Re: Bigger Thinking [was: Tor Project 2008 Tax Return]
And what about Microsoft? I think someone should be targeting/lobbying them to include a Tor client and default bridge relay in every version of Windows 8 or 9. Find out what it would take to get them to do this, Sorry, what's in this for Microsoft? Being a good corporate citizen? From a business point of view, including a peer to peer style client BY DEFAULT in an operating system has PR nightmare written all over it, but they will take the risk of lost revenue for being a good corporate citizen? I find it unlikely... of having a European voice in all this. That means another $20M a year in funding please. At least. Then there is law enforcement and the military and intelligence agencies - for f*ck sakes if someone at the Tor Project can't see them as low hanging fruit then I will start to cry. Right... so in the case of law enforcement, you are going to ask law enforcement to fund a project that (this is not my opinion, this will be theirs) allows people to access illegal content anonymously and makes their job that much harder? That's low hanging fruit? Hate to hear what the high hanging fruit will involve :) I think if you want a job at the tor project, you should just ask :P And maybe just provide them with past results you've obtained for similar organisations or in a lobbyist role, as opposed to getting frustrated on mailing lists :) Cheers, Al *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: Downloading attachments with Tor - is this secure?
I really like the Request-Policy plugin too. Quite amazing how many other sites some reference. Cheers, Al On Tue, Jun 22, 2010 at 10:44 AM, Scott Bennett benn...@cs.niu.edu wrote: On Tue, 22 Jun 2010 09:10:26 +0100 Matthew pump...@cotse.net top-posted (*please* stop doing that!): I am not using NoScript but I used it some time ago. The problem I had was that various websites did not work because it turned off JavaScript which seemed essential. At the moment I am using Polipo and Tor with JavaScript operational but Java, Flash, and QuickTime are all turned off in Firefox. Well, that's rather the point, isn't it? Besides, NoScript has always allowed you to whitelist sites that you *trust entirely*. Further, you can allow script execution globally, but you'd be utterly foolish to do so in a browser not running thoroughly sandboxed. Perhaps you could please tell me why exactly NoScript is superior to the methods I am using? Aside from the aforementioned feature of disabling script execution by default, it provides many other protections, far too many to go into here. Read about them at the NoScript web site at http://noscript.net NoScript should be used with Firefox even when tor is not used. NoScript should be used with Firefox even when Torbutton is not used, but it is much safer to use both NoScript and Torbutton together. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * ** * A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army. * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * ** *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/ *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: shadowserver.org
I am running the exit-node tor-readme.spamt.net. My provider, server4you, keeps getting abuse reports from shadowserver.org. According to the abuse service they are running honeynets which record activity comming from my exit-node's IP. I have tried to communicate directly with shadowserver.org but got no answer. Does anybody have experience with those guys? I mean, they should know what tor is and that their abuse reports create nothing but work and anger for everybody. So why do they do it then? Probably because your exit node is being used to do something that warrants an abuse report. For the moment I have to close abuse tickets on a weekly basis. I could live with that, but I would prefer solving the issue. Any recommendations on what I could do? Stop the activity on your exit node that is causing them to lodge reports? regards Alex -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkwWNngACgkQevm6Dd/q44myVACfT861jycouvMLo1gcMiJUeBva vJkAn0lwpncn8Vs5W4HIHa+tzf1bPAEj =zuoD -END PGP SIGNATURE- *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: shadowserver.org
On Mon, Jun 14, 2010 at 7:03 PM, Damian Johnson atag...@gmail.com wrote: Probably because your exit node is being used to do something that warrants an abuse report. Maybe, but if this shadowserver site is being incommunicado then I wouldn't put much confidence in their findings. FWIW, Shadowserver have a reputation of being very good at what they do. Stop the activity on your exit node that is causing them to lodge reports? Very bad advice. Snooping on exit traffic (or tampering it in any way) are highly discouraged. I would have thought abusing the tor network was highly discouraged too? If people insist on using it for spam and god-knows-what else, what other choice is there? Unfortunately if people continue to abuse it, it just stops people who otherwise would from running an exit node. -Damian On Mon, Jun 14, 2010 at 10:46 AM, Al MailingList alpal.mailingl...@gmail.com wrote: I am running the exit-node tor-readme.spamt.net. My provider, server4you, keeps getting abuse reports from shadowserver.org. According to the abuse service they are running honeynets which record activity comming from my exit-node's IP. I have tried to communicate directly with shadowserver.org but got no answer. Does anybody have experience with those guys? I mean, they should know what tor is and that their abuse reports create nothing but work and anger for everybody. So why do they do it then? Probably because your exit node is being used to do something that warrants an abuse report. For the moment I have to close abuse tickets on a weekly basis. I could live with that, but I would prefer solving the issue. Any recommendations on what I could do? Stop the activity on your exit node that is causing them to lodge reports? regards Alex -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkwWNngACgkQevm6Dd/q44myVACfT861jycouvMLo1gcMiJUeBva vJkAn0lwpncn8Vs5W4HIHa+tzf1bPAEj =zuoD -END PGP SIGNATURE- *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/ *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: shadowserver.org
On Mon, Jun 14, 2010 at 10:03 PM, alex-...@copton.net wrote: On Mon, Jun 14, 2010 at 09:01:53PM +0200, kuhkatz wrote: i assume you might block these server via the exit-rules of your server. Maybe I am wrong, but if the servers' IP addresses where publicly known, they would not be honeypots, would they? How would you block connections to Shadowserver's honeypots? Why would you want to do that? The point is someone is using an exit node for abuse. If you just prevent abuse to a honey pot, you are just covering up the problem - real servers will still be the recipients of the abuse? regards Alex -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkwWmQQACgkQevm6Dd/q44nIggCfbYuxshB+OElTMw6EmafvzVLh EOAAnRgIGS4ovgfw3f+7W3ogETaYeDCG =Edpj -END PGP SIGNATURE- *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: Bridges and China (new thread)
On Wed, May 26, 2010 at 4:06 PM, and...@torproject.org wrote: Rather than continue to hijack the old thread, here's a new one about bridges and china. I'm fully aware the GFW seems to have successfully crawled https://bridges.torproject.org and added all of those bridges into their blocking regime. The email distribution method, brid...@torproject.org, may also have been crawled and added to the blocking regime. There are still 3 other pools of bridge addresses, one of which is held in reserve. It seems the other two methods are continuing to work, as a paltry 5000 connections from China still can access Tor daily. This is vastly smaller than the 100,000 or so we used to get. Is it worth adding a captcha to bridges.torproject.org? Incidentally, what happens when adversaries just block access to that site? How about responding to bridge request emails with a captcha style email attachment with the IPs of bridges? That would kill any automated attempt to scrape the bridges? Al *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: Tor Exit Node Sponsorship - looking for partners
Hi, I don't want to be a party-pooper, but installing just another big node (like blutmagie) would still mean * relatively (still very low) redundancy * strong agglomeration of traffic on only a few nodes (thus leading to) * relatively simple eavesdropping of exit traffic When speaking in terms of bandwidth, e.g. 150Mbps, then I'd rather spread it across n machines with 150Mbps/n each. Just a thought. Cheers, David Timo *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/ Any new nodes are great, but it does seem like the best option might be to get people to donate to a pool of money, from which a number of smaller servers are paid for. Ideally also, there would be a pool of admins, so a different person could run each node (or at least a few nodes of the larger pool)? Al *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: How does TOR deal with mac addresses
Where exactly do you think the MAC address would get recorded? Your MAC Is only sent on your local LAN segment? i.e. your MAC only gets as far as your home router, and then your home router's MAC only gets as far as the ISP's end point... etc... On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 5:50 PM, emigrant fromwindowstoli...@gmail.com wrote: During ARPs the mac address would get recorded isn't it? So how does TOR protect anonymity with regard to mac addresses? Thank you very much. *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/ *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
