-all to reply-to-poster. Given the debate (see links below), we have decided to put the issue up for a vote: * Do you want replies to Liberationtech list messages directed to reply-to-all or reply-to-poster? -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/**mailman/listinfo/**liberationtechhttps://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/**mailman/listinfo/**liberationtechhttps://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
Reply-to-poster. Cheers, On 21/03/13 01:17 , Yosem Companys wrote: Dear Liberationtech list subscribers, Several of you have petitioned to change Liberationtech mailing list's default reply to option from reply-to-all to reply-to-poster. Given the debate (see links below), we have decided to put the issue up for a vote: * Do you want replies to Liberationtech list messages directed to reply-to-all or reply-to-poster? Please vote by submitting your preference to me by 11.59 pm PST on Sunday, March 24, 2013. Any votes received after this date and time will not be counted. Thanks, Yosem One of your moderators PS To read a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of reply-to-all, click on the corresponding links below: * Reply-to-all considered useful: http://marc.merlins.org/netrants/reply-to-useful.html * Reply-to-all considered harmful: http://www.unicom.com/pw/reply-to-harmful.html If you'd like to read the entire debate on the Liberationtech list, please click on the links below: http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03767.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03768.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03769.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03771.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03772.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03773.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03774.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03775.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03776.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03777.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03778.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03779.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03780.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03781.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03782.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03783.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03788.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03789.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03790.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03791.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03799.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03801.html -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Guilherme Andrade -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] skype
Louis Suárez-Potts: One is tempted to suggest using other than Skype. Alternatives exist, and these are secure, at least according to their claims. As well, Skype's code is not transparent, in the way that other, open source, applications' are. louis What alternative do you exactly mean? I know some of them running under Linux, but I rarely know people using them. On 13-03-20, at 22:39 , Eric S Johnson cra...@oneotaslopes.org wrote: Dear LibTechers, When Microsoft applied in 2009 for a patent on “recording agents” to surveil peer-to-peer communications, it was assumed they were talking about something they might implement in Skype. Skype in 2010 started rearchitecting its use of supernodes “to improve reliability.” MS stated in 2012 that the re-engineering is “to improve the user experience.” The recent report in the Russian media that MS can trigger individual users’ Skype instances to establish session-specific encryption key exchange not with “the other end” but with intermediate nodes (thus making possible inline surveillance of Skype communications—presumably VoIP, since MS already stores Skype IM sessions “for 30 days”)—dovetails nicely with suspicions that MS is making (or has made) Skype lawful-intercept-friendly. But wouldn’t the above evolution require changes in the Skype client, too? Does anyone know of any work to identify whether it’s possible to say “if you keep your Skype client below version 4.4 [for instance], any newer capability to remotely trigger individually-targeted surveillance-by-intermediate-node isn’t (as) there”? Best, Eric -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
I vote for reply-to-list as default. Yosem Companys: Dear Liberationtech list subscribers, Several of you have petitioned to change Liberationtech mailing list's default reply to option from reply-to-all to reply-to-poster. Given the debate (see links below), we have decided to put the issue up for a vote: - Do you want replies to Liberationtech list messages directed to reply-to-all or reply-to-poster? Please vote by submitting your preference to me by 11.59 pm PST on Sunday, March 24, 2013. Any votes received after this date and time will not be counted. Thanks, Yosem One of your moderators PS To read a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of reply-to-all, click on the corresponding links below: - Reply-to-all considered useful: http://marc.merlins.org/netrants/reply-to-useful.html - Reply-to-all considered harmful: http://www.unicom.com/pw/reply-to-harmful.html If you'd like to read the entire debate on the Liberationtech list, please click on the links below: http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03767.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03768.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03769.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03771.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03772.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03773.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03774.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03775.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03776.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03777.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03778.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03779.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03780.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03781.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03782.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03783.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03788.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03789.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03790.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03791.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03799.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03801.html -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Collin Sullivan Human Rights Program Associate Benetech Human Rights Program Email: colli...@benetech.org GPG:0x78657D4D XMPP: collin.sulli...@riseup.net OTR:A0946621 68E641FA 4DFBF9F0 10B20AA9 88601348 11C7957D 5A99DAF7 1D0DD4BC EE243287 943AD67A https://www.benetech.org - Technology Serving Humanity https://www.martus.org - Martus Human Rights Bulletin System https://www.hrdag.org - Human Rights Data Analysis Group -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] skype
On 13-03-21, at 06:58 , Andreas Bader andreas.ba...@nachtpult.de wrote: Louis Suárez-Potts: One is tempted to suggest using other than Skype. Alternatives exist, and these are secure, at least according to their claims. As well, Skype's code is not transparent, in the way that other, open source, applications' are. louis What alternative do you exactly mean? I know some of them running under Linux, but I rarely know people using them. I was pointed to: http://wiki.ictd.asia/Secure_VoIP_Discussion_and_Tips It's a pretty good page and I thank the suggester! BTW, the issue that Eric mentioned to me off list was that, of course, even though everyone knows it's probably imperfect, and lack of certain knowledge leads to the anxiety of imperfection, we all still use it. When I worked for large corporations, the policy was not to use it, regardless of whatever security provisions were tacked on (for one, we used OTR). No way to scrutinize proprietary works. Oddly, telephone was preferred! (Perhaps b/c the anxiety was related to enduser recordings….) What I personally used to use, and still do, on occasion, is SIP, in particular, SIIP+ZRTP. It's not even a pain to use. But if one is doing journalism (or any other kind of communication where there are constraints, exigencies), then we're back with Skype. It's not bad. It's just not as verifiably not-bad as one would like. -louis On 13-03-20, at 22:39 , Eric S Johnson cra...@oneotaslopes.org wrote: Dear LibTechers, When Microsoft applied in 2009 for a patent on “recording agents” to surveil peer-to-peer communications, it was assumed they were talking about something they might implement in Skype. Skype in 2010 started rearchitecting its use of supernodes “to improve reliability.” MS stated in 2012 that the re-engineering is “to improve the user experience.” The recent report in the Russian media that MS can trigger individual users’ Skype instances to establish session-specific encryption key exchange not with “the other end” but with intermediate nodes (thus making possible inline surveillance of Skype communications—presumably VoIP, since MS already stores Skype IM sessions “for 30 days”)—dovetails nicely with suspicions that MS is making (or has made) Skype lawful-intercept-friendly. But wouldn’t the above evolution require changes in the Skype client, too? Does anyone know of any work to identify whether it’s possible to say “if you keep your Skype client below version 4.4 [for instance], any newer capability to remotely trigger individually-targeted surveillance-by-intermediate-node isn’t (as) there”? Best, Eric -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
Yosem Companys: Dear Liberationtech list subscribers, Several of you have petitioned to change Liberationtech mailing list's default reply to option from reply-to-all to reply-to-poster. Given the debate (see links below), we have decided to put the issue up for a vote: - Do you want replies to Liberationtech list messages directed to reply-to-all or reply-to-poster? reply-to-all or as one of my mail clients says 'reply-to-list' - it is useful and it promotes a larger discussion. I find replies offlist to be rude, sometimes annoying and rarely is such a reply beneficial for the rest of the group. All the best, Jacob -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
reply-to-all Sincerely, Walid - Walid Al-Saqaf Founder Administrator alkasir for mapping and circumventing cyber censorship https://alkasir.com walid.al-sa...@oru.se PGP: https://alkasir.com/doc/admin_alkasir_pub_key.txt On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 8:26 AM, Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg wrote: Reply to all -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
Reply to all (reply to list) () ascii ribbon campaign - against html e-mail /\ www.asciiribbon.org - against proprietary attachments -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
Reply to list, if possible. Kind regards Paul Dr Paul Bernal Lecturer UEA Law School University of East Anglia Norwich Research Park Norwich NR4 7TJ email: paul.ber...@uea.ac.ukmailto:paul.ber...@uea.ac.uk Web: http://www.paulbernal.co.uk/ Blog: http://paulbernal.wordpress.com/ Twitter: @paulbernalUK On 21 Mar 2013, at 12:36, Walid AL-SAQAF ad...@alkasir.commailto:ad...@alkasir.com wrote: reply-to-all Sincerely, Walid - Walid Al-Saqaf Founder Administrator alkasir for mapping and circumventing cyber censorship https://alkasir.comhttps://alkasir.com/mailto:walid.al-sa...@oru.se PGP: https://alkasir.com/doc/admin_alkasir_pub_key.txt On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 8:26 AM, Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vgmailto:t...@ritter.vg wrote: Reply to all -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edumailto:compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edumailto:compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
Reply to poster as default. Thanks. On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 7:36 AM, Collin Sullivan coll...@benetech.orgwrote: I vote for reply-to-list as default. Yosem Companys: Dear Liberationtech list subscribers, Several of you have petitioned to change Liberationtech mailing list's default reply to option from reply-to-all to reply-to-poster. Given the debate (see links below), we have decided to put the issue up for a vote: - Do you want replies to Liberationtech list messages directed to reply-to-all or reply-to-poster? Please vote by submitting your preference to me by 11.59 pm PST on Sunday, March 24, 2013. Any votes received after this date and time will not be counted. Thanks, Yosem One of your moderators PS To read a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of reply-to-all, click on the corresponding links below: - Reply-to-all considered useful: http://marc.merlins.org/netrants/reply-to-useful.html - Reply-to-all considered harmful: http://www.unicom.com/pw/reply-to-harmful.html If you'd like to read the entire debate on the Liberationtech list, please click on the links below: http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03767.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03768.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03769.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03771.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03772.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03773.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03774.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03775.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03776.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03777.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03778.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03779.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03780.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03781.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03782.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03783.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03788.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03789.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03790.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03791.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03799.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03801.html -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Collin Sullivan Human Rights Program Associate Benetech Human Rights Program Email: colli...@benetech.org GPG:0x78657D4D XMPP: collin.sulli...@riseup.net OTR:A0946621 68E641FA 4DFBF9F0 10B20AA9 88601348 11C7957D 5A99DAF7 1D0DD4BC EE243287 943AD67A https://www.benetech.org - Technology Serving Humanity https://www.martus.org - Martus Human Rights Bulletin System https://www.hrdag.org - Human Rights Data Analysis Group -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- *Sarah A. Downey* Privacy Analyst | Attorney Abine http://goog_822727389, Inc https://www.abine.com: Online privacy starts here. Twitter: @SarahADowney https://twitter.com/#/SarahADowney Office: 617.345.0024 Mobile: 860.717.7304 Skype: Sarah.Anne.Downey Blogging on privacy at Abine.com/Blog -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
reply to list/all. On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 2:17 AM, Yosem Companys compa...@stanford.eduwrote: Dear Liberationtech list subscribers, Several of you have petitioned to change Liberationtech mailing list's default reply to option from reply-to-all to reply-to-poster. Given the debate (see links below), we have decided to put the issue up for a vote: - Do you want replies to Liberationtech list messages directed to reply-to-all or reply-to-poster? Please vote by submitting your preference to me by 11.59 pm PST on Sunday, March 24, 2013. Any votes received after this date and time will not be counted. Thanks, Yosem One of your moderators PS To read a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of reply-to-all, click on the corresponding links below: - Reply-to-all considered useful: http://marc.merlins.org/netrants/reply-to-useful.html - Reply-to-all considered harmful: http://www.unicom.com/pw/reply-to-harmful.html If you'd like to read the entire debate on the Liberationtech list, please click on the links below: http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03767.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03768.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03769.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03771.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03772.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03773.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03774.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03775.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03776.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03777.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03778.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03779.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03780.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03781.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03782.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03783.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03788.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03789.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03790.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03791.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03799.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03801.html -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com http://jilliancyork.com/* | * twitter: @jilliancyork* * We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality - *Vaclav Havel* -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
Reply to all. Sent on the Sprint® Now Network from my BlackBerry® -Original Message- From: Yosem Companys compa...@stanford.edu Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2013 01:17:39 To: liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Subject: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question Dear Liberationtech list subscribers, Several of you have petitioned to change Liberationtech mailing list's default reply to option from reply-to-all to reply-to-poster. Given the debate (see links below), we have decided to put the issue up for a vote: * Do you want replies to Liberationtech list messages directed to reply-to-all or reply-to-poster? Please vote by submitting your preference to me by 11.59 pm PST on Sunday, March 24, 2013. Any votes received after this date and time will not be counted. Thanks, Yosem One of your moderators PS To read a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of reply-to-all, click on the corresponding links below: * Reply-to-all considered useful: http://marc.merlins.org/netrants/reply-to-useful.html * Reply-to-all considered harmful: http://www.unicom.com/pw/reply-to-harmful.html If you'd like to read the entire debate on the Liberationtech list, please click on the links below: http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03767.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03768.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03769.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03771.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03772.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03773.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03774.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03775.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03776.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03777.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03778.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03779.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03780.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03781.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03782.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03783.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03788.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03789.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03790.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03791.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03799.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03801.html -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Microsoft Releases 2012 Law Enforcement Requests Report
From the blog post: As noted in the data table (available in the PDF below) in 2012, Microsoft and Skype received a total of 75,378 law enforcement requests. Those requests potentially impacted 137,424 accounts. While it is not possible to directly compare the number of requests to the number of users affected, it is likely that less than 0.02% of active users were affected. The data shows that, after a careful review of each request by our compliance teams, 18% of law enforcement requests to Microsoft resulted in the disclosure of no customer data. Approximately 79.8% of requests to Microsoft resulted in the disclosure of only non-content information, and only a small number of law enforcement requests (2.2%) resulted in the disclosure of customer content. To further explain the data, we have included Frequently Asked Questions and Answers below. Report page: http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/reporting/transparency/ Blog post: http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2013/03/21/microsoft-releases-2012-law-enforcement-requests-report.aspx PDF: http://download.microsoft.com/download/F/3/8/F38AF681-EB3A-4645-A9C4-D4F31B8BA8F2/MSFT_Reporting_Data.pdf NY Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/technology/microsoft-releases-report-on-law-enforcement-requests.html?pagewanted=all_r=1; -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Microsoft Releases 2012 Law Enforcement Requests Report
We did it! Our Skype Open Letter worked!!! *Pats self on back* NK On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 10:04 AM, James Losey lo...@newamerica.net wrote: From the blog post: As noted in the data table (available in the PDF below) in 2012, Microsoft and Skype received a total of 75,378 law enforcement requests. Those requests potentially impacted 137,424 accounts. While it is not possible to directly compare the number of requests to the number of users affected, it is likely that less than 0.02% of active users were affected. The data shows that, after a careful review of each request by our compliance teams, 18% of law enforcement requests to Microsoft resulted in the disclosure of no customer data. Approximately 79.8% of requests to Microsoft resulted in the disclosure of only non-content information, and only a small number of law enforcement requests (2.2%) resulted in the disclosure of customer content. To further explain the data, we have included Frequently Asked Questions and Answers below. Report page: http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/reporting/transparency/ Blog post: http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2013/03/21/microsoft-releases-2012-law-enforcement-requests-report.aspx PDF: http://download.microsoft.com/download/F/3/8/F38AF681-EB3A-4645-A9C4-D4F31B8BA8F2/MSFT_Reporting_Data.pdf NY Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/technology/microsoft-releases-report-on-law-enforcement-requests.html?pagewanted=all_r=1; -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Microsoft Releases 2012 Law Enforcement Requests Report
Well done!! Sent from my iPhone On 21 Mar 2013, at 14:10, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.ccmailto:na...@nadim.cc wrote: We did it! Our Skype Open Letter worked!!! *Pats self on back* NK On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 10:04 AM, James Losey lo...@newamerica.netmailto:lo...@newamerica.net wrote: From the blog post: As noted in the data table (available in the PDF below) in 2012, Microsoft and Skype received a total of 75,378 law enforcement requests. Those requests potentially impacted 137,424 accounts. While it is not possible to directly compare the number of requests to the number of users affected, it is likely that less than 0.02% of active users were affected. The data shows that, after a careful review of each request by our compliance teams, 18% of law enforcement requests to Microsoft resulted in the disclosure of no customer data. Approximately 79.8% of requests to Microsoft resulted in the disclosure of only non-content information, and only a small number of law enforcement requests (2.2%) resulted in the disclosure of customer content. To further explain the data, we have included Frequently Asked Questions and Answers below. Report page: http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/reporting/transparency/ Blog post: http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2013/03/21/microsoft-releases-2012-law-enforcement-requests-report.aspx PDF: http://download.microsoft.com/download/F/3/8/F38AF681-EB3A-4645-A9C4-D4F31B8BA8F2/MSFT_Reporting_Data.pdf NY Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/technology/microsoft-releases-report-on-law-enforcement-requests.html?pagewanted=all_r=1; -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edumailto:compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edumailto:compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Mozilla Persona - Getting rid of passwords on the web
Greetings, Though the video is very light on cryptographic background, it does do a good job of introducing the Mozilla ideas for a password-free web (except for your e-mail provider). Definitely worth watching, and potentially implementing, imo: http://pyvideo.org/video/1764 Best /P -- Petter Ericson (pett...@acc.umu.se) Telecomix Sleeper Jellyfish -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Disturbing
WASHINGTON, March 20, 2013 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- The following is being released by the American Political Science Associationhttp://www.apsanet.org/index.cfm : (Logo: http://photos.prnewswire.com/prnh/20120604/DC18511LOGO-b ) This afternoon, the United States Senate delivered a devastating blow to the integrity of the scientific process at the National Science Foundation (NSF) by voting for the Coburn Amendment to the Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013. Senator Coburn (R-OK) submitted an amendment (SA 65, as modified) to the Mikulski-Shelby Amendment (SA 26) to H.R. 933 (Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013). The amendment places unprecedented restriction on the national research agenda by declaring the political science study of democracy and public policy out of bounds. The amendment allows only political science research that promotes national security or the economic interests of the United States. Adoption of this amendment is a gross intrusion into the widely-respected, independent scholarly agenda setting process at NSF that has supported our world-class national science enterprise for over sixty years. The amendment creates an exceptionally dangerous slippery slope. While political science research is most immediately affected, at risk is *any and all* research in *any and all* disciplines funded by the NSF. The amendment makes all scientific research vulnerable to the whims of political pressure. Adoption of this amendment demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of the breadth and importance of political science research for the national interest and its integral place on the nation's interdisciplinary scientific research agenda. Singling out any one field of science is short-sighted and misguided, and poses a serious threat to the independence and integrity of the National Science Foundation. And shackling political science within the national science agenda is a remarkable embarrassment for the world's exemplary democracy. For the latest in political science research in the news, follow us on Facebook https://www.facebook.com/PoliticalScienceNews and Twitterhttp://twitter.com/PoliSciNews . *About the American Political Science Association *Founded in 1903, the *American Political Science Association* http://www.apsanet.org/index.cfmis the leading professional organization for the study of political science and serves more than 15,000 members in over 80 countries. With a range of programs and services for individuals, departments and institutions, APSA brings together political scientists from all fields of inquiry, regions, and occupational endeavors within and outside academe in order to expand awareness and understanding of politics. SOURCE American Political Science Association RELATED LINKS http://www.apsanet.org -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Disturbing
As a political scientist: b. As a international relations guy: uh, okay. I am continually amazed that people continue to forget that STEM is embedded in a social, culture, economic, and yes, political context. Chris R. Albon ChrisRAlbon.com (http://ChrisRAlbon.com) On Thursday, March 21, 2013 at 10:55 AM, Yosem Companys wrote: WASHINGTON, March 20, 2013 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- The following is being released by the American Political Science Association (http://www.apsanet.org/index.cfm): (Logo: http://photos.prnewswire.com/prnh/20120604/DC18511LOGO-b ) This afternoon, the United States Senate delivered a devastating blow to the integrity of the scientific process at the National Science Foundation (NSF) by voting for the Coburn Amendment to the Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013. Senator Coburn (R-OK) submitted an amendment (SA 65, as modified) to the Mikulski-Shelby Amendment (SA 26) to H.R. 933 (Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013). The amendment places unprecedented restriction on the national research agenda by declaring the political science study of democracy and public policy out of bounds. The amendment allows only political science research that promotes national security or the economic interests of the United States. Adoption of this amendment is a gross intrusion into the widely-respected, independent scholarly agenda setting process at NSF that has supported our world-class national science enterprise for over sixty years. The amendment creates an exceptionally dangerous slippery slope. While political science research is most immediately affected, at risk is any and all research in any and all disciplines funded by the NSF. The amendment makes all scientific research vulnerable to the whims of political pressure. Adoption of this amendment demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of the breadth and importance of political science research for the national interest and its integral place on the nation's interdisciplinary scientific research agenda. Singling out any one field of science is short-sighted and misguided, and poses a serious threat to the independence and integrity of the National Science Foundation. And shackling political science within the national science agenda is a remarkable embarrassment for the world's exemplary democracy. For the latest in political science research in the news, follow us on Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/PoliticalScienceNews) and Twitter (http://twitter.com/PoliSciNews). About the American Political Science Association Founded in 1903, the American Political Science Association (http://www.apsanet.org/index.cfm)is the leading professional organization for the study of political science and serves more than 15,000 members in over 80 countries. With a range of programs and services for individuals, departments and institutions, APSA brings together political scientists from all fields of inquiry, regions, and occupational endeavors within and outside academe in order to expand awareness and understanding of politics. SOURCE American Political Science Association RELATED LINKS http://www.apsanet.org (http://www.apsanet.org/) -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
reply-to-all Alan Stewart On 3/20/2013 6:17 PM, Yosem Companys wrote: Dear Liberationtech list subscribers, Several of you have petitioned to change Liberationtech mailing list's default reply to option from reply-to-all to reply-to-poster. Given the debate (see links below), we have decided to put the issue up for a vote: * Do you want replies to Liberationtech list messages directed to reply-to-all or reply-to-poster? Please vote by submitting your preference to me by 11.59 pm PST on Sunday, March 24, 2013. Any votes received after this date and time will not be counted. Thanks, Yosem One of your moderators PS To read a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of reply-to-all, click on the corresponding links below: * Reply-to-all considered useful: http://marc.merlins.org/netrants/reply-to-useful.html * Reply-to-all considered harmful: http://www.unicom.com/pw/reply-to-harmful.html If you'd like to read the entire debate on the Liberationtech list, please click on the links below: http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03767.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03768.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03769.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03771.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03772.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03773.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03774.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03775.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03776.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03777.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03778.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03779.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03780.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03781.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03782.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03783.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03788.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03789.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03790.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03791.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03799.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03801.html -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Disturbing
That's right: Technology = Ideology + Materiality. And ideology is not a bad word, despite it's popular negative connotations. On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 7:58 AM, Chris R Albon chris.al...@gmail.comwrote: As a political scientist: b. As a international relations guy: uh, okay. I am continually amazed that people continue to forget that STEM is embedded in a social, culture, economic, and yes, political context. Chris R. Albon ChrisRAlbon.com On Thursday, March 21, 2013 at 10:55 AM, Yosem Companys wrote: WASHINGTON, March 20, 2013 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- The following is being released by the American Political Science Associationhttp://www.apsanet.org/index.cfm : (Logo: http://photos.prnewswire.com/prnh/20120604/DC18511LOGO-b ) This afternoon, the United States Senate delivered a devastating blow to the integrity of the scientific process at the National Science Foundation (NSF) by voting for the Coburn Amendment to the Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013. Senator Coburn (R-OK) submitted an amendment (SA 65, as modified) to the Mikulski-Shelby Amendment (SA 26) to H.R. 933 (Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013). The amendment places unprecedented restriction on the national research agenda by declaring the political science study of democracy and public policy out of bounds. The amendment allows only political science research that promotes national security or the economic interests of the United States. Adoption of this amendment is a gross intrusion into the widely-respected, independent scholarly agenda setting process at NSF that has supported our world-class national science enterprise for over sixty years. The amendment creates an exceptionally dangerous slippery slope. While political science research is most immediately affected, at risk is *any and all* research in *any and all* disciplines funded by the NSF. The amendment makes all scientific research vulnerable to the whims of political pressure. Adoption of this amendment demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of the breadth and importance of political science research for the national interest and its integral place on the nation's interdisciplinary scientific research agenda. Singling out any one field of science is short-sighted and misguided, and poses a serious threat to the independence and integrity of the National Science Foundation. And shackling political science within the national science agenda is a remarkable embarrassment for the world's exemplary democracy. For the latest in political science research in the news, follow us on Facebook https://www.facebook.com/PoliticalScienceNews and Twitterhttp://twitter.com/PoliSciNews . *About the American Political Science Association *Founded in 1903, the *American Political Science Association* http://www.apsanet.org/index.cfmis the leading professional organization for the study of political science and serves more than 15,000 members in over 80 countries. With a range of programs and services for individuals, departments and institutions, APSA brings together political scientists from all fields of inquiry, regions, and occupational endeavors within and outside academe in order to expand awareness and understanding of politics. SOURCE American Political Science Association RELATED LINKS http://www.apsanet.org -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] reply-all
I vote reply all (list) as default. I learn a lot from these discussions, although I wish people could erase as much as possible of the quoted email in their reply... Courtney C. Radsch crad...@gmail.com Website: www.radsch.info Blog: http://arab-media.blogspot.com Twitter: courtneyr -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] reply-all
I vote reply all (list) as default. I learn a lot from these discussions, although I wish people could erase as much as possible of the quoted email in their reply... Courtney C. Radsch crad...@gmail.com mailto:crad...@gmail.com agree! Website: www.radsch.info http://www.radsch.info Blog: http://arab-media.blogspot.com Twitter: courtneyr -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Microsoft Releases 2012 Law Enforcement Requests Report
Re MSFT transparency, congrats on the result. In its FAQ. MSFT seems to answer quite unequivocally that Skype still encrypts Skype-Skype calls on a peer-to-peer basis: We provide SSL encryption for Microsoft services and Skype-Skype calls on our full client (for full function computers) are encrypted on a peer-to-peer basis; however, no communication method is 100% secure. For example Skype Out/In calls route through the existing telecommunications network for part of the call and users of the Skype thin client (used on smartphones, tablets and other hand-held devices) route communications over a wireless or mobile provider network. In addition, the end points of a communication are vulnerable to access by third parties such as criminals or governments. I don't see any wiggle room here, though perhaps it would be even better were MSFT to state that it therefore has no access to the contents of Skype-to-Skype peer-to-peer calls. Stefan -- On 21 Mar, at 15:31, Joseph Lorenzo Hall j...@cdt.org wrote: Two things seem particularly interesting: apparently zero requests for content were fulfilled for Skype and the associated FAQ [1] says CALEA (the US law that mandates intercept capability) does not apply to Skype. That seems particularly encouraging to me. The FAQ is also interesting in that the non-content question mentions location but then only lists state, country and ZIP code as fields provided (I don't know how MSFT would have access to precise geolocation, but that doesn't appear to be something they provide). Also the NSL reporting in the FAQ is binned in terms of thousands of NSLs... so in 2009 they report receiving 0-999 NSLs and in 2010 1000-1999 NSLs (hard to tell if that was just one more NSL or a bunch). best, Joe [1] https://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/reporting/transparency/#FAQs1 On Thu Mar 21 10:07:16 2013, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: We did it! Our Skype Open Letter worked!!! *Pats self on back* NK On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 10:04 AM, James Losey lo...@newamerica.net wrote: From the blog post: As noted in the data table (available in the PDF below) in 2012, Microsoft and Skype received a total of 75,378 law enforcement requests. Those requests potentially impacted 137,424 accounts. While it is not possible to directly compare the number of requests to the number of users affected, it is likely that less than 0.02% of active users were affected. The data shows that, after a careful review of each request by our compliance teams, 18% of law enforcement requests to Microsoft resulted in the disclosure of no customer data. Approximately 79.8% of requests to Microsoft resulted in the disclosure of only non-content information, and only a small number of law enforcement requests (2.2%) resulted in the disclosure of customer content. To further explain the data, we have included Frequently Asked Questions and Answers below. Report page: http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/reporting/transparency/ Blog post: http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2013/03/21/microsoft-releases-2012-law-enforcement-requests-report.aspx PDF: http://download.microsoft.com/download/F/3/8/F38AF681-EB3A-4645-A9C4-D4F31B8BA8F2/MSFT_Reporting_Data.pdf NY Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/technology/microsoft-releases-report-on-law-enforcement-requests.html?pagewanted=all_r=1; -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech We did it! Our Skype Open Letter worked!!! *Pats self on back* NK On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 10:04 AM, James Losey lo...@newamerica.net mailto:lo...@newamerica.net wrote: From the blog post: As noted in the data table (available in the PDF below) in 2012, Microsoft and Skype received a total of 75,378 law enforcement requests. Those requests potentially impacted 137,424 accounts. While it is not possible to directly compare the number of requests to the number of users affected, it is likely that less than 0.02% of active users were affected. The data shows that, after a careful review of each request by our compliance teams, 18% of law enforcement requests to Microsoft resulted in the disclosure of no customer data. Approximately 79.8% of requests to Microsoft resulted in the disclosure of only non-content information, and only a small number of law enforcement requests (2.2%) resulted in the disclosure of customer content. To further explain the data, we have included Frequently Asked Questions and Answers below. Report page: http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/reporting/transparency/ Blog post:
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
Reply-to-all -- James S. Tyre Law Offices of James S. Tyre 10736 Jefferson Blvd., #512 Culver City, CA 90230-4969 310-839-4114/310-839-4602(fax) jst...@jstyre.com Policy Fellow, Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
I vote to retain reply-to-all. — Sent from Mailbox for iPhone On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:18 PM, Yosem Companys compa...@stanford.edu wrote: Dear Liberationtech list subscribers, Several of you have petitioned to change Liberationtech mailing list's default reply to option from reply-to-all to reply-to-poster. Given the debate (see links below), we have decided to put the issue up for a vote: - Do you want replies to Liberationtech list messages directed to reply-to-all or reply-to-poster? Please vote by submitting your preference to me by 11.59 pm PST on Sunday, March 24, 2013. Any votes received after this date and time will not be counted. Thanks, Yosem One of your moderators PS To read a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of reply-to-all, click on the corresponding links below: - Reply-to-all considered useful: http://marc.merlins.org/netrants/reply-to-useful.html - Reply-to-all considered harmful: http://www.unicom.com/pw/reply-to-harmful.html If you'd like to read the entire debate on the Liberationtech list, please click on the links below: http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03767.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03768.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03769.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03771.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03772.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03773.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03774.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03775.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03776.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03777.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03778.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03779.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03780.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03781.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03782.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03783.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03788.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03789.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03790.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03791.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03799.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03801.html-- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Microsoft Releases 2012 Law Enforcement Requests Report
Joseph Lorenzo Hall:
Two things seem particularly interesting: apparently zero requests for
content were fulfilled for Skype and the associated FAQ [1] says CALEA
(the US law that mandates intercept capability) does not apply to Skype.
That seems particularly encouraging to me.
The FAQ is also interesting in that the non-content question mentions
location but then only lists state, country and ZIP code as fields
provided (I don't know how MSFT would have access to precise
geolocation, but that doesn't appear to be something they provide). Also
the NSL reporting in the FAQ is binned in terms of thousands of NSLs...
so in 2009 they report receiving 0-999 NSLs and in 2010 1000-1999 NSLs
(hard to tell if that was just one more NSL or a bunch).
I don't agree with that reading of the report. There is likely a lot of
word-smithing here - for example, Does Skype include SkypeIn and
SkypeOut or just Peer to Peer video, text and storage of (other)
meta-data? Does CALEA happen on the Skype side of things or on the
PTSN/VoIP service side of Skype{In,Out}? My guess is the latter rather
than the former.
Also, note that Microsoft Provided Guidance to Law Enforcement - so
when they say they didn't provide content, did they provide the
credentials? If so, the guidance could have allowed the Law
Enforcement to simply login and restore the account data. Or perhaps
merely disclosing a key?
All the best,
Jacob
--
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Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
reply-to-all -john -- John Sullivan | Executive Director, Free Software Foundation GPG Key: 61A0963B | http://status.fsf.org/johns | http://fsf.org/blogs/RSS Do you use free software? Donate to join the FSF and support freedom at http://www.fsf.org/register_form?referrer=8096. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
Man, I really wish even if people are voting reply-all that you vote by just replying to Yosef. This is spamming everyone's in box with dozens of emails. On 3/21/13 9:30 AM, John Sullivan wrote: reply-to-all -john -- Trevor Timm Activist Electronic Frontier Foundation https://eff.org -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
On 21 March 2013 16:33, Trevor Timm tre...@eff.org wrote: Man, I really wish even if people are voting reply-all that you vote by just replying to Yosef. This is spamming everyone's in box with dozens of emails. I disagree. Like many people here I filter my emails. I can handle plenty more. Regards Bill -- Community Media Association http://www.commedia.org.uk/ http://twitter.com/community_media http://www.facebook.com/CommunityMediaAssociation On 3/21/13 9:30 AM, John Sullivan wrote: reply-to-all -john -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
On 03/21/2013 05:33 PM, Trevor Timm wrote: Man, I really wish even if people are voting reply-all that you vote by just replying to Yosef. This is spamming everyone's in box with dozens of emails. Doesn't it prove the point of reply-to-poster? Guido. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Microsoft Releases 2012 Law Enforcement Requests Report
On Thu Mar 21 12:27:47 2013, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
Joseph Lorenzo Hall:
Two things seem particularly interesting: apparently zero requests for
content were fulfilled for Skype and the associated FAQ [1] says CALEA
(the US law that mandates intercept capability) does not apply to Skype.
That seems particularly encouraging to me.
The FAQ is also interesting in that the non-content question mentions
location but then only lists state, country and ZIP code as fields
provided (I don't know how MSFT would have access to precise
geolocation, but that doesn't appear to be something they provide). Also
the NSL reporting in the FAQ is binned in terms of thousands of NSLs...
so in 2009 they report receiving 0-999 NSLs and in 2010 1000-1999 NSLs
(hard to tell if that was just one more NSL or a bunch).
I don't agree with that reading of the report. There is likely a lot of
word-smithing here - for example, Does Skype include SkypeIn and
SkypeOut or just Peer to Peer video, text and storage of (other)
meta-data? Does CALEA happen on the Skype side of things or on the
PTSN/VoIP service side of Skype{In,Out}? My guess is the latter rather
than the former.
Ok, I certainly agree there is probably a lot of wordsmithing here.
CALEA certainly applies to PSTN interconnection but then presumably law
enforcement would just go to the phone company which has
CALEA-compliant switching hardware there. (I think.)
Also, note that Microsoft Provided Guidance to Law Enforcement - so
when they say they didn't provide content, did they provide the
credentials? If so, the guidance could have allowed the Law
Enforcement to simply login and restore the account data. Or perhaps
merely disclosing a key?
They certainly don't describe what that means, which is strange because
for a transparency report with quantitative data, one would want to
bound what the categories of quantitative data are! I would hope that
MSFT would consider providing ciphertext and session keys as providing
content and increment the zeros in that column, but there's no
definitive statement in all of this that I can see which would support
that.
best, Joe
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Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
No, it just shows that people didn't understand the rules of voting. Nothing else. Travis McCrea Pirate Party of Canada The Ultimate Ebook Library Kopimist Church of Idaho Phone: 1(206)552-8728 US Call/Text IRC: irc.freenode.net, irc.pirateirc.net (TeamColtra or TravisMcCrea) Web: travismccrea.com IM: teamcol...@451.im (jabber) teamcoltra (AIM) On 2013-03-21, at 12:42 PM, Guido Witmond gu...@witmond.nl wrote: On 03/21/2013 05:33 PM, Trevor Timm wrote: Man, I really wish even if people are voting reply-all that you vote by just replying to Yosef. This is spamming everyone's in box with dozens of emails. Doesn't it prove the point of reply-to-poster? Guido. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] skype
On 03/21/2013 05:58 AM, Andreas Bader wrote: Louis Suárez-Potts: One is tempted to suggest using other than Skype. Alternatives exist, and these are secure, at least according to their claims. As well, Skype's code is not transparent, in the way that other, open source, applications' are. louis What alternative do you exactly mean? I know some of them running under Linux, but I rarely know people using them. Take a look at Jitsi (it used to be SIP Communicator). Multiprotocol and allows you to encrypt voice and video chat. Completely cross platform. www.jitsi.org Anthony -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
I vote that the list not munge the Reply-to header. Some call this reply-to-poster, but it really means leave Reply-to however the original poster set it. If OP set it to the list, that's fine; usually the OP sets it to their preferred personal address, of course. http://producingoss.com/en/mailing-lists.html#reply-to has all the references I know of on this ancient and well-exercised debate :-). Best, -Karl Sarah A. Downey sa...@getabine.com writes: Reply to poster as default. Thanks. On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 7:36 AM, Collin Sullivan coll...@benetech.org wrote: I vote for reply-to-list as default. Yosem Companys: Dear Liberationtech list subscribers, Several of you have petitioned to change Liberationtech mailing list's default reply to option from reply-to-all to reply-to-poster. Given the debate (see links below), we have decided to put the issue up for a vote: - Do you want replies to Liberationtech list messages directed to reply-to-all or reply-to-poster? Please vote by submitting your preference to me by 11.59 pm PST on Sunday, March 24, 2013. Any votes received after this date and time will not be counted. Thanks, Yosem One of your moderators PS To read a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of reply-to-all, click on the corresponding links below: - Reply-to-all considered useful: http://marc.merlins.org/netrants/reply-to-useful.html - Reply-to-all considered harmful: http://www.unicom.com/pw/reply-to-harmful.html If you'd like to read the entire debate on the Liberationtech list, please click on the links below: http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03767. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03768. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03769. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03771. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03772. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03773. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03774. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03775. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03776. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03777. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03778. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03779. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03780. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03781. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03782. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03783. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03788. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03789. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03790. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03791. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03799. html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03801. html -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Collin Sullivan Human Rights Program Associate Benetech Human Rights Program Email: colli...@benetech.org GPG: 0x78657D4D XMPP: collin.sulli...@riseup.net OTR: A0946621 68E641FA 4DFBF9F0 10B20AA9 88601348 11C7957D 5A99DAF7 1D0DD4BC EE243287 943AD67A https://www.benetech.org - Technology Serving Humanity https://www.martus.org - Martus Human Rights Bulletin System https://www.hrdag.org - Human Rights Data Analysis Group -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Microsoft Releases 2012 Law Enforcement Requests Report
Joseph Lorenzo Hall:
On Thu Mar 21 12:27:47 2013, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
Joseph Lorenzo Hall:
Two things seem particularly interesting: apparently zero requests for
content were fulfilled for Skype and the associated FAQ [1] says CALEA
(the US law that mandates intercept capability) does not apply to Skype.
That seems particularly encouraging to me.
The FAQ is also interesting in that the non-content question mentions
location but then only lists state, country and ZIP code as fields
provided (I don't know how MSFT would have access to precise
geolocation, but that doesn't appear to be something they provide). Also
the NSL reporting in the FAQ is binned in terms of thousands of NSLs...
so in 2009 they report receiving 0-999 NSLs and in 2010 1000-1999 NSLs
(hard to tell if that was just one more NSL or a bunch).
I don't agree with that reading of the report. There is likely a lot of
word-smithing here - for example, Does Skype include SkypeIn and
SkypeOut or just Peer to Peer video, text and storage of (other)
meta-data? Does CALEA happen on the Skype side of things or on the
PTSN/VoIP service side of Skype{In,Out}? My guess is the latter rather
than the former.
Ok, I certainly agree there is probably a lot of wordsmithing here.
CALEA certainly applies to PSTN interconnection but then presumably law
enforcement would just go to the phone company which has
CALEA-compliant switching hardware there. (I think.)
Also, note that Microsoft Provided Guidance to Law Enforcement - so
when they say they didn't provide content, did they provide the
credentials? If so, the guidance could have allowed the Law
Enforcement to simply login and restore the account data. Or perhaps
merely disclosing a key?
They certainly don't describe what that means, which is strange because
for a transparency report with quantitative data, one would want to
bound what the categories of quantitative data are! I would hope that
MSFT would consider providing ciphertext and session keys as providing
content and increment the zeros in that column, but there's no
definitive statement in all of this that I can see which would support
that.
I wrote to them and asked these questions, as well as a few others.
What other questions should we pose to them, I wonder?
All the best,
Jacob
--
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[liberationtech] US State Dept Discourages Using Technology to Promote Democracy, Human Rights, and Citizen Engagement in Ukraine?
Fostering Civic Engagement in Ukraine (approximately $500,000 available): DRL’s objective is to support the role of civil society in policy formation and enhancing accountability and responsiveness of government officials in Ukraine. The program will support civil society to foster an inclusive and participatory democratic system of government and hold politicians and public officials more accountable to constituents. In order to foster more unity among civil society efforts, the program should support post-election advocacy on areas of policy formation and implementation such as ongoing efforts related to elections and election law reform; freedom of assembly legislation; and/or reversing legislation restricting the rights of vulnerable or marginalized populations. The program should also examine how well existing laws are implemented and help civil society ensure that citizens can use official institutions and mechanisms to exercise their rights. Program activities could include, but are not limited to: support for activities to encourage debate and advocacy by citizens and civil society organizations, small grants to civil society for monitoring and/or advocacy activities, creating regional civil society partnerships to increase civil society unity on advocacy efforts, or connecting Ukrainian civil society with their counterparts in one or more countries in the region through NGO-to-NGO exchanges and mentoring in order to take advantage of shared post-communist and transition experiences. Successful proposals will demonstrate a strong knowledge of civil society in Ukraine and an established ability to work with regional civil society groups. DRL strongly discourages health, technology, or science- related projects unless they have an explicit component related to the requested program objectives listed above. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/p/206488.htm -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Commotion Beta is out: Free Wireless Mesh Network Software
Hi All, I wanted to share that OTI released Commotion Beta, free, open source, wireless networking platform this week. This “Developer Release #1” (DR1) makes Commotion’s technology available for testing and feedback and is freely available from the project website: www.commotionwireless.net. I would encourage you to check it out, but please head our caution that this release is BETA and thus should not be used for mission-critical and/or sensitive communications until version 1.0 is released. This release includes: - A fully integrated web-interface in addition to traditional command-line access. - QuickStart setup wizard - A set of core libraries that will form the backbone of a common network management interface across Commotion platforms - An application portal that makes it easy to announce and discover authenticated local social applications - A debugging tool to provide one-click error reports for network maintainers There are also security features including basic network encryption, which brings mesh networking up to the level of security expected from today’s wireless networks. Commotion adds an additional layer of security by allowing the use of network keys and application signing through the use of The Serval Project’s http://www.servalproject.org/ Serval daemon, making it easier to identify bad-agents posing as legtimate services. These features form the foundation for the Commotion security features under active development. Again, this is beta and *not* for sensitive communications at this time. If you want to try setting up your own network, interested in providing feedback or just want to learn more head over over to www.commotionwireless.net. Best, James RELEASE: OTI Launches Commotion Beta: Free Wireless Mesh Network Software Commotion Technology Revolutionizes Community Wireless by Providing a Safe, Low-Cost Option *Published: * March 20, 2013 Washington, DC — The New America Foundation's *Open Technology Institute http://oti.newamerica.net/ *(OTI) announced today the public release of Commotion Beta - a free, open source, wireless networking platform. This “Developer Release #1” (DR1) makes Commotion’s technology available for testing and feedback and is freely available from the project website: *www.commotionwireless.nethttps://commotionwireless.net/ *. Please note that Commotion is in Beta and should not be used for mission-critical and/or sensitive communications until version 1.0 is released. Commotion is a cutting-edge open-source communications software platform that uses laptops, mobile phones, and other Wi-Fi devices to create decentralized, wireless “mesh” networks. Commotion interconnects devices directly to one-another in a peer-to-peer manner to form a “spider web” of connectivity. “Commotion Beta is a transformative technology - the culmination of years of research and development by hundreds of developers around the globe,” said New America Vice President and OTI Director Sascha Meinrath, who is the founder of Commotion Wireless. “Commotion is an incredible resource for empowering communities and constituencies worldwide, helping with a variety of different needs, from spreading low-cost connectivity, securing communications, and enhancing disaster-response.” Commotion Beta adds new usability enhancements and features that simplify mesh network setup and reduce the difficulty of network maintenance. DR1 contains a fully integrated web-interface in addition to traditional command-line access. Among the new technical features in DR1 are a QuickStart setup wizard, a set of core libraries that will form the backbone of a common network management interface across Commotion platforms, an application portal that makes it easy to announce and discover authenticated local social applications, and a debugging tool to provide one-click error reports for network maintainers. These features will be ported to the Android, Linux, and OS X clients over the next quarter. The DR1 release also includes key security features, beginning with basic network encryption, which brings mesh networking up to the level of security expected from today’s wireless networks. Commotion adds an additional layer of security by allowing the use of network keys and application signing through the use of The Serval Project’s http://www.servalproject.org/ Serval daemon, making it easier to identify bad-agents posing as legtimate services. These features form the foundation for the Commotion security features under active development. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Gentle reminder: Stanford STS Conference submissions due this Friday (tomorrow)
Greetings all, There is just one day until the deadline to submit 250-word abstracts to Stanford's first annual graduate STS conference. This is a gentle reminder to submit (or encourage students/colleagues to submit) abstracts and 50-word bios to governing.technol...@morganya.org. The full CFP is below. Please forward widely! Thank you, and we hope to see you in May! - Morgan, Damien, Mark, and the rest of the GSST conference committee -- Governing Technology: Material Politics and Hybrid Agencies *Thursday, May 9 and Friday, May 10**, 2013* *Stanford Humanities Center* *http://governing.morganya.org * This conference aims to bring together two communities of scholars: those examining the ways that states and other institutions have sought to govern technologies, and those examining the ways that technologies have influenced the practice and form of governing. In the process, we will revisit the concept of governance through the lens of *material politics*. As some technologies promise the world and others threaten to overrun it, scholars in the humanities and social sciences have turned a critical eye to the agentive power and material effects of technology, as well as the responses that this power invokes. Research on technology’s entanglements with states, transnational organizations, and other powerful institutions has often taken its cues from science and technology studies. In particular, pioneering work in STS on materiality, on governmentality, and on hybrid and nonhuman agency has become more and more a part of mainstream work in history, geography, anthropology, communication, literary studies, sociology, and beyond. Scholars from across these fields have, in turn, developed new frameworks of analysis that go beyond classic conceptions of governmentality and materiality to incorporate their own disciplinary strengths. Cornell professor Steve Jacksonhttps://sites.google.com/site/stanfordstsgrad/conference/keynote will discuss the interplay between governance and technology in his keynote lecture https://sites.google.com/site/stanfordstsgrad/conference/keynote. The conference will wrap up with a roundtable discussion on building the STS community in the Bay Area and beyond, featuring STS professors from Stanford and several nearby Universities of California. Call for Participation We invite papers that consider (or critique) the relevance of *material politics* in understanding the relationship between governance and technology: how states and other institutions respond to challenges imposed by new and emerging technological developments and how technologies, understood broadly, become part of governing. Papers from any discipline or institution are encouraged. Possible topics include, but are not limited to: - Natural resource management and extraction - The politics of environmental regulation and tourism - National or transnational policies on innovation and intellectual property - The regulation and development of biotechnology - The agency and role of non-governmental organizations - Governing dangerous materials - The politics of agricultural technologies - Medical innovation and regulation - The *un*governability of certain technologies - The politics of technology in public health or urban planning - Historical accounts of technological governance or agency - Theoretical discussions or critiques of material agencies - Theoretical discussions of governance through the lens of material politics Please submit the following to *governing.technol...@morganya.org*: - *A submission abstract* of no more than 250 words - *A brief biography* of no more than 50 words to be included in the conference program The deadline for submissions is *March 22, 2013*. Notifications will be sent and the schedule posted by April 12, 2013. -- Morgan G. Ames http://morganya.org -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] list reply-all
On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 05:48:20AM -0400, Michael Allan wrote: Pardon me, but that's not true. GNU Mailman is a decent list server and it ships with reply-to-sender. You must go out of your way to munge the Reply-to header. They recommend against it: http://www.gnu.org/software/mailman/mailman-admin/node11.html Correct. (That is, (a) correct that they recommend against it and (b) correct that they SHOULD recommend against it.) [1] Now it's true that there are broken email clients out there that don't handle this gracefully. The solution is not to accomodate broken email clients, but to insist that users of broken email clients either fix them, get them fixed, or abandon them for others. I will also suggest, that in the context of this particular list, everyone should be using a mail client that permits and even better, encourages, full editing of the To:, Cc: and Bcc: fields and that members get in the habit of double-checking those fields before sending. That's just good email practice, along with things like not top-posting, not full-quoting, and not sending mail marked up with HTML. ---rsk [1] Mailman is more than decent: it is, at the moment, the best available software for running mailing lists, period. Certainly all closed-source software may be immediately dismissed from consideration, which leaves us with things like ezmlm and majordomo, none of which have Mailman's feature set, standards compliance, or ongoing track record of bug fixes and improvements. Oh, it's not perfect, and I sure wish it wasn't written in Python: but it's the best-available, and its authors have done an exemplary job of bug-fixing and enhancement. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Announcing a privacy preserving authentication protocol
On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 06:31:56PM -0500, Kyle Maxwell wrote: A. This doesn't eliminate phishing because users will still enter their credentials at a site that doesn't actually match the one where the cert was previously signed. Otherwise, existing HTTPS controls would already protect them. True, but phishing is not currently a solvable problem anyway; it falls into a class of problems that can't be solved no matter how much clever technology is developed because all of that technology presumes that end user systems are secure...and they're not. (Other problems in that class: spam, email forgery, DDoS.) A substantial percentage of end user systems are already compromised (in full or part) and more of them are being compromised while you're reading this. So unless this proposal or one like comes with a plan to remediate a few hundred million systems, it may be beautiful in theory, but it won't work in practice. In passing, let me note that banks and other financial institutions are aiding and abetting phishers by doing extremely stupid things like (a) sending email marked up with HTML (b) sending email with URLs (c) sending email with with web bugs (d) outsourcing their email. The irony is that while those entities are busy *training* their customers to be phished, they're constantly whining about how terribly awfully bad the situation is. There is insufficient scotch to dull the pain of that much stupid. ---rsk -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] skype
On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 11:17:03PM -0400, Louis Su?rez-Potts wrote: One is tempted to suggest using other than Skype. Alternatives exist, and these are secure, at least according to their claims. As well, Skype's code is not transparent, in the way that other, open source, applications' are. I'm more than tempted: I can't understand why anyone would even consider using Skype. It's closed-source, therefore it must be presumed insecure. Nothing Microsoft says about it can be trusted. There is reason to believe that it's been successfully attacked by third parties. etc. I dunno 'bout y'all, but I think that's enough to blacklist it permanently. Done. Over. Next? ---rsk -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Microsoft Releases 2012 Law Enforcement Requests Report
On 03/21/2013 10:37 AM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
Joseph Lorenzo Hall:
On Thu Mar 21 12:27:47 2013, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
Joseph Lorenzo Hall:
Two things seem particularly interesting: apparently zero requests for
content were fulfilled for Skype and the associated FAQ [1] says CALEA
(the US law that mandates intercept capability) does not apply to
Skype.
That seems particularly encouraging to me.
The FAQ is also interesting in that the non-content question mentions
location but then only lists state, country and ZIP code as fields
provided (I don't know how MSFT would have access to precise
geolocation, but that doesn't appear to be something they provide).
Also
the NSL reporting in the FAQ is binned in terms of thousands of NSLs...
so in 2009 they report receiving 0-999 NSLs and in 2010 1000-1999 NSLs
(hard to tell if that was just one more NSL or a bunch).
I don't agree with that reading of the report. There is likely a lot of
word-smithing here - for example, Does Skype include SkypeIn and
SkypeOut or just Peer to Peer video, text and storage of (other)
meta-data? Does CALEA happen on the Skype side of things or on the
PTSN/VoIP service side of Skype{In,Out}? My guess is the latter rather
than the former.
Ok, I certainly agree there is probably a lot of wordsmithing here.
CALEA certainly applies to PSTN interconnection but then presumably law
enforcement would just go to the phone company which has
CALEA-compliant switching hardware there. (I think.)
Also, note that Microsoft Provided Guidance to Law Enforcement - so
when they say they didn't provide content, did they provide the
credentials? If so, the guidance could have allowed the Law
Enforcement to simply login and restore the account data. Or perhaps
merely disclosing a key?
They certainly don't describe what that means, which is strange because
for a transparency report with quantitative data, one would want to
bound what the categories of quantitative data are! I would hope that
MSFT would consider providing ciphertext and session keys as providing
content and increment the zeros in that column, but there's no
definitive statement in all of this that I can see which would support
that.
I wrote to them and asked these questions, as well as a few others.
What other questions should we pose to them, I wonder?
Reading quickly through the documents, there seems to be no information
about US FISA court orders, so that might be something to ask them
about. I am concerned about the possibility that FISA is being abused to
access large swaths of user data (esp given FAA provisions and secret
interpretation of section 215 of Patriot Act). You could suggest general
rounded numbers for FISA like for NSLs. Doubt you'll get any info, though.
That said, kudos to MS for releasing this info and to people for pushing
them on Skype!
--
Dan Auerbach
Staff Technologist
Electronic Frontier Foundation
d...@eff.org
415 436 9333 x134
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Re: [liberationtech] Microsoft Releases 2012 Law Enforcement Requests Report
On 3/21/13 5:27 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
I don't agree with that reading of the report. There is likely a lot of
word-smithing here - for example, Does Skype include SkypeIn and
SkypeOut or just Peer to Peer video, text and storage of (other)
meta-data? Does CALEA happen on the Skype side of things or on the
PTSN/VoIP service side of Skype{In,Out}? My guess is the latter rather
than the former.
Nice consideration for SkypeIn/Out.
Just to say that if in Italy LEA ask a local provider for wiretapping
and it refuse to comply with the request, he is violating ministry of
communication licensing rules and he can be immediately revocated
telecommunication license.
And it's unreasonable to think that in a country with 60mln person like
Italy there was no requests done to Skype, especially considering the
special task force of prosecutors and lawyers that has been setup some
years ago (pre-microsoft acquisition) to make pressure on Skype at EU level.
So i'll add a question:
Does Microsoft/Skype transparency report consider also requests that are
done from non-US authorities to Microsoft Corporation or to non-US
branch of Microsoft (like Microsoft Italia) ?
Fabio
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Re: [liberationtech] Commotion Beta is out: Free Wireless Mesh Network Software
Thanks James, The Commotion team is excited about the new developer release of the Commotion platform. We have already received several bug reports and feature requests following our initial DR1 binary upload a few days ago. This has helped us take steps towards bringing this from the current, unstable nightly build to a stable release. The focus of this release has been to improve Commotion’s usability, so that both developers and users without extensive background knowledge in mesh networking can get a mesh network up and running. This lack of usability has historically been a barrier to implementation and experimentation. The goal of this release is to provide opportunities for a wider community of testers, including security and application developers, to experiment with the Commotion platform. This release itself does not have strong security, but contains tools and APIs to develop secure applications. We are looking forward to working with developers in our community to develop secure tools on top of this platform. While we have implemented new security features that differentiate this release from our last, users should carefully read the warning label, located on our Download page, before using the software in a situation where security is required. The warning will be updated to reflect the current audits once we have completed thorough testing and evaluation of the new release. Commotion development is ongoing. We currently have a multi-year development roadmap https://code.commotionwireless.net/projects/commotion/wiki/Hackday-Roadmap-Notes that lays out all the planned features we will implement. We strongly invite constructive feedback, contributions, and experimentation with our software https://github.com/opentechinstitute/commotion-openwrt. We are working hard towards our full version 1.0 release which we are aiming to land towards the end of this year. -andrew On 03/21/2013 03:47 PM, James Losey wrote: Hi All, I wanted to share that OTI released Commotion Beta, free, open source, wireless networking platform this week. This “Developer Release #1” (DR1) makes Commotion’s technology available for testing and feedback and is freely available from the project website: www.commotionwireless.net. I would encourage you to check it out, but please head our caution that this release is BETA and thus should not be used for mission-critical and/or sensitive communications until version 1.0 is released. This release includes: - A fully integrated web-interface in addition to traditional command-line access. - QuickStart setup wizard - A set of core libraries that will form the backbone of a common network management interface across Commotion platforms - An application portal that makes it easy to announce and discover authenticated local social applications - A debugging tool to provide one-click error reports for network maintainers There are also security features including basic network encryption, which brings mesh networking up to the level of security expected from today’s wireless networks. Commotion adds an additional layer of security by allowing the use of network keys and application signing through the use of The Serval Project’s http://www.servalproject.org/ Serval daemon, making it easier to identify bad-agents posing as legtimate services. These features form the foundation for the Commotion security features under active development. Again, this is beta and *not* for sensitive communications at this time. If you want to try setting up your own network, interested in providing feedback or just want to learn more head over over to www.commotionwireless.net. Best, James RELEASE: OTI Launches Commotion Beta: Free Wireless Mesh Network Software Commotion Technology Revolutionizes Community Wireless by Providing a Safe, Low-Cost Option *Published: * March 20, 2013 Washington, DC — The New America Foundation's *Open Technology Institute http://oti.newamerica.net/ *(OTI) announced today the public release of Commotion Beta - a free, open source, wireless networking platform. This “Developer Release #1” (DR1) makes Commotion’s technology available for testing and feedback and is freely available from the project website: *www.commotionwireless.nethttps://commotionwireless.net/ *. Please note that Commotion is in Beta and should not be used for mission-critical and/or sensitive communications until version 1.0 is released. Commotion is a cutting-edge open-source communications software platform that uses laptops, mobile phones, and other Wi-Fi devices to create decentralized, wireless “mesh” networks. Commotion interconnects devices directly to one-another in a peer-to-peer manner to form a “spider web” of connectivity. “Commotion Beta is a transformative technology - the culmination of years of research and development by hundreds of developers around the globe,” said New America
[liberationtech] Director of NSF's Division of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure
The National Science Foundation CISE Directorate is pleased to announce the formation of a search committee for the Director of the Division of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure (ACI, formerly the Office of Cyberinfrastructure). Dr. Alan Blatecky will be finishing his term as ACI Division Director at the end of this summer – we greatly appreciate his expertise and leadership for the coordination and support of NSF’s cyberinfrastructure during his tenure! Announcements for the search for his replacement can be found at http://www.nsf.gov/cise/news/2013-ACI-Annoucement.jsp and on USAJOBS at https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/339364500?org=NSF. Please feel free to contact any of the following search committee members to nominate candidates; self-nominations are also invited: Jim Bottum, Clemson University, j...@clemson.edu, Co-Chair Katherine Yelick, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, kayel...@lbl.gov, Co-Chair Fran Berman, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, ber...@rpi.edu Sharon Glotzer, University of Michigan, sglotzer...@umich.edu Bill Gropp, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, wgr...@illinois.edu David Lifka, Cornell University, li...@cac.cornell.edu Keith Marzullo, NSF Search Committee Liaison and Director of the Division of Computer Network Systems (CNS), kmarz...@nsf.gov Thank you in advance for your help in identifying candidates for this important position. If you have any questions or comments, you are also welcome to contact me directly. Sincerely, Farnam Jahanian — Farnam Jahanian Assistant Director for CISE National Science Foundation email: fjaha...@nsf.gov web: http://www.nsf.gov/cise/about.jsp -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] skype
Rich, that's because you're not thinking like the average non-technical user, who usually does the following: The user hears from a friend that she can make calls for free over Skype. So she clicks on the Skype link. Skype has millions of users, meaning it will be around for a while. The Skype website looks visually attractive, meaning that it must have a lot of developers. More recently, it is owned by Microsoft, which the user trusts for similar reasons. Most large, stable, visually-striking brands can be trusted, the user thinks. She doesn't think for she doesn't know that Microsoft has been attacked a lot. Now, the user installs Skype. She clicks through a few steps, easy enough. That's a low barrier to adoption. Next, the user sees all their family and friends on there. Great, she thinks. Now I can call that friend who told me to install it. After that, the user reads in a news article that Skype is insecure. That sucks, she thinks. But it's not like I do anything confidential on there anyway. Or, perhaps, she thinks, I haven't done anything wrong, so who cares if I'm being watched. I'm glad the government is looking out for those terrorists. To the extent that the user cares about security, now she needs to figure out what's the best secure alternative out there. But notice what happens: There's no large, established competitor that is secure. Those competitors don't have brands. To the extent that the user finds a secure competitor, say because Consumer Reports published an article on it (for the average non-technical user may not know of EFF), then she might click and check it out. She might ask her family and friends. But their family and friends have never heard of it and, even worse, are not on it. I care about my security, she may think. So I will try it anyway. But all the time it gnaws at her that she doesn't know the competitor's name and that she has to take a leap of faith to install it. The company says it's open source. What the heck does that mean? She thinks. What if this company is untrustworthy? What if this company goes under and sells my data? What if... Too many barriers to adoption. We always think, let's make the most private and secure solution, forgetting that users care about many brand attributes that the most superior technical solution can't provide. On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 1:05 PM, Rich Kulawiec r...@gsp.org wrote: On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 11:17:03PM -0400, Louis Su?rez-Potts wrote: One is tempted to suggest using other than Skype. Alternatives exist, and these are secure, at least according to their claims. As well, Skype's code is not transparent, in the way that other, open source, applications' are. I'm more than tempted: I can't understand why anyone would even consider using Skype. It's closed-source, therefore it must be presumed insecure. Nothing Microsoft says about it can be trusted. There is reason to believe that it's been successfully attacked by third parties. etc. I dunno 'bout y'all, but I think that's enough to blacklist it permanently. Done. Over. Next? ---rsk -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Announcing a privacy preserving authentication protocol
On 03/21/2013 09:02 PM, Rich Kulawiec wrote: True, but phishing is not currently a solvable problem anyway; it falls into a class of problems that can't be solved no matter how much clever technology is developed because all of that technology presumes that end user systems are secure...and they're not. Sir, you are entirely correct. End user systems are insecure. That ship has left in 1980-1990 when everyone and their grandmother wanted a PC instead of an account on a managed main frame. We are suffering since. My protocol relies on the *assumption* that the end user system is secure. But it's ITs dirty little secret that *every* other protocol relies that the end user system is secure! - Passwords: no keylogger; - password manager: no malware; - encrypted password manager: no malware with sufficient patience; - crypto smart cards: no malware in the crypto layer; - TAN-generators for banks: I don't know if the transaction I'm authorising is the one that's displayed in my browser. One of my Dutch banks requires me to type in the amount in the tan-generator so the thieves are limited to that amount. A substantial percentage of end user systems are already compromised (in full or part) and more of them are being compromised while you're reading this. So unless this proposal or one like comes with a plan to remediate a few hundred million systems, it may be beautiful in theory, but it won't work in practice. Acceptance is the first step on the road to recovery. And I think the theory of my solution is more beautiful than the current ugly truth. If the only thing it gives is hope out of the current misery, I consider it a success. It may plant the seed for someone to change their current lousy operating system to something slightly more secure. That seed is what I want to plant. Please see: [1] on how a computer should behave towards its owner. In passing, let me note that banks and other financial institutions are aiding and abetting phishers by doing extremely stupid things like (a) sending email marked up with HTML (b) sending email with URLs (c) sending email with with web bugs (d) outsourcing their email. The irony is that while those entities are busy *training* their customers to be phished, they're constantly whining about how terribly awfully bad the situation is. There is insufficient scotch to dull the pain of that much stupid. Again, you're completely correct. With my protocol, that problem is out of the way when the banks and customers deploy it. But it's only a little step on the journey. The good thing, those who want can choose to use it. No need for the world to change. Regards, Guido. 1: http://witmond.nl/blog/2012/11/09/asimovs-laws-for-security.html -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
Karl Fogel kfo...@red-bean.com writes: I vote that the list not munge the Reply-to header. I would also support this option were it available. :) -john -- John Sullivan | Executive Director, Free Software Foundation GPG Key: 61A0963B | http://status.fsf.org/johns | http://fsf.org/blogs/RSS Do you use free software? Donate to join the FSF and support freedom at http://www.fsf.org/register_form?referrer=8096. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
reply-to-all -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
Reply to all. NK On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 6:36 PM, Trinh Nguyen liatngu...@gmail.com wrote: reply-to-all -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
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Re: [liberationtech] skype
+1 Yosem, except I take issue with the last point. I don't think its always that superior technical solutions *can't* provide better branding/usability, its that they choose NOT to, or in the past have even demonized anyone who thinks there is value in such things. luckily this is changing! B On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 2:36 PM, Yosem Companys compa...@stanford.eduwrote: Rich, that's because you're not thinking like the average non-technical user, who usually does the following: The user hears from a friend that she can make calls for free over Skype. So she clicks on the Skype link. Skype has millions of users, meaning it will be around for a while. The Skype website looks visually attractive, meaning that it must have a lot of developers. More recently, it is owned by Microsoft, which the user trusts for similar reasons. Most large, stable, visually-striking brands can be trusted, the user thinks. She doesn't think for she doesn't know that Microsoft has been attacked a lot. Now, the user installs Skype. She clicks through a few steps, easy enough. That's a low barrier to adoption. Next, the user sees all their family and friends on there. Great, she thinks. Now I can call that friend who told me to install it. After that, the user reads in a news article that Skype is insecure. That sucks, she thinks. But it's not like I do anything confidential on there anyway. Or, perhaps, she thinks, I haven't done anything wrong, so who cares if I'm being watched. I'm glad the government is looking out for those terrorists. To the extent that the user cares about security, now she needs to figure out what's the best secure alternative out there. But notice what happens: There's no large, established competitor that is secure. Those competitors don't have brands. To the extent that the user finds a secure competitor, say because Consumer Reports published an article on it (for the average non-technical user may not know of EFF), then she might click and check it out. She might ask her family and friends. But their family and friends have never heard of it and, even worse, are not on it. I care about my security, she may think. So I will try it anyway. But all the time it gnaws at her that she doesn't know the competitor's name and that she has to take a leap of faith to install it. The company says it's open source. What the heck does that mean? She thinks. What if this company is untrustworthy? What if this company goes under and sells my data? What if... Too many barriers to adoption. We always think, let's make the most private and secure solution, forgetting that users care about many brand attributes that the most superior technical solution can't provide. On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 1:05 PM, Rich Kulawiec r...@gsp.org wrote: On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 11:17:03PM -0400, Louis Su?rez-Potts wrote: One is tempted to suggest using other than Skype. Alternatives exist, and these are secure, at least according to their claims. As well, Skype's code is not transparent, in the way that other, open source, applications' are. I'm more than tempted: I can't understand why anyone would even consider using Skype. It's closed-source, therefore it must be presumed insecure. Nothing Microsoft says about it can be trusted. There is reason to believe that it's been successfully attacked by third parties. etc. I dunno 'bout y'all, but I think that's enough to blacklist it permanently. Done. Over. Next? ---rsk -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Brian Conley Director, Small World News http://smallworldnews.tv m: 646.285.2046 Skype: brianjoelconley -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] skype
Yes. I meant that the superior technical solution could not provide better branding/usability in my hypothetical example. There are plenty of examples of superior technologies having great branding. Case in point is Procter Gamble, which is successful in part because it only makes marketing investments in products with superior technologies because its research has consistently shown that consumers aren't loyal to a product unless it demonstrates technical merit in use. In other words, you can persuade people to try your product, but if it is not technically superior, they will use your competitor's, On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 4:04 PM, Brian Conley bri...@smallworldnews.tv wrote: +1 Yosem, except I take issue with the last point. I don't think its always that superior technical solutions *can't* provide better branding/usability, its that they choose NOT to, or in the past have even demonized anyone who thinks there is value in such things. luckily this is changing! B On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 2:36 PM, Yosem Companys compa...@stanford.edu wrote: Rich, that's because you're not thinking like the average non-technical user, who usually does the following: The user hears from a friend that she can make calls for free over Skype. So she clicks on the Skype link. Skype has millions of users, meaning it will be around for a while. The Skype website looks visually attractive, meaning that it must have a lot of developers. More recently, it is owned by Microsoft, which the user trusts for similar reasons. Most large, stable, visually-striking brands can be trusted, the user thinks. She doesn't think for she doesn't know that Microsoft has been attacked a lot. Now, the user installs Skype. She clicks through a few steps, easy enough. That's a low barrier to adoption. Next, the user sees all their family and friends on there. Great, she thinks. Now I can call that friend who told me to install it. After that, the user reads in a news article that Skype is insecure. That sucks, she thinks. But it's not like I do anything confidential on there anyway. Or, perhaps, she thinks, I haven't done anything wrong, so who cares if I'm being watched. I'm glad the government is looking out for those terrorists. To the extent that the user cares about security, now she needs to figure out what's the best secure alternative out there. But notice what happens: There's no large, established competitor that is secure. Those competitors don't have brands. To the extent that the user finds a secure competitor, say because Consumer Reports published an article on it (for the average non-technical user may not know of EFF), then she might click and check it out. She might ask her family and friends. But their family and friends have never heard of it and, even worse, are not on it. I care about my security, she may think. So I will try it anyway. But all the time it gnaws at her that she doesn't know the competitor's name and that she has to take a leap of faith to install it. The company says it's open source. What the heck does that mean? She thinks. What if this company is untrustworthy? What if this company goes under and sells my data? What if... Too many barriers to adoption. We always think, let's make the most private and secure solution, forgetting that users care about many brand attributes that the most superior technical solution can't provide. On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 1:05 PM, Rich Kulawiec r...@gsp.org wrote: On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 11:17:03PM -0400, Louis Su?rez-Potts wrote: One is tempted to suggest using other than Skype. Alternatives exist, and these are secure, at least according to their claims. As well, Skype's code is not transparent, in the way that other, open source, applications' are. I'm more than tempted: I can't understand why anyone would even consider using Skype. It's closed-source, therefore it must be presumed insecure. Nothing Microsoft says about it can be trusted. There is reason to believe that it's been successfully attacked by third parties. etc. I dunno 'bout y'all, but I think that's enough to blacklist it permanently. Done. Over. Next? ---rsk -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Brian Conley Director, Small World News http://smallworldnews.tv m: 646.285.2046 Skype: brianjoelconley -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at
Re: [liberationtech] Please Vote on Reply to Question
Reply to all. Best, Enrique Piracés Human Rights Watch https://www.hrw.org https://www.twitter.com/epiraces On Mar 20, 2013, at 9:17 PM, Yosem Companys wrote: Dear Liberationtech list subscribers, Several of you have petitioned to change Liberationtech mailing list's default reply to option from reply-to-all to reply-to-poster. Given the debate (see links below), we have decided to put the issue up for a vote: * Do you want replies to Liberationtech list messages directed to reply-to-all or reply-to-poster? Please vote by submitting your preference to me by 11.59 pm PST on Sunday, March 24, 2013. Any votes received after this date and time will not be counted. Thanks, Yosem One of your moderators PS To read a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of reply-to-all, click on the corresponding links below: * Reply-to-all considered useful: http://marc.merlins.org/netrants/reply-to-useful.html * Reply-to-all considered harmful: http://www.unicom.com/pw/reply-to-harmful.html If you'd like to read the entire debate on the Liberationtech list, please click on the links below: http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03767.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03768.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03769.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03771.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03772.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03773.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03774.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03775.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03776.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03777.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03778.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03779.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03780.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03781.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03782.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03783.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03788.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03789.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03790.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03791.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03799.html http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03801.html -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edumailto:compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] reply-all
I totally agree. I love the discussions that ensue (even if my replies tend to be rather long) Crazy-long signatures and the contents of the last few messages aren't really necessary. ~Griffin On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 11:41 AM, Courtney Radsch crad...@gmail.com wrote: I vote reply all (list) as default. I learn a lot from these discussions, although I wish people could erase as much as possible of the quoted email in their reply... -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] skype
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Anyone looked into the reports that Skype leaks your IP address? Apparently you do not have to interact with the person whose location you are interested in to be able to get their IP address. https://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/03/privacy-101-skype-leaks-your-location/ http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2012/05/01/skype-knew-of-security-flaw-since-november-2010-researchers-say/ Michael On 03/21/2013 07:12 PM, Yosem Companys wrote: Yes. I meant that the superior technical solution could not provide better branding/usability in my hypothetical example. There are plenty of examples of superior technologies having great branding. Case in point is Procter Gamble, which is successful in part because it only makes marketing investments in products with superior technologies because its research has consistently shown that consumers aren't loyal to a product unless it demonstrates technical merit in use. In other words, you can persuade people to try your product, but if it is not technically superior, they will use your competitor's, On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 4:04 PM, Brian Conley bri...@smallworldnews.tv wrote: +1 Yosem, except I take issue with the last point. I don't think its always that superior technical solutions *can't* provide better branding/usability, its that they choose NOT to, or in the past have even demonized anyone who thinks there is value in such things. luckily this is changing! B On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 2:36 PM, Yosem Companys compa...@stanford.edu wrote: Rich, that's because you're not thinking like the average non-technical user, who usually does the following: The user hears from a friend that she can make calls for free over Skype. So she clicks on the Skype link. Skype has millions of users, meaning it will be around for a while. The Skype website looks visually attractive, meaning that it must have a lot of developers. More recently, it is owned by Microsoft, which the user trusts for similar reasons. Most large, stable, visually-striking brands can be trusted, the user thinks. She doesn't think for she doesn't know that Microsoft has been attacked a lot. Now, the user installs Skype. She clicks through a few steps, easy enough. That's a low barrier to adoption. Next, the user sees all their family and friends on there. Great, she thinks. Now I can call that friend who told me to install it. After that, the user reads in a news article that Skype is insecure. That sucks, she thinks. But it's not like I do anything confidential on there anyway. Or, perhaps, she thinks, I haven't done anything wrong, so who cares if I'm being watched. I'm glad the government is looking out for those terrorists. To the extent that the user cares about security, now she needs to figure out what's the best secure alternative out there. But notice what happens: There's no large, established competitor that is secure. Those competitors don't have brands. To the extent that the user finds a secure competitor, say because Consumer Reports published an article on it (for the average non-technical user may not know of EFF), then she might click and check it out. She might ask her family and friends. But their family and friends have never heard of it and, even worse, are not on it. I care about my security, she may think. So I will try it anyway. But all the time it gnaws at her that she doesn't know the competitor's name and that she has to take a leap of faith to install it. The company says it's open source. What the heck does that mean? She thinks. What if this company is untrustworthy? What if this company goes under and sells my data? What if... Too many barriers to adoption. We always think, let's make the most private and secure solution, forgetting that users care about many brand attributes that the most superior technical solution can't provide. On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 1:05 PM, Rich Kulawiec r...@gsp.org wrote: On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 11:17:03PM -0400, Louis Su?rez-Potts wrote: One is tempted to suggest using other than Skype. Alternatives exist, and these are secure, at least according to their claims. As well, Skype's code is not transparent, in the way that other, open source, applications' are. I'm more than tempted: I can't understand why anyone would even consider using Skype. It's closed-source, therefore it must be presumed insecure. Nothing Microsoft says about it can be trusted. There is reason to believe that it's been successfully attacked by third parties. etc. I dunno 'bout y'all, but I think that's enough to blacklist it permanently. Done. Over. Next? ---rsk -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change
Re: [liberationtech] Microsoft Releases 2012 Law Enforcement Requests Report
I wrote to them and asked these questions, as well as a few others. What other questions should we pose to them, I wonder? Why are RU and CN (most glaringly) absent from the first chart enumerating the number (and type) of requests by country? It's hard to believe those countries' security services have no interest in (non-Skype) Microsoft data. Is MS defining those countries as having no legal standing to request MS data, and therefore any requests from them would be rejected out-of-hand? We provide SSL encryption for Microsoft services and Skype-Skype calls on our full client (for full function computers) are encrypted on a peer-to-peer basis; however, no communication method is 100% secure. For example ... users of the Skype thin client (used on smartphones, tablets and other hand-held devices) route communications over a wireless or mobile provider network. --Is the implication that the Skype clients used on smartphones don't provide the same end-to-end encrypted-by-session-specific-keys level of security that the Skype for Windows client does? Skype received 4,713 requests from law enforcement. ... Skype produced no content in response to these requests. --It's hard to believe that LEAs never validly requested a record of a Skype user's IM sessions. Perhaps LEAs don't know those data exist? Best, Eric -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] skype
That was one reason Diaspora did well initially. They focused on good design and didn't open source that. There should be a civic Pivotal, like a Mozilla, to help sound technical projects do great design. On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 7:36 PM, Griffin Boyce griffinbo...@gmail.com wrote: Brian Conley bri...@smallworldnews.tv wrote: I don't think its always that superior technical solutions *can't* provide better branding/usability, its that they choose NOT to, or in the past have even demonized anyone who thinks there is value in such things. luckily this is changing! B I agree, but also some projects don't have capable graphics people on their staff (for whatever reason). Public-facing open-source projects in general need to get it together design-wise. ~Griffin -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
