RE: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation
Well, recall that under Thomas v. Review Board, you don't need an official belief of any well-established religious group -- a person's idiosyncratic religious belief, if held sincerely, would qualify. We thus can't simply say there's no substantial burden in such cases, I think, though a strict scrutiny argument would always be available. As to the argument that strict scrutiny is satisfied because otherwise the burden of supporting the child would fall on the government, and that would violate the Establishment Clause: Can that be consistent with Sherbert, where the government was in fact required to support someone who for religious reasons refused to take a job that would support herself? The Court faced an Establishment Clause argument there, and rejected it. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Jean Dudley Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 12:21 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation On Aug 14, 2006, at 10:59 AM, Volokh, Eugene wrote: In re Didier, 2006 WL 2258571 (Wash. App.), raises an interesting question (though it's possible that on the facts in this particular case the objection was insincere): Should parents who are unemployed or underemployed for religious reasons -- for instance, because they have taken a vow of poverty and committed themselves to a monastic or missionary life -- be exempted from a child support obligation that's based on the income the parent would have had if he had been gainfully employed? The Washington Court of Appeals says no, citing Smith; but it doesn't discuss the possibility that this might be an individualized exemptions case a la Sherbert, and it doesn't the Washington state constitution, which has been interpreted as mandating strict scrutiny in religious exemption cases. What do people think would be the right answer under either of those doctrines? See also Hunt v. Hunt, a mid-1990s Vermont case on the subject. Eugene With all due respect for those answering a calling to a religious vocation, I can't think of a single religion that relieves a person of the burden of financial responsibility to the child. The rights of that child supersede those of the progenetor/-trix. Monastary, missionary or being fired for not performing the duties of your job for religious reasons makes no difference. Otherwise the burden of support falls on the government, and *that* is a violation of EC. Jean Dudley ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation
On Aug 14, 2006, at 12:30 PM, Volokh, Eugene wrote: Well, recall that under Thomas v. Review Board, you don't need an official belief of any well-established religious group -- a person's idiosyncratic religious belief, if held sincerely, would qualify. We thus can't simply say there's no substantial burden in such cases, I think, though a strict scrutiny argument would always be available. As to the argument that strict scrutiny is satisfied because otherwise the burden of supporting the child would fall on the government, and that would violate the Establishment Clause: Can that be consistent with Sherbert, where the government was in fact required to support someone who for religious reasons refused to take a job that would support herself? The Court faced an Establishment Clause argument there, and rejected it. Good points, Eugene. So conscience is the key here, not necessarily religious believe. How does one prove sincerity of belief--is it the government's responsibility to disprove sincerity of belief, or is it the plaintiff's responsibility to prove sincerity? I'm ignorant of strict scrutiny; I'm understanding that Washington State provides for individual cases in its constitution, and make exceptions? I'm still not convinced that Sherbert applies here: Again, I'll plead ignorance of the case--did the plaintiff have children to support? Frankly, I know I'm working this backwards. I believe that regardless of sincere religious conviction, a parent (regardless of gender) should be not be relieved of the burden of financial responsibility to their child. I'm thinking that should a parent choose to take a vow of poverty, they should be required to perform community service in lieu of child support. Give back to the community that is supporting their child. If that parent's right to strict scrutiny is being denied, by all means, that needs to be rectified. Jean Dudley. And thank you for educating me so far. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation
I'm afraid I can't do much to explain strict scrutiny on the list -- many tomes have been written on the subject; you might start with a good short book (say, the Nutshell) on the Religion Clauses. Nor is the matter quite one of conscience rather than religion; given Yoder, the Free Exercise Clause applies only to religious objectors, but given Thomas, the religious belief need not be one that's shared with a broader group. The burden is on the plaintiff to show sincerity, but my sense is that courts are usually reluctant to find the person insincere unless there's pretty strong evidence of that (and the mere convenience of his beliefs ought not by itself be enough). Good points, Eugene. So conscience is the key here, not necessarily religious believe. How does one prove sincerity of belief--is it the government's responsibility to disprove sincerity of belief, or is it the plaintiff's responsibility to prove sincerity? I'm ignorant of strict scrutiny; I'm understanding that Washington State provides for individual cases in its constitution, and make exceptions? The Washington Constitution's religious freedom clause has been interpreted by Washington courts to follow the Sherbert/Yoder strict scrutiny model. I'm still not convinced that Sherbert applies here: Again, I'll plead ignorance of the case--did the plaintiff have children to support? Frankly, I know I'm working this I don't think this matters; Sherbert was herself being supported by the unemployment insurance, even though her reason for not working at the jobs which she could fine was religious, and even though the state argued that supporting her religiously-motivated unemployment would violate the Establishment Clause. backwards. I believe that regardless of sincere religious conviction, a parent (regardless of gender) should be not be relieved of the burden of financial responsibility to their child. I'm thinking that should a parent choose to take a vow of poverty, they should be required to perform community service in lieu of child support. Give back to the community that is supporting their child. If that parent's right to strict scrutiny is being denied, by all means, that needs to be rectified. Jean Dudley. And thank you for educating me so far. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation
I much sympathize with Ed's position, but let me probe that a little further. First, while there's obviously a compelling government interest in making sure that the children don't starve, that interest isn't implicated in all child support cases. In at least some, the mother would be able to support the child at a decent level even without the father's help; no-one will die or be sick if the father's religious desires are accommodated. The question is whether (1) there's a compelling interest in making sure that even a child who's at that adequate level of support gets still more support, or (2) there's a compelling interest in making sure that one parent isn't required to shoulder the entire financial burden of childrearing simply because of his religious beliefs. I tend to think that #2 would qualify as a compelling government interest, though I think one of the advantages of a RFRA model rather than a constitutional exemption model is that the legislature can get the final say on this difficult question. But I think it's a little more complex than just saying that there's a compelling interest that fathers support their children (since, among other things, if the mother and father are married and jointly agree that the father should quit work to pursue religious studies, the government pretty clearly wouldn't have the power to force the father to support his child). But, second, what about the common argument made in cases such as Sherbert and the Newark police department no-beards policy case -- that religious objections must be treated (just presumptively, subject to strict scrutiny, or categorically, given that any other policy is underinclusive and thus fails strict scrutiny?) no worse than other objections? I take it that, for instance, a father wouldn't be required to work if he's disabled, even if the disability merely makes work very painful rather than impossible. Would a sincere religious objection to work be entitled to the same exemption as a medical objection? Or may the government say that avoiding physical pain is adequate reason for not working, but avoiding violation of one's felt religious obligations is not an adequate reason? I think the answer should be yes, but my sense is that others have argued the contrary in other contexts. Ed Brayton writes: I can't imagine such an exemption would or should be granted even under strict scrutiny. Clearly there is a compelling state interest in making sure that fathers support their children, and it's hard to imagine a less restrictive means of doing so than requiring them to contribute financially if they are physically able to do so. No one would even conceive of allowing a father to voluntarily decide to stop working to get out of paying child support. I can't imagine why making a religious excuse for such irresponsibility changes the situation any. Ed Brayton ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation
Title: Re: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation Ed Brayton wrote: No one would even conceive of allowing a father to voluntarily decide to stop working toget out of paying child support. There are cases on this, and they go both ways. Some involve Dads who simply refuse to work; some who refuseto look for jobs outside their failing industry; some Dads with professional skills working at low-paying jobs. Some courts have worried that ordering the father to work, or to work in a particular job or occupation,raises a Thirteenth Amendment problem. My impression is that the more recent cases mostly go the way Ed assumed they would go. Douglas Laycock Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law The University of Texas at Austin Mailing Address: Prof. Douglas Laycock University ofMichigan Law School 625 S. StateSt. Ann Arbor, MI 48109 ___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation
Alan: I wonder if you could discuss a little further. Say that John and Mary are two California lawyers with three children; they make $200,000 each (not an unreasonable salary for a California lawyer). John experiences a revelation and decides to join a monastery and take a vow of poverty; he will not spend any custodial time with the children. Under the California child support guidelines, http://www.west.net/~ivguy/testcalc.html, John would have to pay Mary $4,800 per month in child support payments. Without these payments, the children won't starve, or won't become wards of the state; even in California, Mary can raise her three children at a decent level on her $200,000 per year. But Mary still demands the $4,800 per month, because she thinks it's not fair for her to bear the entire financial burden of raising the children. The state agrees, and steps in on Mary's side, asserting what we call the Fairness-to-the-Custodial-Parent Interest. Assume the California courts interpret the state constitution to follow the Sherbert/Yoder model (currently an unresolved question in California). Alan, do I understand correctly that strict scrutiny would bar the state from demanding that John pay over the $4,800/month, and would require that, if the state wants to serve the Fairness-to-the-Custodial-Parent Interest, the state should pay Mary the $4,800/month and instead insist that John does that amount worth of community service instead? Assume that John is willing to do some kinds of work -- some monks are, to support the monastery, so he may be willing to do the same. What if, as is likely, he's unlikely to do enough work to save the state $4,800/month? Or what if he's even willing to work half-time as a lawyer for the state, thus (let's say) making the state the $4,800/month, but the state isn't sure that it could trust him to produce high-quality work? What if his community service supervisors report that he's doing shoddy legal work; can the state then fire him and insist that he take a private sector job (contrary to his religious beliefs)? I'm just trying to figure out how this sort of mandatory community service will really give the state enough revenue to offset the $4,800/month that it will be paying out of state coffers to a woman's who earning $200,000/month. Eugene Alan Brownstein writes: Jean makes an important point here when she states, I'm thinking that should a parent choose to take a vow of poverty, they should be required to perform community service in lieu of child support. Give back to the community that is supporting their child. The state's interest here isn't making sure that a child receives adequate food and shelter. That can be provided by the state. The state's interest is money. Similarly, those of us who support religious exemptions want the religious individual to be free to follow his or her conscience -- but we are not particularly interested in providing a religious individual secular benefits incidental to the granting of an exemption. One way to simultaneously offset the state's increased costs and reduce the secular benefit resulting from an exemption is to require the religious individual to do community service -- or some other action that serves the public good and disgorges the secular benefit he or she has received. Shameless plug. I have an article coming out soon exploring this general issue in more depth. Alan Brownstein ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation
Quickly, Eugene is right of course that John's community service is unlikely to be worth $4800 per month. I recognize that some exemptions are so costly that they can not reasonably be offset by anything the religious objector could reasonably do to disgorge the secular benefit of an exemption -- consistent with his or her religious commitments. Indeed, offsets may not be possible in lots of cases. When that is the case, we are in traditional rights balancing territory. Exactly how courts should balance the obligation to pay extremely high child support benefits against religious commitments that make the payment of such support impossible under a strict scrutiny regime is certainly a fair question given the hypothetical we are considering -- but it isn't one I have given much thought to. But my primary point is not that there is some wonderful doctrinal approach that will make all free exercise exemption cases easy to resolve. (If there is some such approach out there, I don't know what it is.) My point is that there are doctrinal mechanisms that will help resolve some of the concerns raised about some exemptions in some cases. When the beneficiary of a religious exemption is required to take steps to reduce whatever secular benefit he or she receives from the exemption, we avoid some difficulties that make exemptions problematic. Further, when the beneficiary gives something back to the community as Jean suggested, we reduce, and perhaps eliminate, the costs incurred in protecting the right -- which should make it easier to resolve the case in the beneficiary's favor. So if X owes $300 a month in child support, but because of his religious convictions will not work for compensation. But X is willing to do community service without pay as an orderly at a public hospital, or a religious hospital, to help care for poor people who are ill. And if the value of X's service as an orderly is worth around $300. I think there is a pretty fair argument that the state should grant X the exemption from paying child support, condition the exemption on X's performance of community service, and take over X's obligation to provide his children $300 per month. Would you agree, Eugene? Alan Brownstein -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 1:40 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation Alan: I wonder if you could discuss a little further. Say that John and Mary are two California lawyers with three children; they make $200,000 each (not an unreasonable salary for a California lawyer). John experiences a revelation and decides to join a monastery and take a vow of poverty; he will not spend any custodial time with the children. Under the California child support guidelines, http://www.west.net/~ivguy/testcalc.html, John would have to pay Mary $4,800 per month in child support payments. Without these payments, the children won't starve, or won't become wards of the state; even in California, Mary can raise her three children at a decent level on her $200,000 per year. But Mary still demands the $4,800 per month, because she thinks it's not fair for her to bear the entire financial burden of raising the children. The state agrees, and steps in on Mary's side, asserting what we call the Fairness-to-the-Custodial-Parent Interest. Assume the California courts interpret the state constitution to follow the Sherbert/Yoder model (currently an unresolved question in California). Alan, do I understand correctly that strict scrutiny would bar the state from demanding that John pay over the $4,800/month, and would require that, if the state wants to serve the Fairness-to-the-Custodial-Parent Interest, the state should pay Mary the $4,800/month and instead insist that John does that amount worth of community service instead? Assume that John is willing to do some kinds of work -- some monks are, to support the monastery, so he may be willing to do the same. What if, as is likely, he's unlikely to do enough work to save the state $4,800/month? Or what if he's even willing to work half-time as a lawyer for the state, thus (let's say) making the state the $4,800/month, but the state isn't sure that it could trust him to produce high-quality work? What if his community service supervisors report that he's doing shoddy legal work; can the state then fire him and insist that he take a private sector job (contrary to his religious beliefs)? I'm just trying to figure out how this sort of mandatory community service will really give the state enough revenue to offset the $4,800/month that it will be paying out of state coffers to a woman's who earning $200,000/month. Eugene Alan Brownstein writes: Jean makes an important point here when she states, I'm thinking that should a parent choose to take a vow of poverty, they should
RE: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation
I think that under strict scrutiny, that's an eminently plausible result; and under a state RFRA it might even be the right result, because if the legislature concludes that it doesn't adequately serve its goals, it can correct that. I wonder how hard it will be to administer, but it's certainly worth experimenting with. Yet, Alan, do you think that it's right to read the Free Exercise Clause (federal or state) as mandating this result? Eugene Alan Brownstein writes: So if X owes $300 a month in child support, but because of his religious convictions will not work for compensation. But X is willing to do community service without pay as an orderly at a public hospital, or a religious hospital, to help care for poor people who are ill. And if the value of X's service as an orderly is worth around $300. I think there is a pretty fair argument that the state should grant X the exemption from paying child support, condition the exemption on X's performance of community service, and take over X's obligation to provide his children $300 per month. Would you agree, Eugene? Alan Brownstein -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 1:40 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation Alan: I wonder if you could discuss a little further. Say that John and Mary are two California lawyers with three children; they make $200,000 each (not an unreasonable salary for a California lawyer). John experiences a revelation and decides to join a monastery and take a vow of poverty; he will not spend any custodial time with the children. Under the California child support guidelines, http://www.west.net/~ivguy/testcalc.html, John would have to pay Mary $4,800 per month in child support payments. Without these payments, the children won't starve, or won't become wards of the state; even in California, Mary can raise her three children at a decent level on her $200,000 per year. But Mary still demands the $4,800 per month, because she thinks it's not fair for her to bear the entire financial burden of raising the children. The state agrees, and steps in on Mary's side, asserting what we call the Fairness-to-the-Custodial-Parent Interest. Assume the California courts interpret the state constitution to follow the Sherbert/Yoder model (currently an unresolved question in California). Alan, do I understand correctly that strict scrutiny would bar the state from demanding that John pay over the $4,800/month, and would require that, if the state wants to serve the Fairness-to-the-Custodial-Parent Interest, the state should pay Mary the $4,800/month and instead insist that John does that amount worth of community service instead? Assume that John is willing to do some kinds of work -- some monks are, to support the monastery, so he may be willing to do the same. What if, as is likely, he's unlikely to do enough work to save the state $4,800/month? Or what if he's even willing to work half-time as a lawyer for the state, thus (let's say) making the state the $4,800/month, but the state isn't sure that it could trust him to produce high-quality work? What if his community service supervisors report that he's doing shoddy legal work; can the state then fire him and insist that he take a private sector job (contrary to his religious beliefs)? I'm just trying to figure out how this sort of mandatory community service will really give the state enough revenue to offset the $4,800/month that it will be paying out of state coffers to a woman's who earning $200,000/month. Eugene Alan Brownstein writes: Jean makes an important point here when she states, I'm thinking that should a parent choose to take a vow of poverty, they should be required to perform community service in lieu of child support. Give back to the community that is supporting their child. The state's interest here isn't making sure that a child receives adequate food and shelter. That can be provided by the state. The state's interest is money. Similarly, those of us who support religious exemptions want the religious individual to be free to follow his or her conscience -- but we are not particularly interested in providing a religious individual secular benefits incidental to the granting of an exemption. One way to simultaneously offset the state's increased costs and reduce the secular benefit resulting from an exemption is to require the religious individual to do community service -- or some other action that serves the public good and disgorges the secular benefit he or she has received. Shameless plug. I have an article coming out soon exploring this general issue in more
RE: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation
Yes, on the facts as stated. Moreover, I don't think you need strict scrutiny to reach this result. State administrative convenience and efficiency concerns have been considered insufficient to justify laws under intermediate level scrutiny. There may be problems with administering this standard -- but I think it may not be as hard to administer an approach like this as one would think. (I'd be glad to send you a draft of the article, if you are interested Eugene) Alan Brownstein -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 2:40 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation I think that under strict scrutiny, that's an eminently plausible result; and under a state RFRA it might even be the right result, because if the legislature concludes that it doesn't adequately serve its goals, it can correct that. I wonder how hard it will be to administer, but it's certainly worth experimenting with. Yet, Alan, do you think that it's right to read the Free Exercise Clause (federal or state) as mandating this result? Eugene Alan Brownstein writes: So if X owes $300 a month in child support, but because of his religious convictions will not work for compensation. But X is willing to do community service without pay as an orderly at a public hospital, or a religious hospital, to help care for poor people who are ill. And if the value of X's service as an orderly is worth around $300. I think there is a pretty fair argument that the state should grant X the exemption from paying child support, condition the exemption on X's performance of community service, and take over X's obligation to provide his children $300 per month. Would you agree, Eugene? Alan Brownstein -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 1:40 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation Alan: I wonder if you could discuss a little further. Say that John and Mary are two California lawyers with three children; they make $200,000 each (not an unreasonable salary for a California lawyer). John experiences a revelation and decides to join a monastery and take a vow of poverty; he will not spend any custodial time with the children. Under the California child support guidelines, http://www.west.net/~ivguy/testcalc.html, John would have to pay Mary $4,800 per month in child support payments. Without these payments, the children won't starve, or won't become wards of the state; even in California, Mary can raise her three children at a decent level on her $200,000 per year. But Mary still demands the $4,800 per month, because she thinks it's not fair for her to bear the entire financial burden of raising the children. The state agrees, and steps in on Mary's side, asserting what we call the Fairness-to-the-Custodial-Parent Interest. Assume the California courts interpret the state constitution to follow the Sherbert/Yoder model (currently an unresolved question in California). Alan, do I understand correctly that strict scrutiny would bar the state from demanding that John pay over the $4,800/month, and would require that, if the state wants to serve the Fairness-to-the-Custodial-Parent Interest, the state should pay Mary the $4,800/month and instead insist that John does that amount worth of community service instead? Assume that John is willing to do some kinds of work -- some monks are, to support the monastery, so he may be willing to do the same. What if, as is likely, he's unlikely to do enough work to save the state $4,800/month? Or what if he's even willing to work half-time as a lawyer for the state, thus (let's say) making the state the $4,800/month, but the state isn't sure that it could trust him to produce high-quality work? What if his community service supervisors report that he's doing shoddy legal work; can the state then fire him and insist that he take a private sector job (contrary to his religious beliefs)? I'm just trying to figure out how this sort of mandatory community service will really give the state enough revenue to offset the $4,800/month that it will be paying out of state coffers to a woman's who earning $200,000/month. Eugene Alan Brownstein writes: Jean makes an important point here when she states, I'm thinking that should a parent choose to take a vow of poverty, they should be required to perform community service in lieu of child support. Give back to the community that is supporting their child. The state's interest here isn't making sure that a child receives adequate food and shelter. That can
Re: Free Exercise Clause and child support obligation
On Aug 14, 2006, at 1:28 PM, Alan Brownstein wrote: Jean makes an important point here when she states, I'm thinking that should a parent choose to take a vow of poverty, they should be required to perform community service in lieu of child support. Give back to the community that is supporting their child. The state's interest here isn't making sure that a child receives adequate food and shelter. That can be provided by the state. The state's interest is money. Similarly, those of us who support religious exemptions want the religious individual to be free to follow his or her conscience -- but we are not particularly interested in providing a religious individual secular benefits incidental to the granting of an exemption. One way to simultaneously offset the state's increased costs and reduce the secular benefit resulting from an exemption is to require the religious individual to do community service -- or some other action that serves the public good and disgorges the secular benefit he or she has received. Shameless plug. I have an article coming out soon exploring this general issue in more depth. Alan Brownstein OK, let's take it to the next level: Let's say the parent opts to work for the Church doing religious outreach; would that count as community service? How about (yes, it's an extreme case) working at a church-run medical clinic that discriminates based on religion or religious belief? Or should a judge assign secular tasks? Jean ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
