Re: limited liability

2002-12-18 Thread Fred Foldvary
 In practice, small corporations usually cannot get loans without the
 major stockholder personally guaranteeing the loans, so in those cases
limited liability serves mostly to protect the owner(s) from liability
to tort victims.  Why that should be so I'm not sure.
 David

A lender is also protected from tort damages, and should be, because he is
not in charge of the business but only lending funds.

If one agrees that lenders should not be liable to tort claims, then it
follows that stockholders may also be free of liability, since they can be
considered legally as lenders who get a return from a share of profits.

The benefit is that the corporation is able to assemble a greater amount of
lender-investors.

Fred Foldvary

 


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Re: limited liability

2002-12-18 Thread AdmrlLocke

In a message dated 12/18/02 9:19:28 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

  In practice, small corporations usually cannot get loans without the
 major stockholder personally guaranteeing the loans, so in those cases
limited liability serves mostly to protect the owner(s) from liability
to tort victims.  Why that should be so I'm not sure.
 David

A lender is also protected from tort damages, and should be, because he is
not in charge of the business but only lending funds.

If one agrees that lenders should not be liable to tort claims, then it
follows that stockholders may also be free of liability, since they can be
considered legally as lenders who get a return from a share of profits.

The benefit is that the corporation is able to assemble a greater amount of
lender-investors.

Fred Foldvary 

If people want to be lenders they make loans.  A sharehold buys and owns.  
Owners shouldn't be allowed to unilaterally abrogate the tort rights of 
everyone else.

David




Re: limited liability

2002-12-18 Thread Fred Foldvary
 If one agrees that lenders should not be liable to tort claims, then it
 follows that stockholders may also be free of liability, since they can
 be
 considered legally as lenders who get a return from a share of profits.
 Fred Foldvary 
 
 If people want to be lenders they make loans.  A sharehold buys and owns.
 Owners shouldn't be allowed to unilaterally abrogate the tort rights of 
 everyone else.
 David

Perhaps the ideal structure would be two classes of investors:
1) limited-liability bondholders, with dividends per bond equal to that of
owners of common shares, and no voting rights.
2) unlimited liability shareholders, with voting rights.

Which do you think would have a higher market value?

Fred Foldvary

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[EMAIL PROTECTED]




Re: limited liability

2002-12-18 Thread AdmrlLocke

In a message dated 12/18/02 1:09:04 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 Perhaps the ideal structure would be two classes of investors:
1) limited-liability bondholders, with dividends per bond equal to that of
owners of common shares, and no voting rights.
2) unlimited liability shareholders, with voting rights.

Which do you think would have a higher market value?

Fred Foldvary 

In practice larger corporations offer a wide variety of intermediate 
investment options.  In particular some offer shares of preferred stock.  
Generally speaking preferred stock offers a guaranteed dividend, calculated 
as a percentage of face like a bond, but oftentimes payable only out of net 
income yet ahead of common stock.  Thus the preferred element refers to 
getting paid in preference to common stock.  Sometimes preferred stock votes, 
although not always equally with common stock, and preferred stock typically 
has no claim to residual income.  The preferred stockholder's liability is 
limited to the face value of the preferred stock.

I'm not sure that'd I'd offer an opinion as to what structure might be ideal. 
 In the first place, I'm not in concept sold on the idea of a corporation.  
An artificial entity that lives indefinitely, has property rights like a 
person and unilaterally abrogates the rights of contingent creditors?And 
even if someone could persuade me that there's something natural about such a 
creation, I'd be reluctant to offer an opinion on the ideal structure of 
ownership for such an entitty because millions of people pursuing their own 
interests in free markets (would that we had some) would surely work out 
multiple better solutions than anything I'd come up with, not possessing 
their unique knowledge of time, place and preference.

David Levenstam




Re: limited liability

2002-12-17 Thread AdmrlLocke

In a message dated 12/17/02 2:30:29 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
writes:

 Fred Foldvary wrote:


 U.S. and State laws limit this liability, but in a pure market, the

 directors should be personally and fully liable for a 

 corporation's debts,

 as would be the general partners of a partnership.


In a pure market, shouldn't the directors be personally liable, or not, for a 
corporations debts, based on whatever terms they reach with the lenders 
involved? The directors of *small* corporations certainly find themselves in 
that position today. Without a personal guarrantee, from a primary 
stakeholder, that serves to turn a limited liability into a full liability, 
lenders are not very willing to make loans.


Cheers,

Michael Giesbrecht

Internet Engineering

Lucasfilm Ltd. 

But what about contingent creditors of the corporation--that is, what about 
potential future tort victims?  How liability to them be negotiated in 
advance?

David
P.S.  Any news on when Star Wars Episode III will release?  :)




RE: limited liability

2002-12-17 Thread Fred Foldvary
--- Michael Giesbrecht [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 In a pure market, shouldn't the directors be personally liable, or not,
 for a corporations debts, based on whatever terms they reach with the
 lenders involved?

Yes, but there are also liabilities that can be incurred without contracts,
such as if the corporation is sued for damages.

 Without a personal guarrantee, from a primary
 stakeholder, that serves to turn a limited liability into a full
 liability, lenders are not very willing to make loans.

True, especially if there is not adequate collateral, implying that
expected future earnings are not sufficient additional collateral.

Fred Foldvary

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[EMAIL PROTECTED]




Re: limited liability

2002-12-16 Thread Anton Sherwood
Fred Foldvary wrote:
 The argument for [limited liability] is that investors are more
 willing to put up funds if they will not be personally liable.
 
 Nor should they be liable, since lenders are also not, and one could
 map limited partners into lenders who get a return based on profit.

But the borrower would still be personally liable.

-- 
Anton Sherwood, http://www.ogre.nu/





Re: limited liability

2002-12-16 Thread AdmrlLocke

In a message dated 12/17/02 12:21:42 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 Fred Foldvary wrote:
 The argument for [limited liability] is that investors are more
 willing to put up funds if they will not be personally liable.
 
 Nor should they be liable, since lenders are also not, and one could
 map limited partners into lenders who get a return based on profit.

But the borrower would still be personally liable. 

But if the borrow is a corporation then there's nobody with personal 
liability.




Re: Limited Liability for Vaccine Makers

2002-11-22 Thread William Dickens
Can your friend explain why vaccines are different from other drugs?
Everything has side effects. Precisely because the Democrats have such a
stake in pushing the interests of trial lawyers the Republicans have the
opposite incentive making just about any pronouncements on this topic
highly suspect - - particularly when they include one-sided political
flames. 
- - Bill Dickens (DC)

William T. Dickens
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (202) 797-6113
FAX: (202) 797-6181
E-MAIL: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
AOL IM: wtdickens

 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 11/22/02 07:27AM 
David:

As you seem interested in this issue, here's a reply I got to
my
vaccine question from my knowledgeable friend, Ron, who is not on this
network.

Your,
Asa



The proposal, as I understand it, is not to cap liability for
actual
damages, that is medical bills, lost future earning cased by death of
a
working person, burial costs, child care and similar real damages. 
Real
damages are affordable and can be insured against.  Rather, the
proposal
would protect drug companies from punitive damages, which make up most
of the awards in 
recent absurd tort cases and settlements to avert punitive damages,
and
vicarious liability, the convoluted search for deep pockets seen in
many
of these abusive tort awards.  Vicarious liability generally involves
some obscure claim for agency of the party with deep pockets.  Since
in
the case of vaccines, the only deep pocket would be the drug company
producing them, no reasonable Board of Directors would allow a major
drug company to produce the vaccines without tort protection.  There
have been several occasions recently when vaccines were needed by the
Armed Forces and the natural producers not being able to obtain tort
relief by statute and not 
being able to insure the risk, essentially put the product in the
public
domain and the DOD funded a no pocket production corporation to make
it.  The tort situation for corporations is so bad that most Boards
would not do this again because of the potential for vicarious
liability
for the intellectual property or the bugs or the proto-vaccine.

The enormous contributions of the Plaintiffs lawyers to the
Democratic
Party and to four of five key Republican Senators, McCain and
Jeffords,
before he switched parties, particularly, are intended to prevent tort
limits, like those proposed for vaccines.  Absent a ban on punitive
damages and vicarious liability, big tort awards are a sure thing with
any vaccine.  And not just from the actual medical problems that are
sure to arise.  Count on a vaccine syndrome and a jury somewhere in
the
Mississippi Delta -- LA, MISS or ARK.
**


-- 
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class   

struggles. 

-- Karl Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party





Re: Limited Liability for Vaccine Makers

2002-11-22 Thread john hull
William Dickens [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Can your friend explain why vaccines are different
from other drugs?

While I'm certainly not qualified to negotiate that
legal minefield, may I guess?  I'd say that a drug is
intended to fix an existing problem, whereas a vaccine
applies a dangerous element to prevent possible
future risk.  Thus one who gets sick from a vaccine*
can claim that absent the vaccine, the illness would
not have occured; however, with other drugs the person
was already sick and something had to be done.

It sounds like a stretch, to be sure, but then the
claim that putting a car in drive and pushing the
accelerator literally through the floor board is
consistent with an automatically accelerating car is a
bit of a stretch as well.  Yet Audi lost to such a
claim.

-jsh

*Here's an unsettling tidbit:
But there would be panic [from smallpox terror
scares]. Mass vaccination would be demanded, and
politicians would find such calls very difficult to
resist. They should remember, however, that when
millions of people were vaccinated in response to the
outbreak in Britain in 1962, nearly as many died from
its complications as from smallpox itself.
www.lrb.co.uk/v24/n17/penn01_.html

__
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Re: Limited Liability for Vaccine Makers

2002-11-20 Thread AdmrlLocke

In a message dated 11/20/02 11:50:17 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 Armchairs:

What are the pros and cons of limiting liability for the maker of a new
vaccine?  It seems to me that a disadvantage of limited liability is the
moral hazard that the maker will do a less responsible job of trying to
prevent bad side effects.  One advantage that has been put forth is that
limiting liability gets us a vaccine sooner as firms are reluctant to
make a new drug in the face of possible law suits for bad side effects.

Is there alternate set of rules not involving limited liability that
could be adopted to obtain a safe drug in a timely fashion?

All the best,
Asa Janney 

For some time now I've wondered about limited liability.  A buddy of mine did 
his dissertation on limited liability in the British context, and as I recall 
(at least tentatively) concluded that the reduction in investment from having 
no limited liability would have been small, and that Parliament granted it in 
its general form for another or other reasons.  (I just wrote to him to see 
what he ended up concluding in the final draft).  Limited liability has long 
struck me as something rather odd, as it unilaterally abrogates the rights of 
all contingent creditors of the enterprise (potential tort victims).  I'm 
quite interested to hear how people on the list view this phenomenon.

David Levenstam




Re: limited liability

2002-07-18 Thread LFC.NET Registrar

A) To accept passive investments

Would you purchase stock in WorldCom if you'd be liable for their debts?

B) To allow for high risk ventures

Would you start a satellite communications company or biotech research firm
knowing if it failed you'd be liable for billions of dollars in debt?

There are many other reasons, but these two are the must crucial.

Also, two misconceptions:

A) That limited liability shields liability from consequence of actions.

No, officers are liable of any criminal actions (fraud, etc) of a company,
and any employee (owner or not is irrelevant) may be sued directly for
liabilities their actions caused due to negligence.

B) That the State creates limited liability.

Limited liability entities existed prior any state sanction, let alone state
enforced monopoly over them.

Adam


- Original Message -
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, July 18, 2002 7:40 AM
Subject: limited liability[via LSMTP - see www.lsoft.com]


What is the economic argument for limited liability of corporations?
Can anyone suggest some readings on this?

Jason DeBacker








RE: limited liability

2002-07-18 Thread Alex Robson

Jason DeBacker wrote:

What is the economic argument for limited liability of corporations?
Can anyone suggest some readings on this?

For starters, I would recommend:

Easterbrook, Frank and Fischel, Daniel (1991) The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law, Harvard University Press.

After that, you could read the papers referred to in this book.

Alex


Dr Alex Robson
School of Economics
Faculty of Economics and Commerce
Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200.
AUSTRALIA
Ph +61-2-6125-4909

 -Original Message-
From:   [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]  On Behalf Of
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent:   Thursday, 18 July 2002 11:40 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject:limited liability

What is the economic argument for limited liability of corporations?
Can anyone suggest some readings on this?