Re: Undeletable cookies
On Fri, 18 Feb 2011 04:39:39 -0800 Mike Perry mikepe...@fscked.org wrote: Thus spake Irratar (irrata...@gmail.com): Hello. I have just found a site that can recognize me when I re-accessed it after I deleted all private data, toggled Torbutton and restarted Tor. http://samy.pl/evercookie/ This is news to me. Are you using the default Torbutton settings? When we tested this in the past, Torbutton was protecting against it. I also just tested it now, and it did not recover my cookie. Perhaps one of your other addons betrayed you? Did you enable plugins? Or perhaps you have a misconfigured polipo storing these cookies in its cache? The Tor Browser Bundles are a good way to ensure you have a properly configured, vanilla Tor setup. Of course, it isn't a Tor problem, but I think it's better to know for these who are interested in privacy. many sites may use the same technology stealthy. I will try to discover more about how does it keep my private information. So far this site seems to forgets me when I disable JavaScript, but maybe it just can't display the proper number. Actually, web application layer privacy attacks *are* a Tor issue. We try very hard to protect against them: https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/en/design/#adversary I think this is the result of #1968. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1968 signature.asc Description: PGP signature
Re: Loader source
On Sat, 5 Feb 2011 00:59:18 +0200 (EET) Greg Kalitnikoff kalitnik...@privatdemail.net wrote: Hi. Maybe I`m blind or too lazy, but I cannot find source for windows loader of Tor Browser Bundle - Start Tor Browser.exe. Please provide link Thank you. *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/ https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/HEAD:/src/RelativeLink/RelativeLink.c signature.asc Description: PGP signature
Re: Excessive scrubs
On Wed, 13 Oct 2010 09:02:20 -0500 Jon torance...@gmail.com wrote: I saw a message from Tor-op in reference to a similar problem and his solution was: Add the below line to your torrc and the scrubbed will be replaced by the domain in question. SafeLogging 0 of which I tried, but it would not stay in the torrc file. It seems to remove it self at some point. As far as I can tell it never worked, but unknown how long after I placed it before it got removed. Jon On Wed, Oct 13, 2010 at 8:55 AM, Jon torance...@gmail.com wrote: I have noticed over the past 2 weeks, I have been getting an unusual amount of scrubs. It doesn't tell me which addresses are being scrubbed, so I don't know if they are the same or different ones. It does not affect the operation of Tor. Just fills up the logs. Is there a way to have the '[scrubbed]' removed and the address put in its place? Thanks, Jon *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/ What do you mean by 'removed itself'? Was the file never saved, or was there a point at which something else reverted it, or was it something else entirely? Also, which operating system are you using? -- more than just a leitmotif PGP Key ID: 33E22AB1 signature.asc Description: PGP signature
Re: The best way to run a hidden service: one or two computers?
On Fri, 17 Sep 2010 16:36:16 -0400 hi...@safe-mail.net wrote: Robert Ransom: Only if you trust the hardware firewall/router. I wouldn't. Okay so there aren't that many safe options to run a hidden service really, if any at all? *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/ The router issue is only relevant if you're exploited, and if you're running a firewall, get exploited on the root level, too. I'd look into privilege separation software if you're really serious about security, specifically AppArmor and SELinux, or systrace if you're on *BSD. (AppArmor is much simpler than SELinux, though SELinux is probably more powerful. Personally, I like systrace the best.) Just make sure you update frequently, and you'll probably be good. :-) -- more than just a leitmotif PGP Key ID: 33E22AB1 signature.asc Description: PGP signature
Re: gratuitous change blocks upgrade to 0.2.2.15-alpha :-(
On Tue, 14 Sep 2010 03:33:33 -0400 grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com wrote: Also, regarding the interaction with HS directory lookups and excludenodes... i would suggest that specification in excludenodes should prevent all contact with such node for all reasons. Or just make another option for how to handle that case as well. This is more important than the above paragraph. As one could have a node that is a 'bad' exit through no fault/intent of its operator... such as being plugged into a non-ideal isp... yet it would still be perfectly useful when acting as a non-exit or directory provider. The following options should do what you want: ExcludeNodes node,node,... A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to never use when building a circuit. ExcludeExitNodes node,node,... A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this list. StrictNodes 0|1 If 1 and EntryNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in EntryNodes for the first hop of a normal circuit. If 1 and ExitNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in ExitNodes for the last hop of a normal exit circuit. Note that Tor might still use these nodes for non-exit circuits such as one-hop directory fetches or hidden service support circuits. -- more than just a leitmotif PGP Key ID: 33E22AB1 signature.asc Description: PGP signature
