[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Gary, Joe, Kirsti, list,
Personally i think the contradiction is more apparent than flat. As i
said (and i think Kirsti said the same), this is not circulum vitiosum
but a pattern which underlies inquiry and therefore can only be itself
investigated via a cyclical process.
I have to agree. The more I read of Peirce, the more I see loops of reasoning -
loops, networks, call it what you will. In fact it only seems to jive with his
thinking, especially showing itself when he gets knee-deep in relative logic.
The circle has less to do with circular reasoning than with being able to
define even the simplest conceptions via the logic of relations (5.207).
A bit like the hermeneutic circle of Heidegger - the structure of meaning, and
of Dasein itself, looping back on itself and forming a system (H. 153 of Being
and Time). So far as I know, Heidegger never read Peirce, but they seem to be
touching on the same thing.
Circles in reasoning must be demonstrated to be truly vicious; I'm not
convinced that this one is.
best,
jacob
Original-Nachricht
Datum: Wed, 27 Sep 2006 09:35:29 -0400
Von: gnusystems [EMAIL PROTECTED]
An: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Betreff: [peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce
referring to?
Joe, Kirsti, list,
[[ Well, Gary, it looks like some fancy footwork with the term is
rooted in might have to be resorted to if we are to save Peirce on this
one! You've caught him with a flat contradiction there! ]]
Personally i think the contradiction is more apparent than flat. As i
said (and i think Kirsti said the same), this is not circulum vitiosum
but a pattern which underlies inquiry and therefore can only be itself
investigated via a cyclical process.
The social principle is implicit in explicit (formal) logic, *and*
logic/semeiotic is implicit in the social principle. (Though Peirce
would not have put it that way in 1869 or 1878.) The social
principle is intrinsically rooted in logic (1869) because recognition
of others as experiencing beings is a special case of seeing a
difference between phenomenon and reality, or between sign and object --
or between soul and world, to use the terms Peirce uses in both of
these passages. Logic begins with the revelation of a real world out
there beyond phenomenal consciousness. Logic is rooted in the social
principle (1878) in that it explicates the relationship between
experience and reality, which it cannot do prior to the developmental
stage at which the difference between the two is recognized -- a stage
accessible only to *social* animals who can handle symbolic signs. (The
method of tenacity is, in a sense, a reversion to an earlier stage of
development even though it is also a social stance.)
So i don't think Peirce needs to be saved; or if he does, it's only
because (like a bodhisattva) he has sacrificed his own soul to save the
whole world.
gary F.
}To seek Buddhahood apart from living beings is like seeking echoes by
silencing sounds. [Layman Hsiang]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/gnoxic.htm }{
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[peirce-l] Re: Doctoral Defense
Vinicius, Congratulations on finishing the dissertation! and I hope the defense goes at least as well. cheers, jacob Original-Nachricht Datum: Mon, 14 Aug 2006 08:54:29 +0200 Von: Arnold Shepperson [EMAIL PROTECTED] An: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Betreff: [peirce-l] Re: Doctoral Defense Vinicius What a fabulous group of scholars you have for your thesis defense!! Wish I could be there; just thinking of these and all the other names mentioned makes my mouth water. I look forward to subsequent discussion on the List ... Cheers Arnold Shepperson --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- Der GMX SmartSurfer hilft bis zu 70% Ihrer Onlinekosten zu sparen! Ideal f¨r Modem und ISDN: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/smartsurfer --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Greetings all, There���s been a lot of debate on this issue of verification, and it almost sounds like patience is being tried. If I could just give my input about one remark from the last posting; I hope it helps some. Ben wrote: ���I don���t know how Peirce and others have missed the distinct and irreducible logical role of verification. I keep an eye open regarding that question, that���s about all. I don���t have some hidden opinion on the question.��� Prof. Ransdall (or do you prefer Joe?) replied: ���I don���t think Peirce overlooked anything like that, Ben. It is just that verification is not a distinctive formal element in inquiry in the way you think it is, and Peirce���s approach to logic as theory of inquiry doesn���t mislead him into thinking that one has to give a formal account of such a thing.��� I want to agree with Joe; it���s hard for me to see Peirce overlooking that bit, for several reasons. But the question of why verification isn���t a formal element in inquiry needs some unpacking. The discussion sounds like everyone���s talking about isolated instances. All the examples given to illustrate testing here are particular, individual cases where one person observes something, draws a conclusion, and checks to see if he���s right. That���s not the only way to view the development of thought. Take Joe���s common-sense example: ���You tell me that you observed something on the way over to my house to see me, e.g. a large fire at a certain location, and I think you must have made a mistake since the edifice in question is reputed to be fire-proof. So I mosey over there myself to check it out and, sure enough, the fire is still going on at the place you said. Claim verified. Of course, some third person hearing about this might think we are both mistaken or in collusion to lie about it, and having some financial interest in the matter, might not count my report as a verification of your claim. So he or she might mosey over and find that we were both confused about the location and there was no fire at the place claimed. Claim disverified. But then some fourth person . . .Well, you get the idea. So what is the big deal about verification? (This is pretty much what Jim Piat was saying, too, perhaps.)��� I don���t think anyone finds this sort of thing unusual; the difficulty with this illustration is in *how* it bolsters the case Joe is making. It also seems to me there���s some confusion about what we���re arguing about. The role of verification ��� in *inquiry* or *thought*? At the level of individuals or in general? Let me try to illustrate what I mean. When checking your work, you might discover that you���d made an error (often the case with me), or even that you initially had the right answer but somehow messed up (not often the case with me). This occurs at the individual level. But animals reason too, though they don���t verify. And that���s telling. (This was Ben���s point when quoting Lewes on Aristotle: science is science because of proof, testing, verification.) At the general level it doesn���t seem to be the case. I cannot think of any time in the history of physical sciences when the scientific community at large said anything like, ���Copernicus goofed ��� Ptolemy was right after all!��� and *reverted* to the original way of doing things. It just doesn���t happen. When a development occurs in knowledge, it���s pretty much forward-moving. The same goes for other fields of inquiry. One major reason verification didn���t seem to figure in Peirce���s 3-headed view, then, turns on his conception of thought, even of logic. At times he speaks of it in the particular sense of someone at the desk thinking away, but other times he speaks of thought in a more general sense. It���s this sense that was more interesting to him. Among other things Peirce studied was the history of the logic of science ��� ���science��� understood in both the particular sense and the general sense of knowledge as such. The general sense was more important; Peirce regarded individuals (including himself) as tiny parts of the continuum of thought, cells in a body, atomic particles even. And like physics, things behave a little bit differently at the microscopic level than at the macroscopic. Verification is part of the microscopic realm, an individual affair: at the macroscopic level, knowledge simply evolves. When I say that verification is not a formal element of *thought* (rather than inquiry), I mean the development of thought *as a whole* does not do the verifying. That���s what individual scientists do, and their work has effects on the whole. So verification has its place inquiry, but it isn���t a formal component of thought simply because it���s not itself a general operation; it is to thought as the electron���s spin is to a ball���s ballistics. I hope I���m not just rehashing what���s been said before; this discussion
[peirce-l] greetings to peirce-l
Greetings all, Since I'm new to Peirce-l (and lists in general), allow me to introduce myself. My name is Jacob Longshore; I'm a doctoral candidate at the University of Leuven, Belgium. My dissertation topic is on the concept of relation in Peirce and Hegel, which means I'll be working on this till Doomsday. After reading the last few posts, my question about secondary literature should be a pretty easy one to answer: does anyone know of articles treating Peirce's essay SPQR (W1:91-4)? I can't find anything in the Philosopher's Index, but that may just be due to my misuse. Anything, even a No such animal would be greatly appreciated. Thanks, and best wishes to all. cheers, jacob -- Der GMX SmartSurfer hilft bis zu 70% Ihrer Onlinekosten zu sparen! Ideal f¨r Modem und ISDN: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/smartsurfer --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
