Re: Nov 01 02:54:12.309 [warn] connection_dir_client_reached_eof(): http status 400 ("Dirserver believes your ORPort is unreachable") response from dirserver '86.59.21.38:80'. Please correct.
My apologies - I called it 'tabitha'. Hope this helps.
On Thu, 2006-11-02 at 01:27 +0100, Peter Palfrader wrote:
> On Wed, 01 Nov 2006, Martin Naskovski wrote:
>
> > Nov 01 02:54:12.309 [warn] connection_dir_client_reached_eof(): http status
> > 400 ("Dirserver believes
> > your ORPort is unreachable") response from dirserver '86.59.21.38:80'.
> > Please correct.
>
> You left out half the interesting part. What's your router's nickname?
Re: Nov 01 02:54:12.309 [warn] connection_dir_client_reached_eof(): http status 400 ("Dirserver believes your ORPort is unreachable") response from dirserver '86.59.21.38:80'. Please correct.
On Wed, 01 Nov 2006, Martin Naskovski wrote:
> Nov 01 02:54:12.309 [warn] connection_dir_client_reached_eof(): http status
> 400 ("Dirserver believes
> your ORPort is unreachable") response from dirserver '86.59.21.38:80'. Please
> correct.
You left out half the interesting part. What's your router's nickname?
--
| .''`. ** Debian GNU/Linux **
Peter Palfrader | : :' : The universal
http://www.palfrader.org/ | `. `' Operating System
| `-http://www.debian.org/
Nov 01 02:54:12.309 [warn] connection_dir_client_reached_eof(): http status 400 ("Dirserver believes your ORPort is unreachable") response from dirserver '86.59.21.38:80'. Please correct.
I've got Tor setup and running perfectly, yet I consistently see this message
in the log,
periodically:
Nov 01 02:54:12.309 [warn] connection_dir_client_reached_eof(): http status 400
("Dirserver believes
your ORPort is unreachable") response from dirserver '86.59.21.38:80'. Please
correct.
Anyone know what's up? Is it something on my end or not?
Thanks.
Martin
Re: "Practical onion hacking: finding the real address of Tor clients"
On 11/1/06, Fabian Keil <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: ... For Tor users this shouldn't be a big deal. I also don't see anything exciting about Narus the narus advantage is hardware/programmable classifiers, ala snort on fpga, which allows deep inspection across numerous (linearly scalable) OC12/OC48 peering points. rules also scale linearly, with anywhere from 500 to thousands per classifier proc. Of course a patient person can already do the same thing with less comfortable tools like tcpdump anyway. this is all about scale, and since we are discussing taps on the backbones, scale is paramount. but for small ISP's, corp it staff you're right... > That barely begins to describe what the > Narus tools can do. If you care about privacy, this is really creepy. Maybe if you care about privacy and don't use tools like Tor to protect it. the problem with narus run by $TLA is that it functions as global adversary, which is explicitly outside Tor's threat model. this may or may not mean they are watching. (and there are certainly some $TLA's who are using packet latency fingerprinting with active manipulation of packet timing up stream to link clients to particular exit traffic) zero knowledge mixes defend against this threat, but you lose the (relatively) low latency of onion like routing in Tor. [exercise for the researchers: would traffic padding with a DTLS Tor ala reliable multicast at fixed bandwidth limits keep the low latency but provide the anonymity of a stronger mix?] best regards,
Using Privoxy to increase the security level (was: reporter from The Economist in Thailand seeks help / new Tor guide is up)
"Chris Willis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I have to add a bit to this one: > > NO browser (cept maybe a text browser in BSD or something) is really > 100% safe on its own. Firefox has lots of vulnerabilities, just like > IE. > > That is why you use privoxy with Tor. http://www.privoxy.org/ Actually it's not, at least it shouldn't be. If you visit the Privoxy website you will notice that Privoxy isn't advertised as a protection against browser vulnerabilities: |Privoxy is a web proxy with advanced filtering capabilities |for protecting privacy, modifying web page data, managing cookies, |controlling access, and removing ads, banners, pop-ups and other |obnoxious Internet junk. Privoxy has a very flexible configuration |and can be customized to suit individual needs and tastes. While Privoxy has some mechanisms against a small set of IE exploits, these exploits are known for several years and should be fixed in any recent IE release anyway. I'm not aware of a single Firefox vulnerability that didn't affect Firefox versions behind Privoxy, and if there are any, these could probably be prevented by using any other http proxy as well. Usually browser vulnerabilities are the result of active scripting bugs or content parsing problems. Privoxy's filtering capabilities are far too limited to reliable protect the browser against these, especially not in advance. And even if Privoxy could do it: by the time someone implemented a counter measure in Privoxy, the problem would probably be already long fixed in the latest browser release. If you want to increase your browser's security level, use a reasonable default configuration and update regularly to stay on top of known security problems. If you do that, Privoxy is unlikely to increase your security level any further. Fabian -- http://www.fabiankeil.de/ signature.asc Description: PGP signature
Re: Possible fishing attempt for eBay
On 31 October 2006, at 20:58, Zinco wrote: I got two of them myself from someone impersonating ebay. What was weird and kinda scary was that when I went to forward it to [EMAIL PROTECTED] it maxxed out my cpu with winword. Well, that's what you get for using a Microsoft product! -- hackmiester (Hunter Fuller) yknow when you go to a party, and everyones hooked up except one guy and one girl and so they look at each other like.. do we have to? intel & nvidia must be lookin at each other like that right now Phone Voice: +1 251 589 6348 Fax: Call the voice number and ask. Email General chat: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Large attachments: [EMAIL PROTECTED] SPS-related stuff: [EMAIL PROTECTED] IM AIM: hackmiester1337 Skype: hackmiester31337 YIM: hackm1ester Gtalk: hackmiester MSN: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Xfire: hackmiester
Re: "Practical onion hacking: finding the real address of Tor clients"
GeorgeDS <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Tue, 2006-10-31 at 09:49, Fabian Keil wrote: > > George Shaffer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > To go to > > > a malicious site you need to encounter a site whose security has been > > > compromised, be tricked into going to a site, be the victim of > > > poisoned DNS, receive an email with a macro based Outlook virus that > > > uses IE functionality, or deliberately browse fringe web sites. > > > > Or you can use Tor and give every Tor exit node operator the chance > > to render every "trusted site" that doesn't use encryption into > > a source of malware. > > If your only point is I forgot to list this, I'm guilty. Other than > that, this seems to be an argument against using Tor. I think it's just a fact every Tor user should be aware of. It sure is a disadvantage, but I don't see it as a reason to stop using Tor. > Regarding systrace: > > > > Looking at man, it does appear that it would be useful for > > > controlling "developmental" software on a very secure OpenBSD system. > > > > It's useful to control software in general. > > "In general" I agree but there are costs as well as benefits to all > security measures. Rational people can reach a wide range of conclusions > regarding how much to invest and where. Of course. > I suspect you might be rather > uneasy with controlling software, as in preventing customers from using > Skype, as the Narus tools linked to below can. It's besides the point, but given the free alternatives I don't think anyone should be using Skype anyway. Especially not users who care about their privacy and system security. If an ISP thinks it's a good idea to disallow Skype usage in its terms of service and then tries to enforce this policy, I don't have a problem with that. If the user wants to use Skype, she should sign up with an ISP with less unreasonable terms of service. > > There are several valid reason not to run a Tor server at all, > > I just don't think that "local security" or "ISP terms of service" > > are among them. > > We will obviously continue to disagree about these. I recently came > across http://www.narus.com/products/index.html which describes a line > of products that allow large ISPs and broadband carriers to monitor > everything that flows across their network. Virtually every protocol can > be identified, and everything from any IP can be assembled into a stream > and it's contents examined. For Tor users this shouldn't be a big deal. I also don't see anything exciting about Narus, I once saw a Squil presentation and if I remember correctly it can do the basically the same. http://sguil.sourceforge.net/index.php?page=description Of course a patient person can already do the same thing with less comfortable tools like tcpdump anyway. > That barely begins to describe what the > Narus tools can do. If you care about privacy, this is really creepy. Maybe if you care about privacy and don't use tools like Tor to protect it. > Partly this is to allow carriers to conform to the wiretap laws that are > being applied in the US and other countries, but Narus makes clear the > carriers can use these tools for their own purposes. While resources > should prevent an ISP or carrier from monitoring all their customers all > the time, tools like this will allow them to focus on protocols banned > by terms of service and identify the customers using the banned > protocol. Personally I think the frequent changes in wiretaping laws are lot more frightening than the software to comply with them. > In the case of a cable provider, there is only one in any > specific area. If you loose your access, then you have to hope DSL is > available, and you will normally pay more for comparable download > speeds. Personally I want to be careful about my ISPs terms of service. It was probably not clear enough, but I wasn't trying to say that one shouldn't honour the ISP's terms of service. I'm just saying that they aren't a valid reason not to run a Tor server. They are only a reason not to run a Tor server in that ISP's network (if you are interested in running a Tor server and I know, you personally aren't). Fabian -- http://www.fabiankeil.de/ signature.asc Description: PGP signature
