Re: [openssl-users] FIPS mode restrictions and DES
Thanks for all the comments, they're much appreciated. It is a Debian system, so there is no Red Hat FIPS validation (or SuSE which also has one I think) or validated components that can be used. If I may, I'd like to ask about including the Linux kernel in the validation. Now, including glibc2 was a pretty bad idea, it cannot get better with the kernel. In this case, IPSec (libreswan) is using the kernel's crypto functions. So it seems there would be no way out of this one. Any insight on this matter ? - thanks. Regards. -- View this message in context: http://openssl.6102.n7.nabble.com/openssl-users-FIPS-mode-restrictions-and-DES-tp57497p57533.html Sent from the OpenSSL - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com. ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] FIPS mode restrictions and DES
If I may, I'd like to ask about including the Linux kernel in the validation. As the old joke goes, if you have to ask, you can't afford it. ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] FIPS mode restrictions and DES
On 13/04/2015 18:48, Steve Marquess wrote: On 04/13/2015 12:14 PM, Jakob Bohm wrote: On 13/04/2015 17:48, Salz, Rich wrote: In other words, is the only practical and viable option regarding this to re-implement crypt() using EVP methods ? - thanks. Yes. That would be so much easier than anything you can imagine. Yes, the only thing easier would be if someone (maybe Red Hat) already has a FIPS validatedopen source implementation of crypt(). And even if Red Hat does, you would be limited to using the specific commercial versions of RHEL that included that specific validated binary module. With the very unique exception of the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module, there are no FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic modules that can be obtained in source form and compiled by the end user. The fact that Red Hat (or whomever) has taken open source code and obtained a FIPS 140-2 validation of binaries generated from that code does you no good unless you have those specific binaries, which is to say you're a commercial customer paying for a commercial license from that vendor. Then, even for the OpenSSL FIPS module the validation imposes some pretty perverse constraints (from the usual software engineering perspective). You have to start with a snail-mailed CD, you have to build the binary module in a very special way that will conflict with whatever configuration management you use, etc.; you have to treat it differently that all the other software components of your product. FIPS 140-2 is the tail that wags the dog. -Steve M. Of cause. One point is that if this is a delivery for someone subject to the FIPS-only procurementrequirement imposed on various US Government related entities, then whatever OS theyuse, MUST (by that requirement) have already passed this for its password handling. This provides a baseline of already validated stuff on which other contractors can thenbuild, with reasonable care to the (bureaucratic) FIPS requirements. So if the OPs customer is already using/requiring a specificLinux/BSD/Solaris/etc. distribution, and that distributioncontains a FIPS 140-2 validated crypt() function for its loginprocessing, then the OP could reuse that. Red Hat is anexample here. Another possibility is that Red Hat or some other open source supplier to the US government has already reimplemented crypt() in terms of some other FIPS-validated piece of software, such as the OpenSSL FIPS module, with that crypt() reimplementation being outside the cryptographic boundary and thus reusable on other platforms with the same FIPS module. Enjoy Jakob -- Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. http://www.wisemo.com Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10 This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors. WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] FIPS mode restrictions and DES
On 04/13/2015 12:14 PM, Jakob Bohm wrote: On 13/04/2015 17:48, Salz, Rich wrote: In other words, is the only practical and viable option regarding this to re-implement crypt() using EVP methods ? - thanks. Yes. That would be so much easier than anything you can imagine. Yes, the only thing easier would be if someone (maybe Red Hat) already has a FIPS validatedopen source implementation of crypt(). And even if Red Hat does, you would be limited to using the specific commercial versions of RHEL that included that specific validated binary module. With the very unique exception of the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module, there are no FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic modules that can be obtained in source form and compiled by the end user. The fact that Red Hat (or whomever) has taken open source code and obtained a FIPS 140-2 validation of binaries generated from that code does you no good unless you have those specific binaries, which is to say you're a commercial customer paying for a commercial license from that vendor. Then, even for the OpenSSL FIPS module the validation imposes some pretty perverse constraints (from the usual software engineering perspective). You have to start with a snail-mailed CD, you have to build the binary module in a very special way that will conflict with whatever configuration management you use, etc.; you have to treat it differently that all the other software components of your product. FIPS 140-2 is the tail that wags the dog. -Steve M. -- Steve Marquess OpenSSL Software Foundation, Inc. 1829 Mount Ephraim Road Adamstown, MD 21710 USA +1 877 673 6775 s/b +1 301 874 2571 direct marqu...@opensslfoundation.com marqu...@openssl.com gpg/pgp key: http://openssl.com/docs/0x6D1892F5.asc ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] FIPS mode restrictions and DES
On 13/04/2015 17:48, Salz, Rich wrote: In other words, is the only practical and viable option regarding this to re-implement crypt() using EVP methods ? - thanks. Yes. That would be so much easier than anything you can imagine. Yes, the only thing easier would be if someone (maybe Red Hat) already has a FIPS validatedopen source implementation of crypt(). Enjoy Jakob -- Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. http://www.wisemo.com Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10 This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors. WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] FIPS mode restrictions and DES
Thanks for the comments - much appreciated. The following question might be on the naive side of things, but then I'm all new to this. Since crypt() in glibc2 supports SHA-256 and SHA-512 for password, and assuming that these two are FIPS compatible, what would be the (financial) overhead of having the crypto part of glibc2 go through validation ? It sounds very odd, not to mention very expensive, but I'm asking nevertheless, in case there is a possibility. In other words, is the only practical and viable option regarding this to re-implement crypt() using EVP methods ? - thanks. Regards. -- View this message in context: http://openssl.6102.n7.nabble.com/openssl-users-FIPS-mode-restrictions-and-DES-tp57497p57527.html Sent from the OpenSSL - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com. ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] FIPS mode restrictions and DES
In other words, is the only practical and viable option regarding this to re-implement crypt() using EVP methods ? - thanks. Yes. That would be so much easier than anything you can imagine. ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
