[peirce-l] SEED journal
Here is the URL for the on-line journal SEED, which has a lot of papers by Peirceans: http://www.library.utoronto.ca/see/pages/SEED_Journal.html It's edited by Edwina Taborsky. You might want to jot the URL down now or go there and get a "bookmark" or "favorites" URL for your browser. Don't count on being able to find it easily by googling later. I spent several frustrating hours in the prrocess of trying to locate it, starting from the URL Vinicius provided recently for one of the papers from it (by Andre DeTienne). The University of Toronto keeps it well-hidden: their search facility never heard of it, apparently. I've got a paper there myself and didn't realize it. Joe Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
Dear Joe, Thanks for your informal and very helpful response. I think I was misunderstanding the introductory passage in the New List.So I have a few more questions.First some background. My understanding is that signs refer to and stand for the meaning of objects. In standing for objectssignscan beuseful tools for communicating about objects as well as for conducting thought experiments about objects. But it is their function of referring to objects that I want to focus upon and ask you about.It seems to methatin defining signs as referring to objects part of what this definition implies is thatthe sign user is in the position of standing outside (or perhaps above and beyond) the mere reactive world of the object being referred to and observed. IOWs the sign user has a POV with respect to the object that is beyonda mere indexical relationship. That being an "observor" or spectator requires a level or dimension of detachment that goes beyond the level or dimension of attachment that is involved in "participation with" or reacting to an object. And so I'm thinking that an indexical representation is more than just a tool for indexing an object or giving voice toone's sub or pre-representationalunderstanding of an object. I'm thinking that representation is also (and perhaps most importantly) the process by which one achieves the observational stance. Or, to put it another way, that the capacity to step back from the world of objects and observe them as existing is one and the same as the capacity to represent objects. That, in effect, the ability to represent isthefoundation of being an observor in a world of existing objects as opposed tobeing merely a reactive participant in existence.. Actually, as I think about this a bit more, maybe it is notsimply the sign's function of "referring" but also the signs function of"standing for" that creates, presumes or makes possible the "observor" POV. But however one cuts it I don't see how a sign can represent without there being an observor role which is functionally distinct fromthe role of mere participant. So anyway that's my question -- is Peirce's theory of representation and the sign meant to imply or address this issue of an observor or am I just misreading something into it that is not there. I will be greatly dissapointed if such a notion or something akin to it is not part of what is intended by the idea of a triadic relation as being above and beyond that of a mere dyadic relation. But then there are those Peirce comments about consciousness being a mere quality or firstness so I'm not so sure. OK -- I hope I have made clear the nature of my concern and look forward to any comments you might have. I realize I'm drifting a bit from the initial question that started this exchnage but Ifor me the questions are very much related. I'm trying to get at and understand the relation of the sign as carrier of meaning and as that which gives rise tothe feeling we have of being not simply participants in a world (like colliding billiard balls) but of also being observors of this participation -- aware of our nakedness and so on. The notion that in the beginning (of awareness) was the word. Thanks again -- I look forward to any comments, adviceand suggestions you or others might have. I am very eager to get clear on this point. So drop whatever you are doing ... Best wishes, Jim Piat - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, September 09, 2006 12:23 AM Subject: [peirce-l] "reduction of the manifold to unity" Jim and list: This is just a repeat of my previous message,spell-checked and punctuated correctly, with a couple of interpolated clarifications, and minus the unphilosophical paragraphsat the beginning and end: (I will try to state it better in a later message.) As regards your question: I will try to respond to it, but I can only talk about it loosely and suggestively here, in order to say enough to convey anything at all that might be helpful, and you will have to tolerate a lot of vagueness as well as sloppiness in what I am saying. If I bear down on it enough to put it into decently rigorous form it will not get said at all [because of the length], I'm afraid. But then this is just a conversation, not a candidate for a published paper. Okay, that self-defense being given in advance, I will go on to say that I think that one of the things that is likely to be misleading about the New List is that it is easy to make the mistake of thinking of the Kantian phrase "reduction of the sensuous manifold to unity" which Peirce uses at the very beginning of the New List to be talking about a unification of sense-data in the technical sense of "sense-datum" developed by philosophers somewhere around the beginning of the 20th Century, stressed especially by
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
Great question, Jim!I can't even get started on an answer today, but I will be at work on it tomorrow and try to get at least a start at an anwer before the day is out. Joe Oh thanks Joe. I'm relieved to hear that! Reflecting a bit more I see that I should have focused primarily on the triadic (standing for to) aspect of the sign and not the dyadic indexical (referential) aspect. But I'm glad you found my question worth addressing and I'm looking forward to your comments. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Thanks Ben, The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and furthermore,not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might be. So, we might try to rephrase some expressions if they do not fit the theory. It appears here that "possibility" reflects a state of ignorance with respect to the predicate.How far can the theory be extended and still work? The abstracted quality "pregnancy" can be identified. Butcan "possible pregnancy" be identified? I think your response would be "so much the worse for the theory." As you said previously, it is not rich enough. As for the matter of my particular interpretation of "possibility" being nowhere near shouting distance of ordinary Engish, that may be a virtue. Consider that adefinite, actual stove cannot have contrary predicates. So, there is only oneindividual under consideration regardless of our ignorance of the predicate.The statements cannot both be true and in that sense they are inconsistent with each other. In any case, do you think some of your examples can be handled by Peirce's theory of cognition? Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Fri, 8 Sep 2006 6:00 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List Jim, [Jim Willgoose] You say, "The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly, probably, optimally, if only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can apprehend whether the stove is, isn't, may be, might be, is 57%-probably, is if--only-if-it's-Thursday, would feasibly be, would most simply be, is, oddly enough, etc., etc., etc., black. " (end) [Jim] I would say as I previously did that most of these can be handled by treating the subject as a proposition. Otherwise, youpredicate "possible blackness" of this stove rather than the proposition "this stove is black." This might not be so bad if only identification didn't break down. "this stove" is definite but "this is a possible black thing" suffers. I don't see what's wrong with it. In real life we do in fact talk about possibilities involving actual things. You can break it into two interlocked propositions if you wish, oneaffirming the actual existence of the stove and the other affirming a possibility about it. Just make sure that their subjects are somehow equated. And I don't see what's wrong with making the possibility sentence into a one-place predicate "Ex(x={this stove} x[possibly(Eyy{y is black} y=x)])" which can be rephrased to "This stove is possibly black." Of course, one is more likely to say something like, "This stove is possibly malfunctioning a bit." "This stove is possibly black" and "this stove is possibly not-black" are not inconsistent in any logic whose treatment of the word "possibly" is within shouting distance of ordinary English usage. In fact their conjunction makes for at least one sense of the word "contingent," as in _it is a *contingent* question whether the stove is black or non-black._ Usually "possibly..." and "possibly not..." are taken in a sense parallel to that of "consistent" and "non-valid." Any truth-functional sentence is either (a) valid or (b) inconsistent or (c) both consistent and non-valid. [Jim] I might even go so far as to say that "this stove is possibly black" fails to assert anything and thus fails the test of cognition. Tell that to the man who's just been told, in regard to his wife, "She is possibly pregnant," and, in regard to his finances, "You are possibly bankrupt," and so on -- all definitely existent things around which possibilities range. [Jim] It also runs up potentially against contradiction since "this"refers to a definite, individualobject and the two propositions "this stove is possibly black" and "this stove is possibly not black" are inconsistent. It potentially runs up against contradictions? I think you'll need to spell them out.They may be the fault of an inadequate logical formalism since obviously we deal with such things every day. And, again, "possibly black" and "possibly not black" are consistent, not inconsistent, unless one's formalism constrains one to signify something quite deviative from normal English usage of words like "possibly." [Jim] But 'It is possible that "this stove is black"' seems to work better. What is the deal about supposing the identity of the predicate and then assessing the modality of the proposition? Peirce gives the example of "it rains" in the gamma graphs. He doesn't consider possible rain but whether the proposition "it rains" is possibly true (false) If your possibilitative propositions are incapable of transformation into one-or-more-place predicates, then they seem strangely limited.