Re: same first hops
On 10 Oct 2008, at 03:40, Scott Bennett wrote: On Thu, 9 Oct 2008 19:23:48 +0100 Geoff Down [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Interestingly, I had about 6 single nodes showing on the Vidalia network map yesterday, whilst my traffic was going via a normal 3-node circuit and another 3-node circuit was in preparation. The single nodes disappeared after 20 minutes or so. Were those nodes your entry guards by any chance? Although tor initially tries to build a few (3?) circuits, once they have expired and no longer have any active streams in them, they get torn down *except* for the links between your client and the entry guard nodes. This not only improves security, but also means that a new circuit already has the first hop connected when tor goes to build that new circuit. Of course, that doesn't explain why those links disappeared after about 20 minutes, and right offhand, no other explanation comes to mind. They weren't my usual entry nodes, no. It's a mystery.
Re: unsubscribe
* on the Fri, Oct 10, 2008 at 02:44:46AM +0200, sigi wrote: unsubscribe me. Please write your Mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with mailbody including: unsubscribe or-talk btw: When finally will list-subscribers check their mailheaders for this? It would never have occurred to me to check the headers either, so perhaps you are being too hard on them. Possibly I was too hard on this, but this unsubscribe-question comes so often on all mailinglists, that it bothers a lot nowadays... and it's been answered frequently already - so often... Some people are just too lazy to look into how to unsubscribe from a mailing list properly. I'm sure a 30 second google would have been sufficient, but they'd rather email everyone on a mailing list asking that information instead as it involves engaging less brain cells. -- Erilenz
Re: unsubscribe
On 10 Oct 2008, at 10:00, Erilenz wrote: I'm sure a 30 second google would have been sufficient, Actually Google returns four result, all of which have the correct email address obliterated to prevent spamming ;) . We're all capable of making incorrect assumptions.
Re: unsubscribe
On Fri, 10 Oct 2008 18:29:39 +0100 Geoff Down [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 10 Oct 2008, at 10:00, Erilenz wrote: I'm sure a 30 second google would have been sufficient, Actually Google returns four result, all of which have the correct email address obliterated to prevent spamming ;) . We're all capable of making incorrect assumptions. All of that is basically unnecessary and irrelevant. Nearly all modern mailing lists that use an automated subscription process send an email message to each new subscriber to confirm that the subscriber's attempt to subscribe has succeeded. Many use an intermediate step of an email exchange in which the subscriber must confirm that he/she did, in fact, wish to subscribe (i.e., the subscription request wasn't faked by someone else). In any case, the confirmation message almost always includes instructions for unsubscribing and often for modifying the subscription in other ways. The OR-TALK list is no exception. Anyone with enough functioning neurons to use a computer can see that they should keep a copy of the confirmation message containing the instructions for getting off the list. That's just common sense. If they aren't doing that, it's because they are generally inconsiderate and expect the world to tie their shoelaces for them, wipe their butts for them when they crap, etc. If I were the list owner, I would be tempted to leave them subscribed but block their email address from being able to post to the list. That way they would still have to take some responsibility for getting what they want, but could no longer harass my list. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * ** * A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army. * *-- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **
Re: unsubscribe
I guess we'll have to agree to disagree. On 10 Oct 2008, at 19:27, Scott Bennett wrote: On Fri, 10 Oct 2008 18:29:39 +0100 Geoff Down [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 10 Oct 2008, at 10:00, Erilenz wrote: I'm sure a 30 second google would have been sufficient, Actually Google returns four result, all of which have the correct email address obliterated to prevent spamming ;) . We're all capable of making incorrect assumptions. All of that is basically unnecessary and irrelevant. Nearly all modern mailing lists that use an automated subscription process send an email message to each new subscriber to confirm that the subscriber's attempt to subscribe has succeeded. Many use an intermediate step of an email exchange in which the subscriber must confirm that he/she did, in fact, wish to subscribe (i.e., the subscription request wasn't faked by someone else). In any case, the confirmation message almost always includes instructions for unsubscribing and often for modifying the subscription in other ways. The OR-TALK list is no exception. Anyone with enough functioning neurons to use a computer can see that they should keep a copy of the confirmation message containing the instructions for getting off the list. That's just common sense. If they aren't doing that, it's because they are generally inconsiderate and expect the world to tie their shoelaces for them, wipe their butts for them when they crap, etc. If I were the list owner, I would be tempted to leave them subscribed but block their email address from being able to post to the list. That way they would still have to take some responsibility for getting what they want, but could no longer harass my list. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * ** * A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army. * *-- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **
Single nodes (was same first hops)
On 10 Oct 2008, at 07:25, Geoff Down wrote: On 10 Oct 2008, at 03:40, Scott Bennett wrote: On Thu, 9 Oct 2008 19:23:48 +0100 Geoff Down [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Interestingly, I had about 6 single nodes showing on the Vidalia network map yesterday, whilst my traffic was going via a normal 3-node circuit and another 3-node circuit was in preparation. The single nodes disappeared after 20 minutes or so. Were those nodes your entry guards by any chance? Although tor initially tries to build a few (3?) circuits, once they have expired and no longer have any active streams in them, they get torn down *except* for the links between your client and the entry guard nodes. This not only improves security, but also means that a new circuit already has the first hop connected when tor goes to build that new circuit. Of course, that doesn't explain why those links disappeared after about 20 minutes, and right offhand, no other explanation comes to mind. They weren't my usual entry nodes, no. It's a mystery. It's just happened again - 12 single nodes as well as my 3 normal entry nodes and their circuits. Is there some level of logging I should have on to capture what's going on? GD
Re: Single nodes (was same first hops)
On Fri, Oct 10, 2008 at 08:21:54PM +0100, Geoff Down wrote: They weren't my usual entry nodes, no. It's a mystery. It's just happened again - 12 single nodes as well as my 3 normal entry nodes and their circuits. Is there some level of logging I should have on to capture what's going on? Tor makes its directory fetches using one-hop circuits. It started doing this in 0.2.0.22-rc: - Enable encrypted directory connections by default for non-relays, so censor tools that block Tor directory connections based on their plaintext patterns will no longer work. This means Tor works in certain censored countries by default again. Vidalia shows all the circuits, because it can't really distinguish what you (or your Tor) are planning to use the circuit for. Down the road, we may switch it so it makes these one-hop circuits to your entry guards. No point revealing your existence to any more relays than you have to. The phrase for this new design would be directory guards; you can see it scattered about the TODO file and roadmaps. --Roger
Re: Single nodes (was same first hops)
On 10 Oct 2008, at 20:36, Roger Dingledine wrote: On Fri, Oct 10, 2008 at 08:21:54PM +0100, Geoff Down wrote: They weren't my usual entry nodes, no. It's a mystery. It's just happened again - 12 single nodes as well as my 3 normal entry nodes and their circuits. Is there some level of logging I should have on to capture what's going on? Tor makes its directory fetches using one-hop circuits. It started doing this in 0.2.0.22-rc: - Enable encrypted directory connections by default for non-relays, so censor tools that block Tor directory connections based on their plaintext patterns will no longer work. This means Tor works in certain censored countries by default again. Vidalia shows all the circuits, because it can't really distinguish what you (or your Tor) are planning to use the circuit for. Down the road, we may switch it so it makes these one-hop circuits to your entry guards. No point revealing your existence to any more relays than you have to. The phrase for this new design would be directory guards; you can see it scattered about the TODO file and roadmaps. --Roger Aha! Thanks Roger. I went straight from 0.2.0.19 to 0.2.0.31 when I downloaded the latest Tor-Privoxy-Vidalia bundle, so if there was anything in the 0.2.0.22 release notes I missed it. I don't think I've ever seen the roadmap. GD
Re: Single nodes (was same first hops)
On Fri, Oct 10, 2008 at 09:46:37PM +0100, Geoff Down wrote: I don't think I've ever seen the roadmap. You can find two of them in https://svn.torproject.org/svn/tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/ Alas, they're not exactly well fleshed out. I've been working on a newer version that captures more of what we've been up to lately and what we hope to be up to in the next several years. Stay tuned. As for the TODO list, take a look at https://svn.torproject.org/svn/tor/trunk/doc/TODO.021 and https://svn.torproject.org/svn/tor/trunk/doc/TODO.future --Roger
