Comments are after selected passages:
Brad De Long wrote:
> >The underlying assumptions in this discourse make no sense to me. I
> >made a number
> >of comments re Brad's stuff but there was no response.
> > Just a few random notes.
> > 1) What is utility?
> > 2) Is utility measurable in cardinal terms?
> > 3) Are interpersonal comparisons of utility possible?
>
> Well, we make them all the time: any government policy--any political
> program--makes such interpersonal utility comparisons.
COMMENT: But this confirms my point doesn't it? Isn't it a core
assumption of neoclassical economists that it is impossible to make
interpersonal comparisons of utility? Am I wrong in thinking that? Isn't
it standard that among most that only cardinal rankings of utility by
individuals is possible? If you as a neo-classical economist resort to
making interpersonal utility comparisons, how can you do this
consistently with neoclassical theory? Of course you are right that
some sort of assessment of the general good is necessary for any
government policy. But to do this would involve one in questions about
the nature of the good. Where is
all the sophisticated ethical theorising in neoclassical economics. There
doesn't seem to be any. Anything
that I have seen does not look anything like Spinozas ETHICS even though
Spinoza also claims to be demonstrating his ethical system along the
lines of a deductive mathematical model.
> I myself don't think that Benthamite utility exists. But I do think
> that it is useful for thinking about distributional questions to
> suppose that it does exist--and that people try to maximize it.
>
COMMENT. Benthamite utility certainly does exist. Why would you question
that? Utility for Bentham is the quality of things that produces
pleasure. Certainly some things do produce pleasure and hence have
utility. Bentham was no doubt cavalier about his ability to measure
utility but certainly defenders ofpractices such as CBA are just as goofy
as Bentham ever was in some of their methods for assigning monetary
values to many things.
What is this Benthamite utility that people are trying to maximise?
Obviously it is not what Bentham
called utility? Apparently people are seeking to maximise something that
you say doesn't exist.
> This is a matter of taste, I agree. But it seems to me that going
> down the non-utility road ultimately traps you into a language of
> "rights" that can become very inhumane, or risks giving too little
> weight to the preferences that people express...
>
> Brad DeLong
COMMENT: While traditionally rights based types of ethics are
contrasted with utilitarianism, it is possible to regards rights
themselves as among the matrix of values to be maximised. This may
involve
a conceptual error but that is a matter I will not comment upon.
There is no reason not to adopt a mixed theory such as W.D. Ross for
example in which maximisation of the good is one prima facie obligation
but there are others based not upon consequences but past acts.
Duties such as gratitude, fidelity, promise-keeping. One is obligated in
these instances because of what
has happened in the past and not just because the good would be
maximised. Justice in distribtution seems to be a value that is difficult
to incorporate into a standard utilitarian system.
So do you not want to be trapped into speaking of the right to vote,
the right to a job, to medical care, etc. Why not?
Are the preferences that people express to be considered identical
with their utility? So again I ask what of alcoholics, pedophiles, mass
murderers? X prefers Y doesnt mean that Y maximises X's utility or even
adds to his or her utility.
Cheers, Ken Hanly
