[peirce-l] Re: Introduction
Joe, list, Thank you for your recollections of Morgenbesser. He sounds so New York Jewish! To B.F. Skinner, Let me see if I understand your thesis. You think we shouldn't anthropomorphize people? Yes, I've come to think that the NYT claim sounds ridiculous (I didn't know what to think back when I first read it all those years ago). The worst that Morgenbesser may have done was crystallize some people's feelings about Austin. More Morgenbesser stories, Remembering Sidney Morgenbesser: http://daily.nysun.com/Repository/getmailfiles.asp?Style=OliveXLib:ArticleToMailType=text/htmlPath=NYS/2004/08/03ID=Ar01400 Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sidney_Morgenbesser From Leon Wieselier in TNR: And now Sidney Morgenbesser, whom I loved. And not, I hasten to declare, chiefly for his jokes. They are properly famous, but their fame was burdensome to Sidney. He wanted to be remembered for more, this hilarious man consecrated to things much higher than hilarity. Full article available only to paid TNR subscribers: https://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?i=20040816s=diarist081604 More from the Wieselier article at: http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:qUwwWkaF1F4J:scott3362.blogspot.com/2005/07/mind-of-mensch-don-quixotic-bliss-was.html+%22They+are+properly+famous,+but+their+fame+was+burdensome+to+Sidney%22hl=enct=clnkcd=3 Correction to common (not only the NYT) story about unfair unjust from commenter at _Crooked Timber_, http://crookedtimber.org/2004/08/03/sidney-morgenbesser The New York times repeats a misquotation from Sydney Morgenbesser: He was once asked if it was unfair that the police hit him on the head during the riot. It was unfair but not unjust, he pronounced. Why? It's unfair to be hit over the head, but it was not unjust since they hit everybody else over the head. He actually said the opposite: It was unjust but not unfair. It was unjust for them to hit me over the head, but it was not unfair since they hit everybody else over the head. The Times version doesn't make sense. Sydney had been thinking about Rawls' development of the idea that Justice is Fairness and this was one of the ways in which he saw a clear difference. Posted by Gilbert Harman · August 5th, 2004 at 3:32 pm Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2006 1:50 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Introduction Ben: I was in grad school at Columbia while Sidney Morgenbesser was there and the anecdote about his refutation of J. L. Austin's claim (Yeah, yeah) is wholly believable. He published very little and what he published was not especially important, but he was the greatest asset that department had and that story captures him to perfection. He was the most combative and abrasive philosopher I've ever met but also the liveliest, and had an extraordinary knack for deflating anything pretentious but empty. Peirce somewhere characterized Chauncey Wright as the boxing master for the members of the Metaphysical Club, and I immediately think of Morgenbesser whenever I read that passage and also when I encounter one of Peirce's remarks about the superior intelligence of the street-wise New Yorker in comparison with the well-protected genteel intelligence of the Cambridge academicians. The idea (in the article you mention) that Morgenbesser's retort either did or could hurt the first philosopher's reputation and career is ridiculous, by the way. Joe Ransdell --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Introduction
offlist-- Joe wrote: the superior intelligence of the street-wise New Yorker in comparison with the well-protected genteel intelligence of the Cambridge academicians. Hey, who are you talkin' about? Are you talking about me???! Ben, all of your posts of late have been of the greatest interest. Keep up the good work! Gary Joseph Ransdell wrote: Ben: I was in grad school at Columbia while Sidney Morgenbesser was there and the anecdote about his refutation of J. L. Austin's claim (Yeah, yeah) is wholly believable. He published very little and what he published was not especially important, but he was the greatest asset that department had and that story captures him to perfection. He was the most combative and abrasive philosopher I've ever met but also the liveliest, and had an extraordinary knack for deflating anything pretentious but empty. Peirce somewhere characterized Chauncey Wright as the boxing master for the members of the Metaphysical Club, and I immediately think of Morgenbesser whenever I read that passage and also when I encounter one of Peirce's remarks about the superior intelligence of the street-wise New Yorker in comparison with the well-protected genteel intelligence of the Cambridge academicians. The idea (in the article you mention) that Morgenbesser's retort either did or could hurt the first philosopher's reputation and career is ridiculous, by the way. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2006 11:07 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Introduction Theresa, Darrel, Gary Richmond, Gary F., Bernard, Claudio, Victoria, Joe, Jim, list, Thanks, Theresa, for passing the Kant excerpt along, it's interesting. I thought I'd try to do Kant's four categories of nothing(ness) in terms of the same examples for all four. For me, it's proven to be not the easiest exercise. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object: ~ ~ ~ ~ The quantified, in its zero state as ~ ~ ~ ~ underlying any greater-than-zero quantity and ~ ~ ~ ~ as apart from any intuitions and instead ~ ~ ~ ~ as it is in itself, noumenal. 2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object: Actual zero quantity. ~ ~ ~ ~ The quantified, intuited in its zero state as ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ underlying any greater-than-zero quantity. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ Quantity both zero and non-zero ~ ~ ~ ~ in the same time, place, way. = ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Space in itself, noumenal. 2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object: Actually empty space, ~ ~ ~ ~ The pure empty form of space, a vacuum. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ intuited apart from whether it is actually ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty or actually occupied. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ Space both empty occupied ~ ~ ~ ~ at the same time in the same way. = ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object: ~ ~ ~ ~ A system apart from all its (not particle-bound) internal kinetic energy, and ~ ~ ~ ~ considered in itself, noumenal, apart from one's intuitions. 2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object: Actual cold, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A system intuited apart from all its (not particle-bound) actual shortage ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ internal kinetic energy, intuited as underlying . or absence of heat. ~ ~ ~ ~ any heat apart from whether the temperature is ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ actually low or high. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ Temperature both low high. ~ ~ ~ ~ at the same time in the same way. = More nothing humor: He who asks for nothing, will be rewarded. (I don't know where that comes from, and an Internet search on it found -- nothing.) Q: Why there is something rather than nothing? Sidney Morgenbesser: Even if there were nothing, you'd still be complaining! I remember, some decades ago, a New York Times article saying that philosophers were arguing about whether there was too much emphasis in the discipline on that which we now call gotcha! moments and about whether such moments had started to have excessive effects on philosophers' careers. An example given was that of a well known philosopher, not named in the article, who was giving a talk on negation, nothingness, etc. At some point he said that, while in some languages a double negative makes a positive and in others a double negative makes a
[peirce-l] Re: Introduction
List, Sorry, that was to have gone directly to Ben's mailbox. Still, those of you who know that Ben and I live in New York may have gotten my inside joke. Gary Gary Richmond wrote: offlist-- Joe wrote: the superior intelligence of the street-wise New Yorker in comparison with the well-protected genteel intelligence of the Cambridge academicians. Hey, who are you talkin' about? Are you talking about me???! Ben, all of your posts of late have been of the greatest interest. Keep up the good work! Gary Joseph Ransdell wrote: Ben: I was in grad school at Columbia while Sidney Morgenbesser was there and the anecdote about his refutation of J. L. Austin's claim (Yeah, yeah) is wholly believable. He published very little and what he published was not especially important, but he was the greatest asset that department had and that story captures him to perfection. He was the most combative and abrasive philosopher I've ever met but also the liveliest, and had an extraordinary knack for deflating anything pretentious but empty. Peirce somewhere characterized Chauncey Wright as the boxing master for the members of the Metaphysical Club, and I immediately think of Morgenbesser whenever I read that passage and also when I encounter one of Peirce's remarks about the superior intelligence of the street-wise New Yorker in comparison with the well-protected genteel intelligence of the Cambridge academicians. The idea (in the article you mention) that Morgenbesser's retort either did or could hurt the first philosopher's reputation and career is ridiculous, by the way. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2006 11:07 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Introduction Theresa, Darrel, Gary Richmond, Gary F., Bernard, Claudio, Victoria, Joe, Jim, list, Thanks, Theresa, for passing the Kant excerpt along, it's interesting. I thought I'd try to do Kant's four categories of nothing(ness) in terms of the same examples for all four. For me, it's proven to be not the easiest exercise. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object: ~ ~ ~ ~ The quantified, in its zero state as ~ ~ ~ ~ underlying any greater-than-zero quantity and ~ ~ ~ ~ as apart from any intuitions and instead ~ ~ ~ ~ as it is in itself, noumenal. 2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object: Actual zero quantity. ~ ~ ~ ~ The quantified, intuited in its zero state as ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ underlying any greater-than-zero quantity. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ Quantity both zero and non-zero ~ ~ ~ ~ in the same time, place, way. = ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Space in itself, noumenal. 2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object: Actually empty space, ~ ~ ~ ~ The pure empty form of space, a vacuum. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ intuited apart from whether it is actually ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty or actually occupied. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ Space both empty occupied ~ ~ ~ ~ at the same time in the same way. = ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object: ~ ~ ~ ~ A system apart from all its (not particle-bound) internal kinetic energy, and ~ ~ ~ ~ considered in itself, noumenal, apart from one's intuitions. 2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object: Actual cold, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A system intuited apart from all its (not particle-bound) actual shortage ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ internal kinetic energy, intuited as underlying . or absence of heat. ~ ~ ~ ~ any heat apart from whether the temperature is ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ actually low or high. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ Temperature both low high. ~ ~ ~ ~ at the same time in the same way. = More nothing humor: He who asks for nothing, will be rewarded. (I don't know where that comes from, and an Internet search on it found -- nothing.) Q: Why there is something rather than nothing? Sidney Morgenbesser: Even if there were nothing, you'd still be complaining! I remember, some decades ago, a New York Times article saying that philosophers were arguing about whether there was too much emphasis in the discipline on that which we now call gotcha! moments and about whether such moments had started to have excessive effects on philosophers' careers. An example given was that of a well known philosopher, not named in the
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: What is Part III about?
Joe, list, I do want to belatedly comment on this provocative post. The dependency of the symbol on the interpretant is, it seems to me, rather strictly limited. While symbols are arbitrary in some sense, Peirce does not contemplate a free play of semiotic exchange, limited only by, as Rorty might say, what is rhetorically convincing. Rather, every symbol refers more or less directly to an icon and every symbol refers. . . to a real object through an index. Every symbol. Further, as interpretants, we are able to meaningfully use symbols in communicating with one another because we are embedded in a ground of shared reactional experiences. Interpretation is, therefore, sharply constrained by such referentiality and by the additional constraints of shared reactional experiences. Further, symbols are ultimately more dependent on iconicity and indexicality than upon any whims or vagaries of interpretants. Creath Thorne Joseph Ransdell writes: Considered as an introduction to a book on mathematical reasoning, the New Elements is probably best regarded as incomplete because Peirce does not in fact get around to saying anything specifically about that sort of reasoning except for the definition in Part II of diagram, which is important but is not followed up in Part III although some groundwork is laid for doing do. If the introduction were complete I would expect Peirce to have gone ahead to a Part IV in which the distinction between corollarial and theorematic deduction is drawn, and the differing role of the diagram in the two kinds of deduction is explained, and if not there then in still another new part there would be other things to be explained, too, at least briefly, as, for example, the peculiarly hypothetical status of distinctively mathematical reasoning. But since, as it stands, there is actually very little in the New Elements which seems to be designed specifically to explain or provide the logical basis for understanding the nature of mathematical reasoning in particular, I conclude that it is simply incomplete and therefore best understood in respect to what Peirce actually does accomplish, or at least attempt to accomplish as far as he got with it. Looking at it that way, it seems to me, then, that the question is, what is Part III about? What is it mainly attempting designed to accomplish? And I would say that Peirce is mainly attempting there to make clear to the reader what is implicit in understanding a symbol as essentially dependent on its interpretant for its identity as the particular symbol it is. The peculiarity of the symbol is that no conclusion can be drawn as to what it is, as a symbol, on the basis either of an intrinsic characteristic of it, or on the basis of it as something in existential relationship with other entities. It is essentially dependent on its interpretant for its identity as a symbol, which supplies what is missing in the symbol itself considered as replicated in something which has no properties of its own, qualitative or existential, that account for its meaning. This is what makes semiosis essentially dialogical: the actually occurring sign is hostage to the future in the sense that, apart from what its interpretant can do for it, it is meaningless and is not really a symbol at all. (See Thomas Riese's recent message on this in the interchange with Gary Richmond.) Contrary to what some interpreters of Peirce think, there is no implication in this that it is hostage to some infinitely remote interpretant: any authentic interpretant of it will do, provided it is an interpretation of it as significant in the sense of being connotative or having sense or logical intension (i.e.. signifying a quality or character). If it is an interpretation of it as denotative or referential (having logical extension) it must, as a matter of logical priority, already be significative connotationally. And this is true of it a fortiori if it is an interpretation of it as propositional since that presupposes referential interpretation. So if we suppose that a given symbol actually has been replicated in a sinsign occurrence, we are supposing that an authentic interpretant of it either has occurred or will occur. Nevertheless, Peirce also wants to make clear, before going into the special considerations involved in understanding mathematical representation and the way symbolism works in that respect, that the critically reflective symbol user should understand that there is indeed the promise of an infinitude of prospective future interpretation to be taken duly into account, the practical import of which is that the critical interpreter will understand that there is indeed a potentially infinitely interpretational future implicit in the symbol which precludes the possibility of absolute certainty that interpretation of it at any given time is not mistaken. And he seems especially
