Pa. Court: Dad Can Teach Daughter Polygamy
Anyone care to comment? The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in the Shepp v. Shepp case: http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-97-2004mo.pdf Pa. Court: Dad Can Teach Daughter Polygamy http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=localid=4607786 6abc.com WPVI-TV/DT Pennsylvania HARRISBURG, Pa. (AP) - September 28, 2006 - A father may teach his minor daughter about polygamy if the discussion does not present her with a grave threat of harm, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said in a custody-case ruling released Thursday. The 5-1 decision allowed Stanley M. Shepp, a York man whose Mormon fundamentalist beliefs endorse polygamy, to talk about plural marriages and multiple wives even though bigamy is illegal. Where, as in the instant matter, there is no finding that discussing such matters constitutes a grave threat of harm to the child, there is insufficient basis for the court to infringe on a parent's constitutionally protected right to speak to a child about religion as he or she sees fit, wrote Justice Sandra Schultz Newman in an opinion joined by three others. A county judge had prohibited Shepp from teaching the child about his polygamist beliefs - at least until she turned 18 - and that decision was upheld by the state Superior Court. The girl's mother, Tracey L. Roberts, testified that Shepp's interest in polygamy broke up their marriage, and expressed concern that he may introduce the girl to men in preparation for marriage at age 13, according to the court opinion. The ruling did not say how old the girl is. In December 2003, she was 10. Roberts and Shepp have joint custody of her. Newman wrote that the state's interest in enforcing the anti-bigamy law is not an interest of the 'highest order' that would trump a parent's right to tell a child about deeply held religious beliefs. (Copyright 2006 by the Associated Press. All Rights Reserved.) Stan Shepp Somewhere in the West Center of the Universe [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
UCLA Law Expert Available to Discuss Pennsylvania Supreme Court Ruling Allowing a Father to Teach His Child about Polygamy
http://home.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.jsp?ndmViewId=news_viewnewsId=20060929005125newsLang=en http://www.law.ucla.edu September 29, 2006 10:23 AM Eastern Time UCLA Law Expert Available to Discuss Pennsylvania Supreme Court Ruling Allowing a Father to Teach His Child about Polygamy LOS ANGELES--(BUSINESS WIRE)--The following UCLA School of Law professor is available for interviews regarding the Pennsylvania Supreme Courts 5-1 decision in Shepp v. Shepp to allow a father to teach his young daughter about his religious belief in polygamy, despite his ex-wife's objections. The litigating parents in this case, who are divorced, have joint custody of their daughter. Eugene Volokh Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law UCLA School of Law (310) 206-3926 UCLA Law Professor Eugene Volokh has a forthcoming article in New York University Law Review entitled, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restriction, which addresses the issues at the very heart of the Shepp v. Shepp case. Volokh argues that legal restrictions placed upon parent-child speech are generally unconstitutional, except when they are narrowly focused on preventing one parent from undermining the child's relationship with the other. Below is the abstract of Professor Volokhs article: The best interests of the child standard the standard rule applied in custody disputes between two parents leaves family court judges ample room to consider a parent's ideology. Parents have had their rights limited or denied partly based on their advocacy of racism, homosexuality, adultery, nonmarital sex, Communism, Nazism, pacifism and disrespect for the flag, fundamentalism, polygamy, or religions that make it hard for children to fit in the western way of life in this society. Courts have also penalized or enjoined speech that expressly or implicitly criticizes the other parent, even when the speech has a broader ideological dimension. One parent, for instance, was ordered to make sure that there is nothing in the religious upbringing or teaching that the minor child is exposed to that can be considered homophobic, because the other parent was homosexual. Others have lost rights based partly on telling their children that the other parent was damned to Hell. Courts have also restricted a parent's religious speech when such speech was seen as inconsistent with the religious education that the custodial parent was providing. The cases generally rest on the theory (sometimes pure speculation, sometimes based on some evidence in the record) that the children will become confused and unhappy by the contradictory teachings, and be less likely to take their parents' authority seriously. This article argues these restrictions are generally unconstitutional, except when they're narrowly focused on preventing one parent from undermining the child's relationship with the other. But the observations that lead to this rule are likely, I think, to prove more interesting to readers than the rule itself: (1) The best interests test lets courts engage in viewpoint-based speech restriction. (2) The First Amendment is implicated not only when courts issue orders restricting parents' speech, but also when courts make custody or visitation decisions based on such speech. (3) Even when the cases involve religious speech, the Free Speech Clause is probably more important than the Religion Clauses. (4) If parents in intact families have First Amendment rights to speak to their children, without the government restricting the speech under a best interests standard, then parents in broken families generally deserve the same rights. (5) Parents in intact families should indeed be free to speak to their children - but not primarily because of their self-_expression_ rights, or their children's interests in hearing the parents' views. Rather, the main reason to protect parental speech rights is that today's child listeners will grow up into the next generation's adult speakers. (6) Attempts to limit restrictions to speech that imminently threatens likely psychological harm (or even cause actual psychological harm) to children may seem appealing, but will likely prove unhelpful. * * * * * Stan Shepp Somewhere in the West Center of the Universe [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customers with alcohol
The color coding sounds like a pretty good accommodation to me. http://www.startribune.com/789/story/709262.html ... About three-quarters of the 900 taxi drivers at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport are Somalis, many of them Muslim. And about three times each day, would-be customers are refused taxi service when a driver sees they're carrying alcohol. It's become a significant customer-service issue, said Patrick Hogan, a spokesman for the Metropolitan Airports Commission, on Thursday. Now the airports commission has a solution: color-coding the lights on the taxi roofs to indicate whether a driver will accept a booze-toting fare. The actual colors haven't been decided on yet, but commission officials met Thursday with representatives of the taxi drivers and the Minnesota chapter of the Muslim American Society to continue working on the plan. The airports commission has struggled with the issue for several years. Alcohol is a serious concern for devout Muslims, said Hassan Mohamud, an imam and vice president of the society. The Qur'an, Islam's holy book, strictly forbids buying, selling, drinking or carrying alcohol. The observant drivers object only to transporting openly displayed alcohol, said Ali Culed, a Somali Muslim who's been driving an airport cab for eight years. They won't search passengers or quiz them about what's in their bags. It is a religious issue, Culed said. I cannot force anybody to change their belief, but not in my cab. I don't want the guilt. I just want to be an innocent person. Hogan said taxi starters at curbside will look for duty-free bags with bottles or other obvious signs of alcohol and steer riders to cabs whose drivers don't object to booze ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customers with alcohol
Sounds like Plessy v. Ferguson to me. Separate but equal cabs. No way. How far are we willing to take this: what if they say they won't carry people who wear a cross a necklace with the Buddha (a pagan symbol for a devout Muslim); what about a Chistian cab driver who won't pick up someone with muslim or sikh garb? It seems to me that this is a civil rights violation on the part of a common carrier. The Taxi driver gets a license to carry peopel from place to place and may not discriminate on the basis of religion or race or anything else. How about this: Orthodox Jew gets in a cab in Minneapolis with a bottle of kosher wine he has brought back from a trip. It is for his religious observance. It is Friday an hour before sundown. Cab drivers refuse take him home and finally when one arrives that will, it is too late to get home before sundown. What if the cab driver is a member of an Aryan Identity church and won't take black patrons? The whole thing sounds unconstitutional and racist; common carriers have an obligation to accept all passengers. Otherwise they are not common carriers. Paul Finkelman Albany Law School Paul Finkelman President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy Albany Law School 80 New Scotland Avenue Albany, New York 12208-3494 518-445-3386 [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] 09/29 12:31 PM The color coding sounds like a pretty good accommodation to me. http://www.startribune.com/789/story/709262.html ... About three-quarters of the 900 taxi drivers at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport are Somalis, many of them Muslim. And about three times each day, would-be customers are refused taxi service when a driver sees they're carrying alcohol. It's become a significant customer-service issue, said Patrick Hogan, a spokesman for the Metropolitan Airports Commission, on Thursday. Now the airports commission has a solution: color-coding the lights on the taxi roofs to indicate whether a driver will accept a booze-toting fare. The actual colors haven't been decided on yet, but commission officials met Thursday with representatives of the taxi drivers and the Minnesota chapter of the Muslim American Society to continue working on the plan. The airports commission has struggled with the issue for several years. Alcohol is a serious concern for devout Muslims, said Hassan Mohamud, an imam and vice president of the society. The Qur'an, Islam's holy book, strictly forbids buying, selling, drinking or carrying alcohol. The observant drivers object only to transporting openly displayed alcohol, said Ali Culed, a Somali Muslim who's been driving an airport cab for eight years. They won't search passengers or quiz them about what's in their bags. It is a religious issue, Culed said. I cannot force anybody to change their belief, but not in my cab. I don't want the guilt. I just want to be an innocent person. Hogan said taxi starters at curbside will look for duty-free bags with bottles or other obvious signs of alcohol and steer riders to cabs whose drivers don't object to booze ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customers withalcohol
Hmm; isn't this a bit overwrought? It's hard to see how this is racist; and of course outside race and some other grounds for distinction, separate but equal is hardly always (or generally) wrong. To say that the taxi cab driver is a common carrier is, I think, to assume the conclusion: The question is whether we *should* treat the taxi cab driver as obligated to take all comers regardless of his preferences, or whether we should accommodate some of these preferences. Nor does it seem to me enough to point out that there are other accommodations we might want to reject. It seems to me we can pretty easily allow this one, and reject the others; this is the airport considering adopting a narrow rule, not a court mandating a broad accommodation regime (though I should note that the Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted the state constitution as adopting the Sherbert/Yoder model). The concern about a burden on passengers such as the (rather unlikely, I suspect) orthodox Jew who needs to transport kosher wine is a plausible concern, but I would think the color-coding would work very well, especially at airports. There are usually plenty of cabs there; the orthodox Jew would be able to find the cab that will carry his wine. As I understand it, the religious institution exemption to Title VII makes it possible for Orthodox Jews to produce kosher wine without the grapes' being handled by non-Jews (a requirement for kosher wines in the minds of some Orthodox, I believe). Why shouldn't we equally accommodate Muslim cab drivers who don't want to carry wines, kosher or otherwise? Eugene -Original Message- From: Paul Finkelman [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, September 29, 2006 10:07 AM To: Volokh, Eugene; religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Re: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customers withalcohol Sounds like Plessy v. Ferguson to me. Separate but equal cabs. No way. How far are we willing to take this: what if they say they won't carry people who wear a cross a necklace with the Buddha (a pagan symbol for a devout Muslim); what about a Chistian cab driver who won't pick up someone with muslim or sikh garb? It seems to me that this is a civil rights violation on the part of a common carrier. The Taxi driver gets a license to carry peopel from place to place and may not discriminate on the basis of religion or race or anything else. How about this: Orthodox Jew gets in a cab in Minneapolis with a bottle of kosher wine he has brought back from a trip. It is for his religious observance. It is Friday an hour before sundown. Cab drivers refuse take him home and finally when one arrives that will, it is too late to get home before sundown. What if the cab driver is a member of an Aryan Identity church and won't take black patrons? The whole thing sounds unconstitutional and racist; common carriers have an obligation to accept all passengers. Otherwise they are not common carriers. Paul Finkelman Albany Law School Paul Finkelman President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy Albany Law School 80 New Scotland Avenue Albany, New York 12208-3494 518-445-3386 [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] 09/29 12:31 PM The color coding sounds like a pretty good accommodation to me. http://www.startribune.com/789/story/709262.html ... About three-quarters of the 900 taxi drivers at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport are Somalis, many of them Muslim. And about three times each day, would-be customers are refused taxi service when a driver sees they're carrying alcohol. It's become a significant customer-service issue, said Patrick Hogan, a spokesman for the Metropolitan Airports Commission, on Thursday. Now the airports commission has a solution: color-coding the lights on the taxi roofs to indicate whether a driver will accept a booze-toting fare. The actual colors haven't been decided on yet, but commission officials met Thursday with representatives of the taxi drivers and the Minnesota chapter of the Muslim American Society to continue working on the plan. The airports commission has struggled with the issue for several years. Alcohol is a serious concern for devout Muslims, said Hassan Mohamud, an imam and vice president of the society. The Qur'an, Islam's holy book, strictly forbids buying, selling, drinking or carrying alcohol. The observant drivers object only to transporting openly displayed alcohol, said Ali Culed, a Somali Muslim who's been driving an airport cab for eight years. They won't search passengers or quiz them about what's in their bags. It is a religious issue, Culed said. I cannot force anybody to change their belief, but not in my cab. I don't want the guilt. I just want to be an innocent person. Hogan said taxi starters at curbside will
Re: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalcohol
Question. In many states it is illegal to ride in a vehicle with an open container, and some (many?) of those statutes prohibit openly displaying alcohol. Assuming for a moment that all of the cab drivers in question are like the fellow who is quoted (no questions asked about what is in a passenger's bag), does the analysis change if the behavior to which the cab driver objects is illegal? Does it matter that the open container and open display laws are enforced somewhat sporadically? I understand that this does not answer Paul's other hypos (other than the kosher wine one, if it is in a bag, which moots the question, I think). Paul's Buddha hypo strikes me as much more difficult to resolve (or escape) than the situation making the news. And I understand that in states or places without open container or similar laws (are there any?) my inquiry is irrelevant. After all, a taxi driver can refuse to carry a passenger who is hauling a clear plastic bag full of joints, no? Or an uncased rifle. Jim Maule Villanova University School of Law [EMAIL PROTECTED] 9/29/2006 1:07:11 PM Sounds like Plessy v. Ferguson to me. Separate but equal cabs. No way. How far are we willing to take this: what if they say they won't carry people who wear a cross a necklace with the Buddha (a pagan symbol for a devout Muslim); what about a Chistian cab driver who won't pick up someone with muslim or sikh garb? It seems to me that this is a civil rights violation on the part of a common carrier. The Taxi driver gets a license to carry peopel from place to place and may not discriminate on the basis of religion or race or anything else. How about this: Orthodox Jew gets in a cab in Minneapolis with a bottle of kosher wine he has brought back from a trip. It is for his religious observance. It is Friday an hour before sundown. Cab drivers refuse take him home and finally when one arrives that will, it is too late to get home before sundown. What if the cab driver is a member of an Aryan Identity church and won't take black patrons? The whole thing sounds unconstitutional and racist; common carriers have an obligation to accept all passengers. Otherwise they are not common carriers. Paul Finkelman Albany Law School Paul Finkelman President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy Albany Law School 80 New Scotland Avenue Albany, New York 12208-3494 518-445-3386 [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] 09/29 12:31 PM The color coding sounds like a pretty good accommodation to me. http://www.startribune.com/789/story/709262.html ... About three-quarters of the 900 taxi drivers at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport are Somalis, many of them Muslim. And about three times each day, would-be customers are refused taxi service when a driver sees they're carrying alcohol. It's become a significant customer-service issue, said Patrick Hogan, a spokesman for the Metropolitan Airports Commission, on Thursday. Now the airports commission has a solution: color-coding the lights on the taxi roofs to indicate whether a driver will accept a booze-toting fare. The actual colors haven't been decided on yet, but commission officials met Thursday with representatives of the taxi drivers and the Minnesota chapter of the Muslim American Society to continue working on the plan. The airports commission has struggled with the issue for several years. Alcohol is a serious concern for devout Muslims, said Hassan Mohamud, an imam and vice president of the society. The Qur'an, Islam's holy book, strictly forbids buying, selling, drinking or carrying alcohol. The observant drivers object only to transporting openly displayed alcohol, said Ali Culed, a Somali Muslim who's been driving an airport cab for eight years. They won't search passengers or quiz them about what's in their bags. It is a religious issue, Culed said. I cannot force anybody to change their belief, but not in my cab. I don't want the guilt. I just want to be an innocent person. Hogan said taxi starters at curbside will look for duty-free bags with bottles or other obvious signs of alcohol and steer riders to cabs whose drivers don't object to booze ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as
RE: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customers withalcohol
Carrying alcohol generally doesn't create a protected class or constitutionally protected activity, communion or kosher wine notwithstanding. On the other hand, all of the examples listed below do (Buddha necklace, Sikh garb, etc.) and create important competing values. This seems akin to the Spring Valley clinic that closes on Saturdays mentioned in another thread. There didn't appear to be any claim that the complainant was discriminated against because of his religion or religious status. I don't understand the principle behind preventing a private actor from 'discriminating' against nonprotected status (e.g., people who carry liquor) under antidiscrimination laws, even if doing so results from their own religious belief. If they are able to refuse to carry such individuals because of fear of, for example, rowdy behavior, then the religious driver suffers a unique legal handicap. Whether common carrier or other law requires taxis to transport anyone under any circumstance, regardless of what they are carrying-I remember being turned away from cabs for carrying a medium-sized piece of furniture that would easily fit in a trunk-is a different issue, but these drivers may very well have a colorable free exercise defense. Roman Storzer -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Paul Finkelman Sent: Friday, September 29, 2006 1:07 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Re: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customers withalcohol Sounds like Plessy v. Ferguson to me. Separate but equal cabs. No way. How far are we willing to take this: what if they say they won't carry people who wear a cross a necklace with the Buddha (a pagan symbol for a devout Muslim); what about a Chistian cab driver who won't pick up someone with muslim or sikh garb? It seems to me that this is a civil rights violation on the part of a common carrier. The Taxi driver gets a license to carry peopel from place to place and may not discriminate on the basis of religion or race or anything else. How about this: Orthodox Jew gets in a cab in Minneapolis with a bottle of kosher wine he has brought back from a trip. It is for his religious observance. It is Friday an hour before sundown. Cab drivers refuse take him home and finally when one arrives that will, it is too late to get home before sundown. What if the cab driver is a member of an Aryan Identity church and won't take black patrons? The whole thing sounds unconstitutional and racist; common carriers have an obligation to accept all passengers. Otherwise they are not common carriers. Paul Finkelman Albany Law School Paul Finkelman President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy Albany Law School 80 New Scotland Avenue Albany, New York 12208-3494 518-445-3386 [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] 09/29 12:31 PM The color coding sounds like a pretty good accommodation to me. http://www.startribune.com/789/story/709262.html ... About three-quarters of the 900 taxi drivers at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport are Somalis, many of them Muslim. And about three times each day, would-be customers are refused taxi service when a driver sees they're carrying alcohol. It's become a significant customer-service issue, said Patrick Hogan, a spokesman for the Metropolitan Airports Commission, on Thursday. Now the airports commission has a solution: color-coding the lights on the taxi roofs to indicate whether a driver will accept a booze-toting fare. The actual colors haven't been decided on yet, but commission officials met Thursday with representatives of the taxi drivers and the Minnesota chapter of the Muslim American Society to continue working on the plan. The airports commission has struggled with the issue for several years. Alcohol is a serious concern for devout Muslims, said Hassan Mohamud, an imam and vice president of the society. The Qur'an, Islam's holy book, strictly forbids buying, selling, drinking or carrying alcohol. The observant drivers object only to transporting openly displayed alcohol, said Ali Culed, a Somali Muslim who's been driving an airport cab for eight years. They won't search passengers or quiz them about what's in their bags. It is a religious issue, Culed said. I cannot force anybody to change their belief, but not in my cab. I don't want the guilt. I just want to be an innocent person. Hogan said taxi starters at curbside will look for duty-free bags with bottles or other obvious signs of alcohol and steer riders to cabs whose drivers don't object to booze ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the
Re: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalcohol
I had assumed that this was not an open container issue. Rather, I imagine someone getting off a plane from California with a box of wine or someone getting off an international flight with liquor or wine from duty free (or special Kosher wine) in an obvious bottle, box, bag, ec. I assume ALL taxi drivers can refuse to violate an open container law. Paul Finkelman President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy Albany Law School 80 New Scotland Avenue Albany, New York 12208-3494 518-445-3386 [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] 09/29 1:59 PM Question. In many states it is illegal to ride in a vehicle with an open container, and some (many?) of those statutes prohibit openly displaying alcohol. Assuming for a moment that all of the cab drivers in question are like the fellow who is quoted (no questions asked about what is in a passenger's bag), does the analysis change if the behavior to which the cab driver objects is illegal? Does it matter that the open container and open display laws are enforced somewhat sporadically? I understand that this does not answer Paul's other hypos (other than the kosher wine one, if it is in a bag, which moots the question, I think). Paul's Buddha hypo strikes me as much more difficult to resolve (or escape) than the situation making the news. And I understand that in states or places without open container or similar laws (are there any?) my inquiry is irrelevant. After all, a taxi driver can refuse to carry a passenger who is hauling a clear plastic bag full of joints, no? Or an uncased rifle. Jim Maule Villanova University School of Law [EMAIL PROTECTED] 9/29/2006 1:07:11 PM Sounds like Plessy v. Ferguson to me. Separate but equal cabs. No way. How far are we willing to take this: what if they say they won't carry people who wear a cross a necklace with the Buddha (a pagan symbol for a devout Muslim); what about a Chistian cab driver who won't pick up someone with muslim or sikh garb? It seems to me that this is a civil rights violation on the part of a common carrier. The Taxi driver gets a license to carry peopel from place to place and may not discriminate on the basis of religion or race or anything else. How about this: Orthodox Jew gets in a cab in Minneapolis with a bottle of kosher wine he has brought back from a trip. It is for his religious observance. It is Friday an hour before sundown. Cab drivers refuse take him home and finally when one arrives that will, it is too late to get home before sundown. What if the cab driver is a member of an Aryan Identity church and won't take black patrons? The whole thing sounds unconstitutional and racist; common carriers have an obligation to accept all passengers. Otherwise they are not common carriers. Paul Finkelman Albany Law School Paul Finkelman President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy Albany Law School 80 New Scotland Avenue Albany, New York 12208-3494 518-445-3386 [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] 09/29 12:31 PM The color coding sounds like a pretty good accommodation to me. http://www.startribune.com/789/story/709262.html ... About three-quarters of the 900 taxi drivers at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport are Somalis, many of them Muslim. And about three times each day, would-be customers are refused taxi service when a driver sees they're carrying alcohol. It's become a significant customer-service issue, said Patrick Hogan, a spokesman for the Metropolitan Airports Commission, on Thursday. Now the airports commission has a solution: color-coding the lights on the taxi roofs to indicate whether a driver will accept a booze-toting fare. The actual colors haven't been decided on yet, but commission officials met Thursday with representatives of the taxi drivers and the Minnesota chapter of the Muslim American Society to continue working on the plan. The airports commission has struggled with the issue for several years. Alcohol is a serious concern for devout Muslims, said Hassan Mohamud, an imam and vice president of the society. The Qur'an, Islam's holy book, strictly forbids buying, selling, drinking or carrying alcohol. The observant drivers object only to transporting openly displayed alcohol, said Ali Culed, a Somali Muslim who's been driving an airport cab for eight years. They won't search passengers or quiz them about what's in their bags. It is a religious issue, Culed said. I cannot force anybody to change their belief, but not in my cab. I don't want the guilt. I just want to be an innocent person. Hogan said taxi starters at curbside will look for duty-free bags with bottles or other obvious signs of alcohol and steer riders to cabs whose drivers don't object to booze ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
Re: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalcohol
Title: Re: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalcohol I confess I'm with Paul on this one. As someone who has often taught professional responsibility, I've defended the cab rank rule. To put it mildly, it is disconcerting to be told that the cab rank rule doesn't apply to cabs! They are common carriers, end of story, having been granted a valuable public license. If they want to exercise that kind of discretion, let them open a livery company. We've earlier discussed, on more than one occasion, whether a postal worker MUST deliver personally offensive magazines. The answer is yes, and I don't recall that Eugene disagreed. Sandy - Sanford Levinson (Sent from a Blackberry) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalcohol
Title: Re: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalcohol Sandy: I still wonder why this isn't just assuming the conclusion. One could equally well say that unemployment beneficiaries must take any job for which they're qualified, end of story, having been granted unemployment compensation on those terms. Or one could say that a restaurant given a valuable liquor license must open seven days a week, end of story, notwithstanding the fact that its owner feels a religious obligation to close Saturdays or Sundays. The question hereis whether it's proper for those who define the rules to come up with an exception that accommodates the licensee's religious beliefs, while at the same time avoiding inconvenience to the public. It's hard to come up with such an accommodation for the postal worker, but not that hard, I think, for the cab drivers (the color-coding being a pretty good idea). If the airport is willing to accommodate the drivers, why not let it do that? There is also, of course, the question whether such an accommodation should be constitutionally required. I think it shouldn't be, because I generally agree with Smith. But if one accepts Sherbert/Yoder -- including as to Sherbert herself, who is being granted a valuable public benefit -- then why wouldn't the cab drivers have a very strong case? (As I mentioned, the Minnesota Supreme Court has accepted the Sherbert/Yoder approach to the Minnesota Constitution's religious freedom provision.) Perhaps the rule should be something less than strict scrutiny when it comes to conditions of government benefits (cf. http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/intermed.htm#GovernmentasEmployer for a discussion of this issue as to the government as employer), though I take it that this would mean less than strict scrutiny in Sherbert, too. But why should it be no scrutiny, "government wins, end of story"? Eugene From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Sanford LevinsonSent: Friday, September 29, 2006 2:29 PMTo: religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduSubject: Re: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalcohol I confess I'm with Paul on this one. As someone who has often taught professional responsibility, I've defended the "cab rank" rule. To put it mildly, it is disconcerting to be told that the "cab rank rule" doesn't apply to cabs! They are common carriers, end of story, having been granted a valuable public license. If they want to exercise that kind of discretion, let them open a livery company. We've earlier discussed, on more than one occasion, whether a postal worker MUST deliver personally offensive magazines. The answer is yes, and I don't recall that Eugene disagreed.Sandy- Sanford Levinson(Sent from a Blackberry) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Locke v. Davey Analysis
Locke is a mystery to me. It seems to be a triumph of Chief Justice Rehnquist's quest for a wide deference in the name of states' rights. On the other hand,WHR's analysis of discrimination is impossible to support. He seems to say that discrimination (a plain and open disparate treatment) is okay as long as it doesn't involve criminal consequences, substantial civil or other legal "penalties." Because onlybenefits are at stake, the disparate treatment isn't constitutionally significant. This seems athrowback to the old discredited "rights-privileges" distinction. For the most part, I agree with Justice Scalia's analysis, although I think his hypothetical about Western Europe and France is a stretch at best. But Chief Justice Rehnquist's rationale leads to another hypo that is, I think, more telling. WHR cites US v American Library Association in favor of a broad managerial discretion of public libraries, extending to a variety of choices about what goes into libraries and what does not (thanks to internet filters). The comparison is way off point. Suppose the managers of a public library said no theology students may use the library, or the stacks, or the computers, or the copying machines? WHR's analysis seems to lead to the conclusion that there's no discrimination because there's no "penalty." Scalia's analysis seems far more persuasive -- and far more consistent with the bulk of civil rights / civil liberties precedent: any adverse treatment that leaves an individual worse off than the "baseline" defined by statute or other legal authority is discrimination, and if it is based on a prohibited ground (race, sex, religion etc.), it is constitutionally or legally problematic. From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Greg BaylorSent: Fri 9/29/2006 1:54 PMTo: 'Law Religion issues for Law Academics'Subject: Locke v. Davey Analysis I am curious as to how those on this list wouldcharacterize the analysis used by the majority inLocke v. Davey. The Court obviously rejected the notion that non-neutral laws essentially always violate the Free Exercise Clause, (presumably) without regard to the magnitude of the burden imposed on the claimant's religious exercise. At the same the Court did not apply a straightforward substantial burden/compelling state interest/least restrictive means analysis. As I read the majority opinion, after acknowledging the non-neutrality of the law in question, the Court looked at the magnitude of the burden not in isolation, but rather in the context of other factors, including the character of the law that caused the burden on Davey and the importance of the state's interest. [When I say "the character of the law that caused the burden on Davey," I am referring to the Court's observations about the otherwise religion-friendly character of Washington's education aid law (e.g., Davey could have kept his scholarship and majored in something other than devotional theology at the seriously religious Northwest College).] In other words, the Court seemed to be applying a multifactorial approach, under which a claimant's weakness on one factor (e.g., burden) theoretically might be rehabilitated by his or her strength on others (e.g., the magnitude of the state's interest). Do you agree or disagree? Thanks. Greg Baylor Gregory S. BaylorDirector, Center for Law Religious FreedomChristian Legal Society8001 Braddock Road, Suite 300Springfield, VA 22151(703) 642-1070 x 3502(703) 642-1075 fax[EMAIL PROTECTED]http://www.clsnet.org ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
PA SUPREME COURT DECISION OF 9/27/2006
A copy of my statement to the Press. Re: PA SUPREME COURT DECISION OF 9/27/2006 The York Daily Record headline of Nov. 19, 2003, said it best A Fight Kaylynne Can't Win. If Kaylynne couldnt win this fight, then neither could I. This custody case should have been settled in mediation way before it ever went to court. That would have been the only way for Kaylynne to win and unless she wins, I do not win either. These appeals were never about custody, about Kaylynnes best interest, nor even about my constitutional rights to discuss my religion with my daughter. This case, in my mind, was about the rights of *every* Pennsylvania parent to discuss their religious beliefs with their children. The Pennsylvania Supreme Courts latest ruling is good case law and should stand to protect parental rights for years to come. It is my hope that whenever anyones constitutional right to discuss religion with their children is threatened, that their attorney will be able to say, In Shepp v. Shepp, . . . and their rights will be secure. If Traceys supporters whether they be the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints or Tapestry Against Polygamy, can talk her into taking this to the US Supreme Court, I would welcome the opportunity to extend this freedom to parents across the country. As far as discussing plural marriage with Kaylynne, let me just say this, Kaylynne is thirteen, her picture was sprawled across newspapers two and a half years ago, and now again today. She is a typical teenager. She already knows that I believe in plural marriage. She already knows where I live and why. Her mother could always talk to her about it. Her sisters could always talk to her about it. Her teachers, her friends, her church leaders, her extended family everyone could discuss my religious beliefs with her except for me. I am relieved that I will finally be able to answer the questions that she is bound to ask and to correct the misinformation that has been fed to her for the past three years. As for her mothers fears that I will marry her off to some older man, all I can say is that ignorance breeds fear, and fear breeds hatred, intolerance and bigotry. I have always denounced, and I will continue to denounce adult-child marital relationships whether in monogamy or polygamy. Kaylynnes mothers fears are based on the actions of others, not on my actions. I expect to be judged on my actions and beliefs and not on the teachings of others. The Mormon community with which I am associated does not practice underage marriages. I look forward to Kaylynne coming to Utah to visit me, although I do not look forward to the court case that will be generated by my desire to have her come here. Southern Utah is beautiful, I am sure she will love it. Ultimately, I am very happy over this win. I have an excellent attorney who knows Pennsylvania law and who argued my case admirably. Links: http://news.google.com/news?hl=enlr=rls=com.netscape%3Aen-USct=titleie=UTF-8filter=0q=shepp+polygamy+APbtnG=Search+News Stan Shepp Somewhere in the West Center of the Universe [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalcohol
Title: Re: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalcohol I actually agree with much of the thrust of Eugene's post with regard to putting one's thumb on the side of granting accommodations, whether or not they are constitutionally divided. (Thus I believe that the Court was probably correct in upholding what I also believe to be a quite dubious Washington policy in Locke.). That being said, I'm reluctant to push for such accommodations in what historically have been recognized to be common carriers. But perhaps I was too flippant in saying End of story. Sandy - Sanford Levinson (Sent from a Blackberry) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalcohol
Title: Re: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalcohol I appreciate Sandy's thoughtful and gracious response, and I understand the appeal to history and tradition. Yet wouldn't many religious accommodations involve some departures from history? It sounds like a pretty common story: Historically, there's a flat rule mandating X (you must serve everybody, you may not use certain hallucinogens, you may not wear headgear). But along comes a religious group -- perhaps one that's quite new to the jurisdiction or the profession -- that seeks an accommodation. It certainly makes sense to ask whether the group's accommodation will unfairly interfere with others' interests (e.g., cab riders in this case, taxpayers and employers in Sherbert, and such). But does it make sense to be "reluctant to push for such acommodations in what historically have been recognized to be [flat rules]," given that the very nature of many such accommodations is a novel exception to a historical flat rule? Eugene From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Sanford LevinsonSent: Friday, September 29, 2006 4:20 PMTo: religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduSubject: Re: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalcohol I actually agree with much of the thrust of Eugene's post with regard to putting one's thumb on the side of granting accommodations, whether or not they are constitutionally divided. (Thus I believe that the Court was probably correct in upholding what I also believe to be a quite dubious Washington policy in Locke.). That being said, I'm reluctant to push for such accommodations in what historically have been recognized to be common carriers. But perhaps I was too flippant in saying "End of story."Sandy- Sanford Levinson(Sent from a Blackberry) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customers with alcohol
On Fri, 29 Sep 2006, Paul Finkelman wrote: Sounds like Plessy v. Ferguson to me. Separate but equal cabs. No way. How far are we willing to take this: what if they say they won't carry people who wear a cross a necklace with the Buddha (a pagan symbol for a devout Muslim); what about a Chistian cab driver who won't pick up someone with muslim or sikh garb? It seems to me that this is a civil rights violation on the part of a common carrier. The Taxi driver gets a license to carry peopel from place to place and may not discriminate on the basis of religion or race or anything else. I believe the difference is that there is a specific precept against its grower and its presser and its CARRIER. The other examples do not involve any transgression by the *driver*. Will Linden [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.ecben.net/ Magic Code: MAS/GD S++ W++ N+ PWM++ Ds/r+ A- a++ C+ G- QO++ 666 Y ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalcohol
we should not force someone to take a job if they must break religious beliefs, that is too coercive; but surely we cannot run a society if people who have an obligation to do a job (pick up fares) refuse to do that job. COnsider this. What if all 75% of the Muslim cabbies took this position, and then, over time, 95% of the cabbies were Muslims who would not pick up certain fares? And if 25% of all flight attendants are Muslim and refuse to serve drinks on planes, do we color code our planes; or our amtrack trains? Can the conductor on the train refuse to sell a ticket to the passenger who is legally drinking on the train? Paul Finkelman Paul Finkelman President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy Albany Law School 80 New Scotland Avenue Albany, New York 12208-3494 518-445-3386 [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] 09/29/06 5:37 PM Sandy: I still wonder why this isn't just assuming the conclusion. One could equally well say that unemployment beneficiaries must take any job for which they're qualified, end of story, having been granted unemployment compensation on those terms. Or one could say that a restaurant given a valuable liquor license must open seven days a week, end of story, notwithstanding the fact that its owner feels a religious obligation to close Saturdays or Sundays. The question here is whether it's proper for those who define the rules to come up with an exception that accommodates the licensee's religious beliefs, while at the same time avoiding inconvenience to the public. It's hard to come up with such an accommodation for the postal worker, but not that hard, I think, for the cab drivers (the color-coding being a pretty good idea). If the airport is willing to accommodate the drivers, why not let it do that? There is also, of course, the question whether such an accommodation should be constitutionally required. I think it shouldn't be, because I generally agree with Smith. But if one accepts Sherbert/Yoder -- including as to Sherbert herself, who is being granted a valuable public benefit -- then why wouldn't the cab drivers have a very strong case? (As I mentioned, the Minnesota Supreme Court has accepted the Sherbert/Yoder approach to the Minnesota Constitution's religious freedom provision.) Perhaps the rule should be something less than strict scrutiny when it comes to conditions of government benefits (cf. http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/intermed.htm#GovernmentasEmployer for a discussion of this issue as to the government as employer), though I take it that this would mean less than strict scrutiny in Sherbert, too. But why should it be no scrutiny, government wins, end of story? Eugene From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Sanford Levinson Sent: Friday, September 29, 2006 2:29 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Re: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalcohol I confess I'm with Paul on this one. As someone who has often taught professional responsibility, I've defended the cab rank rule. To put it mildly, it is disconcerting to be told that the cab rank rule doesn't apply to cabs! They are common carriers, end of story, having been granted a valuable public license. If they want to exercise that kind of discretion, let them open a livery company. We've earlier discussed, on more than one occasion, whether a postal worker MUST deliver personally offensive magazines. The answer is yes, and I don't recall that Eugene disagreed. Sandy - Sanford Levinson (Sent from a Blackberry) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalco hol
Again, the employement compesation is different; this is about a duty of common carriers to accept all people. Moreover, it opens too many other exceptions -- pagan symbols, race mixing (Bob Jones Cab Co. won't pick up mixed race couples); I think we all think of many examples of how very religious people can find a religious reason for not picking up someone; can a muslim tow truck driver refuse to tow the broken Miller Beer Truck? Can the Muslim bus driver close the door on the overtly pagan kids trying to get on the bus; can Muslim Cabbies (or Evangelical Christians) refuse to carry Wickens? Where, I would ask, would Greg or Eugene draw the line -- on common carries and places of public accommodations? The Muslim grocer can close on Friday and refuse to carry beer; but he cannot refuse to sell to someone who bought beer next store and is legally carrying a six pack (closed of course) as he tried to by chips and salsa in the Muslim store. By the way, if they meet other criteria, would favor unemployment compensation for Muslin cabbies who quit because they cannot obey the law which requires them to take all passengers. Paul FInkelman Paul Finkelman President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy Albany Law School 80 New Scotland Avenue Albany, New York 12208-3494 518-445-3386 [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] 09/29/06 6:45 PM It seems to me that the right question is whether the religious accommodation may be made in a manner that does not cause an unacceptable burden to others. Whether or not such an accommodation is compelled, in the post-Employment Division v. Smith period, it surely is not prohibited. Being here in Minneapolis as I am, I can report that this story has received significant play in the press. And, interestingly, this appears to be a case in which all the parties concerned are behaving with courtesy and respect in an attempt to find the right balance and live together in a community without being forced to surrender faith. The Muslim cab drivers agree that they would not inquire as to what a person is carrying - the Koran does not impose such a duty of inquiry - so any alcohol included in baggage would not be known to or covered by the their refusal to accept the carriage of alcohol. The concern is for visible carrying of alcohol (although not just in open containers, as Paul Finkelman correctly assumed). The Muslim cab drivers further have agreed that they would place a different colored light on their cabs, so that the attendants for the cab waiting line at the airport would simply direct the next passenger in line who is visibly carrying alcohol to the next cab in line that does not have the different light. In most cases, this would occur so unobtrusively that the passenger wouldn't even know what has just occurred. In this way, every passenger still will receive cab service in the order in which he or she appears in the cab waiting line, while the Muslim cab drivers may face a temporary wait for the next passenger without alcohol, a minor burden placed on and accepted by the Muslim community in exchange for accommodation of their deeply-held beliefs. Please keep in mind as well that this is Minneapolis-St. Paul - not New York or Washington, D.C. - so that most passengers arriving at the airport are not taking cabs and thus accommodation for the relatively few passengers who do take cabs is made all the easier. Eugene's point of comparison with unemployment beneficaries is quite apt, in light of recent events in Germany. As he says, drawing the comparison with the Muslim cab drivers, One could equally well say that unemployment beneficiaries must take any job for which they're qualified, end of story, having been granted unemployment compensation on those terms. A case recently arose in Germany in which a young woman, a person of faith as I recall, who received unemployment compensation was told that her benefits would be terminated because she had refused to accept a job as a prostitute that had been posted at the unemployment office, prostitution being a legal form of business in Germany. While that ruling was overturned once public attention was drawn to it, it certainly confirms the serious danger to personal faith and values that may be posed by requiring a person to fall into line simply by receipt of a public benefit. Greg Sisk Gregory Sisk Professor of Law University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota) MSL 400, 1000 LaSalle Avenue Minneapolis, MN 55403-2005 651-962-4923 [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://personal2.stthomas.edu/GCSISK/sisk.html http://personal2.stthomas.edu/GCSISK/sisk.html _ From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, September 29, 2006 4:37 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: FW: 75% of Minneapolis airport taxis refuse customerswithalcohol Sandy: I still wonder why this isn't just assuming the conclusion. One could
