[PEN-L:5920] re: Our contract w/ America?
On Wed, 19 Jul 1995 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bob, The problem, first of all, is not just jobs, but jobs at decent wages and security. Absolutely; that's why I used the words "real jobs." Clinton's 1992 slogan was itself pretty good, "Putting People First." But alot of good that slogan did when Wall Street told Clinton to put deficit reduction and zero inflation first (see Bob Woodward's "The Agenda"). But if its slogans we need, why not just remind Clinton of his old one: Putting People First: Good Jobs for All. First, the problem wasn't just Wall Street; the problem was that Wall Street spoke loud + clear and our side didn't. Second, I'm looking for more than just a slogan. What are the top five actions we'd want taken to create good jobs for all (and, of course, build institutions that will help us keep on fighting)? I think it's important to frame each proposal so that it's catchy or it grabs people, but "Putting People FIrst" doesn't give any real sense of what to do. Anders Schneiderman CCER
[PEN-L:5921] re: Our contract w/ America?
The problem, first of all, is not just jobs, but jobs at decent wages and security. Clinton's 1992 slogan was itself pretty good, "Putting People First." But alot of good that slogan did when Wall Street told Clinton to put deficit reduction and zero inflation first (see Bob Woodward's "The Agenda"). But if its slogans we need, why not just remind Clinton of his old one: Putting People First: Good Jobs for All. -- Bob Pollin ___ But Bob, he had four years to put "people first"--the question would be what was he doing all this time. I don't think he could run on the same old slogan. It would mean that he is accepting that he failed. Cheers, ajit sinha
[PEN-L:5922] Re: : extended reproduction question
On Wed, 19 Jul 1995 [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Paul Cockshott) said: The initial hypothesis that I was advancing was that it is likely to make very little difference whether you measure the rate of profit and organic composition in value or price of production terms. My hypothesis, based on what empirical material as has been published, is that Marxian economists have spent much of the last 30 years arguing about formal differences in models that in practice have little or no measurable effect. It has to be said that once one is aware of this empirical data, one begins to see good thermodynamic reasons for why it will be the case. IN RESPONSE TO JOHN'S MESAGE John Despite all you say, we are still faced with theoretical problems. For example, after reading the three books of CAPITAL, what is the model and what is the "law of motion? If you are going to test something with empirical data, it would seem that you would first be forced into constructing some hypothesis. So what is it? Paul, It seems to me we are back to square one despite your efforts. For example, as I recall you stated that data for historic values was impossible to gather. Yet on this list as well as the Marxism list more than a few have argued that such values should be used to develop models that capture Marx's notion of accumulation. I do not think that the debate should stop or that concepts be banished because you do not have the data. Indeed, I would presume that despite your inclination to decide questions based on available data, you would not argue one should abandon a theory because there is no readily available data. Your work, described above, involves comparing values and prices of production. In a previous post, you claimed that the values and the prices of inputs and outputs were simultaneously determined. Yet, with thought, we know that immediate simultaneous valuation is nonsense. Hence, one would have to argue that any correspondence between values and prices, given simultaneous valuation and pricing, is somehow significant. John R. Ernst PS I am unclear about your use of the term -- "thermodynamic reasons" -- good or bad. Would you explain.
[PEN-L:5923] HR Policy job
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 1995 16:27:40 Sender: "Queen's University: Assoc. for Public Policy Analysis and Management" [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Job opening From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Opportunities in Research THE URBAN INSTITUTE Job Title: Senior Research Associate/Research Associate I Center/Office: Human Resources Policy Center Job Summary: To conduct research and generate funded projects in areas of human resources policy, such as training and employment issues and issues relating to income maintenance and welfare programs. Responsibilities include developing proposals, supervising research assistants, and working with a team of other researchers on major projects. Experience: Requires a proven record of research and policy analysis related to human resource and welfare issues, including publications in academic journals; familiarity with policy developments in the field of labor and income support programs; excellent writing, quantitative, and statistical analytical skills; and the ability to make clear and effective oral presentations and to work independently and as part of a team. The position requires a motivated, self-directed individual able to conceptualize projects, write proposals, and conduct research. Full time; regular Education Level Preferred: Ph.D. in Economics or Social Science field To apply, send a resume, cover letter, and the names of references to: THE URBAN INSTITUTE Search Committee - Job#9529HRP 2100 M Street, NW Washington, DC 20037 or fax to: (202) 223-3043 The Urban Institute is an equal opportunity employer. Michael H. Belzer School of Industrial and Labor Relations Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853-3901 voice: (607) 255-6185 fax: (607) 255-0107 e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[PEN-L:5925] Re: Coase
Paul writes: There have been a couple of posts today denigrating the so-called Coase theorum. Let me say first that I have always believed the theorum to be a crock and seen a number of references to that effect in the litterature -- though precious little argument or model criticism to that effect. Since I am teaching environmental economics next year and the standard texts all trumpet Coase's theorum as the latest and best in absolute truth (Migod, the standard micro texts are a packet of sh--), how would the list like to help me out and provide a symphony of critiques of the theorum? If you do not wish to expose yourself to the ethernet, my private (parts) address is [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- otherwise, expose yourself to the world on Pen-l! Let's make clear what we're criticizing. The Coase Theorem on social cost, as such, was formulated by Stigler based on the arguments in Coase's famous article. It says that, *in a world of zero transaction costs*, optimizing behavior will lead to perfect internalization of external benefits or harms, so that "private costs will equal social costs." This will happen whatever the initial assignment of property rights. The theorem can be criticized in two ways: first, on the basis of its reasoning from the premise of zero transaction costs, or second, by arguing that the zero-transaction-cost condition never holds and is in fact not even meaningfully approximated. But concerning this second route, Coase recognizes that transaction costs matter; his argument was against the inconsistency of Pigovian analysis of externalities against an implicit backdrop of zero transaction costs. He was saying, in effect, that *if* one accepts a frictionless view of the world, then the Pigovian taxes-and-subsidies apparatus is at best redundant. However. With respect to the second approach, the question becomes *how* transaction costs matter, and here I believe that Chicago- oriented types from Frank Knight through Stigler, Alchian, and Williamson consistently get it wrong. All have suggested in one form or another that "second-best" efficient outcomes will emerge in a world with significant transaction costs, as long as big, blundering government doesn't interfere with private orderings. This claim depends on the assumption, stated explicitly by Alchian and Williamson, that the overriding motive of those who enjoy decision rights [read: capitalists] is to "economize on transaction costs." It is easily shown that this does not follow from the assumption of optimizing behavior under transaction costs; one can't rule out that purely redistributional motives won't be at least as important. Peter Dorman's excellent post from yesterday gives an illustration of the problems which arise here. To assert the legitimacy of the "second-best" claim is to assume that markets for control rights (in a capitalist economy, markets for firm ownership) work well, which is never established, and frankly, is not credible. But back to the first line of attack on the Coase Theorem. It asserts that externalities will be fully internalized in a world of zero transaction costs, no matter what the initial assignment of property rights. In saying this, it asserts a particular solution to the problem of bilateral monopoly which naturally arises when the actions of some person A creates a public good or bad for some person or persons B. In effect, the Coase theorem asserts that the solution of the bilateral monopoly problem under zero transaction costs always ends up on the contract curve, and does so independent of the initial distribution of property rights. Says who? The rest of the economic world writing at the time of Coase, then Stigler, thought that the bargaining problem was a pretty tough nut to crack, with or without transaction costs. One could respond by imposing one of the cooperative-game solutions such as the Nash bargaining solution, but doing so would beg the central question, becasue such solutions are not derived explicitly from optimizing behavior under given transaction costs and property conditions. It gets worse. The modern strategic approach to the analysis of bargaining, based on the work of Ariel Rubinstein, requires the existence of transaction costs; "zero-transaction costs" results in this framework are actually results *in the limit* as transaction costs approach zero; and by the way, in that world *the initial distribution of property rights matters* because it determines the exit options of the bargainers. For example, if the polluter owns the property right, then the polluting activity takes place if bargaining breaks down. If the pollutee owns the property right, no pollution results if bargaining breaks down. This asymmetry will affect bargaining outcomes if one or the other "exit option" is valued highly enough. (See my 1991 RRPE article for a short exposition of this result.) But in any
[PEN-L:5926] Re: Coase
It is true that Coase was not really advocating "the Coase Theorem" in "On Social Cost"; rather, he was making the case for thinking about externalities as missing markets in the context of high transaction costs. But the criticisms of the vulgar Theorem are also criticisms of the more sophisticated argument: even if transaction costs are nonexistent, the mere presence of markets is not sufficient to cope with environmental problems -- at least not in all cases. At the very least, it is necessary that there be the "right" assignment of property rights, and even then it may be that markets can't do the job. (This is the point of the environmental nonconvexities literature -- see Baumol Oates my as yet unpublished article.) Peter Dorman
[PEN-L:5927] Re: Coase
Another generally ignored aspect of the "Coase Theorem" is that it requires constant income elasticities of demand for environmental goods. That this is not empirically valid just reinforces the difficulties raised by Peter and Gil arising from unequal property rights and multi-period bargaining. Barkley Rosser
[PEN-L:5929] re: Our contract w/
Not being a macro person, I can't give a complete reply to this (*extremely* important) question. From my perspective, however, there are a few points to be made: 1. The issue, as Bob Pollin pointed out, is not simply the quantity but the quality of jobs. I've written several things on this, but nothing that could be distilled into a proposal or two. That may be a weakness. I think the paper I did in 1989, and which wasn't published anywhere but circulated a lot, "A Postfordist Strategy for Labor" still stands up pretty well. It is very specific about changes in labor law, in particular. I just finished a paper entitled "Regulating the New Economy: A Bottom-Up Approach" for a conference in September. I hesitate to make it generally available just now, but as soon as I get feedback from discussants et al. I hope to post it on-line. Hint: it tries to flesh out the economic content of the "associative democracy" proposal of Joel Rogers Joshua Cohen. BTW, you might want to get the literature on "Sustainable America", which makes relevent proposals. 2. As for the sheer quantity of work, I agree with many others on the left that the point is not to provide an unlimited amount of work, but to provide the goods and services that are actually needed and to share the burden and rewards of this work equitably. This means that there are two issues, mobilizing the effective demand that doesn't exist but could and should, and spreading work (and nonwork) around more evenly. I have nothing to add to the ideas of others on #2. 3. The main shortfall of domestic demand concerns public services. We have a vast array of public needs that are going unmet. Demand in this instance generally takes a political form: voting for politicians who promise greater provision of these services. One aspect of this situation is a lot of this service provision in this country is, in fact, inefficient. Fortunately for us, the solution to low efficiency and quality often lies in greater worker and public participation. I drew up a set of specific proposals in this area for a gov report that is not yet releaseable. 4. Overall, however, the screaming shortfall of demand lies in the global epidemic of poverty, particularly in low-income countries. Here the demands are clear and blunt: democratize the international financial institutions and change the policy agenda to support the creation of domestic demand in every low income country. This means debt relief, an end to SAPs, labor standards, political democratization, etc. The point is not simply that these proposals will create more work in the US (although they will), but that the work will be highly beneficial to human well-being. That's *why* we should work. Peter Dorman PS: I've mentioned some of my own writing because it is not in print but may be useful.
[PEN-L:5931] Re: Stalin's totalitarianism
Jim Devine is right to point to the non-dynamic nature of "totalitarian system" theory, as well as to the political device of using it to apologize for merely "authoritarian" regimes coincidentally backed by the U.S. But as to the term itself, I think Trotsky used it in analyzing Stalinism in the 1930's, well before Arendt (or Kirkpatrick, Brzezinski Co.) took it over. Walter Daum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[PEN-L:5930] Stalin's totalitarianism
(was Re: Right or Left) Barkley writes: Hmmm, everybody's buying that Stalin and Mao were not totalitarians? I'm far from being part of this "everybody." But unfortunately, I've got other things to do besides get involved in a debate about whether Stalin was a "totalitarian" or not. Until now. (I'll leave Mao aside, to keep things short.) As far as I'm concerned, people can throw almost any name at Stalin: "mass murderer," "killer of Bolsheviks," "traitor to socialism," "anti-democrat," "obscurantist," "anti-Semite," are just a few that spring to mind (and not in order of importance). All that Barkley says about Stalin's crimes is true (though one could always quibble on the details, as Alex Cockburn does about how many people were killed under old Joe). If one is speaking loosely, perhaps after a few beers, go ahead and call Stalin "totalitarian" or even "red fascist." But I don't want to speak loosely. To my mind, to call Stalin a "totalitarian" buys into the whole theory of totalitarianism developed by Hannah Arendt et al, which was one of the major theories of the Cold War consensus. That theory, as I understand it, sees Hitler and Stalin as two peas in a totalitarian pod. (The fact that the former opportunistically called his Nazis "socialist" is always brought up, without noting his motive.) The fact that Hitler presided over a capitalist economy while Stalin ran a state-collectivist economy (whatever one wants to call it) is forgotten in totalitarianism theory. (In this theory, capitalism is cleared of any blame for Hitler, but somehow socialism gets the blame for Stalin. Go figure.) This theory links up with the idea that there is a simple left/right political spectrum on which there are extremes of the left and right (left and right totalitarianism). The obvious conclusion is that we should cling to the "middle," defined as our current political leaders and the dominant political parties. (In the 1960s, LBJ was in the middle, etc.) The usual theory is that the totalitarian system is static, lacking any internal contradictions or dynamics. In literary form, it shows up early on in George Orwell's 1984, where there is no hope; the Party and its system totally dominates mind and body, present, past, and future. Class struggle against the "totalitarian" leadership is futile. Liberal or democratic reforms from within are a joke. The only way to change or abolish the totalitarian system is from without: the US, the Free World Colossus, can beat back or contain the totalitarian system while encouraging internal subversion. The totalitarianism theory gave such "moderates" ideological backing for using massive military force to support mere "authoritarians" such as the leaders of S. Viet Nam. (Jeane Kirkpatrick's "totalitarianism = bad," "authoritarianism (i.e., US allies in the third world) = necessary evil" theory simply formalized US government practice.) While the competition between the USSR and the US played an important role, to ignore the internal problems that led to the fall of the USSR is to distort history. I'm sure Barkley is familiar with these details. One problem was the USSR's growth process went okay as long as there were abundant supplies of labor-power, but then Kornai-style problems set in. The scarcity economy gave workers a hell of a lot of political power despite the "totalitarian" system. This power made it difficult for reformers-from-above to do anything. Gorby's effort to reform set the stage for the system to simply collapse. All of this was unforseen by totalitarianism theory. Rather than seeing Stalin's USSR as "totalitarian," I would see the Stalin period as a kind of "primitive accumulation" creating a new kind of class society (what I think of as bureaucratic socialism, BS). It was much more extreme than the capitalist primitive accumulation described by Marx in CAPITAL, since the USSR faced much more severe problems. After "primitive accumulation," the USSR slowly settled into being a system that relied more on conscious consent of the governed and less on overt use of force (just as capitalism did). Part of this occured because Party members wanted to avoid future purges of their ranks; part of this occured because there were other centers of power besides the Party-State, such as factory workers. The Soviet leaders after Stalin were always trying to deal with real or potential dissent due to the shortage of consumer goods. These kinds of event is hard to discern from totalitarianism theory, because the system is portrayed as unchanging, because in the theory there is only one center of power, the Party-State. (Footnote: there's sort of a left-wing version of the totalitarianism theory in the Frankfurt school. Modern industrial capitalism was seen as being "totalitarian," with the only possibility for change coming from the edges.) for socialism from below, Jim Devine [EMAIL
[PEN-L:5934] re: Our contract w/ America?
Earlier PENers discussed one of Marx's crisis theory--tendency for the rate of profit to fall (FROP). Then there were discussions surrounding Business Week's falling wages and productivity. I would like to know how profit squeeze theorists can explain rising rates of profits with falling real wages in the 1990s? Fikret Ceyhun Dept. of Economics e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Univ. of North Dakota voice: (701)777-3348 office University Station, Box 8369(701)772-5135 home Grand Forks, ND 58202 fax:(701)777-5099
[PEN-L:5937] re: Our contract w/ America?
Fikret Ceyhun writes: Earlier PENers discussed one of Marx's crisis theory--tendency for the rate of profit to fall (FROP). Then there were discussions surrounding Business Week's falling wages and productivity. I would like to know how profit squeeze theorists can explain rising rates of profits with falling real wages in the 1990s? I can't talk for "profit squeeze theorists," but for me the "profit squeeze" was historically specific to the late 1960s and early 1970s, but at least in theory could happen again (though it's unlikely during this century). To me, wages can either be "too high" relative to productivity (squeezing profits) _or_ "too low" (implying latent or actual realization problems). In the late 1960s/early 1970s, advanced capitalist countries were operating in a "labor scarce" societal environment in which profit squeezes were possible (and when they happened, reinforced by increasing raw material prices); now, as in the 1920s, capitalism is operating in a "labor abundant" environment, in which accumulation does not pull wages up as quickly as productivity rises. (In the 1920s, the issue of labor migration was more important, at least in the US; these days, the rapid movement of capital (its ability to seek out low wage labor) is the crucial factor that makes labor-power relatively abundant.) In a labor-scarce environment, over-accumulation leads to profit squeezes and thus declining accumulation. In a labor-abundant environment, over-accumulation occurs relative to consumer spending. Rising ratios of investment to consumption imply an increased degree of instability because investment is more volatile than consumer spending. See my 1983 RRPE article and my 1990 article in RESEARCH IN POLITICAL ECONOMY. in pen-l solidarity, Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ., Los Angeles, CA 90045-2699 USA 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way and let people talk.) -- K. Marx, paraphrasing Dante A.
[PEN-L:5938] re: Our cont...
At 11:23 AM 7/20/95, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Raise the minimum wage to at least $10 per hour. Force business owners to pay illegal immigrants the minimum wage. Provide universal day care for all working parents. The average U.S. wage is just a bit over $10, so either we're talking major expropriation or an intense compression. Doug -- Doug Henwood [[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Left Business Observer 250 W 85 St New York NY 10024-3217 USA +1-212-874-4020 voice +1-212-874-3137 fax
[PEN-L:5940] Coase Theorem
Pen-lers might be interested in knowing that there's a file on the subject of Coase and "his" Theorem in the pen-l archives which is gettable with a gopher or Netscape. (I don't have the address here.) Michael Perelman -- is it possible to archive the recent very enlightening messages on Coase and "his" Theorem in a similar way? in pen-l solidarity, Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ., Los Angeles, CA 90045-2699 USA 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way and let people talk.) -- K. Marx, paraphrasing Dante A.
[PEN-L:5941] Rohatyn defends planned economy
Louis Proyect "Most major companies in this country are run on the basis of a one-year forecast and a five-year plan, and for a simple reason. One needs a five-year plan to set objectives, but it is imprudent to try to make hard-and-fast forecasts beyond a single year. To reflect changing conditions, a five-year plan has to be adjusted each year, and the new forecast for the following year is used as the basis for the company's planning. The same process should be built into any long-term plan to balance the federal budget; but so far I have seen no plausible attempt to do so." (From Felix Rohatyn, "The Budget: Whom Can You Believe?", New York Review of Books 8/10/95)
[PEN-L:5942] our contract -- jobs, jobs, jobs?
It's not a new argument to say that new technology is eliminating a lot of jobs because it can maintain production with fewer workers. It also seems to me that a "job", understood as the sale of one's time to someone else in exchange for wages, is neither all that desirable nor a particularly universal way of sustaining livelihood throughout much of human history. Without resorting to utopianism -- or politically unsaleable welfare distribution schemes -- are we not in a position to offer concrete policy options for supporting "livlihoods"? What might such policy options look like? Tom Walker knoW Ware Communications [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://mindlink.net/knoWWare/
[PEN-L:5939] re: Our cont...
Louis Proyect: Hurray for major expropriation! On Thu, 20 Jul 1995, Doug Henwood wrote: At 11:23 AM 7/20/95, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Raise the minimum wage to at least $10 per hour. Force business owners to pay illegal immigrants the minimum wage. Provide universal day care for all working parents. The average U.S. wage is just a bit over $10, so either we're talking major expropriation or an intense compression. Doug -- Doug Henwood [[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Left Business Observer 250 W 85 St New York NY 10024-3217 USA +1-212-874-4020 voice +1-212-874-3137 fax
[PEN-L:5943] Re: Our Contract W/ America?
On Thu, 20 Jul 1995, Eugene Coyle wrote: It seems to me that the demand ought to be for a Four Day week with no cut in pay. I don't have the bumper sticker phrase yet. Agreed but not enough! What about part-timers, temporary workers, immigrants etc, etc.? What about the unwaged labour we are asked more and more to perform under any label (as students, as women, as consumers, etc.) while facing all kind of social spending cuts? Isn't time to shift our focus and approach the question of our radicalism on a broader terrain, a terrain that includes all sections of the "working class" ? Besides, we should not be proposing a "contract" (if I am understaning well this is what people is talking about, but I can be wrong as I have just joined in), we should address people's needs. And these are many different ones. A contract is an ex-post condition, after the battle has followed its course and a balance of power has been established. Ex-ante we cannot address anything less than needs. Thus, here is a short list of demands for discussion. 1. Global citisenship. 2. Social wage. 3. SYSTEMATIC reduction of working hours tied to productivity increases. 4. de-criminalization of occupation of empty buildings, unused property, land, etc. for housing, collective acitvities of production and reproduction of the labour power. etc. This just on top of my head. I am sure that none of these demands are compatible with the competitive position of the United States, or Uk, or any other country. But I am also sure that the realization of people's needs is not compatible with the "unceasing drive for profit" that defines capitalist societies. So, where do we start from in our political activities, from the needs of the working class or those of capital??? Massimo De Angelis - London
[PEN-L:5944] Re: Stalin's totalitarianism
If I remember correctly, old Amadeo was advocating communism as a totalitarian system back in the '20s.
[PEN-L:5945] Re: : extended reproduction question
John Ernst wrote - Your work, described above, involves comparing values and prices of production. In a previous post, you claimed that the values and the price of inputs and outputs were simultaneously determined. Yet, with thought, we know that immediate simultaneous valuation is nonsense. Hence, one would have to argue that any correspondence between values and prices, given simultaneous valuation and pricing, is somehow significant. Paul - It is true that any process that determines values or prices of productionhas to exist in real time. As such, simultaneous determination of prices is an abstraction. However when dealing with actual i/o statistics, one ha to realise that they themselves are not instantaneous measures of flows. Instead they are annual totals and thus already incorporate the effects of a non-simultaneous average over one year of economic activity. Thus they are not accurate for any one instant in that year, but constitute the mean of the year's activity. The question arises as to how large the error one gets through using simultaneous solutions will be. This will be influenced by a number of factors: 1. The turnover time of capital. If this is very large relative to the time period for which measurements are available, then the errors will be more serious than if the turnover time is of the same order as the period over which the statistics were collected. 2. The rate of change of labour productivity per year. We know that for the British economy this is only of the order of 2-3% per annum. This sets an upper bound on the errors due to simultaneous solutions. 3. The dispersion of rates of change of labour productivity. The error due to simultaneous estimation will rise with this dispersion. 4. The mean number of inputs used to produce any output. The greater this is, the more the tendancy of regression to the mean will tend to even out the relative changes in the values of the inputs. Overall the errors due to simultaneous estimation vary directly with the first 3 factors and inversely with the last. I would suggest that the ratio of the turnover time to time of aggregation of the statistics is likely to be in the range 0.5 to 2.0. We know that the rate of technica change was around 2.5%. I would suggest that the coefficient of variation of rates of technical change will be less than 1. Inspection of the I/O tales indicates that factor 4 is at least 10. Overall this indicates that the errors due to simultaneous estimations of values are likely to be small - I would think under 1%. Simultaneous valueation as a measurement technique, is not therefore 'nonsnse'. John PS I am unclear about your use of the term -- "thermodynamic reasons" -- good or bad. Would you explain. Paul One has to recognise that the ratios of prices of production to values of each commodity type consitute random variables. The error in the estimate of the aggregate organic composition of capital with respect to the two methods of calculation is arrived at by taking a large random sampe of these variables ( representing the set of commodities that constitute constant capital ). In practice this random sample involves hundreds of thousands of different commodities. Now we know that the mean of the distribution of all of the random variables is 1, so that the probability that a large sample taken from this distribution having a mean significant different from 1 is small. Thus it is very unlikely that the organic composition of aggregate social capital measured in prices of production will be significantly different from each other. Of course it is theoretically possible that all of the commodities making up constant capital might have prices of productions above their values, but it is very unlikely. The thermodynamic analogy is clear, one day you just might find yourself levitated by Brownian motion, but don't bother waiting for it.
[PEN-L:5946] re: our contract with America?
1. Return to prosperity of the 50s by re-establishing the effective corporation income taxes to the 50s level of 33% from the current 11%. 2. end corporate blackmail of communities by eliminating the "tax reduction" bidding that takes place when companies relocate [by establishing a federal tax penalty for such behavior]. 3. Establish that this is a country of human beings, by human beings, for human beings, not a country of corporations, by corporations, for corporations, by insisting and re-establishing the basic principle that individual human beings have more rights than corporations --specifically, no federal tax breaks, whatever for corporations, only for individuals [including those who create the majority of new jobs, the entrarenuer]. Actually, the question that started this thread was the best 'put up or shut up" question I have seen in a long time. Nat. Ass. of Letter CarriersBill Briggs [EMAIL PROTECTED] unionists subscribe publabor at [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[PEN-L:5947] re: Hitler Capitalism
It would be improper to call Hitler's Germany a capitalistic country. Capitalism requires laws [and , if history is any judge], democracy in order to prosper. There were no laws in Germany, ony Hilter's whims. I believe the term was fasism? Nat. Ass. of Letter CarriersBill Briggs [EMAIL PROTECTED] unionists subscribe publabor at [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[PEN-L:5948] Coase Theorems (was: bigtime radio fun)
Another problem with using Coase to justify deregulation is the Coase theorem assumes transactions cost are zero Bill Humphries * [EMAIL PROTECTED] * On the road until 7/21
[PEN-L:5950] Re: our contrac...
The issue of technology is not as simplistic as I think many people present it. I think to make any blanket statements, like technology increases skills, deskills, costs jobs, creates jobs is wrong. Essentially, technology does all of the above depending on the circumstances. maggie coleman [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[PEN-L:5949] re: Our cont...
Doug, I think I under stand major expropriation, but what is "intense compression?" Of course my wish list -- $10 hour min w., living wages for non-green card holders, and day care is not realistic -- but then, tell me, how many slogans and bumper stickers ARE realistic? These are the things which I think would make quality jobs -- the slogans of the democratic party have created minimum wage jobs. So, if we come up with better democratic party slogans -- do we get more minimum wage jobs or better jobs. Or, if we come up with slogans which reflect real needs, even if the needs are not met, at least there is more awareness of what kinds of jobs are being created. Besides, I think major expropriation would be forcing Purdue to provide clean and safe working conditions. maggie coleman [EMAIL PROTECTED] p.s., I'll be off air for a week or so -- but I really would like to know what intense compression is -- I'l trying to build my vocabulary (grin). Another way of phrasing the question might be -- is there compression without intensity? (giggle).
[PEN-L:5951] More Extended Reproduction
Paul, Now, again, we have a clean slate. As Freeman and Kliman have argued on these lists, it is fairly simple to show that by using historic and not simultaneous valuation one obtains a falling rate of profit in cases where simultaneous valuation would yield a rising or steady rate of profit. Thus, despite your assurances that there is nothing of significance here, I, for one, remain unconvinced. Consider all of the questions and problems we seem to abstracting from in order to obtain your results. Here are a few. 1. To obtain values you simply sum concrete labor times. Is this valid? 2. How do you deal with absolute rent in determining prices of production? 3. How do you deal with monopoly prices in determining prices of production? 4. Do modern monetary policies affect the manner in which capitalists incorporate "moral depreciation" into the the concept of social value? 5. Given that within an industry there are a variety of techniques in use, how do aggregate statistics capture this in the determination of value or price? 6. If, with Marx, we assume that one hour of abstract labor in one country creates a different amount of value than in another, how are we to use your technique in putting the whole picture together? 7. If inputs and outputs are valued and/or priced annually, who takes the loss as you move from year to year with increasing productivity? Does that affect anything? 8. How does all this get us any closer to a theory of crisis in which the turnover of fixed capital is to be the material basis? Please note I do not think that looking at data is, in itself, a mistaken course. But this discussion started with your comment that such looks could settle questions of theory. Again, I remain skeptical. John R. Ernst
[PEN-L:5952] re: Our cont...
On Thu, 20 Jul 1995 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Doug, I think I under stand major expropriation, but what is "intense compression?" I.e. the wage range would be $10-12/hr. That average is based on nonsupervisory workers. If you started getting into capital incomes, well you could push the top of the range a little higher. Of course my wish list -- $10 hour min w., living wages for non-green card holders, and day care is not realistic -- but then, tell me, how many slogans and bumper stickers ARE realistic? Realistic demands have their place, but so do unrealistic ones. I just wanted to make sure you realized that a $10/hr minimum is very very "unrealistic," which doesn't mean it isn't desirable. Besides, I think major expropriation would be forcing Purdue to provide clean and safe working conditions. The university or the chicken magnate? Doug Doug Henwood [[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Left Business Observer 212-874-4020 (voice) 212-874-3137 (fax)
[PEN-L:5936] re: Our cont...
There should be more concrete demands than just quality jobs. Something should be included about having minimum wage cover ALL workers (it does not -- it excludes migrants, hotel and restaurant employees, piece rate workers, and maids). The other thing that would improve quality more than anything else would be: Raise the minimum wage to at least $10 per hour. Force business owners to pay illegal immigrants the minimum wage. Provide universal day care for all working parents. maggie coleman [EMAIL PROTECTED]
