On Tue, Nov 1, 2016, at 07:45, Ben Croswell wrote:
> The other option being having a master owned by your company and then
> setting both external providers to secondary from your master. You to
> maintain control over data and hqve diversity.
I use this approach here, it's proven to be very
Folks,
Saw something in a previous posting that should be corrected:
> The sticking point seems to be that most DNS providers don't allow zone
> transfers from
> their servers The customers of Dyn are in the same situation.
Actually from personal experience just a few
On 2016/11/01 14:45, Ben Croswell wrote:
> The other option being having a master owned by your company and then
> setting both external providers to secondary from your master. You to
> maintain control over data and hqve diversity.
Agreed. This works well -- it's what we do.
Cheers,
In article ,
Ben Croswell wrote:
> The other option being having a master owned by your company and then
> setting both external providers to secondary from your master. You to
> maintain control over data and hqve
The other option being having a master owned by your company and then
setting both external providers to secondary from your master. You to
maintain control over data and hqve diversity.
On Nov 1, 2016 10:42 AM, "Barry Margolin" wrote:
> In article
In article ,
Ben Croswell wrote:
> I think what we see as a result of this attack is DNS provider diversity
> being the new buzz phrase. The same as not relying on a single ISP link i
> see more people using multiple
My co-authors and I wrote a paper about the events at the DNS root servers on
2015-11-30.
On this date, the root servers received a high number of queries (but by far
not as many as Dyn) and since most of the Root letters were using anycast, we
were able to observe how this had an impact on
I think what we see as a result of this attack is DNS provider diversity
being the new buzz phrase. The same as not relying on a single ISP link i
see more people using multiple DNS providers.
The size of these attacks will grow as IoT continues to grow. It makes
sense to have diverse providers to
On 2016/10/31 16:09, Barry Margolin wrote:
> I heard that the impact of the attack was even narrower than just the
> US, it was mostly eastern US. That suggests some things about the
> granularity of Dyn's anycast network and the distribution of the Mirai
> botnet.
There were actually three
In article ,
Jim Popovitch wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 11:27 AM, Matthew Seaman
> wrote:
> > On 2016/10/31 14:53, Jim Popovitch wrote:
> >> On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Matthew
On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 11:27 AM, Matthew Seaman
wrote:
> On 2016/10/31 14:53, Jim Popovitch wrote:
>> On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Matthew Seaman
>> wrote:
>>> This despite the fact that Dyn has a global anycast network with
On 2016/10/31 14:53, Jim Popovitch wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Matthew Seaman
> wrote:
>> This despite the fact that Dyn has a global anycast network with
>> plenty of bandwidth, points of presence all round the world and
>> each POP contains a
On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Matthew Seaman
wrote:
> This despite the fact that Dyn has a global anycast network with
> plenty of bandwidth, points of presence all round the world and
> each POP contains a bunch of top-of-the-line servers.
It seems to me
On 10/31/16 12:41, MURTARI, JOHN wrote:
> God only knows, the DDOS hackers are probably on this listbut I
> have to ask what protections DYN had in place before the attack
> occurred. RRL has been promoted as some protection against these
> types of attacks. If they had it in place, did it
Folks,
God only knows, the DDOS hackers are probably on this
listbut I have to ask what protections DYN had in place before the attack
occurred. RRL has been promoted as some protection against these types of
attacks. If they had it in place, did it help or was the pure
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