[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Dear list, Just now I was thinking about some passages of Peirce. About some small sentences which for me appeared to be quite important somehow. For me they are now, whatever the answers to my questions I have to ask here now. The questions relate to the term diagrammatic of C.S. Peirce. I saw that term in some posts before, connected with at least thoughts. My questions here are, whether in the original texts of Peirce (whatever texts he wrote): 1) It is only mentioned that thoughts would be (or are) diagrammatic 2) Whether he also stated somewhere that (something in the) real world would be diagrammatic. I am also very interested in passages where to find them and for 2) what is exactly stated For me myself, it is also very interesting to see that the term is dia-grammatic (or might it even be called dia-grammatical in some places by Peirce?) If everything goes well I will visit Thomas Riese this Wednesday if so that might lead to lots of interesting questions ;-) Kind regards, Wilfred --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.375 / Virus Database: 268.2.5/284 - Release Date: 17-3-2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.375 / Virus Database: 268.2.5/284 - Release Date: 17-3-2006
[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Ben, Jim and list,
My understanding of the problem opened by Peirce's use of subindices or
hyposemes seems to be quite different from your's. So I try to give my
idea of it below, being accepted that I think this not to be secondary
problem in Peirce's sign theory because he also used the same
distinction for icons (hypoicons) as Frances Kelly recalls it in
another post.
Ben summarizes the problem this way when he writes (in part) in reply
to Jim:
Now here,then,is what
you cannot reconcile:
From "A Letter to Lady
Welby," SS 33, 1904:
66~~~
"I define an Index
as a sign determined by its dynamic object by virtue of being in a real
relation to it. Such is a Proper Name (a legisign); such is the
occurrence of a symptom of a disease (the symptom itself is a legisign,
a general type of a definite character. The occurrence in a particular
case is a sinsign).
~~~99
YET:
1903 ('A Syllabus of
Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:274) he says of subindices / hyposemes
(click on "subindex" in the sidebar at the Commens Dictionary):
66~~~
_Subindices_ or _hyposemes_ are signs which
are rendered such principally by an actual connection with their
objects. Thus a proper name, [a] personal demonstrative, or relative
pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing
to a real connection with its object but none of these is an Index,
since it is not an individual.
~~~99
You will note that inthe
1903he says, specifically, thata proper nameIS a subindex andISN'T
an index "since it is not an invidual." Peirce is very clear on that
point.
My reading of this is that despite Peirce is saying that a proper name,
a personal demonstrative, etc. are not indices because they lack of
individuality, he is NOT saying at the same time that they would be
subindices or hyposemes. May be Ben is mislead by equating "real" with
"actual". The first sentence only states to my sense a character of
subindices, namely Actuality of a Connection.The second sentence states
-INDEPENDENTLY- that in order to be an Index, individuality is
required.
Now, the two sentences are related by "Thus", which means I think that
if we consider that subindices are some kinds of indices, yet they need
to be individuals as well as actually connected to their objects.
But nothing implies here that a proper name is a subindex. On the
contrary, not being an index he cannot be a fortiori a subindex.
BEN:
Yet in the other, the
1904,he says that a proper name, in the sense of a legisign,_is_
an index.
The point is that Peirce
is _varying_ over time. That's what I was tracing the series
of quotes. In the 1904, an Index can be a legisign or a sinsign. That
means it can be general or singular.
I doubt for the time being Peirce is varying here. There is a recurrent
shorthand that perverts our reasoning. It consists in assimilating the
relation sign-object into a kind of sign (this I had already said at
the time of the "pure symbols" discussion). Strictly speaking saying
that a sign is an index is a metonymy (which Peirce uses often too).
The first trichotomy , the sign in itself, allow a sign to be either a
qualisign, or a sinsign, or a legisign. It is only after that that
either of them (except the qualisign) can be considered as an index for
example. If there is a change in Peirce's analysis of signs starting
from the Syllabus of 1903, it is in the "invention" of the first
trichotomy. Perhaps it would be safer not to say as Ben does that an
Index can be a legisign (general) or a sinsign (singular) but the
converse: a legisign and a sinsign can be both indices (among other
things).
Now, what about subindices and other hyposemes? I am not sure at all.
But as it is suggested by the etymology they seem to me to be species
of index, this latter being their genus. At first sight this could
apply indifferently to sinsigns and legisigns, being admitted if we
follow Peirce that the supplementary indexical character lies in the
actuality of their connection to their objects. Now, this does not
prevent the question I hear Ben uttering behind his computer screen:
does legisigns (or generals) can have actual connections to their
objects or does this property can apply only to singulars?
Hoping to have not enfonce des portes ouvertes.
Bernard
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[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen a ¨crit : Dear list, Just now I was thinking about some passages of Peirce. About some small sentences which for me appeared to be quite important somehow. For me they are now, whatever the answers to my questions I have to ask here now. The questions relate to the term “diagrammatic” of C.S. Peirce. I saw that term in some posts before, connected with at least thoughts. My questions here are, whether in the original texts of Peirce (whatever texts he wrote): 1) It is only mentioned that thoughts would be (or are) diagrammatic A diagram is a special kind of iconic relation between a sign and its object (more precisely the ressemblance lies between the parts of the object an the parts of the sign). So it is much more the train of thought, its form, which can accurately be said diagrammatic. This amounts to say that it is reasoning that is diagrammatic, particularly in the syllogistic form. For example (CP 3.363): --Quote Peirce The truth, however, appears to be that all deductive reasoning, even simple syllogism, involves an element of observation; namely, deduction consists in constructing an icon or diagram the relations of whose parts shall present a complete analogy with those of the parts of the object of reasoning, of experimenting upon this image in the imagination, and of observing the result so as to discover unnoticed and hidden relations among the parts. For instance, take the syllogistic formula, All M is P S is M .¨. S is P. This is really a diagram of the relations of S, M, and P. The fact that the middle term occurs in the two premisses is actually exhibited, and this must be done or the notation will be of no value. As for algebra, the very idea of the art is that it presents formul which can be manipulated, and that by observing the effects of such manipulation we find properties not to be otherwise discerned. In such manipulation, we are guided by previous discoveries which are embodied in general formul. These are patterns which we have the right to imitate in our procedure, and are the icons par excellence of algebra. The letters of applied algebra are usually tokens, but the x, y, z, etc., of a general formula, such as (x+y)z = x z + y z, are blanks to be filled up with tokens, they are indices of tokens. Such a formula might, it is true, be replaced by an abstractly stated rule (say that multiplication is distributive); but no application could be made of such an abstract statement without translating it into a sensible image. -- 2) Whether he also stated somewhere that (something in the) real world would be diagrammatic. Yes, I think, while it is only indirect. The deductive syllogism has a diagrammatic form and Peirce often makes the case of the example of the frog as a syllogism: -Quote Peirce- CP 2.711 . The cognition of a rule is not necessarily conscious, but is of the nature of a habit, acquired or congenital. The cognition of a case is of the general nature of a sensation; that is to say, it is something which comes up into present consciousness. The cognition of a result is of the nature of a decision to act in a particular way on a given occasion.†P1 In point of fact, a syllogism in Barbara virtually takes place when we irritate the foot of a decapitated frog. The connection between the afferent and efferent nerve, whatever it may be, constitutes a nervous habit, a rule of action, which is the physiological analogue of the major premiss. The disturbance of the ganglionic equilibrium, owing to the irritation, is the physiological form of that which, psychologically considered, is a sensation; and, logically considered, is the occurrence of a case. The explosion through the efferent nerve is the physiological form of that which psychologically is a volition, and logically the inference of a result. When we pass from the lowest to the highest forms of inervation, the physiological equivalents escape our observation; but, psychologically, we still have, first, habit--which in its highest form is understanding, and which corresponds to the major premiss of Barbara; we have, second, feeling, or present consciousness, corresponding to the minor premiss of Barbara; and we have, third, volition, corresponding to the conclusion of the same mode of syllogism. Although these analogies, like all very broad generalizations, may seem very fanciful at first sight, yet the more the reader reflects upon them the more profoundly true I am confident they will appear. They give a significance to the ancient system of formal logic which no other can at all share.
[peirce-l] kinds of relations (from Century Dictionary)
Peirce did the entry for relation for the Century Dictionary, an enormously long entry from which I pick out a few of the many different kinds of relations he defines there, namely, those that I recall him distinguishing for one purpose or another for philosophical purposes: KINDS OF RELATIONS, from Century Dictionary, p. 5058 --Accidental relation: an indirect relation of A to C, constituted by A being in some relation to B, and B being in an independent relation to C. Thus, if a man throws away a date-stone, and that date-stone strikes an invisible genie, the relation of the man to the genie is an accidental one. --Alio relation: a relation of such a nature that a thing cannot be in that relation to itself: as, being previous to. -- Double relation, dual relation: relation between a pair of things, or between a relate and a single correlate. --Extrinsic relation: a relation which is established between terms already existing. --Plural relation: a relation between a relate and two or more correlates, as when A aims a shot, B, at C. --Prime relation: a relation not resulting from the conjunction of relations alternatively satisfied. --Real relation: a relation the statement of which cannot be separated into two facts, one relating to the relate and the other to the correlate, such as the relation of Cain to Abel as his killer. For the facts that Cain killed somebody and that Abel was killed do not together make up the fact that Cain killed Abel: opposed to relation qf reason. --Relation of disquiparance: a relation which confers unlike names upon relate and correlate. --Relation of equiparance: a relation which confers the same relative name upon relate and correlate: thus, the being a cousin of somebody is such a relation, for if A is cousin to B, B is cousin to A. --Relation of reason: a relation which depends upon a fact which can be stated as an aggregate of two facts (one concerning the relate, the other concerning the correlate), such that the annihilation of the relate or the correlate would destroy only one of these facts, but leave the other intact: thus, the fact that Franklin and Rumford were both scientific Americans constitutes a relationship between them with two correlative relations; but these are relations of reason, because the two facts are that Franklin was a scientific American and that Rumford was a scientific American, the first of which facts would remain true even if Rumford had never existed, and the second even if Franklin had never existed. --Self-relation: (a) A relation of such a sort that a thing can be in that relation to itself: as, being the killer of; but better (b) a relation of such a sort that nothing can be so related to anything else, as the relations of self. consciousness, relative self-depreciation, self-help, etc. --Transcendental relation: a relation which does not come under Aristotle's category of relation, as cause and effect, habit and object. -- Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.375 / Virus Database: 268.2.5/284 - Release Date: 3/17/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] REAL RELATION (passages from Collected Papers)
The passages below were retrieved from the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce by a string search on real relation: Joe Ransdell -- REAL RELATION (passages from the Collected Papers) CP 5.287 (1868) 287. We must now consider two other properties of signs which are of great importance in the theory of cognition. Since a sign is not identical with the thing signified, but differs from the latter in some respects, it must plainly have some characters which belong to it in itself, and have nothing to do with its representative function. These I call the material qualities of the sign. As examples of such qualities, take in the word man, its consisting of three letters -- in a picture, its being flat and without relief. In the second place, a sign must be capable of being connected (not in the reason but really) with another sign of the same object, or with the object itself. Thus, words would be of no value at all unless they could be connected into sentences by means of a real copula which joins signs of the same thing. The usefulness of some signs -- as a weathercock, a tally, etc. -- consists wholly in their being really connected with the very things they signify. In the case of a picture such a connection is not evident, but it exists in the power of association which connects the picture with the brain-sign which labels it. This real, physical connection of a sign with its object, either immediately or by its connection with another sign, I call the pure demonstrative application of the sign. Now the representative function of a sign lies neither in its material quality nor in its pure demonstrative application; because it is something which the sign is, not in itself or in a real relation to its object, but which it is to a thought, while both of the characters just defined belong to the sign independently of its addressing any thought. And yet if I take all the things which have certain qualities and physically connect them with another series of things, each to each, they become fit to be signs. If they are not regarded as such they are not actually signs, but they are so in the same sense, for example, in which an unseen flower can be said to be red, this being also a term relative to a mental affection. CP 1.372 (1885) 372. We have seen that the mere coexistence of two singular facts constitutes a degenerate form of dual fact; and in like manner there are two orders of degeneracy in plural facts, for either they may consist in a mere synthesis of facts of which the highest is dual, or they may consist in a mere synthesis of singular facts. This explains why there should be three classes of signs; for there is a triple connection of sign, thing signified, cognition produced in the mind. There may be a mere relation of reason between the sign and the thing signified; in that case the sign is an icon. Or there may be a direct physical connection; in that case, the sign is an index. Or there may be a relation which consists in the fact that the mind associates the sign with its object; in that case the sign is a name [or symbol]. Now consider the difference between a logical term, a proposition, and an inference. A term is a mere general description, and as neither icon nor index possesses generality, it must be a name; and it is nothing more. A proposition is also a general description, but it differs from a term in that it purports to be in a real relation to the fact, to be really determined by it; thus, a proposition can only be formed of the conjunction of a name and an index. An inference, too, contains a general description CP 1.365 (1890) 365. Thus, the whole book being nothing but a continual exemplification of the triad of ideas, we need linger no longer upon this preliminary exposition of them. There is, however, one feature of them upon which it is quite indispensable to dwell. It is that there are two distinct grades of Secondness and three grades of Thirdness. There is a close analogy to this in geometry. Conic sections are either the curves usually so called, or they are pairs of straight lines. A pair of straight lines is called a degenerate conic. So plane cubic curves are either the genuine curves of the third order, or they are conics paired with straight lines, or they consist of three straight lines; so that there are the two orders of degenerate cubics. Nearly in this same way, besides genuine Secondness, there is a degenerate sort which does not exist as such, but is only so conceived. The medieval logicians (following a hint of Aristotle) distinguished between real relations and relations of reason. A real relation subsists in virtue of a fact which would be totally impossible were either of the related objects destroyed; while a relation of reason subsists in virtue of two facts, one only of which would disappear on the annihilation of either of the
[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Dear Folks, Some thoughts on this issue and interesting discussion: Something, it seems to me, performs an indexical function in so far as it serves to point to the spatial temporal location of something other than itself. That which displays a form is an icon. So, a name, as for example Ben is not an index. because a name does not have a physical (spatial temporal) connection with the object it names. A true index functions as an index whether or not we interpret it as such. For example a reaction is an index of an action. And a part is an index of the whole. Or one side an index of the other. Indexes are necesarry results of the continuity of space and time coupled with the fact that locations in either are specific rather than universal. Icons, on the other hand, are reflections of the fact that forms (as Plato said -- I think;) are universals and independent of time and place. An icon tells one nothing about the location of what it depicts but is does provide something about the depicted objects form, quality or essence. Indexes indicate locations. I would say a name is a symbol and like all symbols has both iconic and indexical functions. But a name is not an index per se. There is no necessary actual or existent connection between ones name and one's location in space and time. A name like all symbols are imputed indexes. That there is not a necessary/actual indexical connection between a name or symbol and its object is what makes symbols so useful for representing objects. The symbol can be manipulated (in thought) without having to actually move the object. Further, a symbol, depending upon its material properties can be either iconical, indexical or more purely symbolic. For example the spoken word bow-wow is an iconic symbol. The arrow on an exit sign is an indexical symbol and the word in is an almost purely symbolic symbol. But how man alone (if indeed it is man alone) achieved the capacity to impute (or partake of imputation) is the great puzzle of symbolization. I see where we got the idea of the importance of forms and locations -- but I don't know how we grasped the notion of using other objects to impute them. The discovery of symbols (as imortalized in the garden of eden tree of knowledge myth) was the begining of man's history as man. I guess what I'm saying is that names are symbols not indexes. As for what specificically is meant by subindex I'm not sure. Just couldn't resist jumping in -- as I am trying to follow this interesting discussion through its backs and forths. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] re: naming definite individuals (REAL RELATION defined)
I am reposting this under the subject description for the thread on naming definite individuals so it will show up under that heading in the archives. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Monday, March 20, 2006 7:29 AM Subject: [peirce-l] REAL RELATION (passages from Collected Papers) The passages below were retrieved from the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce by a string search on real relation: Joe Ransdell -- REAL RELATION (passages from the Collected Papers) CP 5.287 (1868) 287. We must now consider two other properties of signs which are of great importance in the theory of cognition. Since a sign is not identical with the thing signified, but differs from the latter in some respects, it must plainly have some characters which belong to it in itself, and have nothing to do with its representative function. These I call the material qualities of the sign. As examples of such qualities, take in the word man, its consisting of three letters -- in a picture, its being flat and without relief. In the second place, a sign must be capable of being connected (not in the reason but really) with another sign of the same object, or with the object itself. Thus, words would be of no value at all unless they could be connected into sentences by means of a real copula which joins signs of the same thing. The usefulness of some signs -- as a weathercock, a tally, etc. -- consists wholly in their being really connected with the very things they signify. In the case of a picture such a connection is not evident, but it exists in the power of association which connects the picture with the brain-sign which labels it. This real, physical connection of a sign with its object, either immediately or by its connection with another sign, I call the pure demonstrative application of the sign. Now the representative function of a sign lies neither in its material quality nor in its pure demonstrative application; because it is something which the sign is, not in itself or in a real relation to its object, but which it is to a thought, while both of the characters just defined belong to the sign independently of its addressing any thought. And yet if I take all the things which have certain qualities and physically connect them with another series of things, each to each, they become fit to be signs. If they are not regarded as such they are not actually signs, but they are so in the same sense, for example, in which an unseen flower can be said to be red, this being also a term relative to a mental affection. CP 1.372 (1885) 372. We have seen that the mere coexistence of two singular facts constitutes a degenerate form of dual fact; and in like manner there are two orders of degeneracy in plural facts, for either they may consist in a mere synthesis of facts of which the highest is dual, or they may consist in a mere synthesis of singular facts. This explains why there should be three classes of signs; for there is a triple connection of sign, thing signified, cognition produced in the mind. There may be a mere relation of reason between the sign and the thing signified; in that case the sign is an icon. Or there may be a direct physical connection; in that case, the sign is an index. Or there may be a relation which consists in the fact that the mind associates the sign with its object; in that case the sign is a name [or symbol]. Now consider the difference between a logical term, a proposition, and an inference. A term is a mere general description, and as neither icon nor index possesses generality, it must be a name; and it is nothing more. A proposition is also a general description, but it differs from a term in that it purports to be in a real relation to the fact, to be really determined by it; thus, a proposition can only be formed of the conjunction of a name and an index. An inference, too, contains a general description CP 1.365 (1890) 365. Thus, the whole book being nothing but a continual exemplification of the triad of ideas, we need linger no longer upon this preliminary exposition of them. There is, however, one feature of them upon which it is quite indispensable to dwell. It is that there are two distinct grades of Secondness and three grades of Thirdness. There is a close analogy to this in geometry. Conic sections are either the curves usually so called, or they are pairs of straight lines. A pair of straight lines is called a degenerate conic. So plane cubic curves are either the genuine curves of the third order, or they are conics paired with straight lines, or they consist of three straight lines; so that there are the two orders of degenerate cubics. Nearly in this same way, besides genuine Secondness, there is a degenerate sort which does not exist as such, but is only so conceived. The medieval logicians (following a hint
[peirce-l] Re: question about century dictionary
Joseph,I had missed the last part of your message, below, which seems to show a slight confusion about hortatory definitions (I don't think there can be such a thing as a hortatory meaning), probably stemming from my own post. The idea is quite simple and pretty close to "wishful thinking". When an author (e.g. Peirce) writes a hortatory definition of, say, relation, what he does is that instead of describing how the word is actually used, explaining the different shades of current and past uses, he focuses on how he wishes the word would be used in the future; the author tries to influence the accepted meaning and usage of a term. Sometimes Peirce even tried to have new words, of his own making, inserted in the dictionary (I remember that one of his comments goes, "This word did not exist until I just gave birth to it.") We can recognize many of Peirce's ideas in his approach to the Century Dictionary, for example in the way he tried to have a general conception (a definition) influence/determine the future course of scientific conduct and the potential growth of knowledge.David Of course it is possible that Peirce misunderstood it that way, but perhaps the idea of hortatory meaning is sufficient to account for the extended accounts he sometimes gives, though it does seem that he was stretching things beyond reasonable limits at times. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: David Lachance To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, March 18, 2006 6:17 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: question about century dictionaryJoseph, all,There are a number of such statements of Peirce's expressing his dissatisfaction with the Century Dictionary. But Peirce's attitude toward the editors (and other contributors, and the Dictionary itself, etc.) varied widely, from admiration to frustration and contempt; conversely, the attitude of the Century Co. toward Peirce fluctuated. You are right in saying that it should be kept in mind that Peirce worked under special constraints; the thing is that writing for an encyclopedia (the CD was not just a dictionary proper; it was meant to be a state-of-the-art encyclopedia and give a picture of the state of knowledge in almost every field of the day. It is somewhat akin to Diderot and D'Alembert's Encyclopédie) necessarily raises the issue of authorship (cf. your discussion of Wikipedia and Digital Universe) because the responsibility of making decisions about the final state of any piece of text was unevenly and irregularly spread over several people (the author, editors, etymologists, other contributors, proofreaders, and so forth). ==quote Nathan HouserOverall Peirce was quite satisfied with the results of his work, even thoughhe would often remark, as he did to Paul Carus on 25 September 1890, "Godforbid I should _approve_ of above 1/10 of what I insert."==end quoteThe passage you quote from Peirce helps in understanding what Peirce meant in the seemingly negative judgment that Nathan alludes to, namely, that the reader of the definitions in the dictionary should bear in mind that Peirce was under the constraint of being required to give a report on actual usage of the words he is providing definitions for since the Century is not, after all, a philosophical dictionary but rather a dictionary primarily dedicated to reporting popular usage, though it also contains descripitions of specialized usage, too, and perhaps even preferred -- i.e. implicitly recommended -- usage now and then as well. You go on to say: Well, in a way the CD *was* meant to be a philosophical (and botanical, chemical, astronomical, etc.) dictionary. Its main purpose was to give the reader an idea of the current state of knowledge in all fields. In any case that is certainly how Peirce saw things, and that explains that he was sometimes disappointed. Another point is that the notion of what a dictionary definition should do is not exactly the same today as it was in 1880; hortatory definitions (that is, definitions that tell people how they should use or understand a term or notion, instead of just describing how it is actually used) were sometimes used and many of Peirce's articles are hortatory definitions. The prime example is his definition of "university", which was at first rejected by editors, and finally accepted after he impressed upon them his idea that it was vital that the conception of a university in America change, otherwise there would never be an institution worthy of being called a university in the country."It appears at the end of the "Reply to the Necessitarians" Monistarticle. It could induce some rather severe pessimism about any hopeswe might have in
[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Benjamin Udell a crit:
Bernard, Jim, list,
I got too excited, I'm not at all sure that "subindex" can be
equated with "degenerate index."
Best, Ben
==
Ben,
I was ready to write you that if a "degenerate index" makes sense
because it signifies degenerate secondness, the parallel with hypoicons
would not hold anymore because there is not "degenerate firstness".
The whole passage from Essential Peirce, Vol. 2, p. 273-274 (which
comes from the Syllabus of 1903) is certainly of service here. The two
paragraphs concerning respectively the Icon and the Index are written
under the same structure. First a definition is given and some doubtful
limiting cases are discussed. Then we find respectively the
consideration of hypoicons and hyposemes. Nevertheless I think that
these latter considerations are of a different tone than the
definitions or case studies (and then that they are not related to the
degenerescence subject). For hypoicons we find the following exposition
of motives: "But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its
object mainly by its similarity, no matter its mode of being". I
understand this as addressing any kind of sign, be it a qualisign
(which is evident), a sinsign or a legisign provided that they bear an
iconic ingredient. I think that hyposemes can be understood the same
way except for qualisigns which can never be indexical.
As a matter of fact the common presentation structure we see for icons
and indices is not reproduced in the subsequent paragraph concerning
symbols. There seems to have nothing like "hyposymbols". And we can
guess why: an hyposymbol can't be anything else than a legisign. Thus
the concept would be empty or redundant.
Apologies for writing in a previous message the phrasing "subindices or
other hyposemes". I did not intend to mean that there could be a
distinction between both of them. I was just replicating a typical
French phrasing where "other" ("autres") is meant to emphasize that we,
speaker and recipient, know very well and otherwise that they are the
same! Some case of imputed context if I can say so. I infer from your
reply that such a language artifice does not work the same way in
English. Or may be my English itself was not what it should have been.
Bernard
Bernard, Jim, list,
I should have noted that EP 2.273, combined with EP 2.274,in
fact contains "The Answer!" about subindices. A subindex is a
degenerate index. It can be singular or general. I would note to
Mats Bergman the Commens Dictionary folks, that the passage from
2.273 might be best included along with 2.274 under the "subindex"
entry.
1903 ('A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:273)
(which I found here though they numbered it "2.283"
"2.284" http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:pcLX9-62OoUJ:www.univ-perp.fr/csp2001/jappy.htm+%22Thus+a+proper%22
66~~~
An _Index_ or _Seme_1 ({sma}) is a
Representamen whose Representative character consists in its being an
individual second. If the Secondness is an existential relation, the
Index is _genuine_. If the Secondness is a reference, the
Index is _degenerate_. A genuine Index and its Object
must be existent individuals (whether things or facts), and its
immediate Interpretant must be of the same character. But since every
individual must have characters, it follows that a genuine Index may
contain a Firstness, and so an Icon as a constituent part of it. Any
individual is a degenerate Index of its own characters.
~~~99
1903 ('A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:274)
66~~~
_Subindices_ or _hyposemes_
are signs which are rendered such principally by an actual connection
with their objects. Thus a proper name, personal demonstrative, or
relative pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it
does owing to a real connection with its object but none of these is an
Index, since it is not an individual.
~~~99
Best, Ben
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[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Ben A general term has a "range" or "domain." A quantifier has a "scope." Peirce following DeMorgan called the domain a "universe of discourse." The variables x,y are general terms; as is the predicate letter J. (My post right before this raises a lot of questions about that predicate letter.) The schema ExAy(Jy--x=y)translates "there is something x such that for every y, y is J if and only ifx is identical to y.I don't know what you mean by "purport." But I think that if either both domains are empty, or if the domain ofx is non-empty and the universal quantifier has existential import,the statement is formally true. Jim W -Original Message-From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 22:46:51 -0500Subject: [peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals Jim W., Frances, Jim P., Joe, I'm having trouble keeping up with this thread, but I want to get to everything sooner or later. Jim wrote, Ben You say, "I'm not able to find anything saying that the embodiment of a qualisign could be called a "replica" of the qualisign. I don't see why not, but I don't find anything saying that it would be okay." (end) You and I considered a sign that is not individual. If a sign is not individual, does it follow that its general? Consider a "free" logic where the variables are not bound. If a sign is not individual, then it is possible that it is neither individual nor general.I have changed modes. The replica of the qualisign must be possible. Jim W [Image removed] I wish I knew. The Peircean scope system is particularly obscure to me in regard to quality. Quality is vague. I haven't found a scope system in any philosophy that had more than a few "rubber bands safety pins" for a terminology. It's my biggest pet peeve in philosophy. But anyway In contemporary deductive logic, a "general term" is, as far as I can tell, simply a term which does not purport as to scope. If it were general by purport or assumption, then a schema like "ExAy(Jy--x=y)" would be formally false. If (using "E!" as the unique-existence functor) E!x Hx, then "H" is singular, though not necessarily by purport. So then I guess it's no longer called "general," but I don't really know. If we say that a sign truly corresponding to at least two things is general, and that a sign truly corresponding to only one thing is singular, then how does a free-variable logic let us escape the idea that any sign will be either singular or general? I'm not familiar with free-variable logic. Maybe you should take it from there, because what follows are my further boggings-down. I would take qualities and qualisignsto be either general or such that they could be general. I.e., maybe there's only one thing that has a certain exact shade of blue, but there's no intrinisic reason for that, there could have been a second such-blue thing. Not every possible quality will be embodied even once, but then neither will every possible singular or every possible law. So quality doesn't seem vaguer to me than the other categories in that regard. A quality, certainly a sensory-style quality, belongs to some spectrum or gamut or multi-dimensional version of a spectrum in terms of which a mode of sensing or feeling _divides up the world_. So a given quality is (to my way of thinking) is neither singular nor fully universal, but in between -- a non-universal general, or, one could just as wellsay,a non-singular special. The inductive structure of alternatives among qualities, events (universes), etc.,is the subject matter of fields like statistics. The deductive structure of such alternatives is the subject matter of fields like probability theory. Meanwhile "two," "seven" etc. are universal in the sense that any things can be among the two or the seven, their modifications qualities are irrelevant. All that count are things' identities distinctnesses, orderings, mappings, arrangements, etc. The deductive and often equivalentially deductive structure of such things is the subect matter of the pure maths. The abductive structure of such things (where you do have to take qualities reactions, not to mention probabilities the like,into account) is the subect matter of the special sciences. That's all to my fourish way of thinking, not Peirce's trichotomical way. The existential particular doesn't nail down vagueness in the way that the hypothetical universal nails down generality. "ExHx" is vague as to which x is H, but in order to verify it I don't need to find the x which the assertor presumably found, instead I just need to find at least one x which is H, it certainly doesn't have to be the same one which the assertor presumably found. However, if one wants to understand the genesis of the semiosis,one may indeed want to find out which x the assertor found to be H. This is natural from a philosophical, inductive perspective and should not be regarded as merely a quaint wrinkle of Peirce's
