Hi, Squad !
I can't really participate in this month's discussion because I'm
(still!) trying to finish my university degree. Nevertheless, just now
I'm fed up with it so I'm going to use this post as an excuse to get
away from it all a little ;)
One recurring problem we seem to see in those discussions is the nature
of the levels. I believe many people (as Glenn's post indicates) still
see them as ontological "things", entities in their own right.
This is not so.
The levels are intellectual PoVs. If you look at our planet, you can
choose to define it by its mass, gravitionnal pull, magnetic field,
density, or whatever.
You can also choose to define it as a biological entity, in which case
you'll be able to enumerate its different species, their interactions,
etc.
You can also choose to define it in a geopolitical fashion, describing
the dominant nations, their respective economic weight, ressources,
political systems and so on.
Finally, you might decide to describe its intellectuals systems, its
competing metaphysics, which ones are dominant, how they influence each
other, making an "History of Ideas 101", so to speak.
Each and every time, you'll miss something, because as Pirsig pointed
out, each level interacts with the others.
It doesn't mean that the levels are ontological "things", that then
interact with one another.
No, it means that whenever you try to describe something, you leave
something out. That the reality we try to describe is made of
interlocking patterns, which complexities are beyond anyone's abilities
to completely unravel (that's the positivists' illusion). No perfect
metaphysics.
All we ever do is take a handful of sand from this beach, and call it
reality. Because we need to pay attention to this handful of sand.
Because if we don't, we're going to die. Necessity is the primary mover
in this process.
To come back to Glenn's post, and remembering that the IntPoVs I'm about
to present are *tricks* (good ones I hope) to get things done (like
convincing you I'm right ;), I want to say that as Bo points out,
societies aren't composed of individuals any more than Q-Intellect is
composed of societies. Societies are composed of behaviours, which are
biological, and which are a support for new patterns, social patterns.
In this way, just as DNA molecules carry biological informations, giving
birth to the bio level, the repetitive patterns of behaviour carry
social information, then giving birth to societies. This information is
carried on a bio support (organisms), but isn't equal to them. Bacterias
are an example of bio patterns carrying no other informations than
biological ones. Most evolved bio patterns also carry behavioural
patterns, which are in my opinion the machine-code of the social level.
The reason I cannot think of SOM as being equal to the Q-Intellect is
that it is already too perfect, too developped to be a good candidate
for the post. So I've got to find a good (even if it's a little loosely
defined) one. Language seems to be such a candidate for many people.
It's supposed to be different from society, but is it ? Bees
communicate, wolves do too, but that's not language they're using. So
what is language ? I'll give you a linguist definition.
Language must be distinguished from languages, in that it refer
specifically to the phenomenom of human communication, as opposed to the
many communications codes (french, english, german and so on) known to
humans. The traits that are specific to language description are :
1. stratification : languages have two levels, a phenomenal one and a
semantic one. That's no different from most animal languages. A sign is
composed of a signifying part and a signified part. In human languages
the signifying part (the support for meaning, the signified part) is
phonetic, made of sounds.
2. double articulation : this is where animals and human differ.
"Articulate" here refers to "divided into parts". When both levels of
human language are divided into parts, we end up with two types of units
:
a) double-sided units, with a phonetic component and a semantic one :
words.
b) one-sided units, with only a phonetic component : phonems (/s/ like
in [s]ide, [s]aw, [s]lip,[sc]ythe, /k/ like in [c]aporal, /a/, etc.).
The number of phonems contained in a specific language varies (36 in
french, generally between 20 and 50). Combining those units allows one
to forms complex sounds - words.
All animal languages have parallel articulation. One sound - one
meaning. There are no sounds or signs without significations (to our
knowledge) in animal "languages" that combined with other sounds would
create a meaningful sign.
That's for the official definition, but let me go a bit further. One
important distinction here is made between the phenomenal and the
non-phenomenal. This (official, remember) definition positively smacks
of mind/matter division. Sounds and meaning are differentiated, but as
we cannot (yet) decipher the complex