Re: [liberationtech] Looking for collaborators for free-range voting project
An update on this Knight News Challenge submission: The software company Wadobo has joined with its Agora Voting platform. We now have two strong service providers for the mirroring network. We also have the Metagovernment project on board as a neutral facilitator. If you're a provider of on-line, open-source voting services and could use some funding in order to join the mirroring network, please let us know. Adding more providers (up to a certain limit) can only help our chances of winning. See the submission page for contact details: https://www.newschallenge.org/open/open-government/submission/free-range-voting/ -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Looking for collaborators for free-range voting project
On Thu, Feb 28, 2013 at 02:19:11PM +0100, Ruben Bloemgarten wrote: It seems I might have jumped the gun, assuming the discussion was about voting systems for use in political elections. Disclosing all voter data, including voter identity would solve much if not all issues regarding verifiability, however would that not also restrict the use of such a system to topics that have no political or social consequences ? Otherwise it seems that the removal of secrecy/anonymity would be extremely problematic if not out-right dangerous. I'm with Ruben on this one. There are serious problems (in many cases) with disclosure of how someone voted; there are even problems disclosing *if* they voted or possibly if they were *eligible* to vote, even if that disclosure only (putatively) is done to the voter. ---rsk -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Looking for collaborators for free-range voting project
Ruben and Rich, Ruben Bloemgarten said: It seems I might have jumped the gun, assuming the discussion was about voting systems for use in political elections. Disclosing all voter data, including voter identity would solve much if not all issues regarding verifiability, however would that not also restrict the use of such a system to topics that have no political or social consequences ? Otherwise it seems that the removal of secrecy/anonymity would be extremely problematic if not out-right dangerous. Rich Kulawiec said: I'm with Ruben on this one. There are serious problems (in many cases) with disclosure of how someone voted; there are even problems disclosing *if* they voted or possibly if they were *eligible* to vote, even if that disclosure only (putatively) is done to the voter. I guess the main concern is coercion and vote buying. I've discussed this with others and we foresee some important mitigations. (These aren't obvious BAM, and it took us some time to see them.) * (a) Continuous primary voting: Vote sellers can shift their votes after taking the money, perhaps re-selling them to other buyers. This makes vote buying a poor investment. (b) Full disclosure: Buyers, sellers and systematic pressure by others (employers, unions, churches, and so forth) are detectable by statistical pattern analysis of vote shifts and dispositions in correlation with facts (known buyers and sellers, workforce structure and dynamics, and so forth). (c) Separation of primary from decision systems: Public and private voting may be interrelated through separate electoral systems: a public vote in the run-up (primary system) culminates in a private vote on election day (decision system). The final private vote (secret ballot) filters out instances of individual vote buying and coercion. A similar strategy may be applied to normative decisions. Here the decisive vote is often not private, but instead restricted to a small number of people, such as elected assembly members. Concerns of coercion and vote buying are thus *also* restricted to that smaller group of people, who may therefore be closely monitored and scrutinized. These should at least prevent skewing of decisions and other serious harm. Or have we overlooked something? I used to point to the harm caused by our faith in the secret ballot, but now I feel it's the wrong approach. Whatever we suffer on account of our political arrangements (we in the West, who have so much else to be thankful for) is our own fault. We have the wherewithal to fix things, and could even proceed a little faster if we wished. * From this footnote, which also links to discussions http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht#fn-2 Mike -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Looking for collaborators for free-range voting project at Knight News Challenge:
It won't work. Until the bot/zombie is solved, online voting is a non-starter, since any election worthy of being stolen can be. It doesn't matter what you do on the server side: you can construct as elaborate and clever and secure an infrastructure as you wish...because on the client side, there is no way to ensure that what the user sees is what's actually happening. (After all: it's not *their* computer any more. Its new owners can, if they wish, cause a vote for candidate A to be sent as a vote for candidate B, and they can prevent the user from knowing that's happened.) And given that (a) we're now about a decade into the zombie problem (b) no significant effort against them has ever been attempted, let alone completed [1] and (c) the problem is already epidemic and continues to get worse [2] [3], there is no reason whatsoever to think it will be mitigated, let alone solved, in the forseeable future. This doesn't just apply to your proposal: it applies to *all* of them. Unless you can propose and execute a viable plan for solving the zombie problem, then whatever you design/build can be undercut whenever someone chooses to make the effort. (And provided they're not foolishly heavy-handed about it, it's unlikely you would be able to detect this. [4]) ---rsk [1] Botnet takedowns are unimportant and irrelevant; their only purpose is to provide a forum for the spokesliars at Microsoft et.al. to trumpet their prowess while a gullible press and public overlook that they *created* this problem. Merely removing CC networks does nothing to remediate the individual members of the botnets, which are still compromised, still vulnerable, and likely to be conscripted into other botnets before the day is out. [2] We're now seeing portable devices zombie'd: phones, tablets, etc. [3] Estimates of zombie population vary, of course, but clearly, any estimate under 100M should be laughed out of the room. Vint Cerf gave an estimate of 150M just about six years ago, and based on my own work as well as that of others in the anti-spam/abuse area, I thought that was on the high side at the time...but it's most certainly not now. I think the number's probably in the 200-300M range at this point. See: http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070125-8707.html for Cerf's comments. [4] See Schneier's insightful and chilling piece on this here: https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0404.html#4 That piece should be absolutely mandatory reading for anyone even considering voting systems. It not only provides a method for estimating attacker budgets, but it correctly points out that attackers quite often could tip the balance of an election by manipulating a rather small number of votes -- with a corresponding reduction in the probability that the manipulation will be detected. Note that Schneier wrote that in 2004. If you repeat his analysis with numbers from the 2012 election cycle you'll end up with *much* large attacker budgets. For example, Schneier says that in 2002, Congressional candidates raised over 500M. But https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/10/2012-election-spending-will-reach-6.html says that in 2012, they spent about $1.82B. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Looking for collaborators for free-range voting project at Knight News Challenge:
Irrespective of zombies et al. Voting requires the following basic elements : 1. verifiability when casting the vote, i.e. the voter can see that the vote that is cast will be the vote that is counted. This is not possible without a paper trail which is also a valid vote. 2. Counting control. Each step of the electoral process has to be transparent for it to be valid. This means that *anyone* is allowed to observe the counting of the votes, *and* is able to understand that counting process. A printout of a result is not sufficient. Don´t forget that casting the vote is the least important of the process, counting the votes is. 3. Anonimity. There can not be any moment that a vote can be backtracked to the person voting. Again, this can not be based on trusting a system. In many voting laws this anonymity has to be guaranteed, a guarantee that even with paper ballots is problematic, but is practically impossible in the case of electronic voting. When we are discussing voting in its function of the backbone of a democratic system, i.e. the moment when we temporarily delegate our individual power to a representative, deciding who will wield the monopoly on violence, there can be no aspect of this process that is based on trust. If ever there was a system which has distrust at its core, it is voting. The only way to have any form of electronic voting be reliable is when it is seconded by a re-countable paper copy, which means the choice is between one big central printer distributing paper ballots or lots of little little ones printing the ballot on the fly. This excludes online voting completely and makes the entire concept a little silly really. Apart from a child-like enthusiasm for anything with buttons and shiny lights, can anyone here explain to me what the intended benefits of electronic voting over paper voting would be ? Please note that all of the above only applies to political elections, electronic voting is perfectly fine when voting for the X-factor. - Ruben On 02/26/2013 01:35 PM, Rich Kulawiec wrote: It won't work. Until the bot/zombie is solved, online voting is a non-starter, since any election worthy of being stolen can be. It doesn't matter what you do on the server side: you can construct as elaborate and clever and secure an infrastructure as you wish...because on the client side, there is no way to ensure that what the user sees is what's actually happening. (After all: it's not *their* computer any more. Its new owners can, if they wish, cause a vote for candidate A to be sent as a vote for candidate B, and they can prevent the user from knowing that's happened.) And given that (a) we're now about a decade into the zombie problem (b) no significant effort against them has ever been attempted, let alone completed [1] and (c) the problem is already epidemic and continues to get worse [2] [3], there is no reason whatsoever to think it will be mitigated, let alone solved, in the forseeable future. This doesn't just apply to your proposal: it applies to *all* of them. Unless you can propose and execute a viable plan for solving the zombie problem, then whatever you design/build can be undercut whenever someone chooses to make the effort. (And provided they're not foolishly heavy-handed about it, it's unlikely you would be able to detect this. [4]) ---rsk [1] Botnet takedowns are unimportant and irrelevant; their only purpose is to provide a forum for the spokesliars at Microsoft et.al. to trumpet their prowess while a gullible press and public overlook that they *created* this problem. Merely removing CC networks does nothing to remediate the individual members of the botnets, which are still compromised, still vulnerable, and likely to be conscripted into other botnets before the day is out. [2] We're now seeing portable devices zombie'd: phones, tablets, etc. [3] Estimates of zombie population vary, of course, but clearly, any estimate under 100M should be laughed out of the room. Vint Cerf gave an estimate of 150M just about six years ago, and based on my own work as well as that of others in the anti-spam/abuse area, I thought that was on the high side at the time...but it's most certainly not now. I think the number's probably in the 200-300M range at this point. See: http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070125-8707.html for Cerf's comments. [4] See Schneier's insightful and chilling piece on this here: https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0404.html#4 That piece should be absolutely mandatory reading for anyone even considering voting systems. It not only provides a method for estimating attacker budgets, but it correctly points out that attackers quite often could tip the balance of an election by manipulating a rather small number of votes -- with a corresponding reduction in the probability that the manipulation will be detected. Note that Schneier wrote that in 2004. If you repeat his
Re: [liberationtech] Looking for collaborators for free-range voting project at Knight News Challenge:
(most of the statements I make below can be cited... holler if you want some reading.) On Tue Feb 26 08:15:54 2013, Ruben Bloemgarten wrote: Irrespective of zombies et al. Voting requires the following basic elements : 1. verifiability when casting the vote, i.e. the voter can see that the vote that is cast will be the vote that is counted. This is not possible without a paper trail which is also a valid vote. This is a very complex topic, one that I've worked on for many years and was the central them of my PhD thesis. I think it's important to recognize that there are cryptographic voting systems that do verifiable paperless voting. With out-of-band secret sharing, it gets most of the way to what one would want to see... of course, the client-side malware problem and the general problem of unsupervised voting (people voting outside of an official location with polices that make sure only one person enters the booth, etc.). As a member of the board of directors of the Verified Voting Foundation, I should say that currently a paper trail backed by robust risk-limiting audits are the state-of-the-art for governmental elections. 2. Counting control. Each step of the electoral process has to be transparent for it to be valid. This means that *anyone* is allowed to observe the counting of the votes, *and* is able to understand that counting process. A printout of a result is not sufficient. Don´t forget that casting the vote is the least important of the process, counting the votes is. This is somewhat of a strawman... there is no way that one individual can observe all the steps in an election as complicated as the ones we regularly run in the U.S. (the U.S. is very strange compared to most other countries in terms of the massive requirements we place on the voting process... I would argue for very good public policy reasons). This is why the academic literature on these kinds of topics increasingly uses cryptographic auditing mechanisms to ensure that once a valid ballot enters the system, it can be tracked. (And, believe it or not, RFID-based inventory controls can do a lot.) 3. Anonimity. There can not be any moment that a vote can be backtracked to the person voting. Again, this can not be based on trusting a system. In many voting laws this anonymity has to be guaranteed, a guarantee that even with paper ballots is problematic, but is practically impossible in the case of electronic voting. I wouldn't agree that it's practically impossible... fancy primitives like mix-nets and interactive zero-knowledge proofs have been put to good use to come up with some basic assurances of secrecy. As I think you imply, there are fundamental limits... e.g., there are a number of small precincts in CA that I'm familiar with where all the cast ballots are virtually identical (this is just to underline that there are fundamental practical limits on ballot secrecy). And, as Josh Benaloh from MSR highlighted recently, this can be extended in steps to construct pretty interesting ballot secrecy violations (as one example, if I vote for candidate B and I see that all other ballots were counted for candidate A, I know everyone else's vote with certainty while they don't necessarily have the same level of certainty about others' ballots). When we are discussing voting in its function of the backbone of a democratic system, i.e. the moment when we temporarily delegate our individual power to a representative, deciding who will wield the monopoly on violence, there can be no aspect of this process that is based on trust. If ever there was a system which has distrust at its core, it is voting. The popular refrain in the field, I believe from Rice's Dan Wallach is: the purpose of voting is to convince the loser they lost. The only way to have any form of electronic voting be reliable is when it is seconded by a re-countable paper copy, which means the choice is between one big central printer distributing paper ballots or lots of little little ones printing the ballot on the fly. This excludes online voting completely and makes the entire concept a little silly really. I would say paper is necessary (at the moment) but not sufficient... meaningful audits are key. And no state in the U.S. is currently doing them in a robust manner. CA is the only state that has a pilot program to study and test practical implementation of risk limiting audits; the idea being that an audit must test the hypothesis hand-counting all ballots will not find enough error to change the outcome of the race. This is a formalized notion that many of us have worked on for a number of years... and, frankly, it's the biggest development in elections *for the entire world* in many decades. Here is a great Ars post on this that profiles UC Berkeley's Philip Stark, who is the leading mind here: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/07/saving-american-elections-with-10-sided-dice-one-stats-profs-quest/ Apart from a
Re: [liberationtech] Looking for collaborators for free-range voting project at Knight News Challenge:
On 02/26/2013 03:49 PM, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote: (most of the statements I make below can be cited... holler if you want some reading.) On Tue Feb 26 08:15:54 2013, Ruben Bloemgarten wrote: Irrespective of zombies et al. Voting requires the following basic elements : 1. verifiability when casting the vote, i.e. the voter can see that the vote that is cast will be the vote that is counted. This is not possible without a paper trail which is also a valid vote. This is a very complex topic, one that I've worked on for many years and was the central them of my PhD thesis. I think it's important to recognize that there are cryptographic voting systems that do verifiable paperless voting. With out-of-band secret sharing, it gets most of the way to what one would want to see... of course, the client-side malware problem and the general problem of unsupervised voting (people voting outside of an official location with polices that make sure only one person enters the booth, etc.). I mean verifiable by the voter. Using their eyes. Without a PhD in cryptography, preferably. One man. One vote. not One educated man. As a member of the board of directors of the Verified Voting Foundation, I should say that currently a paper trail backed by robust risk-limiting audits are the state-of-the-art for governmental elections. 2. Counting control. Each step of the electoral process has to be transparent for it to be valid. This means that *anyone* is allowed to observe the counting of the votes, *and* is able to understand that counting process. A printout of a result is not sufficient. Don´t forget that casting the vote is the least important of the process, counting the votes is. This is somewhat of a strawman... there is no way that one individual can observe all the steps in an election as complicated as the ones we regularly run in the U.S. (the U.S. is very strange compared to most other countries in terms of the massive requirements we place on the voting process... I would argue for very good public policy reasons). This is why the academic literature on these kinds of topics increasingly uses cryptographic auditing mechanisms to ensure that once a valid ballot enters the system, it can be tracked. (And, believe it or not, RFID-based inventory controls can do a lot.) Not really a strawman. I´m not suggesting that any single individual will be able to observe every step from each voting office, but that all steps are legally allowed to be and can practically be observed by a citizen (a layman), ensuring the likelihood of a significant number of the vote counting being observed, for instance by the cat-lady from a few houses down the street. This is the case for the voting legislation that I do know (the Dutch one), I have no idea what the details of U.S. electoral law are. 3. Anonimity. There can not be any moment that a vote can be backtracked to the person voting. Again, this can not be based on trusting a system. In many voting laws this anonymity has to be guaranteed, a guarantee that even with paper ballots is problematic, but is practically impossible in the case of electronic voting. I wouldn't agree that it's practically impossible... fancy primitives like mix-nets and interactive zero-knowledge proofs have been put to good use to come up with some basic assurances of secrecy. How important is understanding how a person´s secrecy is guaranteed to the person counting on that secrecy ? With practically I do mean practical, I´m sure that its technically possible to reach a similar level of secrecy of a paper ballot, but to achieve both actual secrecy and a common understanding of how that secrecy is guaranteed I would say is ,more likely than not, practically impossible. As I think you imply, there are fundamental limits... e.g., there are a number of small precincts in CA that I'm familiar with where all the cast ballots are virtually identical (this is just to underline that there are fundamental practical limits on ballot secrecy). Yes, quite. It would even be possible to do a massive fingerprint query of the paper ballots, so there are many scenarios, some more obscure than others that would break the secrecy of the ballot. And, as Josh Benaloh from MSR highlighted recently, this can be extended in steps to construct pretty interesting ballot secrecy violations (as one example, if I vote for candidate B and I see that all other ballots were counted for candidate A, I know everyone else's vote with certainty while they don't necessarily have the same level of certainty about others' ballots). When we are discussing voting in its function of the backbone of a democratic system, i.e. the moment when we temporarily delegate our individual power to a representative, deciding who will wield the monopoly on violence, there can be no aspect of this process that is based on trust. If ever there was a system which has distrust at its core,
Re: [liberationtech] Looking for collaborators for free-range voting project at Knight News Challenge:
I would argue that voting backed by re-countable physical paper is more reliable than pure electronic voting in an official election. However, I think that an electronic voting is still very useful under some specific situations. In Hong Kong, the Chief Execute are not elected by citizen through universal suffrage. The CE is instead chosen by a Election Committee consist of about a thousand of persons mainly appointed. The demands for an universal suffrage is clear, but the progress is hindered by the CCP of mainland China and the vested interests. On the 2012 CE election day, some people from the University of Hong Kong set up a mock poll, dubbed civic referendum, to allow the citizen to express their views on the CE election. The mock is funded by public donations. The mock poll provided 15 physical polling stations, and online voting via its website and smartphone. However, shortly after the mock poll began, the online voting server were overwhelmed by huge amount of requests from attackers and legitimate voters. It completely brought down the online voting. Many people went to the physical stations, which may be far away from their home, to cast their vote. Despite the difficulties, a total of 222,990 votes are still casted in the physical stations and online voting combined. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong_Kong_Chief_Executive_election,_2012#Mock_polls) The goal of this civic referendum is never to officially elect the governor. By providing an unofficial election result which has higher creditability and legitimacy than the official result from the Election Committee, we hope to discredit the elected CE and the Election Committee, demonstrating the demand for a truth universal suffrage, and to push the democratic development forward. Because the mock poll is funded by the community, we have no way to set up enough physical voting stations and voter registry comparable to the election organized by the government. Indeed, it is difficult to prevent double voting in such poor man's election. Some supporters of the CCP criticized the mock poll for lack of creditability with these reasons. Due to the lack of resource, internet voting might be one of the only means to allow most Hong Kong citizen to participate in a mock poll. What we need is a deployable solution to allow people to vote anonymously, either online or offline, at the same time provides enough creditability and verifiability. A perfect solution is not necessary because the goal isn't to replace the official paper votes. Edwin On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 6:49 AM, Joseph Lorenzo Hall j...@cdt.org wrote: (most of the statements I make below can be cited... holler if you want some reading.) On Tue Feb 26 08:15:54 2013, Ruben Bloemgarten wrote: Irrespective of zombies et al. Voting requires the following basic elements : 1. verifiability when casting the vote, i.e. the voter can see that the vote that is cast will be the vote that is counted. This is not possible without a paper trail which is also a valid vote. This is a very complex topic, one that I've worked on for many years and was the central them of my PhD thesis. I think it's important to recognize that there are cryptographic voting systems that do verifiable paperless voting. With out-of-band secret sharing, it gets most of the way to what one would want to see... of course, the client-side malware problem and the general problem of unsupervised voting (people voting outside of an official location with polices that make sure only one person enters the booth, etc.). As a member of the board of directors of the Verified Voting Foundation, I should say that currently a paper trail backed by robust risk-limiting audits are the state-of-the-art for governmental elections. 2. Counting control. Each step of the electoral process has to be transparent for it to be valid. This means that *anyone* is allowed to observe the counting of the votes, *and* is able to understand that counting process. A printout of a result is not sufficient. Don´t forget that casting the vote is the least important of the process, counting the votes is. This is somewhat of a strawman... there is no way that one individual can observe all the steps in an election as complicated as the ones we regularly run in the U.S. (the U.S. is very strange compared to most other countries in terms of the massive requirements we place on the voting process... I would argue for very good public policy reasons). This is why the academic literature on these kinds of topics increasingly uses cryptographic auditing mechanisms to ensure that once a valid ballot enters the system, it can be tracked. (And, believe it or not, RFID-based inventory controls can do a lot.) 3. Anonimity. There can not be any moment that a vote can be backtracked to the person voting. Again, this can not be based on trusting a system. In many voting laws this anonymity has to be guaranteed, a
[liberationtech] Looking for collaborators for free-range voting project at Knight News Challenge:
From: Michael Allan m...@zelea.com I'm seeking collaborators for a Knight News Challenge proposal. As Steven mentions, this year's challenge is, How might we improve the way citizens and governments interact? https://www.newschallenge.org/ Below is a rough draft of the proposal. My own contribution to this would be to bring in Votorola as a technical provider for the mirroring network. We'd need at least one other such provider, plus some organizational support (in part because there's financing if we win). The submission deadline is March 18. Please let me know if you can help. My contact details are at: http://zelea.com/ PROJECT TITLE Free-range voting MAIN IMAGE http://zelea.com/project/outcast/vomir.png DESCRIPTION This is a proposal to apply the technology of vote mirroring in order to forestall a monopoly in the provision of online voting services. Online voting and its innovations are important to the field of participatory democracy. You might think that opening up the source code of a voting facility would be sufficient to ensure that the facility itself stays free and open, but that is not true. Voting is prone to network effects. It's like a telephone service in this regard. If I plug my telephone into a different network than everyone else is using, then it isn't going to work. Having a copy of the source code won't help. Unless something is done to tame the broader network effects, then online voters (like telephone customers before them) will become locked into the services of a dominant provider. The solution proposed here is vote mirroring. Votes cast at facility A are mirrored at facilities B, C, and so forth. This involves copying each vote and translating it from the format of the source facility (A) to that of the mirroring facility (B, C, etc.). Voting methods may differ hugely and the translation may therefore entail a degree of information loss, making for an imperfect image. Such imperfections cannot invalidate the overall technique, however, because a best effort at an image is always a better reflection of reality than no image at all. The upshot is that each facility now gets all the votes and can show the truest possible picture of the overall results. It no longer matters where I cast my own vote, because it shows up everywhere regardless. So I can range freely across all the available facilities and settle on whichever best suits my personal needs and preferences. Never again can I be trapped by a particular provider. We are [names of signatory providers and other supporting organizations]. Together we plan to build a lightweight mirroring network to loosely interconnect our various voting facilities. We'll begin with voting forms that are fully public; those are the simplest to handle and they allow for unrestricted technical freedom among providers. We'll work out the problems and gain experience with the technology. An immediate benefit will be to reduce the expectation of network effects that has long poisoned relations among technical providers and hampered their development work. Small projects will no longer be forced to devote scarce resources to attempts at tipping an unstable balance in their own favour. Instead, we may expect an improvement in the professional climate of the field and an increase in its attractiveness to talent, and other resources. WHAT IS YOUR PROJECT? (1 sentence max) To apply the technology of vote mirroring in order to forestall the formation of a monopoly in the provision of online voting services, improve the professional climate in the field of participatory democracy, and heighten its appeal as a career prospect for talented people. LINKS http://zelea.com/w/User:ThomasvonderElbe_GmxDe/Vote_mirroring http://zelea.com/w/User_talk:ThomasvonderElbe_GmxDe/Vote_mirroring http://zelea.com/w/User:Mike-ZeleaCom/Vote_mirroring_as_a_counter-monopoly_measure ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Vote mirroring is the invention of Thomas von der Elbe. See: http://mail.zelea.com/list/votorola/2009-December/000215.html The latest copy of this draft is at: http://metagovernment.org/wiki/User:Michael_Allan/Knight -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/-- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
