Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law
jsamples wrote: Bryan, Why probably? No disparagement of Cato intended, but policy analyses are not generally on the same level as academic articles. Especially for complex questions like the effect of voter initiatives, where economic theory provides little guidance. -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] Who are they? Why are they running? Could they be coming to me? Really coming to me? And why? To kill me? *Me* whom everyone loves? Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*
Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law
Bryan Caplan wrote: Yes, I think: people are basically afraid of someone taking their kids, and people are not in fact very comfortable with trans-racial adoption. But when people hear about kids being sent back to abusive natural parents, do they really say/think It's unfortunate, but on average it's better? I doubt many people have that reaction. As for trans-racial adoption, many people wouldn't want to do it themselves, but how many actually want to prevent other people from doing it? Yes, I'd say most people think protecting natural parents is better on average, and that many people want to prevent trans-racial adoption. Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030- 703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law
Fred Foldvary wrote: --- Bryan Caplan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I'm highly dissatisfied with interest group explanations. Simple reason: Most of the policies traditionally blamed on interest groups are in fact *popular*. Adoption laws seem like a case where existing policies are not popular, though perhaps I'm wrong on that count. Cato's Policy Analysis 420 (Dec 12, 2001) studied voter initiatives and found that tax-and-expediture limitations passed by voters are more restrictive than such legislation by representatives, and they cause per-capita state spending to decrease. At least in this respect, the interests of the voters do not seem to coincide with the legislation by the reps. There is a huge and probably higher quality academic literature on this point. John Matsusaka for example finds that the effect of initiatives is pro-government before 1950 and anti-government after, or something to that effect. Also, it does not seem to me that if they knew about it, most voters would approve of agriculture subsidies and price supports. Why would the median voter want a higher price for sugar and subsidies for the owners of sugar beet farms? When I was a kid I remember my mom explaining why farm programs were a good idea while she was buying produce. I haven't seen polls on this exact point, but I strongly suspect a majority wants what we have. Why? They're interventionists across the board, why would they be any different here? -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] He was thinking that Prince Andrei was in error and did not see the true light, and that he, Pierre, ought to come to his aid, to enlighten and uplift him. But no sooner had he thought out what he should say and how to say it than he foresaw that Prince Andrei, with one word, a single argument, would discredit all his teachings, and he was afraid to begin, afraid to expose to possible ridicule what he cherished and held sacred. Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*
Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law
You are misinterpreting the function of these little issues. Little issues don't build up. Little issues tend to be signals to certain constituencies. For example, nobody has ever lost the vote due to rap music, but Clinton in 1992 signalled to many in the democratic party that he wouldn't be held hostage by the Civil Rights wing of the party by bashing rap star Queen Latifah. It's a low cost signal. Nobody will really care if you bash a rap musician. Same for the community investment act (I forget what this even is). I'd guess that few people are explicitely against it, and it's a cheap way to signal to political moderates that urban issues won't be forgotten by either Gore or Bush. Consider a similar move for adaoption law. Unlike rap, adoption workers are considered experts in their field. They could bash you on the talk shows. A politician who goes for adoption law as an issue might get smeared as someone breaking up black families. How do you counter that? Well, you could argue that having any parents is better than no parents, but then you'd get into an emotional, difficult argument with people who think that children get unintentially hurt by different ethnicity parents, and that adoptions are moves by wealthy whites to steal kids from blacks in financial straits. Basically, like most family issues, it's messy and emotional issue that probably wouldn't yeild easy points for a politician. Fabio But politicians spend a lot of energy working on issues that no one has ever lost an election on. To take one tiny example, both Bush and Gore made a loud point about their support for the Community Reinvestment Act. Who votes on that? The logic, I presume, is that positions on a lot of little issues add up. And it isn't the absolute size of the issue, but the size relative to the effort that counts. Prof. Bryan Caplan
Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law
I suspect interracial adoption may have an asymmetry in the intensity of public opinion. Those of us who feel that interracial adoption is no big deal are probably less passionate than those who are troubled by it. James
RE: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law
Bryan, Why probably? John Samples Cato Institute -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Bryan Caplan Sent: Tuesday, January 08, 2002 11:44 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law Fred Foldvary wrote: --- Bryan Caplan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I'm highly dissatisfied with interest group explanations. Simple reason: Most of the policies traditionally blamed on interest groups are in fact *popular*. Adoption laws seem like a case where existing policies are not popular, though perhaps I'm wrong on that count. Cato's Policy Analysis 420 (Dec 12, 2001) studied voter initiatives and found that tax-and-expediture limitations passed by voters are more restrictive than such legislation by representatives, and they cause per-capita state spending to decrease. At least in this respect, the interests of the voters do not seem to coincide with the legislation by the reps. There is a huge and probably higher quality academic literature on this point. John Matsusaka for example finds that the effect of initiatives is pro-government before 1950 and anti-government after, or something to that effect. Also, it does not seem to me that if they knew about it, most voters would approve of agriculture subsidies and price supports. Why would the median voter want a higher price for sugar and subsidies for the owners of sugar beet farms? When I was a kid I remember my mom explaining why farm programs were a good idea while she was buying produce. I haven't seen polls on this exact point, but I strongly suspect a majority wants what we have. Why? They're interventionists across the board, why would they be any different here? -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] He was thinking that Prince Andrei was in error and did not see the true light, and that he, Pierre, ought to come to his aid, to enlighten and uplift him. But no sooner had he thought out what he should say and how to say it than he foresaw that Prince Andrei, with one word, a single argument, would discredit all his teachings, and he was afraid to begin, afraid to expose to possible ridicule what he cherished and held sacred. Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*
Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law
Build-up has two meanings in this context. 1)Politicians could send a series of signals to win small groups of voters. 2) Politicians could send a series of signals to large group of voters who need repeated re-assurances that the politician really means what he says. Ie, build up of votes vs. build up of perception. My claim is that the adoption of campaign issues a) does not build up the # of votes because the class of people for whom this is the most pressing issue is small and b) if you try to build up perception on the adoption issue, there is a very good chance you will get whacked because adoption workers can easily mobilize to change public opinion, since they are recognized experts on adoption. And the point of sending that low cost signal is to ... get more votes! And if you send a lot of them, that adds up. care if you bash a rap musician. Same for the community investment act (I forget what this even is). I'd guess that few people are explicitely against it, and it's a cheap way to signal to political moderates that urban issues won't be forgotten by either Gore or Bush. So do the political moderates care or not?! A little. You claim Gore/Bush made a big deal over the Community act, although I see very little compared to other issues. I think they could care less. Translation: Pre-public debate, the median voter wants a different policy; post-public debate, the median voter will want the status quo? That's an interesting story, but it's different from your earlier ones. Prof. Bryan Caplan Incorrect interpretation of what I said. My claim was that adoption workers are well established authorities over adoption, thus it requires effort to combat them. I also claimed that because they are well established experts, they can smear politicians, imposing high costs over them. They change the terms of the debate from does the child have a home? to are we breaking up black families and damaging the child's identity? This is NOT a claim about changing preferences, it's a claim that adoption workers are quite able to change the terms of the debate. I know economists are genetically incapable of understanding the role that rhetoric plays in politics, but adoption is a great example. If you ask a voter if a black orphans should have white parents when there aren't enough black parenets, they'd say yes. If you ask a voter whether black orphan's personality be messed up because his white parents can't relate to him, then many will say no. A lot of politics is jockeying for the median voter, but remember that the median voter is defined by preferences defined over a set of issues. But of course, you can always try to argue with what the choices are, and that's what I'm talking about. Fabio
Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law
I think the median voter has the following preferences concerning adoption: same race parents parents different race no adoption. Bryan's point is that adoption workers seem to prefer: same race parents no adoption parents different race. The MVT would predict otherwise. I claim that capture of the adoption business prevents the MVT result. Is there survey evidence that the median voter and adoptions workers have the same preferences? Fabio In this case I don't think the adoption workers preferences are very far from the median voter's preferences regarding general adoption policies. Yes, I think: people are basically afraid of someone taking their kids, and people are not in fact very comfortable with trans-racial adoption. Fabio wrote: A more probably chain of causation is: adoption workers get legislation passed giving them jurisdiction over adoptions (called usurptation in some academic circles), then set up self-perpetuating mechanisms that enforce unpopular policies. Since little is to be gained from combatting these policies, few people bother to fight it.
Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law
Fred Foldvary wrote: The median voter theroem is not supposed to explain all legislation, since public choice theory also states that there will be rent seeking and privelege seeking by concentrated interests at the expense of the general public. I'm highly dissatisfied with interest group explanations. Simple reason: Most of the policies traditionally blamed on interest groups are in fact *popular*. Adoption laws seem like a case where existing policies are not popular, though perhaps I'm wrong on that count. -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] He was thinking that Prince Andrei was in error and did not see the true light, and that he, Pierre, ought to come to his aid, to enlighten and uplift him. But no sooner had he thought out what he should say and how to say it than he foresaw that Prince Andrei, with one word, a single argument, would discredit all his teachings, and he was afraid to begin, afraid to expose to possible ridicule what he cherished and held sacred. Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*
Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law
Robin Hanson wrote: Yes, I think: people are basically afraid of someone taking their kids, and people are not in fact very comfortable with trans-racial adoption. But when people hear about kids being sent back to abusive natural parents, do they really say/think It's unfortunate, but on average it's better? I doubt many people have that reaction. As for trans-racial adoption, many people wouldn't want to do it themselves, but how many actually want to prevent other people from doing it? -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] He was thinking that Prince Andrei was in error and did not see the true light, and that he, Pierre, ought to come to his aid, to enlighten and uplift him. But no sooner had he thought out what he should say and how to say it than he foresaw that Prince Andrei, with one word, a single argument, would discredit all his teachings, and he was afraid to begin, afraid to expose to possible ridicule what he cherished and held sacred. Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*
Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law
--- Bryan Caplan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I'm highly dissatisfied with interest group explanations. Simple reason: Most of the policies traditionally blamed on interest groups are in fact *popular*. Adoption laws seem like a case where existing policies are not popular, though perhaps I'm wrong on that count. Cato's Policy Analysis 420 (Dec 12, 2001) studied voter initiatives and found that tax-and-expediture limitations passed by voters are more restrictive than such legislation by representatives, and they cause per-capita state spending to decrease. At least in this respect, the interests of the voters do not seem to coincide with the legislation by the reps. Also, it does not seem to me that if they knew about it, most voters would approve of agriculture subsidies and price supports. Why would the median voter want a higher price for sugar and subsidies for the owners of sugar beet farms? Fred Foldvary = [EMAIL PROTECTED] __ Do You Yahoo!? Send FREE video emails in Yahoo! Mail! http://promo.yahoo.com/videomail/
Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law
fabio guillermo rojas wrote: I don't think you should focus so much on the median voter theorem. The logic of median voter theorems is that politicians offer policies that closely resemble the median voter's desires. This assumes that politicians have direct influence over the policy in question. They could have a direct influence if they wanted to. Neglecting a situation you could affect is just as easy for voters to punish as anything else. Prof. Bryan Caplan I still think you are missing the point. By itself, politicians could influence adoption laws and practices. But there are costs imposed by many things: the ability of adoption workers to wage a political campaign for the status quo, the mobilization of allies, the opportunities lost while fighting adoption laws and the fact that not a single major electoral victory as ever been won over adoption law. It's as simple as this: people don't vote over adoption law. If someone tried to campaign on it, I bet they'd get trumped by somebody campaiging over issues that are proven vote getters. Fabio
The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law
Two weeks ago there was a John Stossel special on adoption. Does the median voter really want the system we have, where basketcase biological parents can take their crying offspring away from impeccable adoptive parents? How about the de facto efforts to avoid trans-racial adoption? Etc.? I rarely expect the median voter to agree with me, but this seems like a case where a comfortable majority of normal Americans dislike the existing rules. You might say that people are a lot more worried about losing their own biological kids than they are about other people's adoptive kids being taken away. But I doubt that explanation is right. -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] Who are they? Why are they running? Could they be coming to me? Really coming to me? And why? To kill me? *Me* whom everyone loves? Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*
