Ben:
If I am understanding you correctly you are saying that all semeiosis is at
least incipiently self-reflexive or self-reflective or in other words
self-controlled AND that the adequate philosophical description of it will
REQUIRE appeal to a fourth factor (which is somehow of the essence of
verification) in addition to the appeal to the presence of a sign, of an
object, and of an interpretant, allowing of course for the possibility of
there being more than one of any or all of these, as is no doubt essential
for anything of the nature of a process. The appeal to the additional kind
of factor would presumably have to be an appeal to something of the nature
of a quadratic relational character. To be sure, any given semeiosis might
involve the fourth factor only in a triply degenerate form, just as the
third factor might be degenerate in a double degree in some cases, which is
to say that the fourth factor might go unnoticed in a single semeiosis, just
as thirdness might go unnoticed in a single semeiosis.
That seems possible. Is that your view? I pose it in this abstract way to
make sure we are talking about something on par with the sign, the object,
and the interpretant. If so how do you know that semeiosis cannot be
adequately described without recourse to that factor, i.e. cannot be
described on the basis of an appeal to some complexity possible through
recursion and referential reflexivity involving only three kinds of elements
or factors -- as Peirce would have to claim?
Joe
Joseph Ransdell
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
.
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Sunday, August 13, 2006 2:40 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Jacob, Joe, Gary, Jim, list,
[Jacob] Theres been a lot of debate on this issue of verification, and it
almost sounds like patience is being tried. If I could just give my input
about one remark from the last posting; I hope it helps some.
[Jacob] Ben wrote: I dont know how Peirce and others have missed the
distinct and irreducible logical role of verification. I keep an eye open
regarding that question, thats about all. I dont have some hidden opinion
on the question.
[Jacob] Prof. Ransdall (or do you prefer Joe?) replied: I dont think Peirce
overlooked anything like that, Ben. It is just that verification is not a
distinctive formal element in inquiry in the way you think it is, and
Peirces approach to logic as theory of inquiry doesnt mislead him into
thinking that one has to give a formal account of such a thing.
[Jacob] I want to agree with Joe; its hard for me to see Peirce overlooking
that bit, for several reasons. But the question of why verification isnt a
formal element in inquiry needs some unpacking.
[Jacob] The discussion sounds like everyones talking about isolated
instances. All the examples given to illustrate testing here are
particular, individual cases where one person observes something, draws a
conclusion, and checks to see if hes right. Thats not the only way to view
the development of thought.
[Jacob] Take Joes common-sense example: You tell me that you observed
something on the way over to my house to see me, e.g. a large fire at a
certain location, and I think you must have made a mistake since the
edifice in question is reputed to be fire-proof. So I mosey over there
myself to check it out and, sure enough, the fire is still going on at the
place you said. Claim verified. Of course, some third person hearing
about this might think we are both mistaken or in collusion to lie about
it, and having some financial interest in the matter, might not count my
report as a verification of your claim. So he or she might mosey over and
find that we were both confused about the location and there was no fire at
the place claimed. Claim disverified. But then some fourth person . . .
Well, you get the idea. So what is the big deal about verification?
(This is pretty much what Jim Piat was saying, too, perhaps.)
[Jacob] I dont think anyone finds this sort of thing unusual; the
difficulty with this illustration is in *how* it bolsters the case Joe is
making.
[Jacob] It also seems to me theres some confusion about what were arguing
about. The role of verification in *inquiry* or *thought*? At the level of
individuals or in general? Let me try to illustrate what I mean.
[Jacob] When checking your work, you might discover that youd made an error
(often the case with me), or even that you initially had the right answer
but somehow messed up (not often the case with me). This occurs at the
individual level. But animals reason too, though they dont verify. And
thats telling. (This was Bens point when quoting Lewes on Aristotle:
science is science because of proof, testing, verification.)
Animals don't deliberately verify. Even most human verification is not
carried out with a specifically
