MUSCLE Linux based device for financial transaction

2001-06-08 Thread subodh08

Dear Friends,

I am not a technical person, though I have a degree in Computer Science and 
engineering.  For a long time I have been working on rural development projects 
includinng micro-finance in India.  

I read all your messages of struggling to get smart card integrated with Linux 
software.  I admire your efforts to do that very much.  They are of great value in 
bringing in product of Linux based device for financial transactions.

I need application packages for financial transactions including smart card 
integration for my requirement.

My Company BASIX is leader in Micro-finance in rural India.  It lends, accepts 
deposits and carry out insurance for life.  We are looking for linux based backend 
financial plateform and frontend payment solutions.  Please let me know if there are 
such packages available and who provides the follow up services.

with warm regards,

Subodh  

_
Chat with your friends as soon as they come online. Get Rediff Bol at
http://bol.rediff.com




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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-08 Thread Erwann ABALEA

On Thu, 7 Jun 2001, Carlos Prados wrote:

 Hi,

 --- David Corcoran [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  Definitely.  The interface exported must be a subset
  of the
  available functionality or else someone could write
  a worm which does a
  Verify Key function incorrectly and blocks cards
  where services are
  available.

 Even worst. If you leave your card with your private
 PGP key in the reader and the smartcard is accesible
 to anybody over the net, somebody could connect to it,
 and write signed messages with your private key, read
 your private e-mail...

You can design your application so that whenever a signature (or
decryption) operation is to be performed, a PIN code should be presented,
the operation performed, and the authentication state reset. That's how
it's done with the French banking applications. The card in itself doesn't
reset the authentication state after the operation, but the payment
terminals must do it.

 He only needs your PIN, that he can get by snooping
 the network, or donig trial and error.

Trial and error is not a valid attack, as the card usually disables the
code as soon as 3 bad code guesses have been presented. Since you can
enhance the PIN length, guessing the PIN in 3 tries is difficult.


-- 
Erwann ABALEA
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
RSA PGP Key ID: 0x2D0EABD5
-
``There are basically two types of people.
People who accomplish things, and people who claim to have accomplished
things. The first group is less crowded.''
 Mark Twain


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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-08 Thread Erwann ABALEA

On Fri, 8 Jun 2001, Dr S N Henson wrote:

 Carlos Prados wrote:
 
 
  Again, I would pay more athention to local security.
  Why is the file /tmp/.pcscrx world writtable? isn't
  this a security hole?
 

 On the subject of security...

 As may be apparent I've only just got my setup working and I've not
 examined things in any detail. I did notice a few things which might be
 cause for concern.

 Consider a Netscape PKCS#11 module. In this application the connection
 to the reader may need to be kept open for an extended period of time
 (typically the whole browser session) and may not be closed cleanly. As
 we are all painfully aware its not entirely unknown for a browser to
 crash.

For the PKCS#11 part, there's a solution: just use random session numbers,
and close all the sessions if you detect at least 3 invalid session
numbers...

That way, the application can crash, but trying to attach to this previous
session and keep the authenticated state would be difficult.

-- 
Erwann ABALEA
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
RSA PGP Key ID: 0x2D0EABD5
-
A computer is a state machine.
Threads are for people who can't program state machines.
 Alan Cox
   in a discussion about the threads and the Linux scheduler


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AW: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-08 Thread Treutwein Guido



-Ursprüngliche Nachricht-
Von: Erwann ABALEA [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Gesendet am: Freitag, 8. Juni 2001 12:07
An: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Betreff: Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

You can design your application so that whenever a signature (or
decryption) operation is to be performed, a PIN code should be presented,
the operation performed, and the authentication state reset. That's how
it's done with the French banking applications. The card in itself doesn't
reset the authentication state after the operation, but the payment
terminals must do it.

Hi,

it's possibly interesting, that cards exist, where the access condition
expires automatically after the operation is completed. This is how our
German Digital Signature Law compliant card works. (No, it isn't a
JavaCard.) The advantage is, that you don't have to rely on a good-natured
terminal.

http://crypto.mchh.siemens.de/produkte/smartcards.asp?lang=eng

Guido Treutwein
Siemens ICN ISA TNA 21
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-08 Thread Luciano da Silva Coelho

Hi Guido,

Does Siemens have JavaCards?? If so, could you give-me infos about
they??

Thanks a lot.

[ ]´s
Luciano da Silva Coelho
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sun Certified Programmer for JAVA2
Sun Certified Instructor for JAVA2
Diretor de Tecnologia
e-Sec Tecnologia em Segurança de Dados
www.esec.com.br

- Original Message -
From: Treutwein Guido [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, June 08, 2001 8:36 AM
Subject: AW: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards




 -Ursprüngliche Nachricht-
 Von: Erwann ABALEA [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
 Gesendet am: Freitag, 8. Juni 2001 12:07
 An: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Betreff: Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

 You can design your application so that whenever a signature (or
 decryption) operation is to be performed, a PIN code should be presented,
 the operation performed, and the authentication state reset. That's how
 it's done with the French banking applications. The card in itself
doesn't
 reset the authentication state after the operation, but the payment
 terminals must do it.

 Hi,

 it's possibly interesting, that cards exist, where the access condition
 expires automatically after the operation is completed. This is how our
 German Digital Signature Law compliant card works. (No, it isn't a
 JavaCard.) The advantage is, that you don't have to rely on a good-natured
 terminal.

 http://crypto.mchh.siemens.de/produkte/smartcards.asp?lang=eng

 Guido Treutwein
 Siemens ICN ISA TNA 21
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 ***
 Linux Smart Card Developers - M.U.S.C.L.E.
 (Movement for the Use of Smart Cards in a Linux Environment)
 http://www.linuxnet.com/smartcard/index.html
 ***


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Re: MUSCLE Work Waiting Time question

2001-06-08 Thread Peter Tomlinson

On 7 June 2001 Carlos Prados wrote
 Re: MUSCLE Work Waiting Time question


 Hi,

  It seems, therefore, that changing the value of Di
  in the ATR does not
  change the value of the wwt, but changing the value
  of Fi does. Is this what
  the writers of 7816-3:1997 meant? I don't think so,
  because the wwt required
  is related to the values of clock sent to the card,
  the internal structure
  of the card's CPU and clock processing circuits, and
  the application
  algorithm programmed into the card. Changing Fi and
  Di doesn't change the
  way that the card runs its application code, and so
  should not change the
  wwt - but changing Fi does change the wwt.
 
  FI from the card, besides influencing I/O bit rate,
  also indicates the max
  clock frequency that the card can be run at. So:
 
  FI = 0 (means Fi = 372), Di = 1 gives a bit rate of
  9600 in our example, a
  wwt of 1 sec, and indicates (Table 7) a max clock
  frequency of 4 MHz
  (typical for a card run at 3 Volts Vcc)
 
  FI = 1 (also means Fi = 372), Di = 1 gives a bit
  rate of 9600 in our
  example, a wwt of 1 sec, and indicates (Table 7) a
  max clock frequency of 5
  MHz (typical for a low cost card run at 5 Volts Vcc)
 
  FI = 3 (means Fi = 744), Di = 2 also gives a bit
  rate of 9600 in our
  example, but changes the wwt to 2 sec, and indicates
  (Table 7) a max clock
  frequency of 8 MHz (e.g. for a Hitachi 3109 card as
  used by rollout spec
  Mondex in a single application environment)
 

 But the reader that I'm ussing provides 3.5712 MHz
 constant clock rate to the smartcard regardless of the
 ATR in the card.

The clock frequency figures given in the above explanation are the maximum
that the card is rated to use. The card can be run at any frequency from 1
MHz up to the maximum indicated by the value of FI indicated in the ATR. It
is very rare to find a card reader that can switch frequencies (and in other
places I have argued that the combined requirements of 7816-3, EMC
regulations, and the desire to protect the reader's interface circuitry from
static discharges, make it very difficult to design a reliable and compliant
card reader that drives the card at more than 4 MHz). Cards have to be
started with a clock frequency (at 5V Vcc) in the range 1 Mhz to 5Mhz, and
they start with a clock to I/O bit rate ratio of 372, so 3.5712 Mhz (gives
9600 bps on I/O) or something close to that is typical.

What I was showing is that a card that can only be run at up to 5 MHz will,
at 3.5712 MHz clock, expect the terminal to grant it a default wwt of 1 sec.
But a card that can be run at up to 8 MHz (and whose developer wishes to
announce that to the terminal, in case the terminal can switch up to a
higher speed) is very likely to issue an ATR that results in the terminal
giving it, at 3.5712 MHz, an I/O bit rate of 9600 but a wwt of 2 seconds. If
we assume that that card is identical to the other one in all respects
except for being rated to run at up to 8 MHz instead of up to 5 MHz, then
both cards will execute applications at exactly the same rate when run at
the same clock frequency, and therefore both will need the same wwt. This
points out an absurdity in 7816-3, but also shows that, when calculating the
value of WI to send from the card if you want to change the wwt, you must be
careful to use the correct parameters in the equation (if the card sends a
value for FI in the ATR, you must use that value in the calculation).

 So, must I assume that if the clock rate doesn't
 change I must not change the wwt from the standard 1s
 value ?
No, you choose the wwt value (choose a WI value to send from the card) to
give you a long enough wwt to be sure that the card has time to execute the
longest path through the code between responses from the card (remember that
you can send a procedure byte from the card to reset the wwt timer in the
terminal, and sometimes that is a practical solution (e.g. send a NULL), but
at other times you may find you have a card whose ROM code will not let you
do that).


 Does this apply to T=1 timeout values, BWT and CWT?

BWT and CWT have their own formulae in section 9.5.3 of 7816-3:1997, and
their own parameters in the ATR. BWT's formula is very odd:

BWT = 11 etu + 2**BWI * 960 * (372/f) sec

but CWT depends directly on F/D as well as f:

CWT = (11 + 2**CWI) * (F/D) * (1/f)

BWI and CWI are upper and lower nibbles from the TB interface byte after the
first occurrence of a T=1 value in a TD(2) or later TD byte.

wwt extension in T=1 is handled by an S-block request from the card.

Who dreamt this up? Mainly the French for T=0 and the Germans for T=1. Vive
le Common Market!

Peter T
Bristol UK

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MUSCLE applet exchange

2001-06-08 Thread David Corcoran

Hello,


The Applet Exchange:

Under the software section of the site I have added a link for the applet
exchange which will hold open applets for JavaCards.  This will hold the
Common Cryptographic Layer (CCL) applet which will be used to talk to
JavaCards for authentication in a generic manner.  If you have an applet
you would like me to place there please let me know.


I will also be releasing a new version of pcsc-lite soon which will also
work on Solaris and some drivers compiled for Solaris.

Regards,
Dave

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