RE: Fat Americans, Redux
I think Paul Fussel at the Univ of Pennsylvania had the firmest grip on this. Essentially he said it was a social phenomena, where lower socio economic groups saw fat as a sign that they could afford to eat out. In my trips to the states I never cease to be shocked by the size of the portions in restaurants, great value for money, but other consequences are also obvious. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Anton Sherwood Sent: 11 February 2002 06:40 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Fat Americans, Redux Dan Lewis wrote: According to this nutritionist, low-fat diets will work for a while, but after a while, they'll snap, leading to weight gain. . . . An acquaintance of mine (http://holdthetoast.com/) wrote How I gave up my low-fat diet and lost forty pounds!. Her gospel is low-carbo. -- Anton Sherwood, http://www.ogre.nu/blog/blog.htm If nobody said anything unless he knew what he was talking about, a ghastly hush would descend upon the earth. ---Sir Alan Herbert
Re: mathematical assumptions
I can give you a completely opposite reference :-) Philip Mirowski, in the Cambridge Journal of Economics, nr. 8, 1984, pp. 361-379 has an article Physics and the marginalist revolution, where he argues that the similarities between the physics of the 1800s and the economics of the 20th century results from economists taking the mathematical models then in vogue and reinterpreting them in economic terms. Neoclassical economics is bowdlerised nineteenth century physics. The second part of his argument is that this is not reasonable. The article was fun, whatever one may think of the conclusions. Apparently, this is a major theme of Mirowski. I gather that he's written on this subject elsewhere too. And been strongly criticised by others, of course. Ole At 09:25 11.02.2002 -0800, you wrote: Dear all, I once heard about a paper by a physcist who juxtaposed the mathematical assumptions in economics with the mathematical assumptions in physics. Evidently the author found the assumptions in economics to be quite reasonable. I've never been able to locate it. Is anybody familiar with such a work, or anything similar? Curiously, jsh __ Do You Yahoo!? Send FREE Valentine eCards with Yahoo! Greetings! http://greetings.yahoo.com
Re: Decision Markets
Dr. Alexander Tabarrok wrote: Another armchair economist made the news! Robin (Hanson) was mentioned in yesterday's (Sunday Feb. 10, 2002) New York Times in an interesting article about using experimental markets to generate marketing information. ... http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/10/business/yourmoney/10TRAD.html Creating markets in order to generate public policy information is the subject of Robin's contribution to Entrepreneurial Economics: Bright Ideas from the Dismal Science ... www.EntrepreneurialEconomics.org It's nice to get press, but always disturbing to see how wrong reporters can get things. I'm introduced as giving the name decision markets to the Iowa Electronic Markets and to the marketing markets described. But I introduced the term to be specific to markets that estimate the consequences of decisions, rather than just markets that might somehow be informative for decisions. Anyone want to give odds that I'll be able to keep the term meaning what I want it to mean? :-) Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030- 703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
Re: Decision Markets
be informative for decisions. Anyone want to give odds that I'll be able to keep the term meaning what I want it to mean? :-) According to Stigler (the statistician, not the economist) almost every named scientific term is in error. So I'd say the odds are huge that your name will be incorrectly attached to something, and somebody else will get the credit for what you invented. Fabio
Re: Enron- a case for less gov't?
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Corporations could gain a comparative advantage by being very transparent with their financials, where now, the only room for a comparative advantage (with regard to honesty and gaining investment) is through being extra sly in their dealings. All well and good for a company whose records make clear their inherent soundness. But if your financials are in disarray, would there not still exist the same comparative advantage to APPEAR open and honest while surreptitiously cooking the books? __ Do You Yahoo!? Send FREE Valentine eCards with Yahoo! Greetings! http://greetings.yahoo.com
RE: Enron- a case for less gov't?
My response is that without some oversight it is EASIER to cheat... That is not to say that the energy marketplace needs more government, but that government rules on corporate transparency are not bad. So, we need LESS regulation of energy, or cars, or the (insert favourite market place here) market, but not necessarily less scrutiny of corporations. It is not obvious that in a less regulated environment that corporations have an incentive to be more transparent... -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2002 1:14 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Enron- a case for less gov't? Most media sources, and NPR in particular, are quick to blame the Enron problems on too free a market. The thought is the capitalism produces only greed and dishonesty. But, is this the case? I have reason to think that this scandal is a result of the gov't doing too much, and the market not being free enough. The gov't requires publically traded firms to be honest and upfront with their financial situation. This gives firms more of an incentive to cheat (if everyone is honest, the benefits of not being honest increase- this, I guess, is similar to the incentive to sell drugs brought upon by the prohibition of drugs) and consumers(investors) less of a reason to distrust firms (if the law says they must be honest, they must be). If corporations did not have to be open, there would be a market incentive for them to do so (why give your money to someone if you don't know if they can repay) and accounting firms would have even more of an incentive to be very honest and objective in their work. Corporations could gain a comparative advantage by being very transparent with their financials, where now, the only room for a comparative advantage (with regard to honesty and gaining investment) is through being extra sly in their dealings. Similar arguments could be used against other paternalist laws and gov't branches such as the FDA and OSHA. Thoughts? Jason
Re: Enron- a case for less gov't?
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: All well and good for a company whose records make clear their inherent soundness. But if your financials are in disarray, would there not still exist the same comparative advantage to APPEAR open and honest while surreptitiously cooking the books? True, but the cost of appearing honest is much lower when you ARE honest, then when you're not. Fewer stories to keep straight, fewer heads to turn the other way, etc. So companies whose books are in chaos lose on both ends - mismanagement and the cost of masking, if you will. -JP __ Do You Yahoo!? Send FREE Valentine eCards with Yahoo! Greetings! http://greetings.yahoo.com _ MSN Photos is the easiest way to share and print your photos: http://photos.msn.com/support/worldwide.aspx
RE: Enron- a case for less gov't?
All well and good for a company whose records make clear their inherent soundness. But if your financials are in disarray, would there not still exist the same comparative advantage to APPEAR open and honest while surreptitiously cooking the books? Sure. But don't laws requiring openess make the market for honesty less necessary- people already want security in their investments and laws requiring honesty take this quality out of the market. And might faking honest records be more costly than just showing the records you have- finacial documents must be altered, secrets must be kept, perhaps insiders paid off, you still have to pay for some kind of fascade to look like an actual business, etc? And the business is gone once the scam is found out- it is very risky and probably won't last long. So there can be a considerable advantage to being honest in the first place- even if you only appear as honest as the dishonest.(--Just saw that JP said this too.) Also, I am trying to say that with a law saying they have to be honest people may take this for granted and not really know when a company is or isn't being honest. Without the law requiring honesty, people may have more incentive to want to make sure the company is honest- not just pretending. If everyone were honest, you would invest little time in checking their books. If only a minority of firms were honest, you would invest a good deal of time in checking their books. What is the reason to say that without laws requiring it, cheating would be easier? People would no doubt cheat more if they wouldn't get caught, but if honesty, like an automobile, is what consumers (or in this case investors) value, then why won't the market provide it? I think that it will- hence such things as Consumer Reports and auditors. Why is honesty or information different then any other product or quality of a product? Where is the market failure? Are investors who would rather take the gamble on a company with no financial records being hurt? Jason
