[liberationtech] (advice sought) Public safety and configuration of list

2013-04-25 Thread Yosem Companys
Michael insists that we post his reply to our decision to the list, so
we do so below.  We already responded to his message off list.

Best,

Yosem



From: Michael Allan m...@zelea.com
Date: Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 11:40 PM

Yosem,

May I briefly speak in reply?  I will not be joining the admin list,
as it's only by accident that I became involved in this.  Anyway, I'm
sorry to have given you the wrong impression, but you make some errors
in describing my actions and motivations, and I wish to correct them.

 Michael asked that the Program on Liberation Technology at Stanford
 University overrule the list vote over safety issues because he said
 the position created a potential legal liability for the university.

I did not ask the university to overrule the vote, but only to act in
the interests of public safety.  If public safety is best served by
upholding the vote, then that is O.K. by me.  Nor was I concerned with
the university's legal position.  It was the university's own staff
who invited me to off-list discussions, and the university's own staff
who expressed a concern about legal implications, and then referred
the matter to counsel.

The only issue I consider worth discussing in this connection is the
issue of public safety, especially the safety of innocent people who
are not party to these discussions, not connected with the university,
and not connected with the mailing list.  The argument (which I
seconded, but did not originate) is that the configuration of the list
places these people in some danger.  I felt that *their* concerns
ought to have a voice before a decision was made.  So this is what I
attempted to do; though maybe I didn't do a good job of it.

 Michael, however, insists that there are safety issues.  ...

Well, I have never *insisted* on that.  My crime was to ask whether or
not the safety concerns that were raised are valid, and I directed
this question to experts in particular.  But apparently the university
has already made a decision on the matter, so there's nothing further
anyone can contribute.  We can only hope that it's the right decision,
and that we acted rightly in it ourselves.

--
Michael Allan

Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
http://zelea.com/


Yosem Companys said:
 Dear All,

 Michael asked that the Program on Liberation Technology at Stanford
 University overrule the list vote over safety issues because he said the
 position created a potential legal liability for the university.

 We informed Michael that we saw none and that the list subscribers had
 taken the perceived safety issue into consideration when voting; in fact,
 we included the links to the pros and cons that addressed the perceived
 safety concerns.

 Michael, however, insists that there are safety issues.  We remained
 unconvinced.  He asked that we discuss the issue internally at Stanford
 University.

 Our final decision is consistent with the view that Jeremy outlined below,
 which is common practice for mailing lists:  Email users are responsible
 for their use of email, on a list or off, so they are responsible for
 knowing the settings and adapting their behaviors to them.  The locus of
 action of the list is the user, the administrator just sets the terms.

 Moreover, we inform users of the risks associated with subscribing to
 public lists both when they sign up and in our list guidelines.  We also
 clearly state that the list is configured to reply to all.

 As a result, the current option will remain as currently configured and
 voted upon by list subscribers -- that is, reply to all.

 As we have received numerous complaints over having administrative issues
 crowd out substantive discussion on the list, we are creating a separate
 liberationtech-admin list.  As soon as that list is operational, we will
 let you know.  In the meantime, out of respect to your fellow subscribers,
 we ask that you please refrain from further discussion about the issue here
 but encourage you to continue the discussion there, if interested.

 Best,

 Yosem
 One of your list moderators
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Re: [liberationtech] (advice sought) Public safety and configuration of list

2013-04-24 Thread Michael Allan
Brian and Elijah,

Brian said:
 If Stanford University, who currently hosts the libtech mailng list
 decides to change the setup in contravention of democratic process
 of the list MEMBERS, then I would hope list members will move to one
 of many other options for hosting.  ...  Is it not worth considering
 that the constant rehashing of this discussion is in itself,
 something reminiscent of the behavior of bad actors attempting to
 derail effective organizing and discussion?

Safety was hardly discussed in public; mostly only off list.  Here's a
short history of the public exchange between the subscribers and the
university, thus far:

  Subs.  When replying to messages sent via the list, I sometimes
 forget to hit Reply to List.  Instead I hit Reply to
 Sender.  When I realize my mistake, I must re-send my reply
 to the list.  What a nuisance!  How can we remedy this?

   Uni.  It's possible to alter the sender's Reply-To headers, making
 it *appear* as though the sender had requested replies to be
 sent to the list.  Then it no longer matters which button you
 press; your reply is directed to the list regardless.

  Subs.  Yes, let's do that!

   Uni.  But in our particular list, this may present a safety hazard
 to the public.  Also it requires inserting false information
 into the mail that technically verges on fraud.

  Subs.  (silence)

   Uni.  Did you hear what I said?

  Subs.  How dare you question our democratically reached decision!
 Did *you* not hear what *we* said?

This is perhaps a little unfair.  If a proper discussion had been held
beforehand, then nobody could have *reasonably* agreed to alter the
Reply-To headers without *first* refuting the public safety concerns.
But this was not done; instead there was a vote.  One subscriber even
called for the vote as a means to end the discussion.

And now, when the university is required to decide the matter, *again*
public discussion is to be curtailed?  That is fine, but remember that
reasonable arguments of public safety and wilful mis-information are
still standing.  They have hardly been addressed yet, let alone
refuted.

(Again, pending that decision, I recommend that the configuration be
returned to its default setting.  The default is strongly recommended
by the providers and its safety is unquestioned.)


Elijah Wright said:
 Please don't reply-all on private mail (what this appears to be -
 interim mails did not go to Air-L), and then include lists in the CC
 line. ... it's unethical ...

Apologies for cross-posting, but the mail I quoted was not private:
https://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/2013-April/008257.html

Mike


Brian Conley said:
 +1 to both of Joe's comments.
 
 Michael, I'm not sure what world you live in, but in the world I live in,
 anyone who has information worth considering and is to be respected as a
 security adviser would NEVER follow the actions you've suggested.
 
 This is a strawman. The world is a dangerous place, and people get hurt. At
 least give them the agency to decide how best to protect themselves. Quite
 frankly I think there is a lot of hand-wringing going on, and it really
 wastes a lot of people's time.
 
 If Stanford University, who currently hosts the libtech mailng list decides
 to change the setup in contravention of democratic process of the list
 MEMBERS, then I would hope list members will move to one of many other
 options for hosting.
 
 I fully understand that Stanford University may now feel they have some
 sort of legal obligation, due, no doubt, in part to less than transparent
 actions by a few individuals, robbing the members of the list of agency.
 Its the University's legal decision, no doubt, but perhaps someone from the
 EFF can kindly call them and let them know this is a straw man.
 
 Is it not worth considering that the constant rehashing of this discussion
 is in itself, something reminiscent of the behavior of bad actors
 attempting to derail effective organizing and discussion?
 
 regards all.
 
 
 On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 5:43 PM, Joseph Lorenzo Hall j...@cdt.org wrote:
 
  (reply-to-list-only)
 
  On Apr 23, 2013, at 16:39, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
   Maybe there's a misunderstanding here.  The list subscribers are not
   responsible for the safe administration of the list.  The university
   alone is responsible.  It could never pass that responsibility on to
   the subscribers, even if it wanted to.
 
  There's definitely a misunderstanding. I see mailing lists as
  fundamentally normative negotiations with a foundation of acceptable use,
  whether administered by Stanford or some other entity. Changing the entity
  that hosts a mailman list is one of the most frictionless changes which a
  community can agree to online. So, ultimately it's the list that requires
  persuasion (in my opinion).
 
  --Joe
 
 -- 
 
 Brian Conley
 
 Director, Small World News
 
 

Re: [liberationtech] (advice sought) Public safety and configuration of list

2013-04-23 Thread M. Fioretti
3 lines summary of what follows:

There is NO way that the list admin can prevent list members from
putting in danger other people who ask for help to the list, so stop
worrying too much about this and don't mess anymore with the headers.

On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 23:45:47 PM -0400, Michael Allan wrote:

   Experts on the list advise and inform on matters such as
   encrypting communications, protecting infrastructure from cyber
   attack, and protecting onself from personal danger.

in ~2 years I've been a subscriber here, I don't remember anything
that would be in the personal vulnerable situation category, that is
the starting point for all the concerns that follow. Anyway:

 the software adds a Reply-To header pointing to L, which is the
 address of the list itself.  The message is then passed on to the
 subscribers.  The meaning of the added Reply-To header is, Q asks
 that you reply to her at L. [3]
 Note that this is false information; Q does not ask that.

Partly not correct (Q implicitly asked, or accepted that, the moment
he or she subscribed to a MAILING LIST, that as everybody knows are
places for public discussion. Especially when they have public
archives), partly irrelevant:

a) at least HALF of the fault in the scenario that you keep torturing
   yourself with is not on P. It is on Subscriber Q dumb enough to
   reply with helpful information about a PERSONAL VULNERABLE
   SITUATION [only] to the list, instead of being
   mature/sensible/smart enough to:

1) answer to list ONLY in the vaguest possible terms (I'll
get back to you on that) if at all

2) send any advice that may help but provocate reply with
sensitive data in a completely SEPARATE message, that the list
doesn't see at all

3) eventually, post to the list for future reference a summary
of general advice for cases like that, purged of personal data

   if a tired and distracted person asks for advice to a not
   stressed person, and the second person replies OK, let's talk this
   over just on the edge of a cliff, is the distracted person the
   only one to blame if she falls off the cliff? In other words, the
   only problem and fault in your scenario is not point 4 (P replies
   with private info) but point 3 (Q replies with helpful info, but in
   a totally braindead way, when he or she should really know better)

b) many people, like me, set their mail clients to recognize lists and
   automatically send replies to list messages ONLY to the list.
   Regardless of how much the admin played with the headers.

c) oh, and of course there still are the people who routinely and
   blindly reply to all to whatever they get in their inbox

 POSSIBLE EXPLOIT THAT INCREASES THE DANGER

hmm... 

   Might not this exploit be perceived as feasible?

yes. Just don't expect to solve it with mailing list management. If,
instead, the only goal is to give Stanford and the list admin wants a
legal basis to not be sued, that's OK.

   While Stanford University is evaluating these safety concerns and
   has yet to make a decision, it should return the configuration to
   its default setting. The default setting is known to be safe.

The default setting is known to provide very little of the specific
safety you want, for the reasons I explained. If replying to messages
from this list can put other people in danger, this is something that
ALL list members must individually commit to avoid, whenever they
answer.

Oh, and maybe Q people so DUMB to not check whether they are
replying on or off list when somebody's LIFE may be in danger
shouldn't subscribe in the first place, should they now?

So, personally I (re)vote for keeping reply-to to the list, but do as
you wish because I'll keep MY email client to Reply-to List anyway
(which proves my point), because it's infinitely more convenient than
having different behavior from all the other tens of mailing lists I
am subscribed to.

Marco F.
http://mfioretti.com
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Re: [liberationtech] (advice sought) Public safety and configuration of list

2013-04-23 Thread Joseph Lorenzo Hall
I would suggest if you don't accept the decision of the list members to
keep reply-to-list, you should not subscribe. It seems silly to raise it
again and attempt to appeal to higher authorities that have much better
things on which to spend their time than mediate disputes about mailing
list policy. (I initiated the recent policy discussion of the mailing
list configuration and accept the results, despite not agreeing with the
decision (not on safety grounds).)

best, Joe

On 4/22/13 11:45 PM, Michael Allan wrote:
 To the experts in Liberationtech, Air-L and Mailman lists,
 (cc General Counsel of Stanford University)
 
 Stanford University has configured the Liberationtech mailing list in
 a manner that is potentially unsafe.  University staff are aware of
 the problem and are evalutating the situation, but have yet to take
 action.  I'm a subscriber to the list, and I ask your advice.
 
 
 SITUATION
 
   The Liberationtech mailing list is run by Stanford University in
   connection with its Program on Liberation Technology.  That program
   investigates the use of IT to defend human rights, improve
   governance, empower the poor, promote economic development, and
   pursue a variety of other social goods. [1] Experts on the list
   advise and inform on matters such as encrypting communications,
   protecting infrastructure from cyber attack, and protecting onself
   from personal danger.  Often those seeking help are in vulnerable
   situations.  They include aid workers, reporters and activists who
   live and work in environments where human rights are not well
   respected, or where the government is too weak to protect people
   from organized criminals, rival militias, and so forth.
 
   The list software is GNU Mailman.  The administration interface
   includes the following configuration items: [2]
 
 (a) Should any existing Reply-To: header found in the original
 message be stripped?  If so, this will be done regardless of
 whether an explict Reply-To: header is added by Mailman or
 not.
 
  X  No
  -  Yes
 
 (b) Where are replies to list messages directed?  Poster is
 *strongly* recommended for most mailing lists.
 
   X  Poster
   -  This list
   -  Explicit address (c) _
 
   Shown above is the default, recommended setting of (1 No, 2 Poster).
   It leaves the sender's Reply-To headers (if any) unaltered during
   mail transfer.  Instead of this, the Liberationtech mailing list is
   configured as follows:
 
 (b) Where are replies to list messages directed?  Poster is
 *strongly* recommended for most mailing lists.
 
   -  Poster
   X  This list
   -  Explicit address (c) _
 
   With this setting, whenever a subscriber Q sends a message to the
   list, the software adds a Reply-To header pointing to L, which is
   the address of the list itself.  The message is then passed on to
   the subscribers.  The meaning of the added Reply-To header is, Q
   asks that you reply to her at L. [3]
 
   Note that this is false information; Q does not ask that.
 
 
 EXAMPLE OF DANGER
 
   Matt Mackall has suggested that, here of all places, people might
   get hurt as a consequence of this configuration [4].  I agree.
   Here's a brief example of how people might get hurt:
 
 1. Subscriber P is in a vulnerable situation.  P is distacted by
the situation and is not getting a lot of sleep.
 
 2. P asks the mailing list for advice on the situation, because
that's the purpose of the list.
 
 3. Subscriber Q replies with helpful information.
 
The mailing list adds a Reply-To header to Q's message that
points to address L.  Again, the mis-information is, Q asks
that you reply to her at L. [3]
 
 4. P replies with private information, including (as Matt puts it)
a potentially life-endangering datum.  Tired and distracted,
P replies by hitting the standard Reply button.  In the mail
client, this means reply to Q.
 
The reply goes instead to L, which is the public mailing list.
 
Oh my god!  What have I done!
 
 5. People get hurt.
 
   Isn't this a danger?
 
 
 POSSIBLE EXPLOIT THAT INCREASES THE DANGER
 
   Suppose that P is actually a police operative in an authoritarian
   state, or a criminal operative in a failed state.  He only pretends
   to be a vulnerable activist (say).  His real aim is to hurt the
   activists and other opponents; damage the university's reputation;
   close down the mailing list; make democracy look foolish [5]; and
   finally make some money in the bargain [6].  The likelihood of his
   success is roughly proportional to the amount of harm suffered by
   the activists and other innocent people.
 
   If such an exploit were even *perceived* to be feasible, then the
   mis-configuration of the mailing list would not only be exposing the
   public to a 

[liberationtech] (advice sought) Public safety and configuration of list

2013-04-22 Thread Michael Allan
To the experts in Liberationtech, Air-L and Mailman lists,
(cc General Counsel of Stanford University)

Stanford University has configured the Liberationtech mailing list in
a manner that is potentially unsafe.  University staff are aware of
the problem and are evalutating the situation, but have yet to take
action.  I'm a subscriber to the list, and I ask your advice.


SITUATION

  The Liberationtech mailing list is run by Stanford University in
  connection with its Program on Liberation Technology.  That program
  investigates the use of IT to defend human rights, improve
  governance, empower the poor, promote economic development, and
  pursue a variety of other social goods. [1] Experts on the list
  advise and inform on matters such as encrypting communications,
  protecting infrastructure from cyber attack, and protecting onself
  from personal danger.  Often those seeking help are in vulnerable
  situations.  They include aid workers, reporters and activists who
  live and work in environments where human rights are not well
  respected, or where the government is too weak to protect people
  from organized criminals, rival militias, and so forth.

  The list software is GNU Mailman.  The administration interface
  includes the following configuration items: [2]

(a) Should any existing Reply-To: header found in the original
message be stripped?  If so, this will be done regardless of
whether an explict Reply-To: header is added by Mailman or
not.

 X  No
 -  Yes

(b) Where are replies to list messages directed?  Poster is
*strongly* recommended for most mailing lists.

  X  Poster
  -  This list
  -  Explicit address (c) _

  Shown above is the default, recommended setting of (1 No, 2 Poster).
  It leaves the sender's Reply-To headers (if any) unaltered during
  mail transfer.  Instead of this, the Liberationtech mailing list is
  configured as follows:

(b) Where are replies to list messages directed?  Poster is
*strongly* recommended for most mailing lists.

  -  Poster
  X  This list
  -  Explicit address (c) _

  With this setting, whenever a subscriber Q sends a message to the
  list, the software adds a Reply-To header pointing to L, which is
  the address of the list itself.  The message is then passed on to
  the subscribers.  The meaning of the added Reply-To header is, Q
  asks that you reply to her at L. [3]

  Note that this is false information; Q does not ask that.


EXAMPLE OF DANGER

  Matt Mackall has suggested that, here of all places, people might
  get hurt as a consequence of this configuration [4].  I agree.
  Here's a brief example of how people might get hurt:

1. Subscriber P is in a vulnerable situation.  P is distacted by
   the situation and is not getting a lot of sleep.

2. P asks the mailing list for advice on the situation, because
   that's the purpose of the list.

3. Subscriber Q replies with helpful information.

   The mailing list adds a Reply-To header to Q's message that
   points to address L.  Again, the mis-information is, Q asks
   that you reply to her at L. [3]

4. P replies with private information, including (as Matt puts it)
   a potentially life-endangering datum.  Tired and distracted,
   P replies by hitting the standard Reply button.  In the mail
   client, this means reply to Q.

   The reply goes instead to L, which is the public mailing list.

   Oh my god!  What have I done!

5. People get hurt.

  Isn't this a danger?


POSSIBLE EXPLOIT THAT INCREASES THE DANGER

  Suppose that P is actually a police operative in an authoritarian
  state, or a criminal operative in a failed state.  He only pretends
  to be a vulnerable activist (say).  His real aim is to hurt the
  activists and other opponents; damage the university's reputation;
  close down the mailing list; make democracy look foolish [5]; and
  finally make some money in the bargain [6].  The likelihood of his
  success is roughly proportional to the amount of harm suffered by
  the activists and other innocent people.

  If such an exploit were even *perceived* to be feasible, then the
  mis-configuration of the mailing list would not only be exposing the
  public to a haphazard danger, but also providing the means and
  incentive to orchestrate and amplify that danger.

  Might not this exploit be perceived as feasible?


INTERIM RECOMMENDATION

  While Stanford University is evaluating these safety concerns and
  has yet to make a decision, it should return the configuration to
  its default setting.  The default setting is known to be safe.

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
http://zelea.com/


NOTES

  [1] https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
  http://liberationtechnology.stanford.edu/

  [2] The meaning of configuration variables (a,b,c) is defined