Re: [Marxism] The Trump-Putin coalition for Assad lays waste to Syria: Imperial agreement and carve-up behind the noisy rhetoric

[mkaradjis . via Marxism]

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Now, onto Turkey, SDF etc.

Chris:

“I would not criticise any rebel group that adopted a similar policy.
What I am criticising is the fact that some rebel groups have become
instruments of a Turkish intervention that is directed against the
Democratic Federation of Northern Syria.”

Elsewhere, Chris disputes my statement that rebels were transferred
north to Euphrates Shield to fight ISIS, claiming they went to fight
the SDF. He claims that Turkey’s claim that its intervention was
directed against both ISIS and the YPG “was a smokescreen,” because,
he claims, Turkey had previously collaborated with ISIS against the
YPG in the northeast.

This seems strange logic. I will leave aside whether or not Turkey
“supported ISIS” in the past - Turkey heavily supported anti-ISIS
rebels, but at a certain point may have maneuvered with ISIS against
the YPG in Kobani, as any self-respecting Machiavellian regime might
do to look after its interests. Such tactical preferencing of one
enemy over another should not be confused with actually “supporting”
ISIS. But regardless, even if in the past Turkey “supported” ISIS, how
is that an argument against what it was doing now?

As I pointed out in my previous post, which Chris has not really
answered, the Turkey/FSA/rebel action under Euphrates Shield cleared
ISIS out of a vast swathe of territory, bordered by Azaz, Jarablus and
al-Bab. The SDF was not present in any of these areas. The only
FSA-SDF clashes were some brief “border” clashes in the region between
Manbij and Jarablus, near the outset of the operation, which the US
put a stop to. How anyone can describe this as an attack on the SDF
while just using “fighting ISIS” as a “smokescreen” I have no idea; it
defies reality.

Try to remember the Stalinist origins of the PKK, comrades - they may
have moved on, but some of their propaganda style reflects old habits.
I recommend we be aware of this and try not to repeat it.

Of course it is true that one of the motivations of the Turkish regime
in helping the FSA drive ISIS from this region was to prevent the YPG
from carrying out its potentially catastrophic irredentist plan to
“link” Kurdish Afrin with Kurdish Kobani by seizing this 6 thousand
square mile stretch of non-Kurdish territory. But in taking part, the
FSA/rebels were not carrying out Turkish orders, as they were acting
entirely in their own interests in recovering this Arab- and
Turkmen-majority territory from ISIS, which had conquered it from
these same rebels earlier. It had never before been controlled by the
YPG, and the YPG had no special “right” to take it.

Finally, Chris rejects my description of the Menagh-Tal Rifaat region
as "occupied Arab territory" which "The rebels [by which he means the
groups allied to Turkey] have the right to re-take [their territory]
from the YPG-SDF". This is the Arab/Turkmen-majority region of
northern Aleppo that was violently conquered from the rebels by the
YPG in February 2016, with the invading Russian imperialist airforce,
when it wasn’t slaughtering the length and breadth of Syria, bloodily
softening up these rebel towns for the YPG to seize.

On reflection, calling them occupied “Arab” territory, on account of
their Arab majority, was a mistake, Just as Kurdish-majority territory
is not “Kurdish.” In both cases, it is Syrian territory, and it is up
to the locals, of whatever ethnic majority, to decide who runs the
place, and how. But apart from the word “Arab”, everything else I
wrote about this occupied territory was correct.

Chris does not address the bloody conquest, the role of Russian
imperialism in this conquest, the resistance of the FSA/rebels in
these towns, the expulsion of the populations, the demands of the
expelled populations for return, the YPG gloating over FSA corpses in
Tal Rifaat during the conquest, etc etc. Rather, he claims:

“This ignores the fact that the SDF has a strong Arab component, and
that many of its Arab members come from a Free Syrian Army
background.” To back this, he notes my discussion in my MLR article of
Nusra’s suppression of two large FSA coalitions, the Syrian
Revolutionaries Front and Harakat Hazm, and notes that I do not
“mention that some of the survivors of Nusra's attacks fled to Afrin,
where they helped form a new, predominantly Arab, group called Jaysh
al-Thuwar (Revolutionary Army), which later combined with the mainly
Kurdish YPG/YPJ to form the Syrian Democratic Forces.”

Therefore, he concludes: “Thus the "rebel" groups allied to Turkey
cannot be considered the sole representatives of Arab people in
northern Syria.  Tal Rifaat is not "their territory", which they are
entitled to "re-take".”

This 

Re: [Marxism] The Trump-Putin coalition for Assad lays waste to Syria: Imperial agreement and carve-up behind the noisy rhetoric

[mkaradjis . via Marxism]

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Chris: "The US kept sanctions on Iran even after the UN lifted its
sanctions. There are exemptions which have allowed some deals.  But
why have sanctions at all if Iran is such a great ally? I think it has
something to do with Iran's support of Hezbollah against Israel."

My argument was not that the US and Iran were "great allies." It was
that they are, *in practice*, in most of the main theatres of conflict
in the Mideast *at present*, allies, in sharp contrast to Trumpist
rhetoric.

The reasons for the long-term war of rhetoric, as well as the mild
sanctions that Chris notes, are, as I said, an interesting topic for
research. I'm more than open to suggestions. I have no hard and fast
opinions.

However, Chris' view, probably a common one, that "it has something to
do with Iran's support of Hezbollah against Israel" only creates more
questions, not answers. That would have been a good answer up till
Hezbollah's liberation of southern Lebanon from Israeli occupation in
2000. Actually, the Iran-Israel "conflict" is, even much more than the
US-Iran one, a blatant war of rhetoric, mediated by geographic
distance which makes it all the more harmless. It is the Arabic
peoples living in between who get slaughtered by Iran and Israel while
they shout at each other. However, due to the lucky coincidence that
southern Lebanon just happened to be heavily populated by Shia, the
Iranian-backed Shia militia Hezbollah took the lead in the national
liberation struggle. This enabled Iran to appear to be "fighting
Zionism", in an actual hot war, when in fact this was an entirely
rational liberation struggle. Hard to imagine how different history
may have been if southern Lebanon were populated by Sunni, and the
Shia were unaffeced up north somewhere.

But once Lebanon was liberated in 2000, Iran and Hezbollah itself were
then a a loss as to how to continue to justify the "resistance"
ideology that had grown as a result, which for one thing facilitated
the mullah regime terrorising its own population via the use of
bullshit. The brief and bloody flare-up between Israel and Hezbollah
in 2006, when Hezbollah kidnapped a few Zionist troops and Israel
destroyed half of Lebanon and killed 1500 Lebanese civilians in
response, perhaps briefly gave the rhetoric a bit more "meat,"
however, and ironically, but even Nasrallah had to admit that the
punishment meted out on Lebanese civilians was not worth his games.

But regardless, since 2006, the Israeli-Lebanese border has been
stone-cold quiet (not sure if it was as quiet as the Syria-Israel
"border" on occupied Golan for 40 years under Assad, but almost as
much). No-one claims Hezbollah did jack "against Israel" over the last
11 years. Instead, since 2011, and especially 2013, Hezbollah has
turned itself into a death squad for Assad engaged in mass murder and
sectarian cleansing of the Syrian Arab population. I'm sure they shout
some "anti-Zionist" slogans while they do this.

So, given that Hezbollah does nothing against Israel, it is unclear
why Iran's support for Hezbollah "against Israel" would be a reason
for any *real*, as opposed to rhetorical, US hostility to Iran -
except in as much as historical grievances die hard and slow, with
wounded pride and credibility and all that at stake. Therefore, the
case is still wide open for me.

On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 4:21 PM, Chris Slee  wrote:
>
> Michael says:
>
> "But more broadly, what is behind the ongoing “war of rhetoric” between
> the US and Iran that has never led to an actual war is a good question
> for research. I suggest Obama understood the real long-term interests
> of US imperialism much better with his policy of engagement of a major
> regional capitalist power, with a large population/market, a
> relatively developed economy, plenty of oil and plenty of potential as
> a regional killer-cop."
>
> But it is not JUST a war of rhetoric.  The US kept sanctions on Iran even 
> after the UN lifted its sanctions.
>
> There are exemptions which have allowed some deals.  But why have sanctions 
> at all if Iran is such a great ally?
>
> I think it has something to do with Iran's support of Hezbollah against 
> Israel.
>
> Chris Slee

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Re: [Marxism] The Trump-Putin coalition for Assad lays waste to Syria: Imperial agreement and carve-up behind the noisy rhetoric

[Chris Slee via Marxism]

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Michael says:

"But more broadly, what is behind the ongoing “war of rhetoric” between
the US and Iran that has never led to an actual war is a good question
for research. I suggest Obama understood the real long-term interests
of US imperialism much better with his policy of engagement of a major
regional capitalist power, with a large population/market, a
relatively developed economy, plenty of oil and plenty of potential as
a regional killer-cop."

But it is not JUST a war of rhetoric.  The US kept sanctions on Iran even after 
the UN lifted its sanctions.

There are exemptions which have allowed some deals.  But why have sanctions at 
all if Iran is such a great ally?

I think it has something to do with Iran's support of Hezbollah against Israel.

Chris Slee
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Re: [Marxism] The Trump-Putin coalition for Assad lays waste to Syria: Imperial agreement and carve-up behind the noisy rhetoric

[mkaradjis . via Marxism]

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On Chris’s first part of the response, we don’t have big disagreements
here, judging from his response. Disagreement is stronger on the
second part, the Turkey/SDF part. But some comments on the first part
anyway.

In relation to my comment that Turkey acted in its own interests, and
not that of the US, in backing the Syrian rebels, just as it did when
it backed the Mavi Marmara to break the siege of Gaza, Chris responds:

“That is not a good analogy.  A government permitting its citizens to
join a humanitarian aid convoy is not the same as a government arming
rebels to overthrow another government.”

But my point was the reasons for Turkish actions: that Turkey did not
back the rebels because it is a “US-backed” state, a rather obvious
statement given how much more forcefully Turkey did back them, in
contrast to the US role of trying to block, limit, coopt and divert
the rebels as much as possible, leading to significant US-Turkish
differences throughout the war.

But then Chris seems to agree that various states either backed Assad
or the rebels due to their own reasons, and not due to being “US
puppets” or otherwise, so we agree basically.

On the specifics though: the AKP did not just “permit” its citizens to
“join” the convoy; it was part-organised by the Islamist IHH,
connected to Erdogan’s son. Most observers understand the strong
political connection between the AKP’s Syria and Palestine policies,
connected as they were via the AKP’s ideological links to the Muslim
Brotherhood, present both among the Syrian opposition and in the form
of Hamas in Gaza. The AKP also provides significant support to Hamas,
which is a political movement aimed at liberating Palestine, not an
aid convoy. It does not do this because it is “US-backed.”

Next, Chris takes up my point that “to the extent that the US had any
relation to the arming of the Syrian rebels by these three states, its
main role was always to try to limit the quantity and quality of the
arms sent, restrict who they could be sent to, act to coopt those who
got a few arms to divert them away from the struggle against Assad,
and above all to ensure that no anti-aircraft
weaponry got to the rebels ever, in an overwhelmingly air war launched
by the regime".

He says that if this was the US “main role” then “the simplest way
would have been to ban its allies from giving any arms at all to the
rebels.  To enforce this edict, it could have threatened these allies
with sanctions (e.g. a ban on new weapons supplies from the US).”

Of course, the US cannot “ban” states that are not its puppets from
doing their thing. For example, the US was not able to “ban” Saudi
Arabia from supplying so many countless billions of dollars to the
PLO/Fatah over the decades, even though the whole time the US listed
them as an arch-villainous “terrorist” organization. I’m not sure why
Chris thinks the simplest thing for the US to do would have been to
threaten sanctions, when I did not say the US aimed to “ban” them
providing arms, but rather to “limit,” “restrict”, “coopt”, “divert”
and “ban” certain weapons - which the US did very successfully. As you
may have noticed, in a 6-year air war, almost zero anti-aircraft
weapons got to the rebels - thanks to the US.

Chris says “The US did not do this, because it wanted SOME arms to
flow to the rebels.” But that is what I said. But the US did not want
the quantity or quality of arms flowing to the rebels that Saudi
Arabia, Qatar and Turkey would have liked. Of course, even these
countries did not want an unlimited flow; even they only wanted, in my
opinion, “to put pressure on the Assad regime, leading to a negotiated
transition, similar to what happened in Yemen,” as Chris says the US
aim was.

Yes, we agree that the US only ever wanted a “Yemeni solution” - ie, a
superficial change at the top, preserving the regime, not “regime
change.” However, I think we also need to account for the difference
between the far more conservative US, on this, and these three states.
These states knew that, if any actual “pressure” was going to be
imposed on Assad, to bring about the “political solution” they all
support, then the rebels would need somewhat better arms than the crap
they got. If the arms are *too* limited in quantity and quality, no
real pressure at all can be put on Assad, even for the most limited
objectives.

In other words, there was a contradiction between the alleged US aim -
putting pressure on Assad to negotiate - and the very tight degree to
which the US limited, restricted and banned. That is because, in my
opinion, the US had very little commitment to even this conservative
solution. The US aim was for the 

Re: [Marxism] The Trump-Putin coalition for Assad lays waste to Syria: Imperial agreement and carve-up behind the noisy rhetoric

[Chris Slee via Marxism]

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Further response to Michael Karadjis (part 2)

Michael quotes my statement:

"If the 'rebels' are no longer fighting the Assad regime, should they still be 
called 'rebels'?  Some former rebel groups have become instruments of Turkish 
intervention in Syria".

He accuses me of double standards, because I have not criticised the Syrian 
Democratic Forces, even though the SDF also "does not fight Assad".

The SDF has a policy of not initiating armed conflict with the Assad regime 
forces, but fighting back if attacked.

I would not criticise any rebel group that adopted a similar policy.  What I am 
criticising is the fact that some rebel groups have become instruments of a 
Turkish intervention that is directed against the Democratic Federation of 
Northern Syria.

Michael quotes my statement that:

"There has already been a 'counterrevolutionary agreement' between Turkey, 
Russia and Assad.  Last year some Turkish-backed groups withdrew from Aleppo 
city and other areas where they had been fighting against Assad's forces.  Some 
of them were transferred to the northern part of Aleppo province in order to 
fight against the SDF".

Michael disputes this, saying:  "no, they were transferred to northern 
Aleppo province to fight ISIS, not the SDF".

Turkey said its intervention was directed against both ISIS and the YPG.  But 
this was a smokescreen.  Turkey had accepted ISIS controlling a section of the 
Syria/Turkey border, including the town of Jarablus, for several years.  Turkey 
had collaborated with ISIS in attacking Rojava.

It was only after the SDF had liberated Manbij from ISIS, and was advancing on 
Jarablus, that Turkey invaded.

Turkey succeeded in blocking further SDF advances, but was unable to reverse 
the gains already made.  Turkey was warned against trying to capture Manbij by 
the US, which was worried this would divert SDF resources away from the 
campaign against ISIS in Raqqa.  However Turkey and its allies have continued a 
campaign of harassment by bombarding SDF-controlled towns (including Tal 
Rifaat).

Michael makes several references to the SDF's capture of Tal Rifaat in February 
2016.  He claims the Menagh-Tal Rifaat region is "occupied Arab territory", and 
that "The rebels [by which he means the groups allied to Turkey] have the right 
to re-take their territory from the YPG-SDF".

This ignores the fact that the SDF has a strong Arab component, and that many 
of its Arab members come from a Free Syrian Army background.

In his Marxist Left Review article, Michael mentions the violent suppression of 
the Syrian Revolutionaries Front and Harakat Hazm (both of which were regarded 
as part of the FSA) by Jabhat al-Nusra.  But he doesn't mention that some of 
the survivors of Nusra's attacks fled to Afrin, where they helped form a new, 
predominantly Arab, group called Jaysh al-Thuwar (Revolutionary Army), which 
later combined with the mainly Kurdish YPG/YPJ to form the Syrian Democratic 
Forces.

Thus the "rebel" groups allied to Turkey can not be considered the sole 
representatives of Arab people in northern Syria.  Tal Rifaat is not "their 
territory", which they are entitled to "re-take".


Chris Slee



From: mkaradjis . 
Sent: Saturday, 16 September 2017 1:13:59 AM
To: Chris Slee
Cc: Activists and scholars in Marxist tradition
Subject: Re: [Marxism] The Trump-Putin coalition for Assad lays waste to Syria: 
Imperial agreement and carve-up behind the noisy rhetoric

Part 2 of response to Chris Slee

On Turkey's role in Syria, Chris asks:

“If the "rebels" are no longer fighting the Assad regime, should they
still be called "rebels"?   Some former rebel groups have become
instruments of Turkish intervention in Syria.”

Turkey has held back the rebels in the region it occupies in the north
from fighting Assad, just as the SDF does not fight Assad. So we could
say they are more or less on the same wavelength. Or does Chris think
whatever the SDF does is OK, they don’t have to lift a finger against
Assad to be called “rebels”, they can be far-and-away the most totally
US-backed force in Syria, which only fights ISIS and never Assad, and
still get called “rebels”, but those who went through hell fighting
both Assad and ISIS for years are immediately denied rebel status as
soon as they are forced into a compromise situation due to the entire
international intervention against them.

These are all (or mostly) real rebel forces, formed by people whose
purpose was and is trying to oust the regime. Currently they are in a
bind. But that does not make them all puppets, any more than the SDF
are US puppets due to 

Re: [Marxism] The Trump-Putin coalition for Assad lays waste to Syria: Imperial agreement and carve-up behind the noisy rhetoric

[Chris Slee via Marxism]

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A further response to Michael Karadjis
(Part 1)

In my previous message I noted that during the Obama period, some US allies had 
either bombed Syria (Israel) or supplied arms to the rebels (Turkey and the 
Gulf states).  I expressed the view that "initially the US probably wanted 
Assad to be replaced", because he was not totally reliable.

Michael responded:

'The silly trope about “reactionary” or ”US-backed” regimes supporting
the Syrian opposition (albeit “for their own reasons”) relies on the
idea that such regimes are limited to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and TurkeyThe 
majority of “reactionary” and “US-backed” states
in the region either vigorously back the reactionary Assad regime, are
neutral, or are effectively pro-Assad and anti-revolutionary.

'All that aside, these states are not puppets of the US, on either
side, they act on their own interests'.

I agree that reactionary and/or US-backed regimes have taken different 
positions on the Syrian conflict.  Some have supported Assad, while others have 
supported various rebel groups.  

One factor has been the desire of some regimes to promote religious 
sectarianism, both inside Syria and elsewhere.  They wanted their own people, 
and the people of the broader Middle East, to see the Syrian war as a religious 
conflict rather than a struggle for democracy.  Hence they took opposite sides, 
based in part on the religious affiliations of the various participants in the 
Syrian conflict.

These regimes act in their own interests, which often coincide with US 
interests, but sometimes do not.

Michael says:

"If Chris thinks Turkey, for example, backed the Syrian rebels because it is a 
'US ally,' then he
presumably thinks the US told Turkey to send the Mavi Mamara to try to
break the siege of Gaza too".

That is not a good analogy.  A government permitting its citizens to join a 
humanitarian aid convoy is not the same as a government arming rebels to 
overthrow another government.

Michael says:

"Chris should also consider that, to the
extent that the US had any relation to the arming of the Syrian rebels
by these three states, its main role was always to try to limit the
quantity and quality of the arms sent, restrict who they could be sent
to, act to coopt those who got a few arms to divert them away from the
struggle against Assad, and above all to ensure that no anti-aircraft
weaponry got to the rebels ever, in an overwhelmingly air war launched
by the regime".

If the "main role" of the US had "always" been to "limit the quantity and 
quality of the arms sent", the  simplest way would have been to ban its allies 
from giving any arms at all to the rebels.  To enforce this edict, it could 
have threatened these allies with sanctions (e.g. a ban on new weapons supplies 
from the US).

The US did not do this, because it wanted SOME arms to flow to the rebels.  
This was because the US wanted to put pressure on the Assad regime, leading to 
a negotiated transition, similar to what happened in Yemen.

Therefore the US allowed Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar to supply weapons to 
the rebels (within certain limits).

It should also be noted that US policy is not static.  It has changed as 
circumstances changed.  The goal of removing Assad, while not formally 
renounced, was in practice abandoned in subsequent years.

One factor leading to this change was recognition that, because of Russian and 
Iranian support, the Assad regime was not about to collapse.

Another factor was the rise of ISIS.  The US became alarmed, particularly after 
the capture of Mosul by ISIS in 2014.  Replacing Assad ceased to be a priority.

Turkey, by contrast, was much more alarmed at the Rojava revolution, and saw 
ISIS as an ally in crushing it.  Hence Turkey's policy began to diverge from 
that of the US.  (I will say more about Turkey in another message)

IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES

In my previous message I argued that the US rulers have "reluctantly accepted" 
that Iranian-led forces are likely to take over a large part of Deir Ezzor 
province.  I said:

"I suspect that the US might originally have had the aim of trying to
seize Deir Ezzor using forces trained at al-Tanf, thereby preventing
Iranian-led forces from controlling the various roads through the
province, but then realised that their proxy force was not up to the
task".

Michael criticises this statement, saying:

"Once again, we are all entitled to think what might be in the back of
some imperialist leaders’ minds. However, I did not merely “imply” US
support for Assad taking over Deir Ezzor, I also had this quote from
the Pentagon (along with tons of other quotes, evidence facts etc):

"On 

Re: [Marxism] The Trump-Putin coalition for Assad lays waste to Syria: Imperial agreement and carve-up behind the noisy rhetoric

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Part 2 of response to Chris Slee

On Turkey's role in Syria, Chris asks:

“If the "rebels" are no longer fighting the Assad regime, should they
still be called "rebels"?   Some former rebel groups have become
instruments of Turkish intervention in Syria.”

Turkey has held back the rebels in the region it occupies in the north
from fighting Assad, just as the SDF does not fight Assad. So we could
say they are more or less on the same wavelength. Or does Chris think
whatever the SDF does is OK, they don’t have to lift a finger against
Assad to be called “rebels”, they can be far-and-away the most totally
US-backed force in Syria, which only fights ISIS and never Assad, and
still get called “rebels”, but those who went through hell fighting
both Assad and ISIS for years are immediately denied rebel status as
soon as they are forced into a compromise situation due to the entire
international intervention against them.

These are all (or mostly) real rebel forces, formed by people whose
purpose was and is trying to oust the regime. Currently they are in a
bind. But that does not make them all puppets, any more than the SDF
are US puppets due to their close, long-term, strategic cooperation
with the US. The situation remains fluid. There have also been some
confrontations with Turkish forces at times. But what Chris ignores
here too is the geography: the main reason the rebels in the northern
Aleppo countryside region could not fight Assad as he crushed eastern
Aleppo city was that their passage south to the city was blocked, by
the YPG/SDF in the Arab-majority Tal Rifaat region, which they had
seized from the rebels under bloody Russian air cover in early 2016;
meanwhile, the only other way through to Aleppo city would have been
a-Bab, which was held by ISIS. And of course, neither the SDF nor ISIS
fight the Assad regime in that region. This inability of the FSA due
to this geography to fight Assad there is what allowed both the US and
Russia to back the Turkish-FSA Euphrates Shield operation against
ISIS, because there was no danger of this bolstering the FSA against
Assad as well.

“The Turkish-backed groups are fighting the Syrian Democratic Forces, not ISIS.”

Yes Chris, and Assad is fighting US imperialism, the US is supporting
ISIS and Nusra, and Trotsky was an agent of the Gestapo. Uncritical
SDF supporters need to get over this kind of thing.

The Turkey-FSA-rebel alliance (‘Euphrates Shield’) cleared ISIS from a
vast swathe of territory, between Azaz and Jarablus and down to
al-Bab. The SDF was not present in any of those places. There were
brief clashes initially in the region between SDF-occupied Manbij and
Euphrates Shield-occupied Jarablus, rapidly brought to an end by US
pressure on Turkey to back off. While I opposed the Turkish
intervention, and I pointed out that this use of the FSA against ISIS
in that region was not the main priority *at that moment* when Free
Aleppo needed more defence against the main enemy, things are
“complex” - of course I still hail the liberation of these areas from
ISIS terror. Now that they are not being bombed every day by Assad
(due to the Turkish presence), they have the opportunity to develop
some political institutions in peace, and perhaps strengthen their
forces if they do intend to renew their struggle with Assad. I would
have thought doing deals with Assad to not get bombed - for years on
end - was precisely a strategy the YPG/SDF and their supporters
approved of.

Regarding my discussion of the counterrevolutionary dealing between
Russia, Turkey and Assad over Idlib and Afrin, Chris responds:

“There has already been a "counterrevolutionary agreement" between
Turkey, Russia and Assad.  Last year some Turkish-backed groups
withdrew from Aleppo city and other areas where they had been fighting
against Assad's forces.  Some of them were transferred to the northern
part of Aleppo province in order to fight against the SDF.”

Again, Chris’ Orwellian point at the end: no, they were transferred to
northern Aleppo province to fight ISIS, not the SDF. The reason SDF
supporters make this odd claim is because they believe the entire
Azaz-Jarablus-Al Bab region, despite being majority Arab and Turkmen
in composition, and despite having been controlled by the rebels
before the ISIS conquest, “rightfully” belongs to the SDF. No-one else
knows why.

On the rest, if Chris thinks that the transferring of rebel cadre from
Aleppo city to the front against ISIS in the north was a
counterrevolutionary agreement (as I have written in numerous
articles), then presumably he also thinks that the role of the SDF in
the Tal Rifaat region north of Aleppo, where it 

Re: [Marxism] The Trump-Putin coalition for Assad lays waste to Syria: Imperial agreement and carve-up behind the noisy rhetoric

[mkaradjis . via Marxism]

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Response to Chris Slee (first part - re Turkey etc, will post later).

Chris:

“The reference to "the complete absence of any military clash between
the US and Assad in the Obama years" could be taken as implying that
the US has always supported Assad, ever since the start of the
uprising in 2011.

“But in considering the lack of direct military clashes between the US
and Assad during the Obama period, we should not forget that allies of
the US did intervene militarily.  Israel bombed Syria on a number of
occasions.  Turkey and the Gulf states supplied weapons to rebels
(albeit limited in quantity and quality).”

“Allies of the US” are not the US. For example, Iraq is a close ally
of the US, in fact essentially a creature of the US invasion and
occupation, the crowning act of US aggression this century, and Iraq
actively supports Assad, in fact, as my article documents (see links),
this involves nothing less than an invasion of Syria by 20,000 troops
of the US/Iran-backed Iraqi regime. Al-Sisi’s bloody Egyptian tyranny
is a US ally, and has sent arms and even military personnel to Syria
to aid the Assad regime. Jordan is a US ally and has used its leverage
over the southern FSA (given geography) to wind down the southern
front against Assad, and when tasked jointly by the US and Russia to
draw up a list of “terrorist” organisations to be excluded from talks,
came up with a list of some 160 rebel groups, about half the
insurgency! A list partly based on an earlier list drawn up by the
UAE, another US ally. Lebanon is a US ally (5th largest recipient of
US arms in the world), and it is quite remarkable how US arms manage
to turn up with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The silly trope about “reactionary” or” US-backed” regimes supporting
the Syrian opposition (albeit “for their own reasons”) relies on the
idea that such regimes are limited to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey
(and even that needs to take into account how hostile the first is to
the second two, and hence their “support” was based precisely on their
own rivalries). The majority of “reactionary” and “US-backed” states
in the region either vigorously back the reactionary Assad regime, are
neutral, or are effectively pro-Assad and anti-revolutionary.

All that aside, these states are not puppets of the US, on either
side, they act on their own interests. If Chris thinks Turkey, for
example, backed the Syrian rebels because it is a “US ally,” then he
presumably thinks the US told Turkey to send the Mavi Mamara to try to
break the siege of Gaza too. Chris should also consider that, to the
extent that the US had any relation to the arming of the Syrian rebels
by these three states, its main role was always to try to limit the
quantity and quality of the arms sent, restrict who they could be sent
to, act to coopt those who got a few arms to divert them away from the
struggle against Assad, and above all to ensure that no anti-aircraft
weaponry got to the rebels ever, in an overwhelmingly air war launched
by the regime.

In the first few years, Israel (US ally, but once again, not puppet)
was strongly pro-Assad, but with the greater Iranian involvement on
Assad’s side by late 2013, together with the 2013 overthrow of the
anti-Assad MB regime in Egypt (which had threatened an
Egypt-Hamas-Syrian rebel alliance with heavy MB influence, but this
danger was now reduced with Sisi's coup), Israel developed a new
policy aimed largely at keeping Hezbollah away from the Golan and
hitting warehouses or convoys where it suspected advanced weapons were
being delivered to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Yet it has still never armed
any rebel faction, the rebels remain relentlessly in support of
regaining the Golan, and no Israeli hits on Hezbollah have ever
directly aided rebels while clashing with Hezbollah.

However, Chris continues:

“I think that initially the US probably wanted Assad to be replaced.
While he had collaborated with the US in some ways, he was not totally
reliable. Thus I think the US had a perspective of removing Assad, and
bringing a section of the opposition into the government, while
keeping the regime largely intact.”

We are all entitled to think what we want. Evidence is better.
Initially the US - Hilary Clinton no less - strongly supported Assad
the “reformer”, while telling “US ally” Mubarak to “step down” within
a week or so of the beginning of the Egyptian uprising. The equivalent
Obama statement asking Assad to “step aside”, by contrast, came some 6
months, and thousands of killings, later. But as Chris says, the aim
was only ever replacing the Assad figure, not the regime - the US
aimed to keep the regime intact, strengthened by removing 

Re: [Marxism] The Trump-Putin coalition for Assad lays waste to Syria: Imperial agreement and carve-up behind the noisy rhetoric

[Chris Slee via Marxism]

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A few comments on the article by Michael Karadjis:

***

1. The US and Assad

Michael says:

"The deepening American intervention in Syria under the administration of 
president Donald Trump has been both far bloodier than that under Barack Obama, 
and also more openly on the side of the regime of Bashar Assad, as has been 
clarified by a number of recent official statements and changes".

Michael notes that: 

"However, within a number of months of Trump’s election, some events began to 
cast doubt on this trajectory. Above all, in contrast to the complete absence 
of any military clash between the US and Assad in the Obama years, the first 
half-year of Trump saw one regime airbase bombed, one regime warplane downed, 
and three minor hits on pro-Assad Iranian-led Iraqi militia in the southeast 
desert".

But he argues that these are "minor clashes".  The "main game" is "a US-Russia 
alliance, a victory for Assad".

I agree that these clashes are small incidents, and that in general the US 
under Trump is collaborating with Assad.

My question is:  How long has this pro-Assad policy been in effect?

The reference to "the complete absence of any military clash between the US and 
Assad in the Obama years" could be taken as implying that the US has always 
supported Assad, ever since the start of the uprising in 2011.

But in considering the lack of direct military clashes between the US and Assad 
during the  Obama period, we should not forget that allies of the US did 
intervene militarily.  Israel bombed Syria on a number of occasions.  Turkey 
and the Gulf states supplied weapons to rebels (albeit limited in quantity and 
quality).

I think that initially the US probably wanted Assad to be replaced.  While he 
had collaborated with the US in some ways, he was not totally reliable.

On the one hand, he had collaborated with the CIA's rendition program.  But on 
the other hand, he had collaborated with Hezbollah, which had driven Israel out 
of Lebanon.

Thus I think the US had a perspective of removing Assad, and bringing a section 
of the opposition into the government, while keeping the regime largely intact. 
 

However the policy of replacing Assad has been dropped.  Russian and Iranian 
support for Assad made it too difficult to carry out.

***

2. The US and Iran in Syria

Michael seems to downplay hostility between the US and Iran as a factor 
influencing events in Syria: 

"One reason commonly cited for the US stand in al-Tanf is that the 
Baghdad-Damascus Highway passes through the town, and the US is thereby 
blocking a direct Iranian connection, a “land bridge”, to Syria, which would 
effectively link Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon by land...

"While the real reason may be a mixture ... the anti-Iranian reason is 
undermined by the fact that there remains a great expanse of Syria-Iraq 
borderland that Iranian, pro-Iranian Iraqi and Assadist forces can seize in 
order to form the land bridge. If we take out the small area around al-Tanf in 
the southeast corner, and the northern part of the Iraq-Syria border around 
Hassakah, controlled by the US-backed SDF, then we are left with the entire 
ISIS-controlled Deir-Ezzor province".

Michael seems to imply that the US would be unconcerned if Iranian-led forces 
were able to take over a large part of Deir Ezzor province.  I think it is more 
likely that the US rulers have reluctantly accepted that they have no realistic 
way of preventing it.

I suspect that the US might originally have had the aim of trying to seize Deir 
Ezzor using forces trained at al-Tanf, thereby preventing Iranian-led forces 
from controlling the various roads through the province, but then realised that 
their proxy force was not up to the task.

The relationship between the US and Iran is complex.  They are cooperating 
against ISIS, especially in Iraq, but the US is still imposing economic 
sanctions on Iran, which means that the hostility is not just a matter of 
rhetoric.

***

3. Turkey's role in Syria

MK: "In addition, the rebel-held region of northern and eastern Aleppo province 
where Turkish troops are present as part of the Euphrates Shield operation is 
effectively a de-escalation zone, as the rebels there only fight ISIS and are 
not permitted to confront the regime (and, at least in this case, it also means 
they are free from regime bombing)".

If the "rebels" are no longer fighting the Assad regime, should they still be 
called "rebels"?   Some former rebel groups have become instruments of Turkish 
intervention in Syria.

The Turkish-backed groups are fighting the Syrian Democratic Forces, not ISIS.

MK: "At present there is much talk of a 

[Marxism] The Trump-Putin coalition for Assad lays waste to Syria: Imperial agreement and carve-up behind the noisy rhetoric

[mkaradjis . via Marxism]

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The deepening American intervention in Syria under the administration
of president Donald Trump has been both far bloodier than that under
Barack Obama, and also more openly on the side of the regime of Bashar
Assad, as has been clarified by a number of recent official statements
and changes.
https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/2017/09/05/the-trump-putin-coalition-for-assad-lays-waste-to-syria-imperial-agreement-and-carve-up-behind-the-noisy-rhetoric/
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