the problem with fgb's ssh2 (last time I used it) was that it didn't
do many optional things like -L -R -p
I had to fiddle with the source to get it to use port 222 (yay FOSS)
So there's still room for some work if anyone's up for it
Hello everyone!
To get some useful information from a file I write:
; for (i in *_r) @{cd $i; echo -n $i^' '; grep total otdit | grep -v na}
to get lines from the 'otdit' files in *_r subdirectories with the
word 'total' on them, but no 'na' on them. This works to my liking and
produces sth.
where did you put the redirection?
i'd have thought that this would work ok (note the added braces):
{for (i in *_r) @{cd $i; echo -n $i^' '; grep total otdit | grep -v na}} res
2009/5/5 Rudolf Sykora rudolf.syk...@gmail.com:
Hello everyone!
To get some useful information from a file I
On Tue, May 5, 2009 at 6:29 AM, Rudolf Sykora rudolf.syk...@gmail.com wrote:
Hello everyone!
To get some useful information from a file I write:
; for (i in *_r) @{cd $i; echo -n $i^' '; grep total otdit | grep -v na}
to get lines from the 'otdit' files in *_r subdirectories with the
word
2009/5/5 Anthony Sorace ano...@gmail.com:
// ];/home/sykora/CALC/doing/tests/10_r/-xeon4 10_r ...
i think these are escape sequences generated by a defined 'cd'
function containing awd. do fn cd before you run this to undefine
the function and this should go away.
true.
thanks
ruda
You've got the cd implementation from label(1) loaded.
In interactive mode, it echos escape codes that are
supposed to update the label in your terminal window.
Instead it wrote them to the redirected file.
I changed label to write to /dev/tty explicitly, which should
avoid this problem.
I changed label to write to /dev/tty explicitly, which should
avoid this problem.
Russ
So if I understand right, this is/was a plan9port related feature, right?
it's a unix-related problem. the feature of setting window labels
is shared between plan 9 and p9p, but the plan 9 version
in that case, surely it'd be trivial to make a root-suid
executable that allows namespace manipulation in
a non-sensitive area (e.g. /mnt)? maybe it could
be distributed as part of p9p meaning hacks like
$NAMESPACE could go away under linux.
maybe it already has been, and i'm as ignorant as usual.
