Re: Eugene's Blog Post on Liberals and Exemption Rights
Well, I thought I was doing this off list and wasn't. Sorry about that! (Could have been worse.) Rich On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 9:43 PM, Richard Friedman rdfrd...@umich.edu wrote: But given the way you wrote your post, I don't think you really can, because the decision was pretty deliberate to limit the 1964 Act to a carefully defined list of public accommodations that didn't involve intimate contact -- so no boarding houses, no barbershops, not even most types of retail stores. Somebody (can't remember who) wrote ap iece several years ago emphasizing this. I don't know how universally state laws have filled the gap -- they certainly have to some extent, though I imagine not with respect to boarding houses -- and I suppose there's a national consensus that a barber can't decline to cut a person's hair on account of race, but I don't think you can cite the '64 Act in support of it. On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 8:58 PM, Levinson, Sanford V slevin...@law.utexas.edu wrote: You may be right. I was using the term more metaphorically to refer to any business that is open to the public. Sandy Sent from my iPhone On Apr 1, 2015, at 6:48 PM, Richard Friedman rdfrd...@umich.edu wrote: Hi, Sandy. I hope all is well. I'm writing to you off-list, because I haven't followed the entire conversation and may have missed something. But my understanding is that florists and cake-makers (assuming the cakes are not meant to be eaten on premises) are not public accommodations within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, though they're covered by many state civil rights acts. Am I in fact missing something? Best, Rich On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 6:18 PM, Levinson, Sanford V slevin...@law.utexas.edu wrote: I think Prof. Chen is substantially correct, but I believe, more than ever, that it's the kind of problem that can ( and should) be handled outside legal constraints. Why would I want to hire a wedding photographer who so clearly won't view the day as affirmatively special? Ditto the band? But I really can't work up much sympathy for the florist or baker. They should be treated under the general rubric of public accommodations and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. I'm sure there were florists and bakers who objected to mixes-race marriages and could cite the purported curse on Ham. It really doesn't (and shouldn't) matter. Sandy Sent from my iPhone On Apr 1, 2015, at 4:56 PM, K Chen tzn...@gmail.com wrote: As someone putting a wedding together, I can't explain the lack of sympathy for the wedding photographer as anything but thinking that their work is essentially interchangeable. It is not, unfortunately, and it is priced accordingly. Every single photographer of them seems to take their business very, very personally. More to the point, it is a personal, professional service which is by its nature selective compared to the harm done by impersonal corporations excluding goods and services when they otherwise serve the public. A principled difference can be drawn between accommodating personal, inherently selective commercial businesses and businesses that are open to the public at large. The vast majority of commercial transactions are from businesses who sell to the public, or their business community, on a non-discriminatory basis. When such a business denies goods or services to a class of person, that is an inherently political act. Such a businesses is not just refusing the do business with an individual or class, they are making an attempt to exclude them from *the definition of the public itself. * They are thus doing harm to both individual and society by imposing their will on what constitutes the political community. This harm grows geometrically with each exclusionary actor. Individual consumers on the other hand, are inherently selective. If you need one loaf of bread this week, you will patronize precisely one baker this week. If you need a salary, you will work one, maybe two jobs. The harm of being denied service by a consumer (or laborer) because of their beliefs has a societal harm, if any, nearly indistinguishable to being denied for any other reason. Some services should fall in between. I'm not convinced for the florist and the and the baker, but I'm sympathetic to the photographer, the doctor, the lawyer (ethical obligations notwithstanding) , the political consultant, the ghost writer... I don't know how far that gets liberals of course, but it *is* a difference beyond mere size and corporate form. Kevin Chen On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 2:51 PM, Gaubatz, Derek dgaub...@imb.org wrote: “[l]iberals who opposed *Smith* in 1990 and supported RFRA in 1993 — including liberal organizations, professors, and politicians — largely continue to support religious exemptions for individuals, while opposing the extension of such exemptions to commercial businesses. I’m not sure I’m seeing the principled
Re: Eugene's Blog Post on Liberals and Exemption Rights
But given the way you wrote your post, I don't think you really can, because the decision was pretty deliberate to limit the 1964 Act to a carefully defined list of public accommodations that didn't involve intimate contact -- so no boarding houses, no barbershops, not even most types of retail stores. Somebody (can't remember who) wrote ap iece several years ago emphasizing this. I don't know how universally state laws have filled the gap -- they certainly have to some extent, though I imagine not with respect to boarding houses -- and I suppose there's a national consensus that a barber can't decline to cut a person's hair on account of race, but I don't think you can cite the '64 Act in support of it. On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 8:58 PM, Levinson, Sanford V slevin...@law.utexas.edu wrote: You may be right. I was using the term more metaphorically to refer to any business that is open to the public. Sandy Sent from my iPhone On Apr 1, 2015, at 6:48 PM, Richard Friedman rdfrd...@umich.edu wrote: Hi, Sandy. I hope all is well. I'm writing to you off-list, because I haven't followed the entire conversation and may have missed something. But my understanding is that florists and cake-makers (assuming the cakes are not meant to be eaten on premises) are not public accommodations within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, though they're covered by many state civil rights acts. Am I in fact missing something? Best, Rich On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 6:18 PM, Levinson, Sanford V slevin...@law.utexas.edu wrote: I think Prof. Chen is substantially correct, but I believe, more than ever, that it's the kind of problem that can ( and should) be handled outside legal constraints. Why would I want to hire a wedding photographer who so clearly won't view the day as affirmatively special? Ditto the band? But I really can't work up much sympathy for the florist or baker. They should be treated under the general rubric of public accommodations and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. I'm sure there were florists and bakers who objected to mixes-race marriages and could cite the purported curse on Ham. It really doesn't (and shouldn't) matter. Sandy Sent from my iPhone On Apr 1, 2015, at 4:56 PM, K Chen tzn...@gmail.com wrote: As someone putting a wedding together, I can't explain the lack of sympathy for the wedding photographer as anything but thinking that their work is essentially interchangeable. It is not, unfortunately, and it is priced accordingly. Every single photographer of them seems to take their business very, very personally. More to the point, it is a personal, professional service which is by its nature selective compared to the harm done by impersonal corporations excluding goods and services when they otherwise serve the public. A principled difference can be drawn between accommodating personal, inherently selective commercial businesses and businesses that are open to the public at large. The vast majority of commercial transactions are from businesses who sell to the public, or their business community, on a non-discriminatory basis. When such a business denies goods or services to a class of person, that is an inherently political act. Such a businesses is not just refusing the do business with an individual or class, they are making an attempt to exclude them from *the definition of the public itself. * They are thus doing harm to both individual and society by imposing their will on what constitutes the political community. This harm grows geometrically with each exclusionary actor. Individual consumers on the other hand, are inherently selective. If you need one loaf of bread this week, you will patronize precisely one baker this week. If you need a salary, you will work one, maybe two jobs. The harm of being denied service by a consumer (or laborer) because of their beliefs has a societal harm, if any, nearly indistinguishable to being denied for any other reason. Some services should fall in between. I'm not convinced for the florist and the and the baker, but I'm sympathetic to the photographer, the doctor, the lawyer (ethical obligations notwithstanding) , the political consultant, the ghost writer... I don't know how far that gets liberals of course, but it *is* a difference beyond mere size and corporate form. Kevin Chen On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 2:51 PM, Gaubatz, Derek dgaub...@imb.org wrote: “[l]iberals who opposed *Smith* in 1990 and supported RFRA in 1993 — including liberal organizations, professors, and politicians — largely continue to support religious exemptions for individuals, while opposing the extension of such exemptions to commercial businesses. I’m not sure I’m seeing the principled distinction. Do not many individuals depend for their livelihood on commercial businesses? Why do liberals see the conscience of individuals like Sherbert or Thomas worthy of protection
Re: Eugene's Blog Post on Liberals and Exemption Rights
Hi, Sandy. I hope all is well. I'm writing to you off-list, because I haven't followed the entire conversation and may have missed something. But my understanding is that florists and cake-makers (assuming the cakes are not meant to be eaten on premises) are not public accommodations within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, though they're covered by many state civil rights acts. Am I in fact missing something? Best, Rich On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 6:18 PM, Levinson, Sanford V slevin...@law.utexas.edu wrote: I think Prof. Chen is substantially correct, but I believe, more than ever, that it's the kind of problem that can ( and should) be handled outside legal constraints. Why would I want to hire a wedding photographer who so clearly won't view the day as affirmatively special? Ditto the band? But I really can't work up much sympathy for the florist or baker. They should be treated under the general rubric of public accommodations and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. I'm sure there were florists and bakers who objected to mixes-race marriages and could cite the purported curse on Ham. It really doesn't (and shouldn't) matter. Sandy Sent from my iPhone On Apr 1, 2015, at 4:56 PM, K Chen tzn...@gmail.com wrote: As someone putting a wedding together, I can't explain the lack of sympathy for the wedding photographer as anything but thinking that their work is essentially interchangeable. It is not, unfortunately, and it is priced accordingly. Every single photographer of them seems to take their business very, very personally. More to the point, it is a personal, professional service which is by its nature selective compared to the harm done by impersonal corporations excluding goods and services when they otherwise serve the public. A principled difference can be drawn between accommodating personal, inherently selective commercial businesses and businesses that are open to the public at large. The vast majority of commercial transactions are from businesses who sell to the public, or their business community, on a non-discriminatory basis. When such a business denies goods or services to a class of person, that is an inherently political act. Such a businesses is not just refusing the do business with an individual or class, they are making an attempt to exclude them from *the definition of the public itself. * They are thus doing harm to both individual and society by imposing their will on what constitutes the political community. This harm grows geometrically with each exclusionary actor. Individual consumers on the other hand, are inherently selective. If you need one loaf of bread this week, you will patronize precisely one baker this week. If you need a salary, you will work one, maybe two jobs. The harm of being denied service by a consumer (or laborer) because of their beliefs has a societal harm, if any, nearly indistinguishable to being denied for any other reason. Some services should fall in between. I'm not convinced for the florist and the and the baker, but I'm sympathetic to the photographer, the doctor, the lawyer (ethical obligations notwithstanding) , the political consultant, the ghost writer... I don't know how far that gets liberals of course, but it *is* a difference beyond mere size and corporate form. Kevin Chen On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 2:51 PM, Gaubatz, Derek dgaub...@imb.org wrote: “[l]iberals who opposed *Smith* in 1990 and supported RFRA in 1993 — including liberal organizations, professors, and politicians — largely continue to support religious exemptions for individuals, while opposing the extension of such exemptions to commercial businesses. I’m not sure I’m seeing the principled distinction. Do not many individuals depend for their livelihood on commercial businesses? Why do liberals see the conscience of individuals like Sherbert or Thomas worthy of protection, but the conscience of an individual photographer, florist, baker, or bed and breakfast owner less worthy of protection?Justice Kagan, at least back in 1996 when she was in the Clinton White House, appeared to recognize that the consciences of individuals operating small commercial businesses was worthy of protection under a RFRA regime. Commenting on the short shrift given to the claim of a Evelyn Smith who, for religious reasons, did not want to rent one of her units to a co-habitating couple, Kagan noted that the court’s reasoning was “outrageous.” She wrote that it was “almost as if a court were to hold that a state law does not impose a substantial burden on religion because the complainant is free to move to another state.” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/06/23-kagan-rogers *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *James Oleske *Sent:* Wednesday, April 01, 2015 2:25 PM *To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Re: Amazing what Hobby Lobby has wrought
I've looked over the new Indiana law, and what jumped out at me was not that this looked like a law designed to allow people to decline to render services to others on the grounds of sexual orientation; it looks more like the original RFRA and a law designed to overcome the results of cases like *Smith*. But I understand that context is everything. Can somebody tell me whether the nature of the debate in Indiana indicated that the law was meant to accomplish the former objective? And if so, how far did the intent reach? Just to ministers being asked to participate in a marriage? To cake makers or florists asked to facilitate the celebration of a marriage? To dry cleaners who might not want to serve a gay person (but are there any people who claim a right not to do so on religious grounds)? Rich Friedman On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 3:28 PM, Michael Worley mwor...@byulaw.net wrote: I agree with Ryan and Doug that RFRA is sound public policy and many of the outrageous claims about RFRA should be condemned. For instance, the claim that EMTs would be able to refuse service to gays and lesbians is just ludicrous. Having said that, I think further enactment of RFRAs is impractical. If by enacting these bills, we are going to increase the perception that religions want to harm gay and lesbians as individuals, that hurts the religions who teach both that we love our neighbor and uphold marriage as between a man and a woman (as most religions today teach). A wiser course is for both sides to come together and build trust. Otherwise, the polarization over these issues will deepen, and future generations will view support of religious rights as hate speech. This was done in Utah, and can be done elsewhere. If one cannot express a view without being demonized by the other side, that chills freedom of speech. A house divided against itself cannot stand and we should act with malice toward none and charity towards all. Accusations that RFRA is based in animus are wrong. On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 1:12 PM, Alan E Brownstein aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu wrote: Three quick points: 1. As Marty suggests below, if the Court had ruled in Hobby Lobby’s favor but issued a narrow opinion (narrow in its reasoning and holding) making it clear that the ruling in favor of Hobby Lobby gives no support to RFRA claims challenging anti-discrimination laws (all anti-discrimination laws) because those laws raise fundamentally different questions than the exemption sought in Hobby Lobby, there might be less opposition to state RFRA laws. But the Court failed to do that. 2. When people perceive the political momentum behind a state RFRA law to be fueled by concerns that religious employers or operators of public accommodations will have to hire or serve gay and lesbian job applicants or clients, they will interpret the law as furthering that purpose even if, in fact, it is unlikely to be interpreted by a court to permit such discrimination. Certainly, liberal opponents of such laws may overstate their likely impact. But conservative commentators and advocates who describe state recognition of same-sex marriage and anti-discrimination laws protecting gays and lesbians against discrimination as the greatest threat to religious liberty in American history certainly feed the perception that current RFRA laws are intended to protect discrimination in employment and public accommodations. 3. Given today’s climate, I think if people are serious about enacting a state RFRA law without raising the specter of protecting discrimination, they should exclude civil rights laws for the RFRA laws coverage. If narrow exemptions from civil rights laws are to be considered, they would have to be resolved through specific legislation. Recently, California was able to enact a law that significantly strengthened the duty imposed on employers to accommodate the needs of religious employees by essentially excluding a duty to accommodate a religious obligation to discriminate from its coverage. It is important to remember that there are circumstances in which religious exemptions are justified that have nothing to do with discrimination. Alan *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Marty Lederman *Sent:* Friday, March 27, 2015 11:35 AM *To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics *Subject:* Re: Amazing what Hobby Lobby has wrought or, imagine if Justice Alito had not included the references to race and racial in this sentence: The Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal. On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 2:28 PM, Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com wrote: Before the ruling -- but not before the lower court
Re: Is Discussion of Justices' Religion Off Limits?
Well, one thing that might follow is a discussion of the extent to which we want the Supreme Court to be demographically representative of the nation. In the early years of the Republic, there was a clear understanding that it would be geographically representative -- one member from each Circuit. That eventually washed away, as geography became less salient. There are clearly some other demographic expectations now, concerning gender and ethnicity. I suppose the biggest group not represented on the Court now is Protestants. I'm not advocating religion being a criterion for selection, but I do think that's an interesting issue. Rich Friedman On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 1:28 PM, Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com wrote: If I might be so presumptuous as to shift the question somewhat: *Of course* Justices' religion, and their experiences and learnings as adherents of particular religions, affects their perspectives when they decide cases, especially (but not limited to) cases involving religion (e.g., Town of Greece; Hobby Lobby). If a religion had no such effect on its adherents, it would hardly be worthy of the name, right? So I don't think discussions of this question are or should be off limits, yet I wonder . . . to what end? If we were all to agree that the Catholic and Jewish Justices on the Court have very different perspectives on these questions, in part (but not entirely) owing to their experiences and understandings as Catholics and Jews, what, exactly, follows from that? On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 1:17 PM, John Bickers bicker...@nku.edu wrote: When a Justice notes in oral argument (Salazar v. Buono) that the Cross is not limited to Christianity but is simply the default memorial because it is the most common symbol of the dead, how can it not be the case that the justices' life experiences--jobs, schools, politics, faith--are playing a role in how they decide cases? John Bickers Salmon P. Chase College of Law Northern Kentucky University -- *From:* conlawprof-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [ conlawprof-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of Myron Moskovitz [ mmoskov...@ggu.edu] *Sent:* Friday, July 11, 2014 1:04 PM *To:* CONLAWPROF *Subject:* Is Discussion of Justices' Religion Off Limits? I replied that a judge's life experiences form at least part of his or her approach to resolving cases, and it is naïve to ignore this. Some Justices expressly pepper their opinions and speeches and books with this fact. Thomas does, Sotomayer does, and so do many others. A Justice of a minority religion (whether Judaism, Muslim, Hinduism, or any other) might have had life experiences that make him or her more likely to identify with citizens faced with government-sponsored explicitly-Christian prayers. Tribe apparently believes that such a discussion is off limits. I don't. Who is right? Myron Myron Moskovitz *Professor of Law Emeritus* *Golden Gate University School of Law* Phone: (510) 384-0354; *e-mail*: myronmoskov...@gmail.com *website*: myronmoskovitz.com http://www.myronmoskovitz.com/ ___ To post, send message to conlawp...@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/conlawprof Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Is Discussion of Justices' Religion Off Limits?
Well, certainly recent Presidents have made some appointments of women in large part because they were women. I don't think anybody is denying the appropriateness of doing so. Is religion different in this respect? I wonder. If it is to any degree, is it because we're less concerned about under-representation of Protestants than we are about under-representation of women? Is it because we think that religion is less likely than gender to shape attitudes on matters of significance for a Supreme Court justice? Rich On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 2:34 PM, Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com wrote: Sandy's very provocative post is here: http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/07/the-elephant-in-room.html As to which I would ask Sandy this: As I read your post, the elephant in the middle of the room is that there is an elephant in the middle of the room, and that the elephant makes decisions on how to act, in part, based upon its history and perspective as an elephant. OK, but what follows from that? Surely not that Presidents should appoint fewer elephants. If it's that Presidents should be indifferent as to nominees' religion, I wholly concur. (Indeed, Article VI virtually requires such indifference.) But that's not much of an issue these days, is it? Bush 43 did not appoint Roberts and Alito, for instance, *because *they were Catholic. He appointed them because he approved of their foreseeable legal views -- views that were in part shaped by their Catholicism, to be sure, but surely Bush was indifferent to the question of what the various sources of their jurisprudence might be. On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 2:19 PM, Levinson, Sanford V slevin...@law.utexas.edu wrote: For what it is worth, I have an extended posting on this on Balkinization, balkin.blogspot.com I strongly disagree with Larry Tribe on this issue. Sandy Sent from my iPhone On Jul 11, 2014, at 1:10 PM, Patrick Wiseman pwise...@gsu.edu wrote: It's my guess that it is exactly that kind of reductionism to which Prof. Tribe was originally objecting. Cheers Patrick What might follow is a serious discussion of whether, given life tenure and no appellate review of their decisions, ever, the relationship between values and law at SCOTUS is and always has been so egregiously out of whack that we should recognize as Posner says the Court is a unique political court, or as I have written, it is not really a court at all. Best, Eric Sent from my iPhone On Jul 11, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com wrote: If I might be so presumptuous as to shift the question somewhat: *Of course* Justices' religion, and their experiences and learnings as adherents of particular religions, affects their perspectives when they decide cases, especially (but not limited to) cases involving religion (e.g., Town of Greece; Hobby Lobby). If a religion had no such effect on its adherents, it would hardly be worthy of the name, right? So I don't think discussions of this question are or should be off limits, yet I wonder . . . to what end? If we were all to agree that the Catholic and Jewish Justices on the Court have very different perspectives on these questions, in part (but not entirely) owing to their experiences and understandings as Catholics and Jews, what, exactly, follows from that? On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 1:17 PM, John Bickers bicker...@nku.edu wrote: When a Justice notes in oral argument (Salazar v. Buono) that the Cross is not limited to Christianity but is simply the default memorial because it is the most common symbol of the dead, how can it not be the case that the justices' life experiences--jobs, schools, politics, faith--are playing a role in how they decide cases? John Bickers Salmon P. Chase College of Law Northern Kentucky University -- *From:* conlawprof-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [ conlawprof-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of Myron Moskovitz [ mmoskov...@ggu.edu] *Sent:* Friday, July 11, 2014 1:04 PM *To:* CONLAWPROF *Subject:* Is Discussion of Justices' Religion Off Limits? I replied that a judge's life experiences form at least part of his or her approach to resolving cases, and it is naïve to ignore this. Some Justices expressly pepper their opinions and speeches and books with this fact. Thomas does, Sotomayer does, and so do many others. A Justice of a minority religion (whether Judaism, Muslim, Hinduism, or any other) might have had life experiences that make him or her more likely to identify with citizens faced with government-sponsored explicitly-Christian prayers. Tribe apparently believes that such a discussion is off limits. I don't. Who is right? Myron Myron Moskovitz *Professor of Law Emeritus* *Golden Gate University School of Law* Phone: (510) 384-0354; *e-mail*: myronmoskov...@gmail.com *website*: myronmoskovitz.com
Re: Hobby Lobby Question
I know. But it's not as if you were uninvolved, either in the legislation or in the case. Congratulations are certainly in order! Rich On Mon, Jun 30, 2014 at 4:41 PM, Douglas Laycock dlayc...@virginia.edu wrote: Will do. I think overblown rhetoric from both sides was to be expected. It was not my case; I just filed an amicus brief. Douglas Laycock Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law University of Virginia Law School 580 Massie Road Charlottesville, VA 22903 434-243-8546 *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Richard Friedman *Sent:* Monday, June 30, 2014 4:36 PM *To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics *Subject:* Re: Hobby Lobby Question Hi, Doug. Congrats on the result! I haven't focused enough on it to have any clear sense of the merits, but the outcome does seem sensible to me, and it sure seems that some of the rhetoric I'm seeing on the other side -- much of it in support of fund-raising appeals -- is way overblown. I hope all else is well. Please pass on my warm regards to Terry. Best, Rich On Mon, Jun 30, 2014 at 3:28 PM, Douglas Laycock dlayc...@virginia.edu wrote: The entire solution for the non-profits was done by regulation. So I assume that extending it to for-profits could also be done by regulation. Of course there could be some hidden obstacle that I don’t know about. The Court found the win-win solution; female employees can get free contraceptives, and religious conscientious objectors don’t have to pay. However they resolve the remaining objections from many of the non-profits, I would be surprised if they disrupt that solution. Douglas Laycock Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law University of Virginia Law School 580 Massie Road Charlottesville, VA 22903 434-243-8546 *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Hillel Y. Levin *Sent:* Monday, June 30, 2014 10:54 AM *To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics *Subject:* Hobby Lobby Question As we are all digesting the Hobby Lobby decision, let me ask a question. The court suggests that a less restrictive means would be that the gov't provides the contraceptives directly (similar to how it handles non-profit objectors). What kind of government action would it take to institute such a program? A new statute? A new regulation? An interpretive rule? Something else? -- Hillel Y. Levin Associate Professor University of Georgia School of Law 120 Herty Dr. Athens, GA 30602 (678) 641-7452 hle...@uga.edu hillelle...@gmail.com SSRN Author Page: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=466645 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
