[peirce-l] Re: question about century dictionary
David LaChance says: Joseph, I can't recall what that message was, but the quote you are looking might be this one, where Peirce says that his CD [i.e. Century Dictionary] definitions “were necessarily rather vaguely expressed, in order to describe the popular usage of terms, and in some cases were modified by proofreaders or editors; . . . they are hardly such as I should give in a Philosophical Dictionary proper.” No, that wasn't the passage I had in mind, David, but it is directly to the point. The one I had in mind turns out to be in a message I posted myself in which I was quoting something Nathan Houser said in his introduction to Vol. 6 of the new edition, which runs as follows: ==quote Nathan Houser Overall Peirce was quite satisfied with the results of his work, even though he would often remark, as he did to Paul Carus on 25 September 1890, God forbid I should _approve_ of above 1/10 of what I insert. ==end quote The passage you quote from Peirce helps in understanding what Peirce meant in the seemingly negative judgment that Nathan alludes to, namely, that the reader of the definitions in the dictionary should bear in mind that Peirce was under the constraint of being required to give a report on actual usage of the words he is providing definitions for since the Century is not, after all, a philosophical dictionary but rather a dictionary primarily dedicated to reporting popular usage, though it also contains descripitions of specialized usage, too, and perhaps even preferred -- i.e. implicitly recommended -- usage now and then as well. You go on to say: It appears at the end of the Reply to the Necessitarians Monist article. It could induce some rather severe pessimism about any hopes we might have in trusting that Peirce's definitions in the Century Dictionary can be considered to reflect his own views, but I can say he is being overly pessimistic himself in that passage as we find many gems in his CD work, philosophical and otherwise. Everything considered, I don't think it need be read as expressing pessimism but only as saying something like Bear in mind what I could and could not do there. What had bothered me about the passage Nathan quoted was, of course, that it seemed that we might be compelled to infer that Peirce officially approved of something which he did not in fact approve of, thus behaved dishonestly. But he put such an extraordinary amount of time and labor in on that dictionary as to make it highly implausible that he did so in violation of his own intellectual integrity. Joe Ransdell -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.375 / Virus Database: 268.2.4/282 - Release Date: 3/15/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] naming definite individuals
List, I am trying to sharpen my understanding of the concept of index with respect to a natural or an artificial language.I was struck by the number of entries, at least in the Commens Dictionary, that fail to isolate what is essential for distinguishing an index from a subindice with respect to linguistic entities. Peirce uses a lot of concepts, including connection, relation, real relation, reaction, actual connection, individualand existence to doa lot ofwork. In the case of proper names, if the name is governed by a law or legisign, it can count as an index. BUT this still does not give us all of the the necessary conditions fora proper name to count as an index. (In fact, the law could state that it has indefinite reference, and thus concede that proper names are subindices.) The further necessary condition appears to be "definite."I did not find this in the Commens. The law has to prescribe the application of the name to *one and only one individual.* I might add that the existence and individuality of the object namedare criticallyessential also. But those two conditions are not sufficient. Consequently, the proper name "Charles Peirce" is an index only if: 1. Charles Peirce existed 2. Charles Peirce is an individual 3. "Charles Peirce" names a definite object Maybe I missed something in the Commens or should look elsewhere or maybe "individual" and "existence" do all the work "definite" is supposed to. But it seems thatthey do not.Even if Charles Peirce can be differentiated from every other existent individual and made definite, I cannot find any entry in the Commens Dictionary that captures how the law of the proper name could suggest this application.Thus,I cannot find in the text how a proper name can clearly count as an index rather than a subindice. It is not enough to suggest that a law is involved without being more specific about that law. Does anyone know of another passage? Any related comments are welcome too. Jim W Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Joe, Jim,
Joe wrote,
Jim:
Subindex is not a Peircean term, is it? What is it and why should Peirce
be concerned to distinguish an index from it?
Joe Ransdell
I recently posted about the index and the subindex. Friday, February 10, 2006
2:51 PM, Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Reproduced just below. - Best, Ben
66~~~
Joe, list,
Your response sends me back to the Kaina Stoicheia, in search of Peirce's
search for unexpressed thought. I'll have to ponder that till I can think of
something to say about a connection among difficulties with the idea of
connotation, the use of real where usually actual would be used, and
unexpressed thought.
One of the first things that I notice again, in looking around the Kaina
Stoicheia, is that, even if one replaces real with actual, existent in
Peirce's statement that In the first place, a sign is not a real thing. It is
of such a nature as to exist in _replicas_. , it still makes one wonder
whether he is wavering on, say, the idea that an index is an actual existent.
Well, going over Peirce quotes, I see that I have generally been thinking in
terms of a simplified Peirce. I didn't realize that there was a period of
time when he was wavering on whether an index was necessarily a sinsign, and I
don't think that I'll bother my head about it so much as I was doing. I mean,
it's significant that Peirce didn't always view indices as actual, existent,
even in his later years, but I shouldn't have been shocked. The remainder of
this post consists in things which I found in looking into this.
The Commens Dictionary http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html
puts a question mark by the 1904 in its collection of definitions of indices.
One has to wonder whether it was mostly written at least a little earlier,
1903. In looking through the Commens definitions of index, one notices that
Peirce more than once, and indeed in 1909, speaks of the real connection
between index object, and does not define the index in terms of its being an
individual second until 1903. Of course, there is always there is to point to
a persistence, a reality, of the reactional connection between index object.
As for the index's being, itself, an individual reaction or resistance, that's
another story.
In 1885 ('On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of
Notation', W 5:162-3) he speaks of a letter attached to a geometrical diagram
as an index, likewise he speaks of subscript numbers which in algebra
distinguish one value from another without saying what those values are. But
in 1903 ('A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:274) he says of
subindices / hyposemes (click on subindex in the sidebar at the Commens
Dictionary):
66~~~
_Subindices_ or _hyposemes_ are signs which are rendered such principally by an
actual connection with their objects. Thus a proper name, [a] personal
demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes
what it does owing to a real connection with its object but none of these is an
Index, since it is not an individual.
~~~99
The earliest reference to sinsigns or tokens that I find at the Commens
dictionary is from the 1903 'A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:291:
66~~~
A _Sinsign_ (where the syllable _sin_ is taken as meaning being only once, as
in _single_, _simple_, Latin _semel_, etc.) is an actual existent thing or
event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it
involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are
of a peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied.
~~~99
It's as if, until 1903, Peirce thought of indices as general in their own
character and as indicating through existent replicas, then wavered. In the
1903 'A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic' EP 2:274 he defined the subindex
in contradistinction to the index; the index is a sinsign, the subindex (e.g.,
a proper name) is a legisign. Yet later, From A Letter to Lady Welby, SS 33,
1904, proper names are again called indices:
66~~~
I define an Index as a sign determined by its dynamic object by virtue of
being in a real relation to it. Such is a Proper Name (a legisign); such is the
occurrence of a symptom of a disease (the symptom itself is a legisign, a
general type of a definite character. The occurrence in a particular case is a
sinsign).
~~~99
In the 1906 'Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism', CP 4.531, it sounds
like the index as such is a sinsign:
66~~~
... secondly, by being really and in its individual existence connected with
the individual object, when I call the sign an _Index_
~~~99
Later, in 'A Sketch of Logical Critics', EP 2:460-461 (Commens Dict: 1909; EP
Vol. II: 1911), a need for the index itself to be individual, i.e., to be a
sinsign, is unmentioned, though of course maybe he would
[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
You say,
"Subindex" is not a Peircean term, is it?What is it and why should Peirce be concerned to distinguish an index from it?
Joe,
The Commens Dictionary (online) has a singleentry for "Subindex" in the left side roll down window. It links to the followingpassage from CP2.274.But Peirce uses "subindices" in thispassage.I am not aware of him ever using "subindex." The passagehints atwhatsubindices are.(I never used"subindex" in my post.) You probably know all this. My concern is with distinguishing what kind of sign a proper name is, especially in light of both of the following passages. Peirce was apparently interested in the difference betweenan index and a subindice. He uses proper names as examples of both. What distinguishes them with respect to proper names? Peirce seems to be interested, if only indirectly,since he puts "a legisign" next to proper name in the second quote. Did I understand you correctly? Obviously, if there is no such sign, Peirce is hardly expectedto be interested in it. But there does seem to be a distinction.I tried to strengthen this distinction by adding "definite" to individual.
Jim W.
Peirce says,
"Subindices or hyposemes are signs which are rendered such principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a proper name, [a] personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a real connection with its object but none of these is an Index, since it is not an individual." ('A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:274, 1903)
The following is an entry for "index."
"I define an Index as a sign determined by its dynamic object by virtue of being in a real relation to it. Such is a Proper Name (a legisign); such is the occurrence of a symptom of a disease (the symptom itself is a legisign, a general type of a definite character. The occurrence in a particular case is a sinsign)." (A Letter to Lady Welby, SS 33, 1904)-Original Message-From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Sat, 18 Mar 2006 14:14:41 -0600Subject: [peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
- Original Message -
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Sent: Saturday, March 18, 2006 1:14 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] naming definite individuals
List,
I am trying to sharpen my understanding of the concept of index with respect to a natural or an artificial language.I was struck by the number of entries, at least in the Commens Dictionary, that fail to isolate what is essential for distinguishing an index from a subindice with respect to linguistic entities. Peirce uses a lot of concepts, including connection, relation, real relation, reaction, actual connection, individualand existence to doa lot ofwork. In the case of proper names, if the name is governed by a law or legisign, it can count as an index. BUT this still does not give us all of the the necessary conditions fora proper name to count as an index. (In fact, the law could state that it has indefinite reference, and thus concede that proper names are subindices.) The further necessary condition appears to be "definite."I did not find this in the Commens. The law has to prescribe the application of the name to *one and oly one individual.*
I might add that the existence and individuality of the object namedare criticallyessential also. But those two conditions are not sufficient. Consequently, the proper name "Charles Peirce" is an index only if:
1. Charles Peirce existed
2. Charles Peirce is an individual
3. "Charles Peirce" names a definite object
Maybe I missed something in the Commens or should look elsewhere or maybe "individual" and "existence" do all the work "definite" is supposed to. But it seems thatthey do not.Even if Charles Peirce can be differentiated from every other existent individual and made definite, I cannot find any entry in the Commens Dictionary that captures how the law of the proper name could suggest this application.Thus,I cannot find in the text how a proper name can clearly count as an index rather than a subindice. It is not enough to suggest that a law is involved without being more specific about that law. Does anyone know of another passage? Any related comments are welcome too.
Jim W
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