Re: Hegel Marx
Charles Brown wrote: Perhaps a scientific worldview enhances achievement of self-determinaton through greater mastery of necessity and thereby freedom. Radical acknowledgement of objective reality implies the existence of subjective reality. Darwin, Lewontin, Levin and Gould's work concern an area with a lot of non-human wills (improper wills ?), animal psychology. A dialectical materialist approach to biology is not identical with Hegel's. Whitehead's ontology is a scientific worldview. It's a sublation of the scientific materialist form of science that includes, for instance, a sublation of relativity and quantum theory. The sublation produces an ontology consistent with the existence of freedom not only as self-determination, but as self-determination potentially able, in the case of human being, to take the form of a will proper and a universal will. As I've pointed out before, Whitehead makes science in this enlarged sense the essence of freedom understood as the practicability of purpose, a conception of freedom he explicitly associates with the economic interpretation of history. Scientific materialism has no logical space for self-determination in any form let alone this one, i.e. no room for will where we mean by this some degree of self-determination. This produces logical incoherence, as in the claim that science so conceived can enhance human freedom. A will proper contrasts with an animal will which has more of less limitation or a content which is immediately extant through nature. The Will Proper, or the Higher Appetite, is (a) pure indeterminateness of the Ego, which as such has no limitation or a content which is immediately extant through nature but is indifferent towards any and every determinateness. (b) The Ego can, at the same time, pass over to a determinateness and make a choice of some one or other and then actualize it. (Hegel, The Philosophical Propaedeutic p. 2) In the articles I recently cited, Julie Nelson appropriates an object relations psychoanalytic interpretation both of the dogmatic misidentification of science with scientific materialist ontological premises and of the inability of minds dogmatically attached to these premises to comprehend alternative premises such as the premise that relations are internal. On this basis she makes the following claims: This feminist critique of economic methodology, then, springs not from ad hoc dissatisfaction with various aspects, but from a deep analysis of the social, historical, and psychosexual meanings the traditional image of science holds for its participants. The idea that the universe may be open, in some ways fundamentally unpredictable, and intrinsically purposive - in contrast to being a closed system, ultimately distillable into formulae, controllable, and fundamentally indifferent - is not simply a reasonable alternative ontology that can be carefully weighed for its logical implications and neutrally evaluated for its relative merits. As Harding writes, 'it requires a great deal more than just 'clear thinking' to dislodge ... ontologies from their status as obvious' (1999: 130). The idea of an open universe feels fundamentally _scary_ for those who sense that not only their status as scientists set above the objects they study, but also their safety vis-a-vis chaos, their 'manhood' (whether actual, or, in the case of female scientists, symbolic), and their very own distinct selfhood are threatened unless they can keep the living, novel, relational aspects of nature safely at bay. Feminists who delve into the historical, social, emotional, and psychosexual dynamics that have kept women suppressed and oppressed have found a complex of dualistic, hierarchical belief patterns that manifest themselves not only in the social realm, but also in intellectual (and religious and artistic) endeavors. Historically, well-reasoned criticisms of neoclassical economics - targeting its unrealistic assumptions, narrow methodology, over-formalism, false detachment, etc. - have been legion, as any perusal of a bibliographic database will show. Also historically, they have generally failed to alter the mainstream ideas of the discipline. Yet the present feminist analysis does not simply add to this legion of critiques; it suggests, at a basic emotional and motivational level, that such critique is suppressed because it is _feared_. It points out how reasonableness is taking a back seat to emotional reaction, in this drama. This feminist analysis takes us back to the territory of critique of Enlightenment dualisms once more but this time with feeling. (Once more, with feeling: Feminist economics and the ontological question, in Feminist Economics 9(1), 2003, p. 111( I think Doug once tried to initiate a discussion on this list of an earlier version of these claims. Ted
absolute general law of capitalist accumulation/ Hegel/Marx
Hegel Marx by Ted Winslow Whitehead's ontology is a scientific worldview. It's a sublation of the scientific materialist form of science that includes, for instance, a sublation of relativity and quantum theory. ^ CB: So what is overcome and what is preserved ? The sublation produces an ontology consistent with the existence of freedom not only as self-determination, but as self-determination potentially able, in the case of human being, to take the form of a will proper and a universal will. As I've pointed out before, Whitehead makes science in this enlarged sense the essence of freedom understood as the practicability of purpose, a conception of freedom he explicitly associates with the economic interpretation of history. CB: So, is he rediscovering Engels on these issues ? ^^^ Scientific materialism has no logical space for self-determination in any form let alone this one, ^^ CB: What do you mean by scientific materialism ? ^ i.e. no room for will where we mean by this some degree of self-determination. This produces logical incoherence, as in the claim that science so conceived can enhance human freedom. A will proper contrasts with an animal will which has more of less limitation or a content which is immediately extant through nature. ^ CB: Human will in contrast with animal will has much more social content, including especially social connections to life experience and activities of now dead generations of humans. This is the main difference between human and animal consciousness/will. Referring to your previous post crtiicizing Darwin, Lewontin, et.al, since Darwin, Lewontin and other biologists are dealing with animals, the will proper wouldn't play the same role for them as in dealing with human society, right ? ^^ The Will Proper, or the Higher Appetite, is (a) pure indeterminateness of the Ego, which as such has no limitation or a content which is immediately extant through nature but is indifferent towards any and every determinateness. (b) The Ego can, at the same time, pass over to a determinateness and make a choice of some one or other and then actualize it. (Hegel, The Philosophical Propaedeutic p. 2) In the articles I recently cited, Julie Nelson appropriates an object relations psychoanalytic interpretation both of the dogmatic misidentification of science with scientific materialist ontological premises and of the inability of minds dogmatically attached to these premises to comprehend alternative premises such as the premise that relations are internal. CB: How does the concept of internal relations help explicate the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation ? ^^^ On this basis she makes the following claims: This feminist critique of economic methodology, then, springs not from ad hoc dissatisfaction with various aspects, but from a deep analysis of the social, historical, and psychosexual meanings the traditional image of science holds for its participants. The idea that the universe may be open, in some ways fundamentally unpredictable, and intrinsically purposive ^^ CB: Unpredictable , yet purposive ? Doesn't knowing the purpose give a basis to predict ? ^^ - in contrast to being a closed system, ultimately distillable into formulae, controllable, and fundamentally indifferent - is not simply a reasonable alternative ontology that can be carefully weighed for its logical implications and neutrally evaluated for its relative merits. As Harding writes, 'it requires a great deal more than just 'clear thinking' to dislodge ... ontologies from their status as obvious' (1999: 130). The idea of an open universe feels fundamentally _scary_ for those who sense that not only their status as scientists set above the objects they study, but also their safety vis-a-vis chaos, their 'manhood' (whether actual, or, in the case of female scientists, symbolic), and their very own distinct selfhood are threatened unless they can keep the living, novel, relational aspects of nature safely at bay. Feminists who delve into the historical, social, emotional, and psychosexual dynamics that have kept women suppressed and oppressed have found a complex of dualistic, hierarchical belief patterns that manifest themselves not only in the social realm, but also in intellectual (and religious and artistic) endeavors. Historically, well-reasoned criticisms of neoclassical economics - targeting its unrealistic assumptions, narrow methodology, over-formalism, false detachment, etc. - have been legion, as any perusal of a bibliographic database will show. Also historically, they have generally failed to alter the mainstream ideas of the discipline. Yet the present feminist analysis does not simply add to this legion of critiques; it suggests, at a basic emotional and motivational level, that such critique is suppressed because it is _feared_. It points out how reasonableness is taking
Hegel Marx
by Ted Winslow This misinterprets Whitehead. Like Marx's, his ontology is alternative to and radically inconsistent with the materialist ontology that has dominated science since the 17th century. In elaborating it, he provides a systematic critique of this scientific materialism in all its forms (including the Darwinian form embraced by Lewontin, Levins and Gould). Scientific materialism is anti-humanist and anti-subjective where we mean by an ontology that is humanist and subjective one having logical space for the conception of human being as a being capable of the kind of self-determination expressible by Hegel's ideas of a will proper and a universal will. ^ CB: Perhaps a scientific worldview enhances achievement of self-determinaton through greater mastery of necessity and thereby freedom. Radical acknowledgement of objective reality implies the existence of subjective reality. Darwin, Lewontin, Levin and Gould's work concern an area with a lot of non-human wills (improper wills ?), animal psychology. A dialectical materialist approach to biology is not identical with Hegel's. ^^ Specifically Whitehead is, as I've many times indicated, an adherent of the doctrine of relations as internal. Among other things he points to the implications of this doctrine for logic and language mentioned in my previous e-mail. In all this his ontological beliefs contrast sharply with Russell's (as Russell himself indicates). Here are some passages from the two of them which include consideration of the implications of the doctrine for language, logic, arithmetic and counting. So far, this lecture has proceeded in the form of dogmatic statement. What is the evidence to which it appeals? The only answer is the reaction of our own nature to the general aspect of life in the Universe. This answer involves complete disagreement with a widespread tradition of philosophic thought. This erroneous tradition presupposes independent existences; and this presupposition involves the possibility of an adequate description of finite fact. The result is the presupposition of adequate separate premises from which argument can proceed. For example, much philosophic thought is based upon the faked adequacy of some account of various modes of human experience. Thence we reach some simple conclusion as to the essential character of human knowledge, and of its essential limitation. Namely, we know what we cannot know. Understand that I am not denying the importance of the analysis of experience: far from it. The progress of human thought is derived from the progressive enlightenment produced thereby. What I am objecting to is the absurd trust in the adequacy of our knowledge. The self-confidence of learned people is the comic tragedy of civilization. There is not a sentence which adequately states its own meaning. There is always a background of presupposition which defies analysis by reason of its infinitude. Let us take the simplest case; for example, the sentence, 'One and one makes two.' Obviously this sentence omits a necessary limitation. For one thing and itself make one thing. So we ought to say, 'One thing and another thing make two things.' This must mean the togetherness of one thing with another thing issues in a group of two things. At this stage all sorts of difficulties arise. There must be the proper sort of things in the proper sort of togetherness. The togetherness of a spark and gunpowder produces an explosion, which is very unlike two things. Thus we should say, 'The proper sort of togetherness of one thing and another thing produces the sort of group which we call two things.' Common sense at once tells you what is meant. But unfortunately there is no adequate analysis of common sense, because it involves our relation to the infinity of the Universe. CB: This one plus one equal two story reminds of the undergraduates who had a math class in which Whitehead and Russell's _Principia Mathematica_ was mentioned and something about their really proving that one plus one equals two. Yea the joke went we really weren't sure that one plus one equalled two. I'm glad they proved it. Fungibility, the individual, the specific and the general.
Hegel Marx
Shane M. writes: In the depths of WW One Lenin felt called upon to study the Science of Logic. He found it revelatory, and in his Philosophical Notebooks he wrote (I quote from memory, perhaps inexactly): It is impossible to understand Das Kapital without a thorough comprehension of Hegel's Science of Logic. That is why, after fifty years, none of the Marxists has understood Marx. Daniel D: was he right? I'd say so (though there may have been Marxists before Lenin who studied the SCIENCE OF LOGIC and Lenin never heard about it). I think reading Hegel helps one understand Marx, but that it's too bad that one has to read Hegel to do so. Charles B: I'm quite open to Hegel in relatively simple language compared to the original. From my experience, the translation to simpler language would be a complicated project itself though. Are you saying someone has put Hegel (or dialectics) into simpler language ? Levins Lewontin's DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST presents a good effort to present dialectical method (epistemology) in the language of science. They summarize it as describing the totality (whole) that we have to understand in which parts make whole (the various individuals and internal structures of a totality create the totality itself) and whole makes part (the nature of these individuals and structures is profoundly shaped by the totality in which they operate). This back-and-forth doesn't settle down into any kind of equilibrium. Instead, the totality is always changing. (an example: under capitalism, our actions create history, though not exactly as we please, since we are constrained by various institutional structures (such as corporations or political parties). The nature of our consciousness and thus our actions is in turn shaped and largely determined by our positions within capitalism, while the institutional structures are also shaped and largely determined by capitalism's laws of motion.) To LL, the dialectical method does not produce answers to our questions as much as questions to ask of the real (empirical) world. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Re: Hegel Marx
When Marxists heap adulation on a reactionary, racist, anti-humanist metaphysician and Prussian propagandist, then perhaps we have a slight problem. Sure, some of Hegel's ideas are built into Marx's thinking and later Marxism. So are Aristotle's, Leibniz's, etc. Sure, Marx matured in an atmosphere of Hegelianism and could not have avoided being influenced byt it (even if the influence was filtered through radical Hegelians). But if we leap backward over Marx to Hegel and start to proclaim that Hegelian ontology has any value and validity today, we really come close to betraying the spirit of Marx. Some Marxists have claimed to find that just about every non-Marxist philosopher was advancing materialism. It isn't true of Hegel. Hegel and Kant represent the two important streams of idealist thinking that have come down to us. We can give those guys credit for their place in the history of ideas, but we have to recognize that historical and dialectical materialism denies the validity of most of their doctrines. *Except* in the context of the history of ideas, they have no relevance. What really pisses me off is reading Marxists proclaiming the importance of old idealist philosophers -- and new idealist philosophers -- and totally neglecting the naturalist, realist, philosophers. We have to overcome the tendency to heap invective on thinkers whose ideas are close enough to Marxism to pose a real threat of presenting an alternative to Marxism and of seducing people away from Marxism. That was the case with Lenin vis-a-vis Mach -- no radical, but yet a philosopher of science, unlike Hegel. Think of the way we vilify or ignore Dewey. Russell. Whitehead. Mead. The positivists. Etc. These folks represent the main line of thinking in philosophies that are friendly to science and are to one degree or another materialist (although the word of course scared them). Nor are these philosophers somehow anti-humanist and anti-subjective. There is, IMHO, more humanism in John Dewey than there is in the entire Hot Dog school. Dewey, after all, pioneered the most humanistic form of education that we have. And, for goodness sake, Mead practically invented social psychology. Enough said. I don't plan to respond to other postings on this thread unless it becomes unavoidable (personal). En lucha Jim Blaut -- The Marxism list: www.marxmail.org
Re: Hegel Marx
Think of the way we vilify or ignore Dewey. Russell. Whitehead. Mead. who is this we? jd
Re: Hegel Marx
Long version: Last time I looked, we weren't heaping praise on Hegel, nor has anyone denied Hegel's racism. But denying the importance of both the substance and method of Hegel to Marx's of work because Hegel wasn't a humanist, was an idealist, and was ignorant, in every sense of the word, concerning Africa is substituting moral repugnance and outrage for historical analysis, something which is anti-Marxist to the core. Marx never denied the importance of Hegel for the development of his work. Marx, to my knowledge, also never described his work as humanism. And despite the acrobatics of some, Marxism has little enough to do with what passes as humanism. Short version: We were discussing Marx's use of Hegelian jargon, whether or not he even used it (I still can't find anything that comes close to Hegel's expositions). If somebody out there is vilifying Russell, Mead, Dewey, that's a horse on a different colored list. -Original Message- From: Louis Proyect [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Jul 14, 2004 12:14 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [PEN-L] Hegel Marx When Marxists heap adulation on a reactionary, racist, anti-humanist metaphysician and Prussian propagandist, then perhaps we have a slight problem. Sure, some of Hegel's ideas are built into Marx's thinking and later Marxism. So are Aristotle's, Leibniz's, etc. Sure, Marx matured in an atmosphere of Hegelianism and could not have avoided being influenced byt it (even if the influence was filtered through radical Hegelians). But if we leap backward over Marx to Hegel and start to proclaim that Hegelian ontology has any value and validity today, we really come close to betraying the spirit of Marx. Some Marxists have claimed to find that just about every non-Marxist philosopher was advancing materialism. It isn't true of Hegel. Hegel and Kant represent the two important streams of idealist thinking that have come down to us. We can give those guys credit for their place in the history of ideas, but we have to recognize that historical and dialectical materialism denies the validity of most of their doctrines. *Except* in the context of the history of ideas, they have no relevance. What really pisses me off is reading Marxists proclaiming the importance of old idealist philosophers -- and new idealist philosophers -- and totally neglecting the naturalist, realist, philosophers. We have to overcome the tendency to heap invective on thinkers whose ideas are close enough to Marxism to pose a real threat of presenting an alternative to Marxism and of seducing people away from Marxism. That was the case with Lenin vis-a-vis Mach -- no radical, but yet a philosopher of science, unlike Hegel. Think of the way we vilify or ignore Dewey. Russell. Whitehead. Mead. The positivists. Etc. These folks represent the main line of thinking in philosophies that are friendly to science and are to one degree or another materialist (although the word of course scared them). Nor are these philosophers somehow anti-humanist and anti-subjective. There is, IMHO, more humanism in John Dewey than there is in the entire Hot Dog school. Dewey, after all, pioneered the most humanistic form of education that we have. And, for goodness sake, Mead practically invented social psychology. Enough said. I don't plan to respond to other postings on this thread unless it becomes unavoidable (personal). En lucha Jim Blaut -- The Marxism list: www.marxmail.org
Re: Hegel Marx
Louis Proyect wrote: En lucha Jim Blaut This reminds me of an argument I was never able to have with Jim. In the context of a different discussion he remarked in a post on the marxism list that if one knew all the facts involved one would not have to study the relations among them. As I say, it was a parenthetical remark and it was not until almost a year later in wandering through some old posts that I came across it. Hence the lack of any discussion with him on the point. (I have a hard copy of the post someplace but currently all my printouts are in one chaotic pile and I wouldn't be able to put my hands on it. Until I do regard this as a remembered paraphrase, not as Jim's precise words.) But he was profoundly wrong on that, though how much it influenced his thought and practice in general I do not know. Carrol
Re: Hegel Marx
Jim Blaut wrote: Think of the way we vilify or ignore Dewey. Russell. Whitehead. Mead. The positivists. Etc. These folks represent the main line of thinking in philosophies that are friendly to science and are to one degree or another materialist (although the word of course scared them). Nor are these philosophers somehow anti-humanist and anti-subjective. This misinterprets Whitehead. Like Marx's, his ontology is alternative to and radically inconsistent with the materialist ontology that has dominated science since the 17th century. In elaborating it, he provides a systematic critique of this scientific materialism in all its forms (including the Darwinian form embraced by Lewontin, Levins and Gould). Scientific materialism is anti-humanist and anti-subjective where we mean by an ontology that is humanist and subjective one having logical space for the conception of human being as a being capable of the kind of self-determination expressible by Hegel's ideas of a will proper and a universal will. Specifically Whitehead is, as I've many times indicated, an adherent of the doctrine of relations as internal. Among other things he points to the implications of this doctrine for logic and language mentioned in my previous e-mail. In all this his ontological beliefs contrast sharply with Russell's (as Russell himself indicates). Here are some passages from the two of them which include consideration of the implications of the doctrine for language, logic, arithmetic and counting. So far, this lecture has proceeded in the form of dogmatic statement. What is the evidence to which it appeals? The only answer is the reaction of our own nature to the general aspect of life in the Universe. This answer involves complete disagreement with a widespread tradition of philosophic thought. This erroneous tradition presupposes independent existences; and this presupposition involves the possibility of an adequate description of finite fact. The result is the presupposition of adequate separate premises from which argument can proceed. For example, much philosophic thought is based upon the faked adequacy of some account of various modes of human experience. Thence we reach some simple conclusion as to the essential character of human knowledge, and of its essential limitation. Namely, we know what we cannot know. Understand that I am not denying the importance of the analysis of experience: far from it. The progress of human thought is derived from the progressive enlightenment produced thereby. What I am objecting to is the absurd trust in the adequacy of our knowledge. The self-confidence of learned people is the comic tragedy of civilization. There is not a sentence which adequately states its own meaning. There is always a background of presupposition which defies analysis by reason of its infinitude. Let us take the simplest case; for example, the sentence, 'One and one makes two.' Obviously this sentence omits a necessary limitation. For one thing and itself make one thing. So we ought to say, 'One thing and another thing make two things.' This must mean the togetherness of one thing with another thing issues in a group of two things. At this stage all sorts of difficulties arise. There must be the proper sort of things in the proper sort of togetherness. The togetherness of a spark and gunpowder produces an explosion, which is very unlike two things. Thus we should say, 'The proper sort of togetherness of one thing and another thing produces the sort of group which we call two things.' Common sense at once tells you what is meant. But unfortunately there is no adequate analysis of common sense, because it involves our relation to the infinity of the Universe. Also there is another difficulty. When anything is placed in another situation, it changes. Every hostess takes account of this truth when she invites suitable guests to a dinner party; and every cook presupposes it as she proceeds to cook the dinner. Of course, the statement, 'One and one make two' assumes that the changes in the shift of circumstances are unimportant. But it is impossible for us to analyse this notion of 'unimportant change.' We have to rely upon common sense. In fact, there is not a sentence, or a word, with a meaning which is independent of the circumstances under which it is uttered. The essence of unscholarly thought consists in a neglect of this truth. Also it is equally the essence of common sense to neglect these differences of background when they are irrelevant to the immediate purpose. My point is that we cannot rely upon any adequate explicit analysis. The conclusion is that Logic, conceived as an adequate analysis of the advance of thought, is a fake. It is a superb instrument, but it requires a background of common sense. ... My point
Re: Hegel-Marx on colonialism
Date sent: Sat, 25 Oct 1997 18:47:57 -0400 (EDT) Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Louis N Proyect [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject:David Harvey on the Communist Manifesto That Hegel and Marx's views on colonialism were quite similar has already been shown by Avineri in his essay "Marx on Colonialism and Modernization". Marx's views on the political cultures of non-European societes were quite negative - just see his writings on India, Mexico, or even Eastern Europe. It is important, however, to be clear about what he was critical before we adopt a retrograde nationalist position, as dependency theory was to do later. David Harvey spoke on the Communist Manifesto last night at NYC's Brecht Forum as part of a year-long celebration of its 150th anniversary. Harvey has some of the most interesting insights into the Marxist classics today, especially involving questions of their "spatial" dimension. Since he a geography professor, this is not surprising. Harvey spent much of his talks discussing shortcomings or omissions in the Communist Manifesto. For example, the question of how the state comes into existence is only dealt with in a sketchy manner. Also, there is little discussion of how the world is "territorialized." Marx and Engels accepted the division of the world as it stood in 1848 pretty much on its own terms. There is also very little consideration of the power of financial institutions, which Harvey found puzzling given the major role that the Rothschild and Baring banks were playing in Europe in those days. This oversight has been corrected by Doug Henwood, needless to say. One of the presuppositions of the Communist Manifesto is that local struggles meld into national struggles, which culminate in proletarian revolution. Harvey wondered if this was a simplistic view in light of the tendencies to retain a stubbornly local character with their own dynamic. He also questioned whether the socialist movement has failed to develop a geographical strategy that is anywhere as comprehensive as the bourgeoisie's. The bosses have learned to divide up workers in such a manner that trade union and political struggles are weakened. They, for example, have calculated that 50 workers per plant in distances of 200 miles from each other has a powerful dampening effect on the ability to form unions. Workers need a geographical strategy of their own. Another problem is the tendency of the Communist Manifesto to depict the working-class in much more homogenous terms than it has developed historically. This means that the problem of conceptualizing socialism is much more difficult than originally anticipated. Perhaps the key is to conceive of a form of socialism that embraces heterogeneity rather than struggling against it. In almost a sidebar, Harvey developed some very interesting insights on the importance Marx and Engels attached to the question of colonialism. One of the goals of the Communist Manifesto was to develop a strategy for internationalism. The bourgeoisie had spread its tentacles world-wide and it was incumbent on the workers to forge ties across national boundaries. Harvey pointed out that colonialism was embraced by Hegel in "The Philosophy of Right" in 1821. This work was of enormous significance to Marx and he felt the need to confront and overcome Hegel's imperialist world-view, as reflected in the following passage from Hegel's work: "The principle of family life is dependence on the soil, on land, *terra firma*. Similarly, the natural element for industry, animating its outward movement, is the sea. Since the passion for gain involves risk, industry though bent on gain yet lifts itself above it; instead of remaining rooted to the soil and the limited circle of civil life with its pleasures and desires, it embraces the element of flux, danger and destruction. Furthermore, the sea is the greatest means of communication, and trade by sea creates commercial connections between distant countries and so relations involving contractual rights. At the same time, commerce of this kind is the most potent instrument of culture, and through it trade acquires its significance in the history of the world... "To realize what an instrument of culture lies in the link with the sea, consider countries where industry flourishes and contrast their relation to the sea with that of countries which have eschewed sea-faring and which, like Egypt and India, have become stagnant and sunk in the most frightful and scandalous superstition. Notice also how all great progressive peoples press onward to the sea." Marx was attempting to put these questions on the terrain of capital accumulation rather than philosophy when he wrote chapter 33 of volume one of Capital, titled "The Modern Theory of Colonization." He says: "In
